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 This dissertation is a condensed version of a road trip. It started earlier, 
much earlier, like any road trip: you envision the journey way before you set off 
on the road. Also, like all trips, many people, events, landscapes came and went. 
Some stayed. But this dissertation bears everyone’s traces, and I’m grateful to all 
of those who found the time to hear, feed, shelter, encourage, inspire or even just 
bear me along the way.  
 A significant share of this gratitude goes to my committee. I am thankful 
to Katherine Verdery, who sent me notes of encouragement while I was doing 
fieldwork, who pushed me to stop whining and get my work done, and who took 
time to read, edit, and comment on several drafts of this thesis. From Katherine, I 
learned that one should always aim high and never settle for less. Her outstanding 
scholarship is exemplary. Another part of my gratitude goes to Gillian Feeley-
Harnik, for inspiring me humanly and professionally, for showing me that the key 
to almost everything is first to wonder; and allowing me to enter the silent and 
safe green estate of her office during the last months of writing. Since my first 
semester in graduate school, Brian Porter has encouraged me by always finding 
time to read and comment on my work, and especially to write letters of 
recommendation within 24 hours’ notice. Fernando Coronil asked me, “why 
heritage?” making me pause and seek to understand what is my own “Romania,” 
and where it is placed in this dissertation. I thank him for his pivotal questions and 
insights, which helped me “see” core arguments of the thesis. Carmen Popescu 






on the Old Court and the politics of architecture in Romania of the 1950s-1960s. 
These questions, which I began tackling at the end of my fieldwork in Sibiu and 
Bonţida, ended up becoming central to my dissertation. Krisztina Fehérváry came 
late to my doctoral committee, but she gave me great advice always with a smile. 
I would also like to thank Stuart Kirsch and Alaina Lemon in Anthropology, and 
Kathleen Canning and David Cohen in History for the advice and encouragement 
they offered me at different stages of my graduate studies. 
Laurie Marx in Anthropology has been truly a wonderful friend, always 
findings solutions to the unsolvable, and offering words of wisdom and strategies 
of coping with graduate school ever since I set my foot in the door of the 
department. I am especially grateful to Darlene Ray-Johnson for her generous 
assistance in my last semester of graduate school. I also thank Diana Denney for 
helping me smooth out the bumpy roads of bureaucratic formalities.  
 Research for this dissertation was carried out with the generous support of 
the following institutions: International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) 
through a 2005-2006 IARO fellowship funded by the US Department of State’s 
Title VIII Program; Wenner-Gren Foundation through a 2006 Individual Doctoral 
Research Grant; and the Institute for Advanced Studies “New Europe College” 
(Bucharest, Romania) through a 2007-2008 “Europe” research fellowship funded 
by Volkswagen Foundation. I also received short-term research grants from Open 
Society Archives (Budapest, Hungary), as well as the Center for Russian and 
Eastern European Studies, Rackham Graduate School, Eisenberg Institute for 
Historical Studies, and the Doctoral Program in Anthropology and History, all at 
the University of Michigan. Most of this dissertation was written with the support 
of a 2008 Jean Monnet fellowship from the Center for European Studies-
European Union Center at the University of Michigan, and a 2008-2009 
Fellowship for East European Studies from the American Council of Learned 
Societies. The conclusions of this research are my own and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of any of these institutions. 
 In Ann Arbor, at different moments, I received kind words, advice, 






Halvorson, Henrike Floruschbosch, Bridget Guarasci, Laura Brown, Claire Insel, 
Maria Perez, Doug Rogers, Genese Sodikoff, Josh Reno, Laura Heinemann and 
Chris Weber, Sara and Josh First, Alice Weinreb, Susanne Unger, and Karen 
Herbert. I also thank Josh and Sara, Laura and Chris, Henrike and Arthur, 
Bhavani Rhaman, together with Frank Cody, Emil Kerenji, and Olivera Jokic, 
who each hosted me in Ann Arbor during my shorts visits from the “field.” 
 In Sibiu, from September 2005 until August 2006, Susanna Lulé, Stefanie 
Schrewe, Loredana Andrei, Andrada and Lacrima Schneider, Laura Balomiri and 
Cristi Gănescu, Ioana Deac, and especially Aurela Kenatso, offered me warmth, 
kindness, friendship, and a million kinds of help. Marilena and Dragoş Ionescu, 
together with their Natalis, shared with me not only their house, but also their 
friendship and humor, during my multiple stopovers in Bucharest. The Saxon 
ladies of the Frauenarbeit circle graciously allowed me to attempt to knit along 
with them, while letting me eavesdrop on the best gossip in town. I am grateful to 
the Saxon ladies whom I met at the “Carl Wolff” retirement home, for sharing 
their memories about Sibiu, Saxon villages in Transylvania, or the deportation to 
Siberia. I am especially grateful to the memory of Frau Anna Bruckner, who 
passed away in 2007. She was 92 when I met her in 2005, and a wonderful spirit. 
Her witty observations, intelligence, and courage of being herself (a mountain 
climber vegetarian and a travel addict) have been an inspiration to me ever since. 
The manager of the house, Ortrun Rhein, kindly agreed to allow me to spend a 
few months there helping around and talking to the residents. Hannelore Baier, 
Vasile Ciobanu, Annemarie and Horst Weber, Paul Philippi, Gabi Mersch, 
Michael Engel, and Hanna Derer took time to talk to me at length and share their 
rich knowledge about Transylvania’s history, Sibiu, or architecture (or all three of 
them). In Budapest, the personable and professional archivists of Open Society 
Archives made my research time there easy and pleasant.  
In Bonțida, Ana Precup (tanti Ana) not only hosted me, but also let me 
enjoy her dry humor, showed me how to cook káposztaleves, and then, when I 
could no longer stay at her place, ingeniously taught me how to fill coke plastic 






thank David Baxter and Csilla Hegedüs for their help and generosity, even though 
our opinions differ. Architect Dávid Gyula generously provided me with copies of 
archival documents on the attempts to renovate the Bánffy castle during 1969-
1970. József Bálint, the reformed pastor in Bonțida between late 1940s and early 
1990s, talked to me at length about the village and its inhabitants. He also granted 
me the permission to use photographs of the Bánffy castle from his unique album, 
which was made by the specialists who supervised the castle’s partial restoration 
between 1968 and 1969.  
I also thank many other people I met in Sibiu, Bontida, Cluj, and 
Bucharest who helped me in various ways, by generously sharing with me time, 
insights, opinions, archival data, documents, or other resources related to my 
project. 
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Heritage Revival in Contemporary Romania 
 
As recently as 2000, Romania was regarded by western tourists as too dangerous 
a place to travel to; the situation has drastically changed since 2000. Both statistics and 
locals have noted a sharp increase in tourism, especially in Transylvania. Some of the 
travelers have been lured not only by tourism ads, but also by newspapers, travel 
magazines, pictures, and novels stirring up their imagination. In search for a pristine 
landscape, with rare flora, forgotten castles, fascinated by riding in carts with horses on 
rough village roads, those tourists, many of them wealthy middle-class individuals and 
adventurous backpackers, hope to find in Transylvania a now lost pre-industrial Europe. 
Travel guides and narratives advertise trips to Transylvania as journeys into the past. As 
recently as November 2005, a widely known UK daily opened the travel column with the 
lines: “ Out of the shadows ... rural Transylvania looks at times like 18th-century 
England.” Under an idyllic photograph, the author continued to describe Transylvania in 
somewhat nostalgic terms: 
It was a scene of almost unimaginable beauty, and one that also seemed curiously 
familiar; a landscape from the Grimm's fairy tales of one's childhood. "It is 
exactly what 18th-century England looked like before enclosure," said Ackroyd.1 
And this, most of all, is why you must go to Transylvania: to soothe your soul in 
vast tracts of idyllic pre-industrial landscape.2 
                                                        
1 Dr. John Ackroyd is a British botanist and a regular visitor to Transylvania. 






The promise of an encounter with pure nature, together with the simplicity of life in an 
undisturbed accord with the rhythm of seasons sounds, indeed, extremely enticing not 
only to foreign travelers, but also to international organizations. The latter not only wish 
to enjoy such an environment fully, but, more importantly, to preserve it. Such groups 
have often made their activist debut in an informal manner, i.e., as a group of 
acquaintances interested in pursuing conservation or restoration projects in less known or 
accessible areas.  
In the early 1990s, among the former socialist countries in the region, Romania 
was in a particularly disastrous situation. Ceauşescu-run policies of so-called 
“systematization” had aimed at a drastic spatial reconfiguration, which was to be 
accomplished through the demolition of many of the buildings evoking modes of being 
and living other than those prescribed by the Communist Party. Right after 1989, 
notwithstanding the genuine efforts of the few Romanian specialists in conservation left 
in the country, the heavily centralized political system, combined with the lack of specific 
legislation on conservation and protection of heritage, led to a further degradation of the 
sites already affected. Moreover, between 1990 and 1992, most of the Romanian 
Germans, who could not leave before 1989, emigrated to Germany, leaving behind entire 
villages, churches and other sites. In an attempt to record the German presence in 
Transylvania for future generations, the German state commissioned a comprehensive 
survey of all the former German settlements in Transylvania, done by Romanian 






However, due to the restrictive Romanian legislation at that time, many of the 
Saxon sites in Transylvania did not count as “heritage” (representing mainly vernacular 
heritage, which was not included then in the national list of official historical sites). As a 
consequence, those sites, not-yet a heritage from the perspective of the Romanian state 
and therefore with no government funding invested in their preservation, degraded even 
further. Meanwhile, private foundations and other bodies from abroad initiated projects 
of emergency conservation, by taking under their sponsorship some of these sites.  
 This triggered more international interest in the neglected “heritage” of 
Transylvania, heritage that was not recognized as such by the Romanian state, which was 
still the owner (given the blurry situation of property restitution in the postsocialist 
Romania in the 1990s). By the mid-1990s, organizations such as “Mihai Eminescu” 
Trust, sponsored by the Prince of Wales, and the German-government sponsored 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeiten [Society for Technical Cooperation], or 
GTZ, together with foundations from Germany and others established in Romania, 
started new projects of conservation of cultural heritage, now expanding from the 
preservation of the sites to re-launching traditional craft skills and rural tourism. Also, in 
1998, the Ministry of Culture obtained a 20-year grant from the World Bank co-financed 
by the World Monuments Fund for the preservation of several sites (including some of 
the Saxon villages). More importantly, the grant states that funding will be directed also 
to “help build public awareness to foster a stronger civic understanding of, and support 
for, cultural heritage and its important role in the nation's future development.”3 The 
                                                        
3 World Bank News Release number 99/2054/ECA. The document states: 
A US$5.0 million Learning and Innovation loan for Romania to help finance a Cultural Heritage 
Project was signed [on December 23, 1998] at the World Bank. […]The project will help Romania develop 






recent development of the Romanian legislation regarding the issue of cultural heritage 
could represent thus a combined effect of all these previous efforts on the part of 
numerous foundations, to which the 2004 elections and the EU-enlargement prospects 
only added impetus. For, even though the Law for the Protection of Historical 
Monuments was passed in 2001, only since 2004 has a more complex set of regulations 
grounded institutionally the Institute for the Protection of Historical Monuments, 
established in 2002 together with the National Commission for Historical Monuments. 
Also, a Presidential Commission for the protection of national heritage was established in 
April 2008. The main question is how these regulations affect the social map, what kind 
of new social and political relations they set onto the social space, and how they are 
employed politically by different actors. 
Among the more or less formally organized groups in the current heritage field in 
Romania we could distinguish four kinds of actors: 1) heirs of former owners, often 
aristocratic families who fled Romania during or immediately after the second World 
War, when communists forcefully and deceitfully took over state power; 2) local 
architects and experts in art history and building conservation, who have tried to distance 
themselves from centralized institutions of the post-socialist Romanian state, forming 
instead smaller, yet more flexible and independent, organizations; 3) the newly formed 
group of experts who became mediators between the still dysfunctional institutions of the 
Romanian state, EU bureaucracy, and the private international foundations that offered 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and assets. The project will test different approaches to partnerships (public-private; community based; 
national-international) with the goal of ensuring more sustainable, cost effective approaches to cultural 










substantial funding for the heritage sites threatened with destruction; and 4) international 
specialists in conservation and/or architecture, eager to restore the derelict architectural 
sites of Transylvania, as well as other foreigners, not necessarily specialists, who, by 
developing a special relationship to this region, wished to contribute their know-how and 
sponsorship.  
Of course, they have interacted with 5) the state, that is to say, the governmental 
bodies charged with the protection of the built heritage in Romania, more precisely, the 
National Institute for the Protection of Historical Monuments. This organization, working 
under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Culture, takes the final decisions on the 
architectural and patrimonial value of a specific site. While assisted by the regional 
offices, it also maps out the entire landscape of the built heritage sites of Romania by 
establishing a list of national monuments (of over 30,000 in number).4 However, this list 
is seriously questioned by other actors working in the non-governmental sector of the 
field. More specifically, they criticize the centralist and exclusivist methods of drafting 
the list (the specialists for the regional offices are nominated only by the Institute), as 
well as the arbitrariness of the selection criteria in deciding upon the quality of “national 
heritage” potential of a specific site.5  
Many actors described in the four categories outlined above have met and 
collaborated on different projects, thereby forming a network in which everyone knew 
everyone else, some of them even migrating from one organization to another.6 
Particularly, those specialists have continuously moved back and forth between 
                                                        
4 Presentation by the manager of INMI at the Workshop on Cultural Heritage, The French Institute, 
Bucharest, 5-6 November, 2007. 
5 For instance, there are voices pointing out the absence of ethnic Hungarian vernacular architecture.  






governmental institutions (such as the Romanian Ministry of Culture) and private 
foundations, depending on the shifting political hierarchies of post-1989 Romania. In the 
process, the domain of heritage conservation has been (re)constituted as a dynamic field 
which developed at a speedy pace, especially due to the significant number of foreign 
partners and their institutional expertise in project drafting and securing financial 
assistance. 
Besides, it appears that the developing rate has been too high. That is, the national 
list of historical monuments has been criticized by many for being far too long for all the 
included sites to be seriously taken into account by the governmental bodies. At the same 
time, there are the private organizations (foundations, charity funds, associations) that try 
to work through the web of governmental regulations in order to first prove that a site not 
figuring on the national monument list is worth being rehabilitated. Basically, they must 
persuade the government, and thereby the local authorities in charge (if it is not already 
private property), to acknowledge the heritage value of a novel site and approve the 
renovation project. It is only after this recognition is granted that the organization will be 
entitled to pursue external funding for the initiation of the project. In the meanwhile, the 
state reaps symbolically all the benefits of the renovation by making claims over the site 
without having invested anything in the project. However, if the site has become private 
property, then the organizations have two options: either to buy the property (if it is 
small) and then restore it in line with all conservation principles; or to engage in a 
campaign of persuading the owners to pursue a proper, albeit expensive, restoration, 





 As the specialists involved in these organizations put it, they often feel caught 
between the slow bureaucracy of a seemingly passive postsocialist state and the poverty 
(or even worse, the peculiar aesthetic preferences) of the site owners. They accuse both 
the state and the owners of indifference towards and even rejection of the past, 
paradoxically the country’s own past. These organizations are truly dedicated to the 
cause, many of them working with foreign specialists who put a lot of energy and passion 
into their projects. When asked by inquisitive journalists and anthropologists, these 
specialists admit they want to help Romanians recuperate their past, via historical 
building restoration and the revival of local traditions. They wish to function as mediators 
between these historical monuments and the people, that is, between a specific past 
inscribed in and represented by the buildings and the people presently living in their 
vicinity.  
However, by assuming that people of Romania should be helped to remember the 
past by learning traditional building skills and participating in projects of heritage 
rehabilitation, such external actors have fully ignored the complex strategies of “heritage 
(re)making” already initiated and refined by the socialist state. Drawing upon twenty-four 
months of archival and ethnographic research in three distinct regions of Romania, this 
dissertation explores how the socialist Romanian state created a regime of “heritage” to 
ground and endorse a seemingly future-oriented totalizing project of “building 
socialism.” I show how this multidimensional project of social(ist) homogenization was 
to be pursued not only discursively, but also via the production of a common spatialized 
knowledge, which entailed a radical reordering of place, built environment, cultural 






the earlier forms of assigning political and cultural meaning to things still inform the 
strategies of some ethnic groups in postsocialist Romania, who simultaneously pursue 
economic decentralization and a more coherent cultural identity. At a time when property 
restitution participates in a broader individualization of rights, projects of “heritage 
revival” capture new meanings and practices of “community” in a EU imagined as “unity 
in diversity.”  
One of the arguments set forth by this dissertation is that the socialist state 
employed architecture and archaeology as complementary scientific mechanisms that 
would invest different territories with a unitary political meaning. I suggest that the 
transformation of post-war fragmented landscapes into socialist modernist cities in the 
1950s entailed a reordering not only of urban spaces, but also of their history. The thesis 
argues that architects and politicians changed their visions of the socialist city according 
to ideological priorities of distinct political moments, on local and international scales. 
Whereas modernist architectural forms were meant to symbolize a socialist future, the 
state officials looked upon urban archaeology as a particular method of scientific inquiry 
that allowed the socialist state to create its own unitary “heritage,” which legitimated a 
cohesive body politic and a centralized system. 
My research illuminates and compares the ways in which the socialist state 
attempted to imprint its vision of social order in distinct places, and the multiple forms in 
which this project of social homogenization was systematically challenged. More 
specifically, I focus on three sites in different regions of socialist Romania: 1) the 
country’s capital, Bucharest, which was envisioned to become “the socialist city of the 





(the Saxons), whose presence in the city remained significant until the last wave of 
emigration in the early 1990s, and 3) Bonţida, a Transylvanian village currently inhabited 
by a multi-ethnic population of Romanians, Hungarians, and Roma, and home to one of 
the most famous Baroque castles in the region. My research in these locales revealed that 
distinct strategies of social and ethnic differentiation emerged during the 1960s and 
developed during the 1970s as subtle reactions to the state’s centralist regime of heritage.  
In Transylvania, different ethnic groups initiated intricate processes of memory work 
under which new lieux-de-memoire were being created intra muros, within the group, in 
order to preserve symbolic institutions that were crucial for their identity, but no longer 
politically allowed. The homogeneous spatialized knowledge that the state wanted to 
impose was subtly countered by local histories of multiethnic habitation. Those histories 
informed the ways in which groups were actively creating a situated heritage-as-practice, 
upon which they continued to draw to reinforce their group identity.7 It is these 
processual forms of heritage-making, continuously adjusting to the shifting cultural 
policies of the socialist state, that still inform how different local actors in Sibiu and 
Bonţida understand, relate to, or reject the current projects of heritage revitalization 
developed in these two sites.  
 Another contribution of my dissertation is to analyze the emerging forms of 
heritage-as-recognition that bear on broader shifts in the practices of memory and politics 
of identity in one marginal location of the “New Europe.” By analyzing heritage as a 
situated political category, I ask what kinds of contestations over the very meaning of 
culture, politics, and economics underlie the calls for recognition emerging in a “Europe” 
                                                        
7 I import the concept of “heritage-as-practice” from Lisa Breglia’s work on the processes of heritage 






paradoxically asking for “diversity” and “standardization” simultaneously. I show that 
while there has been an increasing interest on the behalf of the ethnic minority groups in 
Transylvania to be given full recognition and political visibility, those claims could be 
challenged by various factors (such as, Western European actors coming to Sibiu with 
preconceived notions about the German heritage in Eastern Europe, or hidden local 
histories of destruction of material goods, as I found to be the case in Bonţida).  
 Both of the heritage revival projects that I examine here propose an approach to 
the past as a form of property, which groups are to (re)own and identify with. Those 
projects of memory-work unquestionably deem remembrance a valuable form of 
property, which people are encouraged to produce and display. In other words, projects of 
heritage revival also stand as strategies of (re)creating individual and collective links to a 
past, which must be remembered and revived via historic buildings and sites. The 
heritage specialists want to make the locals feel accountable for themselves by feeling 
accountable for this specific past. However, sometimes, as in the case of Bonţida, those 
people’s own past might be a past that they want to forget. Instead of being an 
inheritance—a heritage—it could be a burden. At other times, the past that Sibiu’s small 
Saxon community wants to remember and re-create to an extent is not palatable to 
Western European actors, who want to bring in EU monies to transform Sibiu into a 
cosmpolitan, “young since 1191” type of burg, aiming rather to become attractive to hip 
European tourists, while ignoring the German-speaking local population.8  
                                                        
8 “Young since 1191” was one of the slogans used in the advertising campaign “Sibiu 2007,” which began 
in early 2006. See the touristic guide, “Sibiu/Hermannstadt: Young since 1191,” 
http://www.turism.sibiu.ro/pdf/EN.pdf, accessed January 20, 2010. It alludes to the chronicle dated in 1191, 
which first mentioned the fortification established by the Saxon colonists in Transylvania, then Villa 
Hermanni, and later the city of Hermanstadt, in German, or Sibiu, in Romanian. Coordinated by a 
Bucharest-based advertising agency, the campaign involved an intense mediatization of the city of Sibiu, 





 I suggest that these projects of heritage making in Transylvania must be 
understood as being formed at the crossroad of diverging discourses about “the past,” 
informed by international attempts to better monitor the fuzzy domain of “culture,” 
postcolonial and postsocialist sensibilities engendered by Cold War Politics, as well as 
regional networks of capital circulation and political alliances, such as the European 
Union (EU, that seek to legitimate themselves by calling upon imaginaries of a “common 
heritage.”  
 
Heritage and Patrimony 
 
Many analysts today point out that “heritage” should be approached conceptually 
as representing a cultural and political process, formed through as well as legitimizing 
distinct political systems, regimes of property, and circuits of capital within an 
increasingly connected global economy. Anthropologists have argued that the very 
selection strategy by which “the past” is represented in the present must be approached 
ethnographically, by examining how “its negotiation [is] taking place within specific 
historical contexts characterized by particular systems of power and authority that deem 
only certain forms of heritage credible.”9 Why is it that brahmans in a temple in a city in 
India claim that their version of the past, which employs a set of poems, should be more 
credible than others?10 Why do the inhabitants of Rethemnos, a Cretan town, feel 
                                                                                                                                                                     
beautiful young couples drinking champagne, playing instruments, or just displaying a Mona Lisa tattooed 
on a shoulder or a musical score on a woman’s legs, were exhibited all across the main cities in Romania as 
well as in many locations of Europe. A German colleague expressed his surprise when he described to me 
the intense mediatization of this campaign in Germany, where the Sibiu 2007 banners seemed to be 
everywhere, from the underground to the city buses.  
9 Karen Fog Oung, "The Burden of Heritage: Claiming a Place for a West Indian Culture," American 
Ethnologist 26, no. 2 (1999), 370. 






constrained by the historical preservationists who ask them not to alter the form of their 
houses, requests that dramatically interfere with local practices of agnatic coresidence?11 
 Whether the past appears as “a scarce resource” (Appadurai) or “a negotiable good” 
(Herzfeld), “heritage” appears to function in a similar way to “property,” in that it offers 
a clearer view of the social webs that are being created among people through “things” 
and through specific renditions and representations of the past. An analysis of the 
creation of new property regimes could help us better understand how heritage could 
represent, to an extent, a form of commodification of memory. As Verdery and others 
point out, the “reconstitution” of private property in the former Soviet bloc relied on a 
teleological understanding of history, which treated the socialist period as an accident.12  
 Unlike a legislative framework, an entire social landscape imbued with the forms of 
social and economic interaction that had emerged after 1945 could not have been 
changed overnight, or even worse, erased all together. However, many of the experts 
designing the privatization policies refused to see that. Verdery points out the importance 
of understanding those radical economic and political changes as part of the creation of 
new property regimes.13 In contrast to more simplistic approaches to privatization, 
Verdery shows that in fact there are various forms of economic interactions that are 
connected with each other by a shared understanding of “property” as a conceptual realm, 
with its boundaries clearly defined. As such, a property regime becomes a formative 
domain. At the same time, the creation of a new regime of property entails its 
                                                        
11 Michael Herzfeld, A Place in History: Social and Monumental Time in a Cretan Town (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1991). 
12 Michael Burawoy and Katherine Verdery, eds., Uncertain Transition: Ethnographies of Change in the 
Postsocialist World (Lanham: Rowman&Littlefield Publishing,1999), David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, 
Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (Cambrdige, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), Katherine Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare: Property and Value in 
Postsocialist Transylvania (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 





naturalization, that is, the production of its own normativity through the imposition of 
new norms, which automatically restructure the relationships among previous economic 
forms. In this process, the boundaries—the criteria of inclusion and exclusion—are being 
challenged. Previous forms are being questioned, some are being canceled out as no 
longer relevant, while other domains become suddenly included in the new property 
regime.  
 A similar understanding of the relational character of the creation of “property 
regimes” could be employed in an ethnographic analysis of processes of “heritage 
making.” The insistence on the processual nature of “heritage” has been a recurrent 
theme in the recent literature. Breglia proposes an approach to heritage as practice, as 
opposed to one focused on heritage-as-artifact, as it represents “an endlessly renewable 
resource, not some ‘thing’ to be extracted from the contexts of its users or locked away 
for its own good.”14 Smith writes about the performative aspect of heritage, which entails 
a multilayered enterprise of “visiting, managing, interpretation or conservation […] that 
embodies acts of remembrance and commemoration while negotiating and constructing a 
sense of place, belonging and understanding in the present.”15 
 Even though the emergence of the concept of “cultural heritage” should be 
understood within the multiple geopolitical and economic shifts of the late 19th and 20th 
centuries, heritage-making, understood as the mechanism of employing one form of the 
past to justify and consolidate a social or political configuration in a given present, is far 
from being new. As David C. Harvey points out, the resignification of sites already 
imbued with historical meaning has been a pivotal political practice since the ancient 
                                                        
14 Lisa Breglia, Monumental Ambivalence: The Politics of Heritage (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2006), 14. 






Romans had aimed to emulate the mythical figures and aesthetic forms of their former 
rivals, the Greeks.16 Furthermore, following St Gregory’s instruction to “cleanse heathen 
shrines and use them as churches,” the Catholic Church became engaged in a vast 
operation of “heritage making” by appropriating aesthetic expressions, even in locations 
of some of the abandoned Greco-Roman sacred sites, and redefining them as “Christian 
heritage.”17 (This enterprise could also be found in the development of the Eastern 
tradition of icon painting that relied upon the extremely refined technique and artistic 
expression of portrait painting that had already been developed as part of the intricate 
burial rituals in Asia Minor, illustrated by the Fayum portraits.) Given the increasing 
authority of the Church in medieval Europe, it is then no wonder that both “heritage” and 
“patrimony” emerged at around the same time (13th and 14th centuries) to designate two 
complementary entities. “Patrimony” entailed anything derived from one’s father (pater) 
or an endowment belonging by ancient right to a church. “Heritage” focused rather on the 
heir, who received that which was being inherited or acquired from a predecessor, that is, 
from someone who was positioned within a kin relationship to the inheritor. This kin 
relationship could have also been a symbolic kinship that was conferred by the adherence 
to the same religious congregation. 
 The distinction between “patrimony” and “heritage” might originate in the distinct 
ways in which the material remains of Antiquity—especially the architectural ones—had 
been approached in France and England. Choay shows that despite a rising interest in the 
study of Greco-Roman antiquity among the humanists and artists starting with the 15th 
                                                        
16 David C. Harvey, "The History of Heritage," in The Ashgate Research Companion to Heritage and 
Identity, ed. Brian Graham and Peter Howard (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 22. 
17 J. Blair, "Minster Churches in the Landscape," in Anglo-Saxon Settlements, ed. D. Hooke (Oxford: 





century, it took more than three centuries until a more systematic enterprise of 
conservation of the architectural remains could be implemented.18 This is because, Choay 
argues, up to the late 18th century, throughout Western Europe (with the partial exception 
of England), those sites represented foremost an object of study rather than of 
conservation, appearing as a resource of technical knowledge and artistic expression, 
which could be replicated in novel edifices rather than being historical unica that must be 
preserved as such.19 The English antiquarians, outraged by the radical iconoclasm that 
continued even after the success of the Reform, were the first to ask for a royal edict that 
guaranteed the protection of the medieval monasteries and other “monuments of 
antiquity” on the argument of their civic and historical dimension.20 Considered valuable 
not as obsolete religious sites, but rather as lieux-de-memoire that could ground an 
incipient national sentiment, those sites appeared then as potential producers of a 
historical imaginary guaranteeing a much sought-after political stability in a pre-
Cromwell England torn asunder by internal struggles for power and desires for imperial 
expansion. According to Choay, this might be one of the first episodes documenting the 
civic dimension assigned to “monuments of antiquity,” and thereby their transformation 
into “heritage,” with the purpose of grounding and reifying a sense of belonging to a 
political community.21 Two centuries later, at the end of the 18th century, as a response to 
the radically interventionist restoration of some gothic cathedrals in England, the society 
of antiquaries in London succeeded in establishing a fund sustaining a private 
institutional framework of protection for the historical sites, which later developed into 
                                                        
18 Françoise Choay, The Invention of the Historic Monument, transl. Lauren M. O’Connell, (Cambridge: 









the currently well-known National Trust.22 
 In comparison to England, pre-revolutionary France appears to Choay as “typical” 
for the attitudes of Western European elites. That is, even though antiquaries and 
architects decried the degradation, abandonment or demolition of the Greco-Roman 
antiquities, scarcely any of them showed concern about their protection in situ.23 Choay 
argues in fact that a framework for “heritage” (patrimoine)—in its current understanding 
of an institutional framework of selecting, arranging, and protecting sites deemed of 
national importance—appeared only with the Revolution.24 Contrary to a more popular 
view of the vandalism accompanying those turbulent times, Choay contends that the 
juridical and institutional framework for the preservation of historical monuments had 
been in fact initiated by the revolutionary committees, whose decrees anticipated the 
procedures implemented by the first Commission for Historical Monuments in France, 
starting in 1837.25  
 However, in her discussion, Choay moves uncritically from a discussion of the 
antiquities to an analysis of the formation of the field of “national heritage” in France in 
the wake of the Revolution. That is, she assumes that the historical sites, as well as the 
objects that are taken from the clergy and the aristocracy, had remained the same during 
this transfer, with the important change being the emergence of a more systematic interest 
in their conservation. However, it is the radical resignification of their property regime 
(for the immovable sites) and the selection, transfer, hoarding, and rearrangement of the 
mobile objects in the recently established museum—an epitome of the revolutionary 
                                                        
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 78. 





ideals—that allowed them to become metonyms of le patrimoine. Only by virtue of their 
new ownership status, as state possessions (patrimony), could these sites and objects be 
symbolically linked and thereby be transformed into parts and signs of a new body 
politic. That is, it was the distinct manner in which those material forms were constituted 
into an assemblage not only owned by, but also making, the nation that offered them a 
particular political status and value, more so than their distinct materiality. It was this link 
that made other bonds imaginable and thus possible: that of forming a body politic out of 
distinct political actors. 
 This perspective on “patrimony” as appearing through (and endorsing) a radical 
breach in the way of imagining the political is very important, because it seems to me that 
a different approach exists in the case of “heritage” in the form that has emerged in 
England, through the societies of antiquarians and later in the domain of the National 
Trust. In comparison to the notion of patrimoine in France, where this assemblage 
simultaneously represented (as state possessions) and constituted the state, the sites that 
ended up being treated as “heritage” in England continue to be separated from the state, 
being privately owned. As such, they are not institutionally endowed with the potential of 
creating broader “imagined communities,” but perhaps become more important for 
endorsing more locally situated representations of history.26  
 This discussion points out that heritage-making in medieval and early modern 
Europe was a localized process, very much enmeshed in particular political, economic, 
and moral frameworks defined by intricate alliances as well as conflicts among various 
                                                        
26 There may be more at play here in the very distinct French and English relationships of state and church 
that were gradually consolidated over this time period. The deployment of “heritage” and “patrimoine” 
were distinctions in part bound complexly in the religious-political landscape and in shifting significations 






political and religious institutions. This view of heritage challenges the point of view 
advanced by some legal scholars, who have justified their views in favor of an increased 
liberalization of the circulation of cultural goods on global markets by appealing to 
interpretations of historical texts that present heritage-making in medieval and early 
modern Europe as a continuous process of transaction of cultural goods and 
representations. In the next section, I analyze the ways in which legal scholars have 
discussed “heritage” in relation to the field of cultural policymaking, as well as the 
questions that anthropologists and other social scientist have raised.  
  
Cultural Heritage and Cold War Geopolitics 
 
During the last two decades, there has been a rapidly growing body of scholarly 
literature proposing distinct approaches to “cultural heritage.” Often, the very choice of 
using “cultural heritage” or “cultural property” to designate a body of objects, sites, and 
knowledge that carry cultural value for one community, signals distinct approaches to 
this subject. 
John Merryman, a Stanford law professor, argues for a “cultural internationalism” 
that would endorse a higher liberalization of the circulation of cultural objects in 
international markets. He uses a rather simplified portrayal of the international 
geopolitical and economic relations underpinning the circulation of cultural objects, one 
in which  
the world divides itself into source nations and market nations. In source nations, 
the supply of desirable cultural property exceeds the internal demand. Nations like 
Mexico, Egypt, Greece and India are obvious examples. They are rich in cultural 
artifacts beyond any conceivable local use. In market nations, the demand exceeds 





the United States are examples. Demand in the market nation encourages export 
from source nations. […] Despite their enthusiasm for other kinds of export trade, 
most source nations vigorously oppose the export of cultural objects.27 
 
He starts by pointing out the “dissonant sets of values” underlying two pivotal treaties 
that had been issued on the protection of cultural objects after the Second World War: the 
1954 Hague Convention and the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of 
1970.28 As he shows, these international agreements had been preceded by a systematic 
series of efforts to insure the international protection of cultural objects (“monuments and 
works of art”) in times of war at the end of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th. 
However, as a treaty signed by many of the Western countries in the aftermath of the 
second world war, the 1954 Hague Convention becomes the main document guaranteeing 
the protection of cultural property as a “individual international responsibility,” one that 
set forth a “cosmopolitan notion of general interest in cultural property […], apart from 
any national interest.”29As such, Merryman reads the Convention as a “charter for 
cultural internationalism,” an endorsement of “the international protection of cultural 
property,” which signals a shift from a view treating cultural goods as being under the 
ownership of nation-states to one deeming them universally valuable for mankind.30  
He then contrasts the Hague 1954 treaty with the UNESCO convention of 1970, 
whose purpose was to ensure the protection of the cultural property of the states that 
signed the treaty and deter the illicit international trade. In fact, Merryman argues, the 
                                                        
27 John Henry Merryman, "Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property " The American Journal of 
International Law 80, no. 4 (1986): 832. 
28 Ibid, 833. 
29 Ibid, 837 and 841. 
30 Ibid, 837. Merryman cites the Hague convention, which stated that “damage to cultural property 
belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each 






latter is “largely about national retention of cultural property.” As such, it endorses a 
“cultural nationalist” approach to cultural objects, signaling them as the exclusive 
possessions of each nation-state that adhered to the convention. Therefore, according to 
Merryman, we have two paradigms of thinking about cultural property: “one 
cosmopolitan, the other nationalist; one protective, the other retentive.”31 In terms of 
practices, he describes two antagonistic perspectives on the goods themselves:  
[Cultural nationalists engage in] the practice of hoarding cultural objects, a 
practice that, while not necessarily damaging to the articles retained, serves no 
discernible domestic purpose other than asserting the right to keep them. 
[…Those artifacts] are merely warehoused, uncatalogued, uninventoried and 
unavailable for display. […] Foreign dealers and collectors would gladly buy 
them. Cultural nationalism finds no fault with the nation that hoards unused 
objects in this way. Cultural internationalism, however, urges that objects of that 
kind be made available abroad by sale, exchange or loan.32 
 
In short, Merryman notes that while the Hague 1954 treaty aims to “preserve cultural 
property from damage or destruction,” the main purpose of the 1970 UNESCO document 
is to support “retention of cultural property by source nations.” Given these 
circumstances, Merryman is appalled that “cultural nationalism [still?] dominates the 
field.”33 This piece sets the tone of 30 years of scholarship with which the author, 
together with other scholars, have aimed to produce the legalistic argumentative 
framework concerning the increasing international flexibility of commercial transactions 
in the art world.34  
                                                        
31 Ibid, 846. 
32 Ibid, 847. 
33 Ibid, 846. 
34 Among his most well-known works, there are John Henry Merryman, "The Nation and the Object," 
International Journal of Cultural Property 3 (1994); "Cultural Property Internationalism," International 
Journal of Cultural Property (2005) 12:11–39., no. 12 (2005), Thinking About the Elgin Marbles: Critical 
Essays on Cultural Property, Art and Law (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 
and John Henry Merryman and Albert E. Elsen, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts (Philadelphia: University 





Merryman’s approach has been found wanting by many analysts, including other 
lawyers, who objected to his interpretation of the language of the two treaties, as well as 
to his blatantly ignoring the histories of colonialism underlying previous forms of one-
sided circulation of cultural goods to sites that are currently the countries standing for the 
“market nations.” Replying to one of his latest pieces, his colleague Lyndel V. Prott 
challenges the abruptly Eurocentric perspective that Merryman adopts in order to 
construct a legal and historical argument for the liberalization of cultural property.35 In 
fact, Prott argues that what Merryman describes as “cultural internationalism” stands 
rather for “cultural imperialism,” since it hides much more complex forms of persuasion, 
value-attribution, and transaction, sometimes verging on the margin of illicit trade, in 
which world-famous dealers sometime engage.36 (Prott also observes that the dealers’ 
international associations have not shown any interest in forging relations with 
UNESCO.) More importantly, Prott notes the exclusively material dimension of the 
cluster of cultural goods that Merryman includes in the domain of cultural property, as 
well as the assumption that any of those objects could be potentially transacted as 
commodities.37 As such, an “internationalist” approach to cultural objects could dilute or 
erase altogether the sacred value that indigenous communities attribute to some objects 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Internationalism,” he aimed to historicize further his endorsement of “cultural property internationalism,” 
by grounding in a history of literary texts, which he interprets to endorse the creation of heritage in Europe 
formed through circulation, appropriation and adaption of different cultural valuables. 
35 Lyndel V. Prott, "The International Movement of Cultural Objects " International Journal of Cultural 
Property no. 12 (2005). Prott replies to Merryman’s “Cultural Property Internationalism.” 
36 Ibid, 223. 
37 As Prott put it, 
Merryman prefers to speak of cultural property as “the sorts of things that dealers deal in, collectors collect, 
and museums acquire and display: principally works of art, antiquities and ethnographic objects” that are 
“the foci of a social subsystem we can call ‘the cultural property world’ that is populated by artists, 
collectors, dealers and auction houses, museums and their professionals, art historians, archaeologists and 






produced by community artists if removed from their place of origins in order to be 
displayed in a museum.38 
 Even more interesting is Merryman’s observation that the US signed the 1970 
UNESCO treaty in 1972, but that in fact it took ten years and a great deal of negotiation 
among dealers, museums, collectors and legislators for the Congress to adopt a legislation 
that would adhere to UNESCO requirements.39 Merryman does not inquire, however, into 
the politics of this rather paradoxical gesture as he does not consider the broader 
economic and political framework in which the 1970 UNESCO document appeared. If 
we scrutinize the list of the parties that signed the 1970 Convention, we note that many of 
those countries were included in that “limbo” political zone which represented the main 
target of both the USA and the USSR at a particular time of Cold War politics (the height 
of decolonization movements in the former colonies in the global south, the 
intensification of political struggles and the civil rights movement in the global north, the 
bloody reiteration of Moscow’s decisional power over the satellites in the Eastern bloc, 
shown by the interventions in 1968 Czechoslovakia, etc). Moreover, the 1970 UNESCO 
treaty was soon followed by the 1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of 
Cultural and Natural World Heritage (which the US signed in 1973, only to withdraw 
later).40 As a UNESCO ambassador admits,  
the convention of 1972 established itself fully in the prospect of development (my 
underlining). It is a tool to help poor countries confronted with huge disparities 
between the amplitude of the means necessary to safeguard their heritage and the 
lack of financial and technical resources. To that end, the economy of the 
convention settles on a mechanism of redistribution between the north and the south 
                                                        
38 Ibid, 232. 
39 He observes that in the USA, “[t]he Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act was enacted in 
1983.” Merryman, "Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property," 845, note 45. 
40 Jean Musitelli, "World Heritage, between Universalism and Globalization," International Journal of 





for which the World Heritage Fund is key.41  
 
 Given the increasingly tense political context of the time, we must think of 
UNESCO in that period as a stage on which two world rivals met and exchanged 
diplomatic gallantries in order to scrutinize each other more closely. It also functioned as 
a medium of translating competing visions of global order into a seemingly universal 
language of “culture.” In fact, as the ambassador pointed out, the UNESCO agenda at 
that time was part of broader attempts to import a “modernization model” into the new 
territories that struggled to achieve their national independence, but still stood undecided 
at a crossroads of competing ideological paths. Each of the two world powers, as they 
liked to portray themselves, sought to thrust their political visions into these new 
territories by portraying them as the most adequate solutions for a postcolonial social 
organization. 
 To develop an argument about a shift in the meaning of “heritage” that was forged 
through the UNESCO regulations after the second half of the 20th century, I draw on 
Chari and Verdery’s analysis of the broader epistemological shifts and forms of 
spatialized knowledge that had been endorsed by Cold War representations of space, 
time, and political order.42 They note that the very idea of a third tier within the world 
economic hierarchy was a product of the Cold War.43 The widely diverse countries that 
did not directly belong to the capitalist world or to the socialist bloc countries were 
confined to a unitary category of “Third World,” which was defined as a temporary 
negation of the other two blocs, as being not yet capitalist or not yet communist. As Chari 
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and Verdery argue, 
[The Cold] “War” was quintessentially an organization both of the world and of 
representations and knowledge about it. […]The very concept of a Third, Non-
aligned World emerged from the Cold War; in the encounter of the superpowers, 
the “Third World” was constituted as an object of thought and subject of action.44 
 
They note that one of the key discursive and practical strategies that the Western world 
employed in this war was the development paradigm, which aimed to transfer funds and 
expertise into the global south as a way to encourage them to develop from within.45 
However, the unilateral plan of development, which was in general concocted in the 
spacious offices of the major international institutions, corresponded to a naively 
inaccurate representation of those diverse territories as one culturally uniform global 
perimeter. The modernization strategies that the international political actors deemed to 
be equally applicable to any area in this “Third world” were rooted in fact in the 
reductionist imaginary underlying the Cold War trichotomous partitions of the world. 
 The application of this grandiose plan, the responses it provoked within the targeted 
countries, and eventually its failure should be analyzed as being directly articulated to 
and constrained by the conditions of possibility and political imagination, the hopes and 
fears engendered by one form of global rivalry, cloned afterwards at different scales. 
Therefore, Chari and Verdery argue that “development strategies of newly decolonized 
states in the second half of the twentieth century must be situated in their efforts to 
exploit Cold War rivalries between West and East, First and Second worlds.”46 
Describing it as “one of the most important knowledge effects of the Cold War,” they 
observe that the modernization theory emerging in western social science offered the 
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scientific ground to endorse “the economic advantages of alliances with the West, for 
which western countries were investing in an ever-larger development apparatus.”47 
 In fact, as many social scientists have shown, the global agenda of development-as-
modernization failed not only due to the form of negative definition—a definition by 
negation—of the “Third World” that Cold War politics engendered. It was the 
assumption that this uncertain cluster of countries functioned as a ground zero, a cultural 
terra nova on which technologies of modernizing could be easily applied, with rapid 
results. What the technocrats in the metropolitan offices of the wealthy north fatefully 
ignored was the immensely complex forms of social stratification, intricate systems of 
transactions, political in-fighting, and hybrid forms of sociality that have resulted from 
the interaction of pre-colonial settings with the systems of governance that colonial 
regimes aimed to impose.48 Far from being a terra nova, the third world literally was a 
terra incognita almost in an opposite sense from the one used by earlier bearers of 
modernization projects, the 17th and 18th century European explorers.  
 As I mentioned earlier, Merryman criticized UNESCO 1970 for guaranteeing the 
retention of a cluster of culturally valuable objects, which, according to him, should be 
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instead put in circulation, which in turn could increase their market value. In Merryman’s 
core argument on the international liberalization of cultural property, we have a view of 
“culture” that is made through circulation: goods that are transacted on the world market, 
loaned or exchanged, displayed in the grand museums of the “market nations,” enjoyed 
by as many world citizens as possible. He decries then the attempts of the “source 
nations” to “hoard” objects in sites such as “warehouses,” which appear purely illogical 
from the other point of view of culture as value made through transaction. He appears to 
be genuinely flabbergasted as to why Mexico, India, Greece, or other “source nations” 
would not happily pursue the selling of all those objects that they already have “in 
excess.” 
Merryman does not take into account a crucial aspect of the role of those objects 
for the literal making of the nations discussed. Whereas current political and economic 
circumstances do not allow those countries to forge and maintain a wealthy status quo at 
a national scale, they need culturally valuable objects in order to create and maintain a 
“national heritage” that would ground the nation-state in the present. As Herzfeld 
persuasively describes to be the case in Greece, it is those objects of multiply layered 
pasts that makes their body politic hic et nunc.49 If they sold those objects, they would 
lose any legitimation as states on the contemporary world map. Therefore, the objects 
have value precisely because they do not travel too much. 
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 More interesting is how Merryman’s accusation of UNESCO’s impeding free 
circulation of these objects might in fact be right on target, but for reasons that he fully 
ignores. In fact, in some of the countries of the “Second World,” that is the socialist 
satellites on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain, cultural property in the form of objects 
reordered and politically made inalienable turned out to be a pivotal strategy for the new 
states to acquire their legitimacy. In the first part of the dissertation, I show how in post-
1947 socialist Romania the creation of a new regime of heritage legitimated a new body 
politic and an imagery of social order in full accordance with Cold War representation of 
space and time. The thesis investigates the formation of this socialist regime of heritage 
that occurred via a redefinition not only of the value of things, but especially of the ways 
in which they related to one another. More specifically, I examine how a socialist 
heritage was created out of wide range of movable and immovable things, via a 
rearrangement of the relationships among them and thereby their cultural and political 
meaning.  
I show how during the 1950s and early 1960s, the Romanian government 
entrusted particular professional categories (technocrats, archeologists, and architects) 
with the task of redefining the political value of things. Those included buildings and 
objects that had once belonged to various people or groups in interwar Romania and that 
became confiscated by the state during the nationalization carried out between 1948 and 
1952. The political authorities aimed to de-ethnicize and culturally revalue a wide range 
of material forms by assigning them an exclusively political dimension: to symbolize the 
inviolable possession of “the people” and thereby materially ground the newly 






archeologists assign new political meanings to materiality, the socialist state in Romania 
attempted to retrospectively create its own “heritage” that would fit a teleological vision 
of historical development. 
Those revalued objects and sites were added to another pool of objects invested 
with political meaning: the artifacts collected through a series of archeological digs that 
were opened across the country as early as 1951. As the common possession of “the 
people,” belonging to everyone and no one, this heritage endorsed a socialist project of 
peoplehood, composed of homogeneous individuals in a homogenized territory. Whereas 
modernist architecture aimed to reshape the social relations in the present and create 
novel subjectivities via the ways in which people related to and inhabited the built 
environment, archeological data enabled an imaginary of “the origins” of these people, be 
they imagined as Slavic during the 1950s or “proto-Romanian” beginning in the 1960s. 
Archaeology was therefore entrusted with the task of creating a past that would fit the 
socialist society of the future.  
Throughout the 1950s, the archeologists in the socialist bloc were politically 
compelled to produce data attesting to the ancient pervasiveness of the Slavic culture 
across the Central and East European region.50 Beginning in 1960, however, under the 
attempts of some of the eastern bloc countries to gain relative autonomy from USSR and 
open relations with the Western world, a revived interest in the discourse of the nation 
began to prevail. Accordingly, archeologists shifted their research interests to 
investigations tracing the origins of the nation in material data. In Romania of the mid 
1960s, archeologists and architects alike found themselves once again compelled to 
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adjust the scope of their research and means of expression to the new political project of 
inscribing national ideology into the urban landscape. Since Bucharest captured most of 
the attention of the Politburo, significant resources were invested in the endorsement of a 
new history of the country’s capital. With Bucharest’s archeological past becoming as 
important as its architectural future, a City Museum was officially opened in 1958 as a 
depository of the city’s heritage, and an old palace in the city’s center was restored and 
presented to the public as representing Bucharest’s medieval nucleus. Similar 
archeological projects were pursued in other cities undergoing a socialist remodeling, 
such as Sztálinvaros (Dunájváros, after 1961) in Hungary and East Berlin in the German 
Democratic Republic.51  
A comparative analysis of the production of such socialist teleologies of place in 
urban sites of the Eastern bloc could shed new light on the visions of development 
underlying the socialist project. It could probe the political strategies of place-making and 
history production underlying the transformation of fragmented post-war urban 
landscapes of Central and Eastern Europe into future-oriented, modernist lived 
environments. Moreover, by comparing how socialist regimes of heritage were being 
created in these locales, such research could offer new insights on how international 
institutions such as UNESCO might have facilitated more hybrid concepts of “heritage,” 
inspired by earlier projects of national consolidation in interwar Europe.  
 The 1970 Convention was soon followed by the 1972 Convention, which “became 
the favored interventional tool of UNESCO in 1978, the date of the first inscription on the 
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World Heritage List.”52 However, if we place this set of arguments and institutional 
events within the broader geopolitical context of that time, we note some interesting 
contradictions. If we approach the two UNESCO conventions as a set of interventions 
endorsing an agenda of heritage-as-development—as one of the UNESCO ambassadors 
described the 1972 convention and then the World Heritage list that ensued a few years 
afterwards—we could become less certain than Lyndel Prott (Merryman’s opponent) as 
to the larger implications of UNESCO’s heritage agenda. More specifically, the same 
ambassador specified that  
[l]imited by its own modest resources, in its wake UNESCO has trained other 
international institutions, in particular the agencies and the banks that fund the 
development, which are progressively integrating heritage cooperation into their 
strategies.53 
 
Included in this cluster there are institutions such as the World Bank, which funded a 
program to develop historic sites for tourism purposes, the Interamerican Development 
Bank that sponsored the revitalization of historic areas in Latin America, and the 
European Union, while an increasing number of private international companies, such as 
Packard Industries, have recently joined these efforts. 
 In a sense, then, even if the 1970 Convention guaranteed the right of a state to 
define its “own” heritage, the establishment of the World Heritage List that immediately 
followed imposed a unitary regime of value, against which the national heritage of each 
state that signed the convention was evaluated. This model, which I call heritage-as-
development, mirrors projects of development that were simultaneously developed in 
other sectors in the countries of “Third World.” Consequently, even if in following the 
1970 UNESCO treaty those countries presumably could set their own definition of 
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“culture,” such a framework proved to be entirely unsustainable. In order to be more 
visible on the global and political map, those states had to adjust even more to the 
UNESCO established standards of the evaluation of culture, which started with the World 
Heritage List. In other words, this list still proposed a regime of value for cultural goods 
that was grounded in an approach to “heritage” as “historical monuments,” or “historic 
sites.” However, such an approach to heritage often diminished the range of options that 
many of the postcolonial countries found available in order to define a postcolonial 
heritage, given that their historical landscapes had already been radically modified by 
immersions of European-style architecture and urban planning sponsored by the colonial 
regimes.54 On the contrary, the perspective on heritage that was imposed by UNESCO 
through the World Heritage List in fact encouraged postcolonial elites to embrace 
European models of heritage as forms of cultural mimicry, hoping that they would 
function as both a proof of and a path to broader claims of modernization.55 
 
Contradictory Good Intentions: Intangible Heritage, the Intellectual Property 
Model, and the Risks of Over-Regulating Culture 
 
 Increasingly stronger claims for the recognition of cultural forms that transgress 
material worlds, such as unique forms of technical knowledge and artistic skills, required 
UNESCO to enlarge the domain of heritage by recognizing those forms as intangible, 
“fragile and perishable” cultural resources in its 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of 
the Intangible Cultural Heritage (CSICH). At the same time, the recognition of intangible 
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heritage created an expansion of the heritage domain beyond the policy-makers’ ability to 
monitor the circulation of those resources. This situation has generated what Michael 
Brown calls “heritage trouble,” that is, “diffuse global anxiety about the movement of 
information among different cultures.”56 He notes that the heritage protection policies 
have tended to follow the Information Society model, which values mostly information 
understood as (individually owned) creativity to be set in fast circulation. That is, the 
more forms of cultural knowledge are recognized and promoted as “intangible heritage,” 
the higher is the risk that their new recognition in this era of global information would 
lead to their losing the importance and meanings within the cultural context where they 
originated. Brown describes the paradox in the following terms: 
One of the ironies of the CSICH is that its language and administrative strategies 
are patterned on the very Information Society practices they are ostensibly trying to 
counter. The convention portrays intangible heritage as an objectified resource 
amenable to modern management techniques. In such a legalistic vision, heritage 
cannot be protected until it is thoroughly documented.57 
 
 The intellectual property framework has therefore become a trendy trope, being 
now held by various national and international forums as a symbolic denominator of 
one’s accountability as well as individuality within global systems of information 
production and circulation. The intellectual property laws, enforced at an international 
scale, and the effects of their endorsement have generated debates not only among 
scholars, but also between policy analysts, lawyers, politicians, and culturally and 
politically disadvantaged groups. Some of these global actors argue that, in the context in 
which information has become the new currency of the global economy, copyright laws 
are “at best, a blunt instrument for managing information exchange in the age of 
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information and digitization.”58 Many scholars have pointed out, however, that, instead of 
“information exchange,” one might want in fact to talk about a unidirectional flow of 
resources and information from the “have-not” to the “have” nations.59 The proponents of 
a strong international copyright system argue that the copyright reinforcement in 
developing countries will eventually be beneficial economically and socially, as the local 
industries and knowledge will be protected from foreign economic and cultural 
encroachments of western corporations.60 However, the critics of copyright argue that 
such policies will in fact increase the economic gap between developing and developed 
nations.61 Thus, they point out the costs of the information production (as research and 
innovation), as this process assumes a certain level of information already acquired, while 
they observe the peculiar flow of non-copyrighted resources to the west and their return 
as western intellectual property to developing countries.62  
 These economic dynamics are intrinsically linked to changes in cultural patterns. 
Scholars have pointed out the dangers of uncritically employing the IP model; 
sometimes, labeling a creative work as “intellectual property” could undermine the very 
goal and sense of that work. For instance, by looking at the social and cultural role of 
aboriginal art and discussing its incorporation in the market system, Barron shows how 
intellectual property law cancels out other potential systems of signification and 
alternative ontologies. This is because “the integrity of our law depends precisely upon its 
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ability to banish any trace of theirs: any element of myth in our notions of authorship or 
ownership, of ritual in the practices through which we live these statuses, or of the sacred 
in our concept of work.” 63 In a similar vein, Coombe shows how the discourse of 
intellectual property, inserted in the discourse of cultural recognition and used by the 
Canadian government to grant a “voice” to Native peoples of Canada, operated a divide 
between these groups and the other Canadians.64 As the Native cultural activists insisted 
that their stories be told exclusively by their own people and not be used by non-Native 
writers, the “voice” that they were given was already othered and marginalized. 
Discursively formed by the categories of intellectual property, the policy of “cultural 
recognition,” by offering a “voice” to the native groups, legitimized it as separate from 
mainstream “voices.”  
 In sum, “intellectual property” carries complex political, economic, and moral 
implications at global and localized scales. Lately, the topic has acquired an increasing 
significance (and more room on the bookshelves) due to the expansion of the category 
itself and therefore of its value on global markets of both signs and capital. That is, we 
observe a globalization (read universalization) of the IP concept, both in geographical 
space and in sites of representation. Not only ideas, but also plants, body cells, spleens, 
genes, air, signs, musical notes, voice, body movement, are being patented or labeled 
with the © mark (copyright).65 One could ask then if we witness a strategy of creating a 
homogenized type of a global social actor, subjected to a cultural and economic order in 
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which everything boils down to being “property.” The implications of the IP discourse 
therefore transgress the boundaries of the economic realm; IP becomes a sign for specific 
ideologies of personhood, of societal organization and social relations, and of the 
dynamics of political and economic models that underlie them.  
 How could we situate those debates in relation to other political agendas, such as 
the launching of a concept of a common European heritage, lately brought to the fore by 
both the Council of Europe and the European Commission? Could we think of the 
European Union as attempting to create a “European heritage” informed by an 
exclusionary IP model, in a world increasingly divided in distinct areas governed and 
defined by treaties that control the circulation of cultural resources as well as, sometimes, 
the very meaning of “culture” (one example being the controversial 2003 UNESCO 
Convention for Cultural Diversity)? Could we draw a parallel between these 
contemporary attempts at regimenting “culture” as a means for making political 
statements in the international arena to earlier partitions operated by Cold War competing 
visions of global order? In the next section, I analyze the debates triggered by the 2003 
UNESCO treaty, to see how those discussions bear on the EU-sponsored enterprise of 
creating a “European heritage.”  
 
“European Heritage” and Global Politics of Culture 
 
 The 2003 Convention on Cultural Diversity (CCD) emerged as a policy instrument 
that would complement the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 






these two treaties target different audiences. Whereas CSICH aims to encourage 
communities that often are not geographically located in the wealthier Euroamerican 
space (or, if they are, they are socially relegated to the margins of this territory, by being 
set in a gray area of national belonging and often treated as social “outsiders,” such as the 
First Nations in Canada), CCD appears to be an artful political statement of European 
nation-states against the US-dominated global market of cultural industries.66 As much as 
CSICH seemed to cater to the local communities by entitling them with the right of 
deciding what to include in their own heritage domain, CCD offers an even stronger basis 
for the (especially European) states to consolidate their sovereignty by providing them 
with the main role of selectors of cultural expressions and goods.67 As anthropologist 
Alexander Bauer notes, 
[th]e 2003 convention requires that states draw up lists enumerating precisely what 
their important intangible heritage is, and develop management programs for their 
preservation. Along the way, this often means deciding who can and cannot claim 
to be cultural practitioners, and which particular variation of a practice will be 
codified as the “authentic” one. […] [In fact, the language of the Convention, 
including terms] such as “cultural contents” and “cultural expressions” […] seem to 
open the space for the interests and practices of “traditional,” minority and other 
intra- and transnational communities, but in practice, these groups are largely cut 
out of the convention’s framework.68 
 
Moreover, Bauer points out that the very attempt, set within an IP model, to identify, 
regulate and protect “cultural expression,” on the reasoning that it is imbued with much 
more social signification that transgresses its exclusively market-given value, makes it 
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prone to imitation and commodification on specialized markets of cultural goods.69  
When the initial draft of the 2003 Convention on Cultural Diversity was expanded 
and transformed into the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of 
the diversity of cultural expressions, the changes in the new title did not alter the message 
of the initial 2003 draft. It noted that while the world cultural industries have become 
monopolized by five countries, “50 per cent of the world languages are in danger of 
extinction and that 90 per cent of them are not represented on the Internet.”70 We could 
interpret this as a willingness to approach the field of “cultural expressions” as not 
defined by boundaries set by nation-states. However, the insistence on languages and the 
need for their institutional protection appears as a shrewd take on the earlier criticism 
offered by the US team at the negotiations of the 2003 Convention. Then, the US team 
opposed France’s claim for “cultural exception” as being part of the field of “cultural 
diversity” by arguing that instead, “diversity” should be grounded in “notions of freedom 
of expression and free flow of ideas.”71 As anthropologist Robert Albro astutely remarks, 
the two teams spoke past each other, since their arguments were informed by opposed 
conceptual frameworks. Albro points out that while “freedom of expression” entails an 
active view of culture as a process (the enunciation and making of “it”), “cultural 
diversity” presupposes a static set of “it”-s, to be “accounted for and preserved.”72 Even 
though the new text of the 2005 Convention attested that “freedom of thought, expression 
and information, as well as diversity of the media, enable cultural expressions to flourish 
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within societies,” it kept reaffirming “the importance of intellectual property rights in 
sustaining those involved in cultural creativity.”73 
 More interestingly, the 2005 Convention has become international law only after 
the European Community, together with 12 other member states, ratified the treaty in 
December 2006.74 Marked by a ceremony held in Brussels that appeared to endorse a 
political alliance, the signing of the Convention by the European Community was 
considered to mark “a new pillar of world governance in cultural matters.”75 This move 
on the part of the European Community must be understood within a broader attempt to 
consolidate Europe as a distinct cultural space and validate the European Union as an 
increasingly homogeneous actor in world politics. 
 In May 2007, the European Commission (EC) launched “a European agenda for 
culture in a globalizing world,” signaling a strong interest in integrating “the cultural 
dimension and different components of culture in all external and development policies, 
projects and programmes.”76 Two of the crucial objectives of this agenda are “to protect 
and promote cultural diversity through financial and technical support for, on the one 
hand, the preservation of and access to cultural heritage and, on the other, the active 
encouragement and promotion of cultural activities across the world.”77 In other words, 
the European Commission plans to create the institutional and economic mechanisms that 
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would transform (the loosely defined) field of “culture” into a form of “capital.”78 
Moreover, it would represent a particular form of capital that would, through a free 
circulation of “forms of cultural expression,” also create a new European identity. 
According to the EC, this identity is crucially understood through the establishment of the 
past as a preserved “heritage.”  
The 2007 EC agenda for culture is informed by an earlier perspective that invokes 
the rhetoric of an ancient history that is specific to Europe as a symbolic basis for 
European integration.79 It is only now that de Rougemont’s view of “Europe [as] a 
culture” has been “upgraded” from a loosely defined “spirit of Europe” to an EU-defined 
and institutionalized “culture,” which, alongside capital and labor standards, strengthens 
the EU’s role in Europe as a “regulatory order.”80 That is, the 2007 “European agenda for 
culture” promotes an identification with a past (the cultural heritage of Europe) and 
establishes the continuity between this past (Europe’s heritage) and the present—where 
culture in Europe, envisioned as “European culture,” is called upon to represent a present 
beyond one concerned solely with the economic integration of nation-states.  
By analyzing heritage as a situated political category, I use ethnographic research 
in two distinct sites in Transylvania in order to explore how the contestations over the 
very meaning of culture, politics, economics and the relationship among them underlie 
the framework of the “Unity in Diversity” of the New Europe. How does this novel EU-
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endorsed approach to cultural heritage as a means to justify transnational political goals 
(e.g., a democratic and united Europe) meet with the local and regional histories of 
heritage conservation in postsocialist Romania? 
At the Council of Europe workshop “Communicating Cultural Heritage,” held in 
Sibiu, Romania, in October 2007, participants questioned the relevance of local forms of 
heritage (traditions, sites, etc.) for a European identity. As they put it, such cultural forms 
represent heritage precisely because they are localized. It is their function to signify the 
particularity of a site and a special relationship to the localized past that justifies their 
quality as heritage. For the 2007 EC agenda, however, it is only through an imagery of 
mobility that European heritage is to be imagined, created, and naturalized; this heritage 
emerges as a deterritorialized and translocal process, a point that is endorsed by the 
relaunched EC Culture Programme 2007-2013, Crossing Borders - Connecting Cultures. 
As the title suggests, a common European heritage cannot be localized, especially 
because the very concept and ideology of “heritage” originated in the 19th century search 
for and justification of a “national culture,” as part of the legitimization of nation-states. 
How could a concept that designates a particular kind of relationship to history and 
signifies a nation’s particularity within Europe come to represent a transnational 
European identity? Which cultural forms could stand as “European heritage”? How can 
we recognize them? Moreover, which actors eventually decide whether those forms are 
“European” or not? 
As I have already pointed out, the earlier attempts of UNESCO to regulate the 
field of “cultural heritage” were grounded in a model of heritage-as-development, in 





of cultural value were understood to promote a more equitable distribution of resources 
across the globe (the development model of the 1970s, whose failure became visible 
during the 1980s). Recently, social scientists have observed an important shift in the 
meaning and function of heritage. In Michael Rowland’s words, “cultural property, 
defined as heritage, now plays a much larger role in defining the right to exist.”81 To 
support his point, he draws on Verena Stolcke’s argument that “cultural difference is now 
understood increasingly in terms of the possession of distinct cultural heritage rather than 
idioms of race and ethnicity.”82 As such, Rowland notes, Stolcke’s observation 
substantiates earlier arguments advanced by Charles Taylor and Nancy Fraser that a 
politics of recognition has replaced a politics of redistribution, which supported the 
development model accompanied by the modernization theory as its epistemological 
framework.83 In other words, we note a shift from heritage-as-development to heritage-
as-recognition. Even more so, Rowland points out that in order for recognition to happen, 
one must set “cultural difference” within a moral-affective framework: 
The right to exist asserts instead a claim to a unique identity supported and 
identified with an objectified notion of culture that may be gained or lost but not 
exchanged. What this means is that in order for injustice to be recognized, it is 
necessary not only to deal with the conditions that erode identity but also to 
arouse feelings of loss and the need of redemption.84 
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Rowland’s argument adds an important perspective to the earlier discussion of the 
heritage agenda set forth by UNESCO and the European Community. He points out to 
the moral undertones of loss and redemption that underlie the 2005 Convention, which 
advances the idea that in order to be used by groups to sustain claims for political and 
social recognition, they must first identify and select representations of their difference 
and freeze them as “endangered cultural heritage.” 
 However, as my ethnographic research in Transylvania shows, sometimes those 
calls for political recognition are being employed to guard and mask particular politics of 
redistribution, which transgress national boundaries to create still very localized clusters 
of economic and cultural capital. For instance, in the town of Sibiu, the project of the 
rehabilitation of the old center has been promoted as a form of redemption of the Saxons 
in Transylvania, who had been living in the region for centuries but emigrated to 
Germany during in the 1980s and especially the 1990s. As I show, the discourse of a 
Saxon endangered heritage triggered a wealth of international attention, capital, and 
practical support from private institutions from abroad and even some European states. 
The project had been, however, relatively ignored (in fact, actively opposed) by the 
Romanian government at that time (2000-2004), which was pursuing an opposing 
strategy of cultural marketing very much grounded in an (obsolete) nationalist discourse. 
The central authorities changed their attitude about the Sibiu project and consequently 
began rechanneling monies into it, only when they realized that it would directly help 
Romania’s acceptance into the EU. 
At the same time, the international capital and expertise targeting the recent 





Transylvania, a situation that has expanded even more the already existing economic and 
social gap between this location and other poorer regions in Romania. I suggest that these 
internationally and EU-sponsored projects of built heritage rehabilitation have promoted 
symbolical geographies that resuscitate earlier nostalgic imaginaries of a transnational 
Central Europe, which is seen in turn as a metonym of a cosmopolitan turn-of-the-century 
Europe at large. Heritage-making in Transylvania appears then as an example of a subtle 
and complex strategy in which an EU cultural imaginary is being formed via an economic 
de-sovereignizing of the member nation-states.  
An accompanying process is the confiscation of nostalgia. In the dissertation, I 
show how in the two cases of Sibiu and Bonţida, we observe how the heritage domain is 
being formed through a selection of local narratives about the past, combined with 
preconceived notions about the blurry “communist times,” as well as a standardization of 
those narratives according to EU-representations of “cultural diversity.” In fact, the 
endorsement of a powerful symbolic framework for the EU-regulated network of 
circulation of labor and capital is achieved by having localized, particular forms of 
“nostalgia” be reinterpreted though nostalgic depictions of Europe as a whole. These case 
studies stand as political projects to endorse visions of social order by calling upon and 
producing a representation of the past to legitimize a particular imaginary of the future.  
 
From materiality to peoplehood-making: Imaginaries of social order 
 
This dissertation examines how particular imageries of social order, political 
values of materiality and visual representations of history were underlying projects of 






More specifically, by relying on archival material as well as multi-sited ethnographic 
fieldwork, I analyze three projects: 1) the transformation of a central area of Bucharest 
into a “historical architectural reservation,” at a time (the 1960s) when the socialist 
regime aimed to transform Romania’s capital into a “socialist city of the future,” 2) the 
recent (2005) rehabilitation of the medieval city center of Sibiu/Hermannstadt, which is a 
lieu de mémoire for Transylvania’s Germans, and 3) the current reconstruction of the 
Bánffy baroque castle in the village of Bonţida, which is now a cultural pilgrimage site 
for Transylvanian Hungarians. 
These sites complement one another in a particularly interesting manner, as each 
in its own way symbolizes different historical times in the political trajectory of the 
Romanian modern state. Bucharest, the capital of Romania since the unification of the 
two principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, in 1859, symbolizes the center par 
excellence of a modern, politically independent Romania. At the same time, Transylvania 
is looked upon as “the cultural heritage of Romania”—the region at the heart of 
Romania’s political identity.85 Sibiu, a historically multiethnic site established by German 
colonists (the Saxons) in the 12th century, represents a Transylvania characterized by a 
productive (even though economically and socially multi-layered) multiculturalism, 
which took the form of the German influence on the regional cultural dynamics. The 
multiethnic village of Bonţida, whose population is divided among Romanians, 
Hungarians, and Roma, has become representative for the history of Transylvanian 
Hungarians, especially since the project of the castle’s rehabilitation has been 
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accompanied by a cultural revival of the literary works of Miklós Bánffy, the castle’s 
owner and an important political and intellectual figure in interwar Transylvania.  
I examine how in each of those cases, the transformation of a site into “built 
heritage”—be that a ruined palace in the center of Bucharest, a city center reminiscent of 
a medieval German burg, or a castle symbolizing a formerly powerful Hungarian 
aristocracy—entails an endorsement of particular social imaginaries that produce and 
essentialize forms of “peoplehood” in conjunction with interrelated forms of political, 
ethnic, and economic boundaries. Moreover, the production of those groups (that is, the 
justification of their differences) is spatially marked, with various political actors 
claiming that the differences emerge from distinct, particular forms of relating to and 
inhabiting social space and built environment.  
In order to become valid, however, those claims must be preceded by strategies 
through which these actors assign political values to particular material forms, such as 
medieval houses, Baroque castles, or ruined walls. Only by enlivening them, so to speak, 
could these groups transform things into politically powerful tools of governance. By 
being attributed an agentive power to define the spectrum of social relations, these things 
are then turned around to become political fetishes, which begin to visually represent 
novel historical narratives. At the same time, these things could also limit the ways in 
which different people could relate to one another via the things themselves. From this 
point of view, those things could literally even ground claims aiming to essentialize 
social or ethnic differences and thereby justify various strategies of exclusion. 
In this dissertation, I view the relation between materiality and heritage as 






Following Latour’s argument that things should always be understood as contingent 
assemblies, I approach “heritage” forms as specific instances of such assembly, in which 
things capture meaning by the ways in which they are set in relation to other things.86 The 
field of heritage-making could be further explored, I suggest, if we begin to analyze the 
processes of signification that are engendered by the particular ways in which things are 
ordered in relation one to another. Such a processual approach to materiality still 
considers its pivotal importance for heritage-making, but it accounts for instances in 
which this materiality proves to be porous enough as a means of signification in order to 
accommodate different narratives. 
This approach reveals the shift of perspective from the inhabitants to tourists as a 
condition for the transformation of Sibiu’s old center into an immovable representation of 
Saxon heritage. It also reveals the ways in which material forms are being re-arranged in 
Bonţida by two groups (the villagers and the Trust supervising the rehabilitation of 
Bánffy castle) as diverging forms of heritage-making signal strategies to endorse distinct 
social hierarchies. 
One of the arguments advanced by this dissertation is that projects of heritage-
making played a key role in providing a historical substance to the socialist state. The 
first part of the dissertation illustrates some of the material forms and institutional 
strategies through which the socialist system derived its legitimacy. I suggest that the 
regime did that not only from hoarding goods and means of production, as Verdery 
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persuasively argued, but also by engendering specific ways in which things were ordered 
in relation to one another.87 In the first part, I reflect on the ways in which the socialist 
regime endorsed particular assemblies of things that would reflect broader representations 
of spatialized political order. In the second part, I ask how these earlier forms of 
assigning political and cultural meaning to things continue to inform the ways in which 
various groups in contemporary Romania attempt to redefine collective identities at a 
time when individual property restitution participates in a broader individualization of 
rights, leaving too little room for the practice of “community.”  
Thus, the shift between the two sections represents also a shift between two 
temporal and political regimes of heritage. Whereas the first part shows how socialist 
heritage had been formed through processes of centralization and rearrangement of 
cultural goods as a form of cultural and social homogenization, the second part illustrates 
how the rhetoric of “heritage-making” informs the attempts to decentralize as a form of 
political and cultural recognition pursued by different groups in postsocialist Romania. 
That is, it shows how these goods are being reclaimed by their former owners as being 
crucial ethnic identity markers and makers. Those cultural goods—be they medieval 
buildings that had been owned by the Lutheran church in the center of Sibiu or a castle of 
a former Transylvanian Hungarian aristocrat—become important means for ethnic groups 
to set forth further claims of cultural recognition not only within national borders, but 
especially within novel transnational geographies, such as the one endorsed by the EU. 
Since the EU promotes a cultural agenda of “unity in diversity,” those groups are fully 
aware that, in order for them to be given a political recognition, they must first matter 
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culturally. In other words, they must be “different” enough to prove their contribution to 
“diversity.”  
Under these circumstances, an approach to heritage-as-practice is also a form of 
reflecting on how groups adjust to broader political shifts by trying to redefine 
themselves in relation to the movement and rearrangement of things. In a highly 
centralized context, such as the socialist system, the agentive power is taken over by the 
state. Rearranging things deemed historically valuable becomes a prerogative of power, 
as well as a means of constituting power. In an increasingly decentralized context, such 
as post-2007 Romania, social actors aim to be treated as active participants in the 
processes of signifying materiality by exercising some control on the movement and 
rearrangement of things. They indicate a desire to participate in heritage-as-practice, 
instead of being confined to a cultural field in which “heritage” is understood within a 
grid of semiotically and physically immovable things. 
 
Outline of the dissertation 
 
This dissertation is divided in two parts. The second, third, and fourth chapters 
focus on the period between 1947 and 1971 to examine the constitution of a heritage 
domain for the socialist state. The fith and the sixth chapters represent two case studies of 
projects of European heritage development implemented in postsocialist Transylvania 
since the end of the 1990s. I compare the institutional mechanisms, the usages of 
historical narratives, and the political allegiances underlying the process of forming two, 
seemingly opposite, kinds of heritage: 1) that of a socialist state, occuring through a 





the redefinition of the relationships among these things, and 2) the revival of an ethnic 
heritage in Transylvania, such as Saxon or Hungarian, as part of more complex EU-
sponsored project of producing a “European heritage” set under the paradigm of “unity in 
diversity.”  
 In the second chapter, I sketch the picture of an institutional landscape in full 
reform, wherein small, private museums are being dismantled, collections reorganized, 
and the notions of “patrimony” and “monuments” given new meaning. Here, I explore 
the fluid and often contradictory directions within which this landscape was being 
reformatted by various actors across a relatively short period (1948-1952). I also ask to 
what extent epistemological claims, rationales and representations of history that had 
been considered too daring during the interwar period came to the fore during the 
communist regime. Archaeology, for instance, offered such a disciplinary framework. 
By moving from a discussion of the institutional reforms to an in-depth case 
study, in the third chapter I examine the transformation of Bucharest into a socialist city 
in the 1950s and 1960s. I analyze the specific understanding of history and modernization 
underlying the transformation of the capitall into a socialist city of the future and I argue 
that this process entailed a reordering not only of urban space, but also of its history.  
The fourth chapter explores the making of a heritage site that would fit the 
historical narrative of the socialist state. More specifically, I analyse the discussions and 
negotiations among different professional bodies about the archeological digs 
simultaneously opened in the central area of the city, in particular the site of the Old 
Princely Court, a location that had been the residence of the princes of Wallachia during 






post-1945 political regime, when the Old Court came to occupy a central point in the 
network of archeological digs in the city center. The results of the successive 
excavations—the unearthing of the walls of the court and some rooms of the royal 
palace—led the state-endorsed archeologists to lay new claims over the site and ask for 
the official recognition of the area as a “historical reservation.” I argue that, by portraying 
the excavations as unique tools for the discovery of the past, archaeology as a method of 
inquiry offered a scientifically grounded mechanism that directly helped the socialist 
state to carve out a new historical map of the city. 
Drawing upon my ethnographic research in Sibiu between 2004 and 2005, in the 
fifth chapter I analyse the project of reviving Sibiu’s Europeanness and thereby its 
economic potential through the historical preservation of the city’s old center. Here, I 
argue that this endeavor of reviving a Saxon heritage in a town that had been mostly 
deserted by its Saxons residents, who currently form only 1.5% of the population, should 
be approached as a political project. By investing in the rehabilitation of the historical 
houses of Sibiu’s historical center, many of which had been confiscated by the socialist 
state, the German state reinforced its request that the postsocialist Romanian state grant 
full recognition to the ethnic minorities by restituting their former possessions (especially 
land and buildings). As such, the rehabilitation of the city’s center illustrates a process of 
postsocialist decentralization occurring at the pressure of external and internal actors. At 
the same time, it also represents a form of place-marking as place-making. I argue that 
the civic beautification of Sibiu’s old center aimed to endorse a new relationship between 
the houses and their inhabitants, in which tenants would become more aware of their 





sensitive to the ethnic dimension of their houses and thereby recognize and value them as 
Saxon heritage. 
Finally, through a historical ethnography of the Bánffy castle in Bonţida, the sixth 
chapter explores how the local contestations over a project of heritage revival, currently 
pursued at the castle by an international NGO, stand in fact as a conflict over different 
temporalities and their differential currency in emerging property regimes. I analyze how 
the castle’s restoration is bolstered by a broader agenda of heritage (re)making, that of 
producing heritage as a form of political recognition in the present of the Transylvanian 
Hungarians who played a major role in the cultural and political development of the 
region before 1945 and who had been ignored or willfully forgotten during the 
communist period. I contrast this approach with the claims set forth by the local officials, 
who have appropriated the trope of “heritage” only to use it to reclaim the castle as the 
most important collective ownership of the village and to reject the validity of the Trust’s 
claims for restitution. These conflicting perspectives on heritage are grounded, I suggest, 
in diverging understandings of history, but they intersect when they become means for 







The Making of a Socialist Heritage in Romania (1947-1971) 
 
 
This part of the dissertation focuses on strategies employed by the post-1947 
socialist government to collect, rearrange and culturally transform the immovable and 
movable goods confiscated from various groups and individuals in Romania in the 
aftermaths of the Second World War. In 1947, with the direct help of the USSR, the 
Communist Party won the elections in Romania, which marked the beginning of the 
communist political regime and the country’s official inclusion in the Soviet bloc of 
influence. Between 1947 and 1953, Romania’s political, cultural, and social life was fully 
controlled by the Stalinist USSR through a wide network of Soviet councilors, who 
monitored and “offered advice” on important political projects developed by the 
Politburo in Romania. 
After Stalin’s death in 1953, many people cried, but for many more, life resumed. 
In Romania, a first wave of political prisoners, who had been sent to prison between 1949 
and 1951, were freed and some of them were relatively reintegrated in the system. The 
political regime led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej needed experts to build socialism, and 
the new cadres had been found wanting. Although the influence of the Soviet councilors 
was still strong, the Politburo in Romania tried to distance itself subtly but gradually from 
the USSR, by becoming increasingly focused on building up technological and economic 





national heritage within a socialist environment dominated by their struggles to diminish 
Soviet domination. They did so through a political project of social and spatial 
homogenization, with Bucharest as its nucleus. The pursuit of a socialist nationalist 
heritage presupposed a situation in which Bucharest, envisioned to become the socialist 
capital of the future, would become also the historical center of the country. By focusing 
on the debates around the remodeling of a central area of Bucharest, the Old Court site, I 
show how debates about “heritage” and “socialist modernization” must be approached as 
part of the same project of political resignification of material forms. I suggest that 
architecture and archaeology were regarded as two distinct technologies of producing 
social reality, to validate complementary temporal frameworks and historical spans.  
My analysis begins in 1947 with an investigation into the making of a national 
network of socialist museums, homes for the new state’s heritage. It continues with an in-
depth reading of the transcripts of the 1953 meeting of the Romanian politburo on the 
remodeling of Bucharest into “a socialist city of the future.” I then develop a 
complementary examination of the projects of history-making pursued through the 
archeological digs opened in the center of Bucharest simultaneously with the 
architectural enterprise of transforming the city into an epitome of socialist modernity. 
The analysis ends in 1972, when the Museum of the Old Court in the center of Bucharest 
was officially opened.  
During this time, significant political events occurred: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, 
the Party secretary and the state president, died in 1965, and Nicolae Ceauşescu became 
the new leader. At the beginning of his regime, he appeared to be open to economic and 






an open-minded communist leader, when he was the only one among the statesmen of the 
socialist satellites who openly opposed the USSR’s invasion of Czechslovakia in 1968. 
However, it soon turned out that Ceauşescu’s main interest lay in an increasingly national 
agenda of a peculiar interpretation. He aimed in fact to construct his own minuscule 
empire. His “July theses of 1971” marked a turning point in the cultural politics of 
socialist Romania. Any western influence in cultural developments, including literary and 
artistic life, was dramatically curtailed. Instead, there was intense pressure for producing 
a protochronist discourse of the historical continuity of the Romanian people. (“The 
protochronists” were a group of scholars in Romania of the 1980s who aimed to place the 
Romanian people at the core of the world’s history, by nonsensically arguing that the 
“proto-Romanians” had played a key role in ancient history or that they even had an 
ascendancy over all other people.) Archaeology became a means to consolidate this 
discourse by providing the material proof of such continuity. (This went to an extreme 
when archeologists were encouraged to prove a historical continuity between Ceauşescu 
and perhaps the first linguistically articulated leaders by “discovering” near his home 
village, Scorniceşti, “evidence” of the earliest Homo sapiens in Europe.88) 
More changes were to come. Ceauşescu’s agenda to fully pay Romania’s external 
debt so that to achieve complete economic autonomy from international political actors 
marked a process of rapidly decreasing living standards among Romania’s citizens. The 
regime’s agenda to achieve economic autonomy at all costs from international actors was 
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combined with a political frenzy of ostensible modernization on a national scale. The 
discourse of modernization had been part of the socialist state ideology right from the 
beginning of the regime in 1947, but the early 1980s marked an important shift in the 
ways the state implemented this agenda. A major project was the (forced) urbanization of 
Romania’s villages, which began being implemented in late 1970s.89 Feeding on dreams 
of grandiose modernization overnight, similar to Stalin’s famous “catching up 150 years 
in 10,” and promising a more efficient use of land for agriculture, a part of the 
systematization plan targeted the villages, which were to be artificially transformed into 
towns, with villagers living in collective tenement houses.90 The Romanian socialist 
government had presented this plan as a form of social and ethnic redistribution, since the 
inhabitants of the multiethnic villages of Transylvania would be soon enjoying urban 
standards of living. This project of radical spatial and social homogenization raised a 
wave of criticism in Western countries, especially due to a very active Hungarian 
diaspora who presented this project as an orchestrated form of ethnic destruction. 
Petitions had been signed worldwide by famous literati and scholars, and the organization 
“Save Romania’s Villages” was immediately formed in 1987. Those efforts 
complemented the attempts of Romanian professionals and intellectuals to raise 
awareness about the radical plans of remodeling-as-demolition that were being pursued in 
urban centers in Romania, with Bucharest being the main focus of this national 
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reconstruction program.91 Romanian intellectuals’ apparehension about the fate of old 
Bucharest took the form of numerous petitions sent to Radio Free Europe. However, what 
they were not willing to admit at that time was that “Ceauşescu’s project” of 
modernization initiated in the late 1970s in fact mirrored earlier fears of backwardness 
and hopes for modernization that informed the intellectual debates about the capital (and 
by extension, about Romania), before and during early socialism.92 
The discussion outlined in the first part of this dissertation precedes the worst part 
of Ceauşescu’s regime. I discuss some of the arguments about the modernization of 
Bucharest during the 1950s and 1960s, as they emerge from the Politburo debates about 
the transformation of “the Party’s dear child” into the “socialist city of the future.” At the 
same time, my analysis shows how the post-1971 developments had already been 
prefigured by a shift from a Western-influenced modernist architectural expression to an 
increasing interest in an architectural representation of socialism, such as the (never 
accomplished) project to transform the entire quarter nearing the Old Court Museum into 
a “reserve of national historical architecture.” A closer examination of the political 
project of heritage-making pursued during early socialism in Romania also shows how 
earlier debates became employed and exploited later, during Ceauşescu’s late years. 
More specifically, it points out how new and old experts of the past fought for positions 
of power in the system and gained them by adhering to the protochronist ideology. 
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 The chapters in Part I rely exclusively on archival documents and articles 
published in the professional journals of architecture and urban planning of the time. I 
use correspondence among central governmental bodies to show how professionals and 
politicians changed their visions of the socialist city according to ideological priorities of 
distinct political moments, on local and international scales. In contrast to the second 
part, which employs ethnographic and historical data, the following three chapters draw 








A STATE OF MATTERS: MUSEUMS, ARCHAEOLOGY AND 




When the socialist state radically shifted property regimes through 
nationalization and collectivization, all of the material forms deemed valuable became the 
people’s property, being set at a frozen zero time, that is, a continuous and permanent 
present. Inheritance—one of the major means of assessing property by vertically fixing it 
within a temporal scale where the past and present were directly linked—was no longer 
valid as a mechanism of endorsing ownership. In theory, socialism was future-oriented, 
seeing the past as to be rejected, though in practice Romanian socialism autonomized 
itself from the USSR by indigenizations involving continuity with the past. The meaning 
of heritage—as a sign of a past deemed to be representative and still valuable in the 
present—had to shift as well. That is, the value of the built structures previously regarded 
as representative of the heritage of the nation (or the region, or the city) had to be 
reassessed: some passed the test, others did not. The latter then became dispensable from 
the point of view of their symbolic historical value, being thus reduced to a practical 
functionality, like other ordinary buildings. 
 Particular imageries of the past, the present, and especially of a “bright socialist 





well defined after 1952.93 Moreover, I suggest that within this all-encompassing 
centralized structure, the new leaders initially aimed at carving out discrete fields, 
separated along disciplinary methods and material forms. They thereby configured 
“institutions of the past” (such as a well centralized network of local, regional, and 
national museums, which were also in charge of the archeological sites opened nearby) 
that were fully separated from the “institutions of the present and of the future,” such as 
the State Committee for Architecture and Constructions that was asked to transform 
“chaotic” urban fabric landscapes into strictly planned socialist cities. As I will show in 
Chapters 2 and 3, those initial visions ended up being challenged by various actors within 
and across these ideally separated fields. However, in order to fully grasp the strategies 
later employed by those professionals, we should first understand how this neat 
separation between “the past” and “the present,” reflected in the establishment of specific 
institutions, emerged from a fluid and often contradictory background of the 
immediate postwar years (1947-1951).  
Paradoxically, the new leaders of postwar Romania did not always fully and 
exclusively copy the cultural models imposed by “the center” (that is, Moscow), but also 
let themselves be inspired by alternative ideas, some of which they allowed to be grafted 
on new soil. For instance, the emerging interest in archeological sites was not necessarily 
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a mere replication of institutional models within the current Soviet system, which had 
been paying significant heed (and funding) to building a centralized archeological 
structure. In Romania, local scholars, who had been professionally trained in the late 
1930s and 1940s, held an important role in the establishment of archaeology as a pivotal 
discipline for the state. Many of them had been the disciples of the first professionally 
trained archeologist in Romania, Vasile Pârvan (1882-1927). By employing his theories 
and adjusting them to the ideological requirements of the new regime, those researchers 
established in archaeology a privileged episteme in the production of a history for the 
socialist state. I suggest that in order to understand how new meanings were imparted to 
objects and sites and how distinct theories of history coalesced in the socialist state’s 
process of “heritage-making,” we must first review the previous debates on the origins 
and forms of the “nation” emerging at the turn of the 20th century and during the interwar 
times.  
 The first part of this chapter outlines the creation of the heritage domain, which 
accompanied the formation of the Romanian state at the end of 19th century. I briefly 
discuss the ways in which the new Romanian aristocracy had pursued the creation of a 
“national heritage” through an emulation of Western imaginaries that highlighted the 
symbolic importance of a medieval past, which were then adjusted to an eclectic local 
background. I focus then on the radical breach within this imagery of heritage, a breach 
that was produced by the archeological research and methods institutionalized by Vasile 
Pârvan at the turn of the 20th century. I argue that the institutional conflict that emerged 
between Pârvan and his disciples, on one hand, and the supporters of the interwar 





paradigm shift in the writing of history in interwar Romania, but also a novel form of 
imagining and relating to the state. Ironically, some of the institutional strategies and 
epistemological claims advanced by Pârvan, which appeared too radical in the eyes of his 
contemporaries, ended up being used later by the socialist government.  
The question immediately following was who should be put in charge of this 
radical remaking of the regime of property, a key mechanism for legitimating a new body 
politic. This enterprise entailed a double process of reordering: of objects and property 
regimes and, through them, of social relations. The duality of this process becomes 
obvious if we analyze the remaking of the institutions and of the personnel set in charge 
of the museum collections across the country. I will show that the creation of a national 
network of museums, which would be assigned the pivotal task of displaying a purified 
vision of the past, became a key political nexus for the new leaders. This happened at the 
expense of the other sites, such as mansions, historical buildings, or palaces, that had to 
be reordered and redefined according to a new view of what constituted a “monument.” 
The process of defining heritage according to certain political narratives was not only 
about history-making. Since this process fundamentally required people to carry it out, it 
further created a big problem of political authority for the state because it tested the 
capacity of the new political apparatus to manage and control the network of “experts,” 
such as the personnel of the museums and institutes across the country. This production 
of heritage as orchestration of labor and redefinition of “expertise” theme is a main focus 
of the second section of the chapter. 
Through an analysis of these debates occurring among various institutions 






political moment along three discrete lines: 1) through shifting the temporal frameworks 
of the national past and identifying what material forms could signify a redefined national 
history; 2) by expanding and also creating separate categories of professional expertise 
concerning heritage and heritage-making; and 3) by stretching out and reshaping the 
boundaries of the state-endorsed institutional definition of heritage to legitimately 
encompass archaeological artifacts and other movable forms of heritage as state 
possesions. 
 
Archaeology, Modernization, and Representations of the Past in Interwar Romania  
 
As the sons of gentry boyars, the French-educated urban elites of mid-19th century 
Wallachia and Moldovia had pursued the construction of a 19th century Romanian 
national identity by engaging in various searches for “the essence of the people.” Those 
quests ranged from literary productions written in a romantic key to more pragmatically-
oriented expeditions aiming to collect not only folklore, but also material traces of the 
past.94 As such, the “national heritage” was the result of a dynamic, and contested, 
combination of a western Romantic penchant for medieval sites along with regional 
compulsions to identify a “national self” rooted in an Orthodox religious legacy. 95 By the 
                                                        
94 For a more detailed account of the phenomenon of antiquarianism in the early modern Romanian state, 
see Mircea Anghelinu, Evoluţia gândirii teoretice în arheologia românească. Concepte şi modele aplicate 
în preistorie (Târgoviște: Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2003), 72-100.  
95 A recent analysis of the national self-identifications emerging in the Balkans at the end of the 19th 
century point describes them as “refractions,” that is, as dynamic combinations of multiple projects of 
modernity, rather than mere passive and exclusive “reflections” of a Western model. See Diana Mishkova, 
"Symbolic Geographies and Visions of Identity: A Balkan Perspective," European Journal of Social 
Theory 11, no. 2 (2008), 237–56. Those national self-images must be understood, Mishkova argues, as 
being produced not only through a fascination with a French political and cultural background (such as in 
the Romanian principalities), but also through cultural models induced by the modernizing reforms of the 





end of the 19th century, those collections of objects (mostly medieval inscriptions and 
religious objects and sites), as well as major religious sites, came to represent valuable 
instruments for the new state. Within this context, a widespread interest in “antiquities 
and archeological sites” among the late 19th century Romanian literati and politicians 
(partly inspired by “bovaric” longings for French cultural practices) had rapidly led to the 
establishment of the Commission for Public Monuments in 1874, which included the 
Museum of Antiquities, already established in 1834.96 This development encouraged 
interest in the material representation and preservation of a national identity, which was 
now for the first time presented as a scientifically valid and politically legitimate pursuit. 
The Commission for Historical Monuments and the Archeological Committee under the 
Museum of Antiquities became the main agents in the process of sketching a taxonomy 
of heritage for the newly formed Kingdom of Romania. Their purpose was to serve an 
emerging notion of collective identity inspired by Western projections of the nation-state, 
in which the main strategy of forming and legitimizing a body politic was to classify 
sites, buildings, and objects and transform them into national “heritage.”  
The first Law on Historical Monuments and the Law on the Antique Monuments 
and Antiquities, which both appeared in 1892, represented a pivotal moment for the 
consolidation of state heritage. Closely following the French model of creating a new 
state by collecting and ordering various material forms as patrimony, the 1892 law on 
antiquities specified that “all of the objects discovered in the ground, even on private 
land, belong to the state, with the entrepreneur not being able to appropriate them under 
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any circumstances.”97 In addition, all churches built prior to 1847 were declared 
“historical monuments” and set under the state’s protection. Obviously, such stipulations 
triggered intense debates among various groups as to the “proper” approach the state 
should take toward “private property.” This attempt at protection and centralization was a 
strategy of materially creating the state by assigning a “national value” to material forms 
so that they could no longer be claimed by non-nationals, be they landowners or amateur 
French or German archeologists. Moreover, this strategy of legitimizing a new state by 
forming and displaying “it” as material objects must be understood in the context in 
which the state was seeking to establish its own (“national”) wealth. It did so not only 
through the requisition of the land of Orthodox monasteries and a process of institution-
making and industrialization, but also by securing a tight control over this wealth by 
means of limiting the development of a large urban middle class and postponing a radical 
land redistribution to the peasants.98  
In 1913, the Romanian government passed a new Law on the Preservation and 
Restoration of Historical Monuments. The leading archeologist, Vasile Pârvan, then the 
director of the Museum of Antiquities, publicly criticized this law for offering a 
privileged position to the Commission at the expense of the Museum. Pârvan noted that 
the new law guaranteed the Commission a full monopoly over current archeological sites 
and ongoing archeological research throughout the country. Moreover, he pointed out 
that the Commission had traditionally favored the preservation of “medieval monuments” 
at the expense of “the ruins of antiquity and the scientific research about them.” By 
debunking the Commission’s “exclusive and limited” treatment of late medieval, 
                                                        
97 Cezara Mucenic, "Legislaţia privind monumentele istorice din România 1892-1992," Revista 
Monumentelor Istorice LXI, no. 2 (1992), 14-20.  





especially Orthodox, churches as the major category of “monuments,” Pârvan challenged 
the Commission’s privileged position as the sole institutional body entrusted by the state 
with selecting and promoting specific material forms as “the past of the nation.” With 
Vasile Pârvan, generally acknowledged as a primary promoter of the discipline of 
archaeology and the founder of the archeological school of interwar Romania, divergent 
models of time came to bear on theories of nation formation. The controversy that he and 
his disciples spurred around the powers attributed to the Commission for Historical 
Monuments signaled a clash between diverging temporal frameworks of imagining the 
“national past” and different imaginaries of history that were framed in terms of specific 
material forms. How were those temporal frameworks grounded in different material 
forms of representing the past?  
Pârvan’s model of history, grounded in an archeological paradigm of 
ethnogenesis, came to challenge and displace an earlier, Romantic understanding of the 
nation, one that had been grounded in exclusively linguistic arguments. Pârvan proposed 
an epistemological framework that was materially grounded and used artifacts to make 
the origins of the nation more “palpable” and thus imaginable. I suggest that Pârvan 
aimed at radically redefining the temporal framework of the nation and thereby proposed 
a novel representation of history through archeological artifacts, which he promoted as 
forms of heritage more valuable than the medieval churches. He approached the question 
of ethnogenesis not from a linguistic angle, as had an earlier generation of scholars, but 
from a new interest in non-linguistic forms of history, a history inscribed in a “new” 
matter that had been recently unearthed from the ground. Pârvan’s criticism of the 






a new body politic for the Romanian state, one that was no longer defined by a historical 
imaginary circumscribed by the religious monuments of the late Middle Ages. The 
debates initiated by Pârvan led to conflicts between the Commission for Historical 
Monuments and the Museum of Antiquities during the interwar years, conflicts that 
emerged out of diverging visions of the ‘matters’ of history— what history is and how it 
should be represented. 
The approach to national history advanced by Pârvan and his later project of 
institutionalizing archaeology as a pivotal discipline for the legitimization of the new 
post-1918 Romanian state must be understood in the context of his earlier training in 
ancient history and archaeology at the universities of Jena and Berlin, where he had been 
exposed to radical shifts in understandings of the ancient world as well as debates about 
the genesis of modern nations. At the same time that the model of a Kulturnation, or the 
idea that a nation was constituted by a shared cultural legacy, was being rejected, earlier 
(19th century) endeavors in the study of antiquity as defined by a Greco-Roman paradigm 
were being challenged by a growing interest in a Germanic past.99 By cutting the ties to 
the Scandinavian antiquarian scholarship from which it had emerged, archaeology in 
Germany was turning into a political mechanism for defining ethnic groups as “naturally” 
formed entities that evolved into nations.100 Pârvan employed these arguments when he 
tried to “stretch” the temporal framework of the nation by calling upon the heuristic value 
                                                        
99 Bernard Mees, "Hitler and Germanentum," Journal of Contemporary History 39, no. 2 (2004), 255-70. 
100 Such an epistemological climate favored the development of “cultural-historical” paradigm, promoted 
by German archeologist Gustav Kossina starting in the 1920s. This view promoted the model of 
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contemporary nations. For a critical discussion of Kossina’s paradigm and its employment in Central and 
Eastern Europe, see Florin Curta, "Introduction," in East Central and Eastern Europe in the Early Middle 
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of antiquity in identifying national traits presumed to have emerged much earlier than a 
medieval past. Therefore, the new paradigms of “indigenous archaeology” that emerged 
in early 20th century Germany played a pivotal role in Pârvan’s attempt to institutionalize 
a totalizing archeological project, one that would allow a new regional history to be 
written from non-linguistic forms of evidence: archeological artifacts.101  
Pârvan’s institutional project of promoting archaeology as a key technology for 
producing and validating the new state cannot be separated from his organicist vision of 
history. One could ask: how was it possible that a pervasive positivist call for science and 
method could cohabit with, or even disguise, an institutionalization of the “sciences of 
the nation,” that is, scientific legitimation of various forms of “national essences”? 
Historian Sorin Antohi coined the term “ethnic ontology” to describe the process of 
“endowing the ethnie/nation with an ontology of its own means,” under which the nation 
is set within a self-confined verticality and divested of any geopolitical comparison, in 
which categories are simultaneously indigenized and universalized.102 In order to 
understand Pârvan’s approach to the production of historical evidence and knowledge, I 
suggest we read Antohi’s analysis of the production of “ethnic ontologies” in interwar 
Romania through Jorg Rusen’s discussion of the double effect of modernization: an 
inescapable diachronic comparison that creates a permanent need for the re-enchantment 
of the past. Rusen writes: 
Modernization is [...] an internal process of rationalization in dealing with the past. 
[...] But rationalization is only one side of the coin of modernization. There is always 
                                                        
101 Pârvan wanted to start a project together with other specialists in the Balkans, that would involve a 
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region of Southeastern Europe. Alexandru Elian, "Introducere," in Orașul București. Volumul I (1395-
1800), ed. Alexandru Elian (redactor responsabil), et al. (București: Editura Academiei Republicii 
Socialiste România, 1965), 37. 






a reaction against it, a re-enchantment in the relationship to the past which at least 
compensates for the loss of sense and meaning brought about by rational 
methodologies. So the comparative approach to historiography should always keep in 
mind both rational disenchantment and a compensatory irrational re-enchantment or 
new, reformulated (“reformed”) sources and potentials of the sense of meaning of the 
temporal dimension of human life. 103  
 
In his attempts to challenge the medieval temporal framework for the material 
representation of the national past, as promoted by the Commission for Historical 
Monuments, Pârvan ultimately called upon the scientific validity of archeological 
evidence to ground a more implacable argument on the formation of “the Romanian 
nation.” At the same time, he also brought along a different form of re-enchantment with 
the past, one rooted in a fascination with antiquity that made him extend the temporal 
framework of the nation, by adopting an (after all, very Romantic) notion of the “rhythm 
of history.”104 He did so by offering his own sort of “ethnic onthology,” one based on 
material objects, that understood the ethnie as fixed to a specific territory. He emerged 
then as an interesting scholarly figure of the interwar times in Romania, one who 
attempted to advance a novel configuration of the material representation of the past. 
Pârvan’s approach to “historical evidence” and his critical take on the Commission 
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104 His understanding of history as “rhythm” is strikingly similar to sociologist Dimitrie Gusti’s 
understanding of a unique “will” underlying the formation of a nation. Both Pârvan and Gusti, key figures 
in the formation of the state-endorsed Romanian Social Institute, envisioned total, exhaustive and fully 
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transforming the Museum of Antiquities into the central body for coordinating all of the archeological 
research in the country. With the help of regional history museums, which were subordinated to the 
Museum of Antiquities, he hoped to produce a comprehensive “Archeological Map of Romania” while 
promoting archaeology as a scientifically autonomous discipline and method of inquiry. See Alexandru 
Zub, Pe urmele lui Vasile Pârvan [Following the Footsteps of Vasile Pârvan] (București: Sport Turism, 
1983). As such, Pârvan, a founding member of the Romanian Social Institute (formerly the Association for 
Social Reform), which was established in 1918 to “develop solutions of scientific reorganization of 
Romanian society,” played a key role in the process of scientifically endorsing post-1918 Greater Romania. 
For a discussion of Gusti’s project to develop sociology as “science of the nation,” see Emanuela Grama, 
"Creating ‘the Science of the Nation’: The Romanian Social Institute and the Politics of Modernization in 





occurred at the conjunction of a series of epistemological developments that echoed 
wider paradigm shifts while being locally grounded in particular struggles over 
institutional capital. The methodology proposed by the “Critical School,” established by 
Nicolae Iorga and other Romanian historians at the turn of the century, was brought 
under scrutiny by the next generation of historians led by Constantin Giurescu. Pârvan 
himself occupied a peculiar space within this shift, having inherited the Hegelian vision 
of total history from Iorga while also promoting a positivist focus on the sources. 
Giurescu proposed a new perspective on the production of history within an 
institutionalized framework by promoting a renewed positivist insistence on sources as 
the exclusive means to write history. This insistence was combined with a programmatic 
call for a shift from the writing of history within the paradigm of a maestro and his 
disciples, to the writing of history as a collective project informed by a common 
methodology.105 
Ironically, Pârvan’s vision of archaeology as a particularly powerful strategy of 
grounding a body politic came to be recognized by the new socialist state after 1947. 
Pârvan’s dream, never fulfilled during his short lifetime, that of having the Museum of 
Antiquities transformed into a national Institute of Archaeology, came true only in 1956. 
Many of Pârvan’s disciples became appointed to key positions within the new scientific 
apparatus, being entrusted with the task of developing archaeology as a scientific method 
for endorsing the ideology of the new state. To explain how this happened and why, I 
must first move backwards a few years, to an apparently minor event in the turbulent 
postwar period, a moment marking the dissolution of the Commission for Historical 
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Monuments, the institutional rival of the Museum of Antiquities during the interwar 
years.  
 
Museums and Monuments: Redefining and Rearranging Materiality (1950-1952) 
 
On May 5, 1950, to the dismay of its members and despite their efforts to 
maintain its validity within the new regime, the Commission for Historical Monuments 
(henceforth, the Commission), an institution that had held significant political leverage 
during the interwar period, was officially dismantled. The newly established Committee 
for Cultural Establishments (henceforth, the Committee), formed after its Soviet 
equivalent, was to take over the former responsibilities of the Commission under its new 
Department for Museums and Monuments (Serviciul Muzee şi Monumente).106 Soon 
thereafter, the Committee asked the directorate of the former Commission to transfer all 
of its collections and documents (“the archive, memos, and correspondence regarding the 
monuments”) to them.107 It took more than one month for the Committee to receive the 
requested materials, containing an immense volume of material.108 Understandably, the 
former members of the now non-existent Commission could not easily let go of such a 
                                                        
106 The Committee for Cultural Establishment, attached to the Council of Ministers, was founded via 
Decree 63/March 17, 1950. It was dissolved on November 30, 1953, when it became included, together 
with other provisory Committees, in the new Ministry of Culture. 
107 The collection of the (interwar) Commission of Historical Monuments, deposited at the Archives of the 
National Institute for Historical Monuments (Arhiva Comisiunii Monumentelor Istorice, henceforth 
ACMI/AINMI). File 3880, “Organizare, Servicii, Personal, Colaborări, 1945-1950,” 46. 
108 As the director of the former Commission, Victor Brătulescu assessed, the collection was formed of “an 
archive dating from 1914, the publications, the library, the chromatic and glass negatives, the 
photographical archive, the collections and the deposit of publications that have been issued since 1908.” 
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Council of Ministers), sent by the Comission on the official document carrying the heading of the Ministry 
of Arts and Information. Nr. 420, dated May 7, 1948. See also the note about several requests of the 





precious collection, especially since they suspected that a great deal of this material might 
end up in the garbage can of history, as obsolete scrap paper.109 
Immediately after this request, soon to be endowed with such a notable volume of 
records and recently invested with the authority of defining the cultural policies of the 
new state, the Committee sent a general circular to all of the Provisory Regional 
Assemblies in the country (the temporary bodies preceding the Executive Committees of 
the People’s Councils, to be established in 1951). The Assemblies were asked to pursue a 
detailed survey of the museums in their regions, with precise directions on how to 
conduct their investigation.110 The survey entailed also an inventory of the historical 
monuments, which, “even though they had been owned by exploiters in the past, 
represent monuments constituting our people’s patrimony, and must therefore be 
preserved in their current state as documents of the past of our Fatherland.”111  
The monitoring of this wide range of cultural artifacts, ranging from museum 
collections to sites and buildings, should be read as an attempt on the part of the new 
socialist state to construct anew a body politic for itself. After having acquired a clearer, 
thorough record of the things and sites that had now to be included in the socialist 
                                                        
109 As the current archivist of the National Institute for Historical Monuments, Iuliu Șerban, told me, the 
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heritage, as a key part of the sacred collective property of the people, the state needed 
proper caretakers for this domain. The inventory of the collections, and historical 
buildings was soon to be followed by an inventory of people. The latter one, however, 
proved to be rather difficult. 
A few months after the first circular, the Committee sent off a detailed list of local 
museums, which were to be established or reopened across the country, being included in 
the local budget of the People’s Councils for the subsequent year (1951). At the same 
time, the Committee requested the Councils to “take measures to fill [the museums] with 
politically and professionally suitable personnel.”112 The local Councils were advised to 
contact the universities and the principal museums in their region for suggestions on the 
potential personnel, on the condition that the new employees would be ultimately verified 
by the cadres of the People’s Councils.113 The demand to fill in the empty slots was soon 
followed by a decision of the Council of Ministers, which required an immediate 
inventory of all the historical, ethnographical, and scientific objects of exceptional value, 
existing at that moment in the museums of RPR.114 The decision was accompanied by 
detailed instructions on the making of this inventory: after the directors of the museums 
had put together the lists of the highly valuable objects in their collections, the leaders of 
the cultural departments of the People’s Councils were to verify the thoroughness of the 
collection and then submit the lists to the Committee.115  
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It seems, though, that such an enterprise was not an easy one. The Committee sent 
several memos noting the discrepancies between how the project was envisioned at the 
center and the ways in which it was implemented across the country.116 For instance, a 
circular sent by the Committee to all of the executive committees of the local Councils 
pointed out the recurrent troubles of the central authorities and forced them to confront 
the difficult task of identifying politically and intellectually “qualified” personnel for the 
bureaucracy of the new state: 
there had been cases in some counties where unsuitable people had been 
proposed to occupy positions in museums. They were uneducated, recruited from 
other types of jobs, and in some cases, were relatives of various local cadres. Our 
committee, which had been struggling to have the diagram/schema/system of the 
Museums approved, arguing for the necessity of well-prepared scientific 
personnel, will approve of no nominee that does not correspond to the standards 
laid out above.117 
 
Initially, the new personnel for the ever-expanding network of local museums 
were to be recruited directly by the People’s Councils, after previous consultations with 
the directors of the museums. The potential candidates were to be politically “checked” 
by the cadres of the Council, and the lists of the final candidates then submitted to the 
Committee. However, only a week afterwards, further questions were being raised 
regarding the decisions reached by some of the local Councils—that is, the central 
authorities learned that some of the local cadres went far beyond their attributed powers, 
since “in some regions, the proposals for the new personnel are done without seeking 
advice from the museums’ directors; hence, incompetent persons are selected, by means 
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other than the professional and scientific criteria.”118 Under these circumstances, a second 
circular was issued to modify the earlier one, by requesting that  
the lists of candidates [for the positions in the local museums] be ‘collectively’ 
drafted by the leader of the Cultural Section of the People’s Council, together 
with the director of the main regional museum, as well as all the directors of the 
county museums. Also, in the regions where there are Institutes of Philosophy and 
History of the RPR Academy, the consultation with the directors of those 
institutions will be mandatory.119 
 
However, the new directions given by the second circular did not seem to bring 
any major change in the ways in which the recruitment of the new personnel, as well as 
the inventorying of the collections, was being carried out on the ground. This must be the 
reason why the President of the Committee issued yet another decree, which directly 
aimed at “controlling the nomination of the specialized personnel in the regional or 
county museums, and the inventorying of the museum collections.”120 The new ordinance 
(the third one within a month) asked that the directors of the regional and county 
museums no longer “draft and submit the lists of the nominees for the new positions in 
museums, as well as the list of the museums’ current employees.” Under this new decree, 
the People’s Councils were no longer invited to actively contribute to the recruitment of 
the museum personnel, but rather they were offered a secondary role, that of making sure 
that the lists were drafted and submitted on time.121 This latter decision points out that as 
much as the new state wanted to rely on the new people—that is, the political cadres—to 
carry out the making of the socialist institutions, the leaders were forced to admit that 
those people lacked not only the scientific expertise, but also a moral commitment to “the 










The difficulty for the central socialist authorities to find trustworthy and reliable 
subjects among the local cadres has been recently documented. Writing about the first 
stages of the collectivization process, Verdery points out that the newly appointed cadres 
could get away with a wide range of abuses of power due to the inability of the Party to 
fully manage such a radical project of redistributing goods while controlling everyone 
involved (that is, the persuaders and those who were to be persuaded to give in to the new 
Party-state).122 She writes: 
Across the entire period, policy oscillated between centralization and 
decentralization: when Party leaders wanted to control the process, they tried to 
centralize it, inevitably slowing the pace; when they wanted to increase the pace, 
they had to decentralize. This, in turn, led to their losing control of their cadres and 
to local abuses of power, as cadres competed with one another to sign up more 
villagers.123  
 
As Verdery argues, it was these abuses of power in which the newly appointed cadres 
engaged at the beginning of the regime. This emerging regime produced and then 
reinforced a social landscape marked by “careerism, insubordination, network-
embeddedness, and clientelism that were the hallmarks of Romanian communist 
society.”124  
While collectivization was a broad project, searching for new “experts of the 
past” to be placed within the new local elites as producers and custodians of the new 
cultural institutions was a more manageable enterprise. Hence, the multiple circulars that 
the Committee kept sending to all of the People’s Councils in the country, showing that 
the central authorities were carefully watching the selection of the would-be local cultural 
                                                        
122 Katherine Verdery, "Abusive Cadres in a Voracious Party-State: Romanian Collectivization in the 
1950s," NCEEER Working Paper (July 2009). 
123 Ibid., 7. 






activists. Indeed, as Verdery notes, the lack of qualified personnel in the immediate 
postwar years was a widespread phenomenon.125 (In the next chapter, I discuss how two 
years later [1953] the Council of Ministers was still bemoaning the lack of cadres, 
acknowledging the shortage of specialists needed for the massive project of urban 
remodeling in Bucharest. The leaders found themselves forced to “welcome” back some 
of the “old elements” who had been admittedly bourgeois, but also “talented 
architects.”)126 Given the tight control that the Committee maintained over the 
recruitment of the new personnel for the museums across the country, it becomes evident 
that these institutions represented key sites for political propaganda. The organization of 
museums had represented a priority for the state right from the beginning, as a July 1951 
official decision states:  
In the struggle that the regime of the People’s Democracy is currently carrying on, 
the museums must stop representing simple deposits of collections; they must turn 
into genuine instruments of the Party and the government, by directly contributing 
to the great activities of building socialism, democracy and peace in the People’s 
Republic of Romania.127  
 
The central authorities were therefore interested in establishing a secure network 
of museums as ideologically stable recipients for what was soon to follow: an equally 
stable and pervasive narrative of history, to be set within (and produced by) museum 
collections that had been thoroughly “rearranged and developed according to the 
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principles of historical materialism.”128 Among those newly selected objects, I will argue, 
archeological artifacts became a particularly important category.  
However, before being purged, selected, and rearranged, these objects were to be 
first identified and collected. Immediately after its establishment, the Committee began 
this enterprise not only by pursuing a survey of the existent museum collections, but also 
by collecting “all of the books and museum pieces” that existed in the recently 
nationalized mansions and villas.129 A circular sent by the Committee asked all of the 
Provisory Regional Assembles (the temporary bodies preceding the Executive 
Committees of the People’s Councils) to immediately collect the books and objects left in 
the expropriated mansions in each region, with the books and furniture being channeled 
to the local libraries, while the other museum pieces were directed to the regional 
museums.130 Soon afterwards, the Committee decided to invest significant funding into 
the acquisition of more objects for museums collections. The Executive Committees of 
the People’s Councils received special subventions aiming at “the reorganization of the 
regional, city, and county museums; openings of new exhibitions, and the acquisition of 
museum objects.”131  
Also, the decision signals one more aspect of the making of the heritage of the 
new state. Whereas the museums seemed to have become a key political institution as the 
makers of specific representations of the past, the domain of “monuments” was less 
clearly defined. Indeed, as early as September 1950, immediately after its establishment, 
the Committee had sent out general directions regarding the protection of buildings 
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deemed historical monuments. These initial directions sent to all of the Provisory 
Regional Assemblies, stressed that no renovation should be done to the buildings that 
were 100 years or older, without prior permission from the central authorities.132 A 
second, more detailed circular was issued a month later, in October 1950, with more 
detailed instructions. It asked that, “in agreement with the Law for the preservation of 
historical monuments passed on July 29, 1919, which is still valid, buildings of all kinds, 
houses, palaces, castles, fortresses, churches, monasteries, displaying interesting 
architectural motifs, which had been built before 1834, are considered historical 
monuments.”133 Therefore, “they must be preserved in their current state and cannot be 
demolished under any circumstances.”134 More specifically, any form of renovation or 
remodeling was forbidden, and no “inscription, herald, plate, emblem” was to be taken 
down, without prior approval of the Committee. The heads of the cultural divisions of the 
local assemblies were held responsible for the further destruction of such monumental 
buildings that were no longer inhabited.135 
However, these directives were not very effective with respect to the country’s 
actual architectural landscape. Most of the monumental civic architecture in Romania had 
been erected after the middle of the 19th century, as a direct consequence of the 
modernization and rapid development following the formation of the Romanian state in 
1859. Many of the more imposing buildings in the fledging cities appeared only 
immediately before or around the turn of the 20th century. Moreover, some of the earlier 
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castles and mansions in the countryside had also been altered around that time, in order to 
accommodate the aesthetic preferences and a new life style of an emerging middle class. 
Therefore, most of the buildings that constituted the urban fabric of the cities up to the 
war were in fact not within the temporal framework that represented “the past”—“before 
1834”—and therefore were not legally protected. 
This meant automatically that the list of sites not to be demolished became 
drastically reduced, by paradoxically calling upon an obsolete law, which the former 
Commission for Historical Monuments had been preparing to annul. The situation of the 
nationalized buildings that had been built after 1834, that is, most of them, was therefore 
extremely precarious. In fact, with their former owners expelled, emigrated, thrown in 
prison, or in the communist labor force, there were not many left to take care of them. 
Depending on their location and size, they became sites for the new bureaucracy of the 
party or headquarters for collective farms, or ended up being abandoned altogether. After 
the dismantling of the Commission for Historical Monuments, there were few specialists 
left to travel in the country and monitor the conditions of the sites. With the architects of 
the former Commission transferred to other institutions and in other positions, the 
Committee instituted local “Collectives for the historical monuments,” which had to be 
instituted in each “region, county, and city,” being “attached to the local museums […] or 
to the cultural sections of the People’s Councils, if there are no museums.”136 
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The collectives were then to start anew a laborious project that had already been 
carried out for more than half of century by the Commission for Historical Monuments. 
On the one hand, the Committee really wanted to get hold of the archive and resources of 
the now dismantled Commission, but on the other, they wanted to assemble their own 
archive and records ab initio, set up by trustworthy comrades, who would establish new 
hierarchies and monuments lists, by relying on their own understanding of what history 
was and how should it be represented. Apparently, those collectives had not produced 
any significant results, since a year afterwards, in October 1951, the Council of Ministers 
(the most important governmental body, the leader of the state) sent a circular directly to 
all the Executive committees of the People’ s Councils asking them to take immediate 
measures for the monuments’ protection. Following a report of the Scientific 
Commission of Museums and Historical and Artistic Monuments of the Academy that 
pointed out the critical situation of the monuments and historical sites in the country, the 
ordinance gave detailed instructions on the buildings and sites that should undergo such 
protection.137 More interestingly, the monuments were separated into four distinct 
categories: archeological, historical, architectural, and art monuments.138 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(architects, engineers) of the “regional administrative unit.” The collectives were also set in charge of the 
protection and preservation measures, by recruiting amateurs to study the “old architecture” and put 
together plans that would be then centralized in order to request governmental funding for restoration 
projects. Even attached to the regional, city or communal museums, the collectives were envisioned as 
relatively autonomous units, which had to draft work plans and submit reports directly to the Central 
Committee. 
137 ACMI/AINMI, File 3814 “Acte normative muzee si monumente, 1947-1952,” 41. Circular nr. 18.938, 
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This distinction marked a significant shift in the institutional take on “the past.” 
During the interwar period, the Commission for Historical Monuments had been set in 
charge of the “protection of the prehistoric, classic, medieval and in general historical 
sites, as well as of the buildings and objects that appear to be of artistic or historical 
interest.”139 In other words, the Commission was set in charge of every form of 
materiality deemed to carry “historical value.” Interestingly, right after the organization 
of the Committee for Cultural Establishments in 1950, the newly appointed director 
wrote a note concerned with the new criteria of selection, which separated “art 
monuments” from the “historical” ones, each distributed to distinct institutions (the first 
to the Committee for Arts, and the latter to the Committee for Cultural 
Establishments).140 Pointing out that such a distinction is not valid, as all monuments 
carry aesthetic and historical value, he suggested that one single institution must be 
responsible for all of them. A logical argument, his request asked in fact that the former 
Commission be established under a new form—or, in a more pragmatic interpretation, 
that the newly established Committee fully acquire the power of decision-making over 
and consequently the resources to protect all forms of “monument.”141  
But the more important part of the note is what the director wrote at the 
beginning. According to him, “until very recently,” the selection criteria relied upon on a 
temporal element: that is, the monuments dated before the year 1200 were relegated to 
the Institute of History and Philosophy of the Romanian Academy, whereas those built 
afterwards were set under the supervision of the former Minister of Arts (in fact, under 
the responsibility of the now dismantled Commission for Historical Monuments, active 
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until May 1950).142 I suggest that the director alluded to a de facto state of affairs that 
characterized the workings of the Commission in the period 1919-1950. That is, even if 
the 1919 Law entrusted the Commission with full responsibility over all forms of 
“historical monument,” most of the members of the Commission, many of them 
architects and historians, had manifested a stronger penchant for late medieval, especially 
Orthodox, churches, which they treated as the major category of “monuments.” This state 
of affairs had led Pârvan to unsuccessfully fight for the recognition of a separate 
institution (the Museum of Antiquities, which was included in the Academy after the war, 
as the Institute of Archaeology), which would become responsible for the current and 
future archeological sites. What was Pârvan’s main argument? It now appears obvious to 
us: he argued that “the past” cannot just be represented through material forms placed 
above ground, such as medieval buildings (most of them, churches), but that it must be 
also sought underneath the ground, in the older strata preserving much older ruins and 
artifacts. Beneath the steps of his fellow citizens, he contended, there was lying an entire 
“new” past, waiting to be unearthed and displayed—an archeological map, that would 
complement and ground the geographical map of Greater Romania.  
It is this “new” past, represented by archeological findings, that greatly appealed 
to the new leaders, as it offered the promise to meet the ideological premises of building 
a new world of socialism, as well as grounding this world, literally and symbolically, by 
providing it with a novel form of heritage. I suggest that archaeology provided a material 
form of representing the past that appeared the most adequate from a political point of 
view. Archeological artifacts ended up being amassed, redistributed and displayed 







a pivotal role in the creation of a heritage for the socialist state. The local museums 
offered the perfect framework, set within an aura of scientific and historical accuracy, 
within which the socialist regime was “glued” to a medieval past represented by artifacts 
and thereby presented as a predetermined historical stage, perfectly fitting the teleological 
vision of Marxism as well as its emphasis on materialism. The archeological artifacts 
unearthed from the ground became thus more important than the built structures of the 
past times (the latter were to be fully replaced by the new buildings of the socialist urban 
aesthetics). 
In comparison to the interwar period, when “heritage” had been mostly 
represented by old built structures, the socialist state of the 1950s began to amass 
archeological artifacts in order to create a different form of heritage. The artifacts 
represented a different kind of materiality, one that was both “new” and often more 
mobile (being thus able to be inscribed and displayed as state property). (I develop this 
argument at length in the fourth chapter.) In addition to the major operations of 
nationalization and collectivization, this process of agglomerating artifacts stood as 
another form of channeling resources to the center—the key strategy by which the 
communist state aimed to consolidate its power.143  
Archeologists could enjoy significant institutional support as early as 1951, when 
the Museum of Antiquities, “the national authority of the archeological research during 
the interwar years,” became included in the newly established Institute of History and 
Philosophy of the Academy.144 In 1953, the first network of archeological sites was 
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opened in the central area of Bucharest, being first set under the supervision of the 
Institute’s researchers.145 As soon as the Museum of Bucharest was officially opened in 
1958, the current and future archeological sites as well as the supervision of the 
archeological research to be conducted on the area of Bucharest were transferred to the 
Museum.146 However, the Institute of Archaeology, as the “most powerful institution” in 
the field retaining the majority of Pârvan’s disciples, remained at the core of a highly 
centralized system of archeological research, benefiting from institutional and symbolic 
privileges throughout the socialist period. Under these circumstances, the newly 
established regional museums, the other two Institutes of Archaeology (in Cluj and Iaşi, 
the other two important university centers), as well as the research conducted within the 
departments of archaeology and history at the universities, could not alter much the 
position of institutional dominance held by the Institute.147 Indeed, as I will show in the 
next chapter, some of those more marginal actors, such as the Museum of Bucharest, at 
least tried to do so, but without much success. 
 
Above ground: Architecture for a non-historical Future 
 
Bearing this context in mind, I would like to return to the note sent by the 
Committee for Cultural Establishments in October 1951, which mentioned the separation 
of “monuments” into four distinct categories. I contend that this separation marked a key 
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shift in the official representation of “the past,” and thereby in the process of history 
production pursued by the socialist state. In other words, architectural forms of heritage 
(reclassified in categories of monuments) were severely circumscribed because they 
could not as easily signify a past that would fit the ideology of the socialist state. An 
examination of the descriptions of each category points to the artificial boundaries that 
had been drawn among those four forms of “monument.” The Committee’s director was 
obviously right to argue that all monuments share an aesthetic and historical 
dimension.148 However, the separation was crucial for legitimizing a more complex 
rearrangement of material forms to fit the new property regime. That is, the “art 
monuments,” represented by “paintings, sculptures, engravings, fountains, monumental 
paintings separated from architectural monuments,” could have been more easily moved 
around, and in most cases placed in the recently established national network of 
museums. (This is when some of the most valuable ones did not end up as decoration 
objects in the villas “redistributed” to the newly installed apparatchiks.) Therefore, the 
state could be immediately endowed with a significant heritage, in the form of the art 
objects collected from the nationalized houses across the country and distributed to the 
“instruments of the Party:” the museums. However, the rearrangement and the 
centralization of the immovable heritage, formed of the nationalized buildings and 
assemblies (castles, mansions, villas, etc.), proved to be a more difficult task. Hence, the 
Committee for Cultural Establishments showed limited interest in developing a tight 
policy of controlling this heritage (in contrast to their diligent involvement in a country 
wide control of the new museum collections and personnel). Therefore, the archeological 
                                                        







sites, which were automatically considered “historical,” and therefore scientific, were 
assigned for further research and supervision to the Academy (more specifically, to the 
Scientific Commission of Museums, Art and Historical Monuments, established in 1951 
and formed of members of the Academy).149  
What was left were the architectural sites: some of them could be still considered 
“historical,” on the condition that they “had been directly linked to important events in 
our Fatherland’s past.” In other words, they could be used as safe lieux-de-memoire, to 
tell a story that would fit the grand narrative of socialist History. The others, those that 
were “not connected to significant historical facts,” but were rich in architectural motifs, 
and “could contribute to the study of architectural evolution,” were included in the 
category of “architectural monuments.”  
As non-historical sites, the latter could therefore be assigned to a separate 
institution. Consequently, after having been relatively abandoned since the abrogation of 
the Commission in 1950, the sites and buildings that remained standing during this time 
and preserved a good part of their architectural value were set under the supervision of 
the State Committee for Architecture and Constructions. Established in November 1952 
as the governmental body in charge of the remodeling of all cities in socialist Romania, 
this new institution—more exactly, its Department for Monuments—was also responsible 
for supervising and organizing “the protection and preservation of the historical 
architectural monuments on the territory of the People’s Republic of Romania.”150  
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In other words, those sites and buildings were valuable for the history of 
architecture, but were not deemed valuable for the new historical narrative, which would 
be produced by the Academy. They did not seem to be as “historically” valuable as other 
forms of materiality—that is, the archeological sites and artifacts—because the 
architectural forms were relatively too new to be able to be employed as signs of the past 
for the new state. They were reminders of “a past” that started with the modernization of 
Romania under King Carol I, moved into quests for a “National Style” in architecture that 
emerged at the turn of the century, and then exploded during the interwar period as 
products of the fervent debates between modernists and preservationists (represented by 
the members of the Commission for Historical Monuments). This (grossly summarized) 
“past” was not part of the historical trajectory that the new state wanted to display and 
especially identify with. Those buildings and assemblies represented rather “a past” that 
needed to be leveled and camouflaged as much as possible, when it could not be 
demolished altogether.  
At the moment of the establishment of the State Committee for Architecture and 
Constructions, the political meaning and potential use of those “architectural 
monuments” was still ambiguous. In fact, confusion was looming large at that time. Only 
a few months earlier, in June 1952, the Party leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej had 
successfully orchestrated the ousting of three key members of the Politburo.151 This 
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move, approved by Stalin, strengthened Dej’s position in the Party, as well as froze any 
incipient projects in the larger cultural and artistic sphere that did not strictly follow the 
Party line.152  
More changes were to come. Mărginean (2008) nicely captures the shifts 
occurring in the field of architecture at that time: 
Stylistically, the shift from “unduly modernist landscape” to “serene socialist  
realism” occurred in Romania between 1949 and 1954, causing not just a visual 
conversion, but as well a redeployment of the social function of the architecture. 
Comprised in the rhetoric’s main tenet “national in form and socialist in content” 
it was synonymous with the allocation of formative function within a social 
system. Therefore, architecture came to play a more central place within the 
society whereas the space had been allocated the main function of mediating 
between the political authority and the masses.153  
 
The discussions over the aesthetic options in the architectural field, far from being 
merely technical or professional considerations, were thoroughly saturated with the 
debates and negotiations of the political moment. A growing body of work on Soviet 
culture and history has been approaching architecture as a particularly relevant domain to 
analyze the changes in the models of aesthetic representation that accompanied shifts in 
the internal and external policy of the Soviet state. Vladimir Paperny offers a binary 
analysis of architecture and arts in Soviet society, in which Culture One expresses the 
“fluidity” of the Soviet avant-garde in the 1920s and a democratic horizontality in 
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architectural vocabulary, while Culture Two represents the freezing absolutism of 
Stalin’s epoch, whose hierarchy and authority came to be architecturally represented by 
the seven Stalinist skyscrapers.154 Paperny’s view is challenged by Boris Groys, who 
argues that the tenets of the 1920s avant-garde directly informed Socialist Realism, in 
that “the production of images in Socialist Realism served above all to depict the utopia 
of a happy future,” in the form of “a new public with new eyes” that the avant-garde 
artists always imagined as consumers of their art.155  
This utopia was soon to be exported abroad. In Romania of the early 1950s, under 
the direct “guidance” of the Soviet councilors, architectural expression became a major 
aesthetic and technological means to represent the future as well as to visually ground a 
symbolic geography of the soviet bloc. According to Stalin’s own tenet, any architectural 
project in the new satellites of the Soviet Union had to be “national in form and socialist 
in content.” With the Romanian leaders becoming increasingly preoccupied with the 
application of this principle and the institutionalization of Socialist Realism in the 
architectural field, it may seem that the last thing they could think about was the 
preservation of older buildings and sites—the “architectural monuments.”  
However, to some specialists, those buildings appeared as possible sources of 
inspiration for autochthonous searches for stylized expressions of “national content.” 
During one of the meetings of the Council of Ministers regarding the launching of the 
State Commission for Architecture and Constructions, the Soviet counselor Zvedin 
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proposed the establishment of “a body that will focus on the historical monuments and 
will hold a great responsibility for the architectural development of the cities.” Moreover, 
he added, “this body will study the monument from the perspective of its architectural 
value and of its ideological suitableness and certainly will inform the Council of 
Ministers when a no longer valuable monument must be eliminated.” He stressed the 
importance of Bucharest within this project of architectural development, as the city that 
“must be the dear child of the Party and the People’s Council.”156 
Councilor Zvedin was asking then for a State Committee that would offer a 
politically coherent architectural vision by selectively integrating the field of monuments 
in the project of creating a socialist realist aesthetic. In fact, the Soviet councilor was 
pushing the Romanian government to reproduce the institutional infrastructure that 
underlay the Soviet model of construction and urban planning in the postwar years (until 
Stalin’s death). The establishment of a Committee of Architecture that would also include 
a special department responsible for the monuments’ political suitability was closely 
following the Soviet legislation on the protection of the architectural monuments. In the 
aftermath of the Second World War, an acute sense of loss and destruction triggered a 
new awareness of the role of monuments in constituting and representing the “national 
property.” This, combined with Stalin’s “policy of reconciliation with the emblems of 
national identity,”157 led to the formulation of detailed instructions on the identification, 
cataloguing and protection of monuments on the basis of scientific criteria of research 
and restoration in the form of the law issued in 1948.  
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More importantly, in contrast to the precarious status that the monuments held 
during the 1920s and 1930s, which led to numerous demolitions under the revolutionary 
impetus of constructing a world anew, the 1948 law set the architectural monuments 
under a stronger scrutiny as well as protection by the state, via the Committee for 
Architectural Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.158 As such, the field of 
“architectural monuments,” even though still included in the larger domain of “cultural 
monuments,” was offered a certain degree of autonomy. The text of the law contained a 
detailed list of what kinds of buildings and monumental complexes (both civic and 
religious), “complete buildings as well as damaged buildings, ruins, and parts of ancient 
buildings,” should have been treated as “architectural monuments.”159 Also, the 
comprehensive instructions on the maintenance and restoration of those buildings pointed 
to a renewed interest in including those sites in the post-war enterprise of recovery and 
modernization, now set under a Cold War competition.160  
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War tight competition between the socialist and capitalist blocs, both involved in a post-war project of 
quick recovery and modernization. At the same time, it is very likely that the 1948 Soviet law was 
influenced by a wider concern about the built environment across Europe recovering from the aftermaths of 
the war. See for instance the discussion on the development of historic preservation in the US as a part of a 






The official interest in the historical preservation of architectural monuments had 
dramatically diminished after Stalin’s death in 1953. No longer having the tenets of 
Socialist Realism as the main guiding schema, the architects in the satellite countries 
became largely confused and maintained this confusion for a few good years. (In 
Romania, for instance, this aesthetic confusion was visible up to the late 1950s.161) 
Khrushchev’s rise to power in 1954 led then to a relative political “thaw” that gradually 
allowed an assimilation of the architectural modernist forms of the postwar Western 
world into the socialist bloc.162 This openness was mostly dictated by economic 
reasoning, as a (moderate) modernist expression seemed to offer the key to economic 
efficiency and rapid industrialization expected by the socialist leaders.  
The shift from socialist realism to modernism was, however, monitored by the 
Party ideologues, who were wary that a bolder modernist vocabulary would endanger the 
“socialist architecture” (with the notable exceptions when architects succeeded in 
“reconciling political loyalty with modernist ideas.”)163 However, architects in the 
socialist bloc found ways to work around the “directives” given by the political center, 
especially in a context of more frequent and vibrant dialogues with their Western 
colleagues.164 The architecture emerging in Romania in the early 1960s illustrates this 
quest for novel means of expression (see, for instance, the radical modernism of the 
industrial sector, or the administrative shift from kvartal to microraion, indexing a new 
                                                                                                                                                                     
superiority of the Soviets.” Jorge Otero-Pailos, "Editor’s Note," Future Anterior (Special Issue on the 
Preservation of Soviet Heritage) V, no. 1 (2008).III. 
161 Radu-Alex Răuţă and Hildergarde Heyden, "Shifting Meanings of Modernism: Parallels and Contrasts 
between Karel Teige and Cezar Lăzărescu," The Journal of Architecture 14, no. 1 (2009). 
162 Carmen Popescu, "Looking West: Emulation and Limitation in Romanian Architectural Discourse," The 
Journal of Architecture 14, no. 1 (2009). 
163 Răuţă and Heyden "Shifting Meanings of Modernism: Parallels and Contrasts between Karel Teige and 
Cezar Lăzărescu," 28. 





model of imagining collectivity).165 Moreover, earlier agendas came to underlie these 
quests. Maxim points out that the architecture of socialism in the 1950s and 1960s came 
to be heavily influenced by the interwar tenets of the modernist movement (such as, the 
focus on standardization, technology, and the city as the new unit of production) and 
earlier attempts to adapt those tenets to the local environment. 
The leaders therefore resisted the investment of much funding in the restoration 
of old built structures, favoring instead two other interventions in the urban landscape: 1) 
the development of archeological excavations, and simultaneously 2) the remodeling of 
the urban fabric according to the Master Plan. At the insistence and pressure of a group of 
specialists, and under the influence of the revival of heritage preservation occurring in the 
USSR after the war, this shift of interest did not mean a full cancellation of the funds 
channeled into the restoration and preservation of historical buildings. It entailed, 
however, a significant reduction of funding for an already radically shortened list of the 
buildings officially recognized as “historical monuments.”166  
Moreover, in the post-1953 period, when calls for finding “nationalist forms with 
                                                        
165 For a discussion of the relative leeway offered to architects for the projects of industrial architecture in 
Romania of the 1960s, see Carmen Popescu, “Looking West.” For an analysis of the microraion 
approached as a technology of crafting a new social form in Bucharest in the 1960s, see Juliana Maxim, 
"Mass Housing and Collective Experience: On the Notion of Microraion in Romania in the 1950s and 
1960s’," The Journal of Architecture 14, no. 1 (2009). 
166 According to historian Andrei Pippidi, the official list of historical monuments published in 1955 
included a drastically reduced number of sites in comparison to the interwar (unofficial) record of 
monuments. He mentioned, however, that despite the difficult conditions, the architects working for the 
Direction for Historical Monuments managed to pursue a significant number of preservation and renovation 
projects all across the country. (Interview with Andrei Pippidi, Bucharest, June 2008.) Architect Eugenia 
Greceanu, who started working for the Department for Monuments right after graduating from the 
University of Architecture of Bucharest in 1953, describes this institution as an almost liminal space, where 
many of the important names of interwar architecture had been exiled to work on “secondary” projects of 
built preservation. Eugenia Greceanu, "Sovietizarea învăţămîntului de arhitectură," in Arhitecţi în timpul 
dictaturii—Amintiri [Architects under Dictatorship—Remembrances], ed. Viorica Iuga Curea (București: 
Uniunea Architectilor din Romania, 2005), 147. I would take both positions with a grain of salt, especially 
because both accounts were formulated in the context of post-1990 Romania, and both Greceanu and 






socialist content” shifted to officially encouraged quests for a modernist repertoire, those 
buildings became relegated to a peripheral zone within the socialist bureaucratic 
apparatus. However, after 1960, under a systematic policy of distancing from the soviets 
and searching for national autonomy, the question of history in architecture becomes 
once again important. We encounter in that period a forced shift to ‘authenticity’ and 
‘national traditions’ in architectural design, already increasingly articulated during the 
last years of Dej’s regime.167 Under these new circumstances, the preservation of 
architectural monuments received more attention and the question of their potential 
political employment reappeared.168 Even though most of those sites carried histories that 
could not easily fit a purified official historical narrative, there were still some of them 
that could potentially ground a “national past.” However, such sites represented 
palimpsests of various kinds—an architectural monument could also hide an 
archeological site, and often both of them could be considered historically important and 
artistically valuable. 
This was the case with the site of the Old Court, which I discuss in detail in the 
next two chapters. What does the story of the Old Court, its emergence out of “nothing,” 
                                                        
167 Carmen Popescu, "A Denied Continuity: The Shift of ‘Heritage’ as Ideology in Romanian Socialist 
Architecture," Blok, no. 3 (2004), Augustin Ioan, Power, Play and National Identity: Politics of 
Modernization in Central and East-European Architecture. The Romanian File (Bucharest: The Romanian 
Cultural Foundation Publishing House, 1996), Ana Maria Zahariade, "On Silence and Words," in Ideals in 
Concrete: Exploring Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Cor Wagenaar, Mieke Dings, and Jannes Linders, 
picture editor (Amsterdam: Fonds BKVB, 2004). 
168 See, for instance, the first national congress on historical monuments, organized in 1963 by the 
Department for Monuments and the Institute of History of the Academy, where the vicepresident of the 
State Committee for Construction, Architecture, and Systematization pointed out that “the research of 
historical monuments must not be a goal, but rather a means for finding more accurate techniques for their 
preservation.” “Sesiunea de comunicări a Direcţiei Monumentelor Istorice,” Arhitectura, 82, no.3 (1963), 
60. During the period 1960-1963, the specialists of the Department conducted complex research in the 
historical cities in Transylvania, thereby acquiring a solid research portofolio. The local architects later 
relied heavily on this body of research, produced by the specialists in historical restoration and 
preservation, in order to fight off the more radical plans of systematization of those cities’ historical 
centers. For a review of a more systematic approach to historical preservation, see Victor Bilciurescu, 





tell us about the larger political shifts occurring at that time in Romania? I suggest that 
the debates among architects, and then between architects and archeologists over the 
forms in which the Old Court must be preserved and displayed, should be understood 
through a dichotomous framework that the socialist leaders aimed to endorse, one 
separating “the past” from “the future” (with “the present” being only a transitory stage 
towards the socialist future). That is, architecture and archaeology were regarded as two 
distinct technologies of producing social reality, to validate an institutional and 
epistemological framework, within which those domains were assigned complementary 
temporal frameworks and historical spans. This political vision was to be spatially 
imprinted—in the case that I analyze, onto Bucharest’s urban surface and underground. 
However, like any form of totality, it ended up being challenged by various institutional 
actors, who employed the very categories endorsed by the state only to turn them on their 
head. In fact, the 1962 conflict around the Old Court, a conflict between architects 
(employed by the State Committee for Architecture) and archeologists (working either 
for the Institute of Archaeology, or, very likely, for the Museum of Bucharest), signaled a 
larger debate. It literally brought to the discussion table of the new leaders (the Council of 
Ministers) the following question: how could “the past” still dormant underground in the 
center of Bucharest, in the form of the ruins of the Princely Palace at the Old Court, be 
unearthed in order to coexist spatially with “the future,” depicted in the form of a totally 
remodeled city center of a “socialist capital”? 
All that followed, with twisting and tweaking, stretching and turning the ground 
in a central area of Bucharest, with the endless discussions and negotiations among and 






Bucharest, carrying distinct visions and interests, and the archeologists, carrying in turn 
their own interests), signaled a major conundrum for the socialist leaders. The story of the 
Old Court stands as yet one more proof that their attempt at imprinting their political 
vision onto the urban space, by clearly separating this space into concentrated sites of the 





Chapter 3  
CITIES OF THE FUTURE, SITES OF THE PAST: INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS, 







For Bucharest’s inhabitants, in comparison to other people living behind the 
Iron Curtain, 1953 meant something more than the year when Stalin died. It also marked 
the beginning of a radical transformation of the city landscape. This enterprise entailed a 
double process of unearthing the city’s grounds while building its socialist future. In the 
words of someone directly involved in this process, the director of the Museum of the 
city, 
Starting with that year [1953], the residents of the Capital became the witnesses 
of an interesting phenomenon, which was also a typical one for the new 
conditions of our lives. Side by side with so many building sites, constructing 
the capital city of the future, one could also notice here and there, in the city 
center or at the periphery, the archeological digs unraveling the past.169  
  
The plan for building “the socialist city of the future” had begun to be drafted as early as 
June 1949, but only in November 1952 was a ministerial decision issued to start “the 
construction and reconstruction of the cities and the organization of architectural 
                                                        
169 Florian Georgescu, "Introducere [Introduction]," in Cercetări arheologice în București [Archeological 






activity.”170 By setting forth an agenda of bringing radically new urban forms into a city 
depicted as being like “a spider web of skewed and narrow streets,” a city of which “3/4 
of its total surface is currently occupied by hovels,” the political actors of the new regime 
praised a centralized aesthetics of order that informed the modernist tenets of socialist 
architecture. The new architectural dogma focused on extending the city vertically via 
several-story buildings instead of allowing for the city’s horizontal development into 
suburban areas.171 Dismissing earlier plans of modernization of the city as inherent 
failures of a capitalist order, those politicians regarded the new vertical city as a novel 
urban form representing the socialist revolution—that is, a total reordering of space that 
would accompany and enforce that of social and political forms. 
 Making Bucharest into a socialist city entailed a reordering not only of urban 
space, but also of its history. This chapter aims to inquire into the interconnectedness of 
those two processes, during which a different historical city was being assembled 
(“discovered”) along with the socialist city of the future. I will examine the process by 
which the past became defined by particular forms and historical periods. More 
specifically, I focus on the debates triggered by the archeological findings in one of the 
central areas of Bucharest: the Old Court area (Curtea Veche, in Romanian) 
                                                        
170 Hotărîrea CC al PMR și a Consiliului de Ministri privind construcţia și reconstrucţia orașelor și 
organizarea activităţii în domeniul arhitecturii și construcţiei, de la Plenara CC al PMR din noiembrie 
1952. Cited in Ana Maria Zahariade, "New Buildings and Forms [ Locuinţa şi Orașul Socialist]," in Two 
Books, the Communist Dream & Dacia 1300. Fragments of an Architectural Landscape in Dacia 1300 – 
My Generation, ed. Tom Sandquist and Ana Maria Zahariade (Bucharest: Simetria, 2003), 68-79. 
Published as Hotărîrea Comitetului Central al P.M.R. și a consiliului de Miniștri al RPR cu privire la 
planul general de reconstrucţie socialistă a orașului București. Bucharest: Editura pentru Literatură 
Politică, 1952. 
171 “Proces verbal al ședinţei Prezidiului Consiliului de Miniștri și Biroului Politic al Comitetului Central 
PMR din 25 Noiembrie 1953.” Stenogramele ședinţelor Prezidiului Consiliului de Miniștri și al Biroului 
Politic al Comitetului Central al P.M.R. (Partidului Muncitoresc Român) din luna noiembrie, 1953 
[Transcripts of the meeting of the Council of Ministers and the Politburo, November 25, 1953] (henceforth, 





circumscribed by the Old Princely Palace, built at the end of the 17th century and 
abandoned a century later, and the commercial quarter (also known as Lipscani area) that 
had been formed around the Palace at the end of the 18th century and developed 
throughout the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries.  
 The chapter is divided into three parts. I begin with a description of the 
geographical and social changes occurring in this area from the end of the 17th century 
until the end of the interwar period. In order to understand how the Old Court area gained 
an (unexpected) importance in the new geography of a socialist Bucharest, at a time when 
many other historical sites were being ignored or demolished, I need first to examine in 
detail the urban vision advanced by the new political leaders. The second part focuses 
therefore on one of the first (1953) Politburo meetings about the urban remodeling of 
Bucharest into “the socialist city of the future.” Confronted with a lack of specialists, the 
Politburo agreed to bring back “the old elements,” that is, those specialists who had 
already gained significant professional experience before 1945, to help with the 
development of a socialist Master Plan of the city.  
Far from being merely robots executing the orders, those specialists gradually 
started expressing a stronger concern with “the national past.” In the early 1960s, the 
political atmosphere turned to be relatively more relaxed, and the issue of a “national 
past” became a serious point of contention within and across professional fields in 
Bucharest (that is, among architects, as well as between architects and urban 
archeologists who also worked in the city center). Such concerns took the form of some 
lively debates on the topic of the Old Court area. In the third part of the chapter, I pay 






institutional entitlements underlying different visions of the representation of the national 
past in the site of the Old Court. I note that those debates point to a broader shift in the 
usages and forms of “heritage”—that is, if during early 1950s, discussions about “the 
national heritage” had been confined more to the archeological field, “heritage” expanded 
at the beginning of the 1960s to other domains as well, including architecture. The tense 
interactions among architects with regards to the transformation of the Old Court and the 
neighboring quarter into a “historical reservation of architecture” point to a novel interest 
of the state in the promotion of an architecture with national specificity. Such quests, far 
from being new, were reminiscent of the turn of the 20th century debates about the 
creation of an architectural “National Style.” However, as Popescu pointed out, this 
reminiscence was systematically denied, precisely because the official endorsement of 
architecture as yet another form of producing a national socialist heritage could not allow 
for any resemblance with earlier, “bourgeois” representations of “the national past.” 
 
From the Old Court to Lipscani: A journey in time 
  
If we open a map of Bucharest and try to locate the area that underwent a 
radical reconstruction in the 1980s, resulting in the famously gigantic House of the 
People and the Victory of Socialism boulevard, we will find that an important part of this 
area falls into an imaginary triangle. This upside-down triangle is formed by three points 
on the map, marking three of the oldest sites of the city: the churches Radu Vodă and 
Mihai Vodă and the Old Princely Court (Curtea Veche, in Romanian), a location that had 





of 17th centuries.172 If we switch from the map to a bird’s eye view of this triangle, we 
will note a significant difference: while two of the points forming its upper side—both 
churches—are currently surrounded, almost hidden, by new apartment buildings erected 
in the 1980s, the third point (the Old Court) is located among much older two-story 
buildings, distributed unevenly on small tangled streets.173 Given the striking difference 
between those areas, why should we imagine this triangle in the first place? At one 
moment in recent history, those three sites had been closely connected by being set under 
the same scientific gaze. It is in these sites that the first archeological digs had been 
opened in 1953 under the supervision of the Institute of Archaeology (then, the Museum 
of Antiquities) of the Academy of the People’s Republic of Romania.  
 
Figure 1 A bird’s eye view over the area circumscribed by the big triangle: Mihai Vodă church, 
the Central Market (the rectangular construction in the middle), and Radu Vodă.The upper left 
perimeter of the picture, delimited by red lines, shows the conglomerations of the buildings in 
                                                        
172 Dumitru Almaș and Panait I. Panait, Curtea Veche din București (București: Editura pentru Turism, 
1974). 
173 The map on which we try to draw the triangle must be a map of a pre-1980 Bucharest, for one of three 
points—the church Mihai Vodă—had been previously located on the hill. During the building of the new 
civic center, the church was initially scheduled to be demolished, together with other constructions on the 
Spirii Hill, to permit the building of the new civic center. At the insistence of specialists and other public 
pressures, the church was slid (on rails) 300 m down the hill from its initial location. Silvia Colfescu, 







between Lipscani street and Dâmbovița. Fragment of a larger picture. Unknown author, 1927. 
source: Google Images, www.mcworld.com. 
 
This chapter will try to answer a rather unusual question: what circumstances 
made this triangle possible in the first place? At the same time, what made it become the 
site of such a volatile process, whereby two of the archeological digs that formed its 
imaginary angles disappeared without trace under the new socialist constructions? More 
importantly, how was it possible that one of the angles of the triangle—set in the site of 
the Old Court—endured until the present day, despite the ephemeral nature of the 
archeological inquiries into the city’s central grounds? The archeological digs 
temporarily reinstated a fragment of 17th century Bucharest onto the map of the city in 
1953. Thus, by exploring the transformations of the design parameters and historical 
value of one point in the triangle—the Old Court—across twenty years (1953-1978), this 
chapter will try to inquire into the making and unmaking of various geometries onto the 
surface of the city as key zones of political debate within and among emerging networks 
of expertise in socialist Romania. The location holding the remains of the Old Court—the 
area delimited by the Dâmbovița river to the north and the oldest commercial venue of 
the city (Lipscani street) at the south—held ambivalent roles in the economy of the city 
and the imagination of its inhabitants.  
Once the main commercial area of the town, at the end of the 19th century and 
the first decades of the 20th, what is currently described as “Bucharest’s historical center” 
was regarded as a rather peripheral area located south of the “modern” city center.174 
Established by the middle of the 16th century, the Court functioned as the political 
nucleus of the region until the end of the 17th century, when a fire destroyed the site and 
                                                        





the Court had to be moved to a different location. After the fire, the terrain was divided 
and auctioned to the traders and craftsmen who kept moving into the area. This influx of 
capital and people led to the economic boom of the area, with new inns being opened and 
commercial venues and shops trading goods brought from as far away as Leipzig (hence 
the name of the main commercial street, Lipscani), Padua or Paris.175 Starting with the 
beginning of the 18th century, the area became the main economic location of the city and 
a place of great social animation. The ruined walls of the Old Court were taken down and 
the ground leveled to leave room for the new one- or two-story houses built by the 
prosperous traders. The new buildings accommodated the higher expectations of both the 
traders and their clientele, by better dividing the commercial space at the ground level 
from the private area of the trader’s family located upstairs. 
Inevitably, by being the city’s economic nucleus, the area turned into a social 
magnet, as well, attracting people from all the social and economic strata and thus 
allowing for various forms of mélange and exchange among those actors. The site 
became renowned not only for the luxurious goods displayed in the shops aligned on 
Lispcani street or the money absorbed by the new banks, but also for the black market 
and prostitution flourishing on the very same streets. The name Curtea veche became 
associated with this underground world, famously depicted in the novel The Kings of the 
Old Court. Written at the turn of the century and published in the interwar years, this 
short epic generated enthusiastic responses among the intellectuals of the epoch as well 
                                                        
175 The name of the street, Lipscani, comes from Lipsca (Leipzig), where one of the most important fairs in 
late medieval Europe had been organized three times per year. The traders from Wallachia and Moldovia 
went to the Lipsca fair for supplies twice per year. Their participation had become so significant by the mid 
18th century, that when those traders seemed not to be able to travel due to the plague epidemics in the 
Principalities, the fair organizers did not know whether they should still open the fair. G. Ionescu-Gion, 
Istoria Bucurescilor (Bucuresci, 1899). 458. In Costin Murgescu, Mersul ideilor economice la români [the 
Development of the Economic Ideas among the Romanians] (București: Editura Ştiinţifică și 






as contemporary audiences for its unique style, which captures the atmosphere of a 19th 
century “Levantine” Bucharest, “where nothing is ever too severe.” The overlapping of 
two seemingly antagonistic worlds (the “West” and the “Levant”) comes to be 
represented by the main characters of the book, two boyars well versed in Western 
manners who want to forget them by immersing themselves in the underground worlds 
thriving on “those cramped lanes, with houses stuck one to another,” that had been 
erected on the ruins of the Old Court.176  
The novel’s vivid descriptions of the area as a symbol of fin de siécle 
decadence help us envision a Lipscani quarter that, at the time of Bucharest’s economic 
and geographical expansion at the turn of the century and then into the interwar years, 
thrived as a rich geographical palimpsest of multiple transactions, experiences, and 
transgressions, a miniature world bordering on the center of the modern city. The 
ambiguous social atmosphere of the site came also from its proximity to the fair opened 
by the 18th century at the periphery of the town, on empty terrain lying on the northern 
side of the Dâmbovița river.177 The largest market of the city (Halele Centrale, the 
Central Market henceforth) was later established there, while the site was expanded to 
form an urban square (later named Union Square [Piața Unirii]), which was formed in 
the 1920s when the Dâmbovița was covered with concrete slabs.178 
During the interwar debates on the city’s development, the Lipscani area and 
the Central Market came under scrutiny as the seat of corruption, illegal or petty 
                                                        
176 Mateiu Caragiale, Craii de Curtea-Veche [the Kings of the Old Court] (București: Editura Eminescu, 
1970[1929]), 23. 
177 The fair moved from the initial location at the Sf. Gheorghe church, a site that currently is situated 
across the Lipscani street, down south, on the shore of Dâmboviţa river, when the town expanded. T. 
Evolceanu, "Concursul pentru sistematizarea Pieţei Unirii din București." Arhitectura 62, no. 1 (1960), 14. 





commerce, immorality, and urban chaos—in other words, everything that the urban elites 
rejected. Some of them asked for a radical restructuring of the area through the removal 
of the Central Market and the entire realignment of the streets in the Lipscani area.179 As 
early as 1930, urbanist Cincinat Sfințescu attempted to find a less radical solution for 
both sites. He pointed out that the Central Market, like other city markets, represented 
“tradition,” therefore they need not be “liquidated,” but rather preserved and improved.180 
Similarly, the commercial center, which included the Lipscani district, had to be 
maintained in a more “hygienic form,” that is, be “cleansed” of the small industry 
producing noise and smoke.181 Sfințescu’s proposals aimed mainly at eradicating the 
multifarious forms of disorder characterizing the area, which ranged from the inadequate 
and aesthetically “heteroclite” shop facades aligned on Lipscani to the unorganized traffic 
and the amassed goods and people in the Central Market.182 
None of Sfințescu’s plans—including the first master plan for the entire city, 
drafted in 1935— ever achieved a material form during the interwar years. However, 
many of Sfințescu’s ideas directly informed the remodeling of the city pursued by the 
                                                        
179 Such as Martha Bibescu, a famous writer and socialite of the turn of the century, quoted by Popa, 
“Restructuring and Envisioning Bucharest,” 13, 60, 61, 63. Marta Bibescu, “Sugestiuni pentru 
înfrumuseţarea oraşului Bucharest” (Suggestions for the Beautification of the City of Bucharest) in 
Bucharest: Secolul XX 5-7 (1997), 183-192. Popa mentions that the text represents “a manuscript from the 
1930s, edited and published by architect Şerban Popescu-Criveanu” in Secolul XX. Bibescu’s text is quoted, 
however, by Sfinţescu, 1932 [1931], 44-45. 
180 Cincinat Sfinţescu. “Estetica Bucureștiului [The Aesthetics of Bucharest]” In Pentru București; Noi 
studii urbanistice. Delimitări, zonificare, circulaţie, estetică [For Bucharest: New Studies of Urban 
Planning], (Bucharest: Institutul de Arte Grafice "Bucovina,” 1932[1931]), 150-55, and “Zonificarea 
urbanistică a municipiului București,” Pentru București, 30. 
181 As he put it, “the unsanitary industries that produce smoke, dust, or unhealthy waste should be taken out 
of the city.” Sfinţescu “Zonificarea urbanistică a municipiului București,” Pentru București, 45-46. 
182 See especially the section “Amenajarea stradei Lipscani, [The remodelling of Lipscani street]” 156-165, 
in “Estetica Bucureștiului,” Pentru București. Sfinţescu writes, “such a heteroclyte street poses even higher 








Figure 2 The Central Market during the interwar period. Cincinat Sfinţescu, Pentru București, 156. 
 
Not surprisingly, the interwar elites’ fears and loathing against the city’s disorder and 
chaotic development continued to lie at the core of the master plan, now translated as 
socialist planning principles. The following section will focus on a close analysis of the 
debates surrounding the implementation of the master plan of the city of Bucharest and 
its political implications. I will move then to a discussion of the various urban solutions 
for Union Square, the square adjacent to the Lipscani/Old Court area, and situate it within 
the more intricate struggles over political and symbolic capital that came to be inscribed 
onto the city’s territory. 
 The following section will discuss these two projects (the making the Old 
Court area into a historical reservation, and the remodeling of Union Square) as parallel 
processes that could offer us some insights into how the Party leadership and the experts 
                                                        
183 Two of the main supervisors of the 1935 plan—Duiliu Marcu and Cincinat Sfinţescu— were invited to 
be part of the team in charge of drafting the initial version of the Master Plan in 1949. ANR, Fond CC al 
PCR—Cancelarie [the Central Commitee of the Romanian Communist Party], File 220/1949, 4. 
Sfinţescu’s suggestion that Union Square be reoriented on a south-north direction was implemented in the 





of the new state projected the dialectics of power onto the urban landscape of Bucharest. I 
start with an analysis of the debates on Union Square’s reconstruction, using the 
particularities of this case to develop an argument about the institutional rearrangements 
occurring within the wider architectural field in Romania of the early 1960s. I engage 
then in a detailed reading of a set of letters exchanged between 1962 and 1964 among 
central institutions on the topic of the preservation of the Old Court area, which some 
institutional actors deemed to be endangered by the radical remodeling of Union Square. 
These letters reveal reciprocal accusations among differently positioned institutional 
actors of ignoring the “national value” of the Old Court or, on the contrary, ludicrously 
attempting to modify the architectural past that the Old Court represented. Interestingly—
and perhaps, not surprisingly—among those actors we also find some of “older elements” 
that Dej endorsed in 1953, such as architects who had already gained a professional fame 
during the interwar period. In the last part of the chapter, I situate those debates within 
the emerging discourse of the (socialist) nation, revived in the mid 1960s and reaching its 
peak in the 1980s, in order to show that the arguments about architectural form and 
historical preservation in the case of the Old Court illustrate a more complex enterprise of 
the socialist state to rewrite a “new” national history into the urban landscape. 
 
Making Bucharest into a Socialist City (1953-1962) 
The Master Plan 
 
 As early as June 1949, the Council of Ministers of the Romanian People’s 
Republic had already set up a Provisory Committee for the Capital, in charge of outlining 






(“systematization”) became one of the crucial terms, continually used by politicians and 
specialists alike, to describe in one word “the standardization and rationalization of both 
design and building process,” over which the state intended to exert a full monopoly.184 
The operation was already understood as a vast one, as “a prestigious project for the 
Local Council and as an act of great importance for the current political moment.”185 The 
urban remodeling of the city represented the material proof of “the transformation of our 
Fatherland into a socialist country.”186 
 A detailed overview of this remodeling went public in November 1952, when 
                                                        
184 Juliana Maxim, "The New, the Old, the Modern. Architecture and Its Representation in Socialist 
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project: 
In the Romanian context, sistematizare is more than just a method for the physical transformation 
of villages and towns. It is, firstly, an ideal of how spatial planning should be integrated with 
economic planning (planificare) and socialist development. Second, systematization is a program 
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metropolis. Third, systematization involves an organizational structure in which national 
objectives, regional imbalances and local potentialities are to be harmonized into a centrally 
administered State policy, codified by law. 
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Romanian New Town (Boulder: East European Monograph, 1984), 75. 
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220/1949, 4. The Provisory Committee’s main task was “to place order into the city via the development 
plan of the Capital.” (1949:2) Like other operations, this plan also was meant to endorse the absolute 
newness that the socialist regime was supposed to represent. This is why the “old plan” (the 1935 Master 
plan Plan of the city’s systematization, elaborated by a team supervised by urbanist Cincinat Sfințescu) was 
condemned as having been a “failure,” as was “any plan elaborated under the capitalist regime”(1949: 2-3). 
 Despite their stated criticism, the Committee asked, though, that the second team, formed of the 
specialists in charge of drafting the plan, include, among other key architects involved in building 
socialism, two of the experts who had played a crucial role in the development of the 1935 plan: architect 
Duiliu Marcu and urbanist Cincinat Sfințescu. The committee advised that instead of being assigned to the 
Systematization department within the city’s Local Council, the plan be drafted within Bucharest’s Institute 
of Architectural Design and Constructions (Institutul de Proiectări și Construc ii București), which was 
then under the supervision of the Ministry of Constructions. This appeared as the best solution, since most 
of the specialists appointed to be part of the second team had already been working for the Institute. 
Moreover, as they stated, “it would not be healthy to mix the collective in charge of the supervision with 
the collective that elaborates the project.” (1949:3) Those two teams were to be supervised by a third group, 
the “consultants,” representing in fact the political apparatus ranging from members of the Central 
Committee of the Party, the State Commission for Planning, and the newly reformatted Academy, a team 
whose main role was to control and politically endorse the proposals outlined by specialists. The Provisory 
Committee asked for help from other institutions that would offer resources, as well as seek, acquire and 






the Council of Ministers issued the Resolution on the Reconstruction of the City of 
Bucharest.187 The Resolution set out the main elements to be pursued in most of the 
systematization plans to follow. It limited the perimeter of the city as well as its 
population (to a maximum of 1.7 million inhabitants). It also introduced a “novel model 
of urban development”: the kvartal.188 Imagined as economically self-sufficient 
residential districts formed of 6-story residential buildings and aligned by 8-story 
buildings on the main arteries, these new social units were to be replaced by 15-story 
apartment buildings in the second stage of the project.189 The 1952 Resolution laid out 
two long term goals: 1) to smooth out the striking difference between the center and the 
periphery and 2) to bring order into the city. One of the key words constantly employed 
to describe the current state of the city was chaos. The topic of Bucharest’s chaotic 
development had already been widely discussed during the interwar debates on 
modernization which led to the formulation of the 1935 Master Plan. However, this plan 
was now deemed “a dead piece of work, with no technical and economic foundation.”190 
Consequently, “the city [had] continued to develop anarchically and in conformity with 
the interests of the dominant class.”191 By denying the previous attempts to shape the 
urban form according to a western ideal of modernization, the Communist Party 
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appropriated the discourse of “order” to present it as an intrinsic element of the socialist 
project. Order was to come to the city in multifarious forms—spatially and temporally. 
Everything that was disordered had to be ordered, disciplined, tamed down. 
 The decision established a separate institution, the State Commission for 
Architecture and Construction, in charge of the supervision of the “systematization” of all 
cities in socialist Romania. Architect Nicolae Bădescu, one of the faithful members of the 
Communist Party before 1945 and professionally trained under the best interwar 
architects, was elected the president of the new commission, holding the rank of a 
minister in the Council.192 The Institute of Architectural Design and Planning appeared as 
an immediate product of the 1952 Resolution launching Bucharest’s Master Plan and 
directly following the establishment of the State Commission for Architecture and 
Construction (SCAC), in charge of the supervision of the systematization of all cities in 
socialist Romania. The Resolution also endorsed the creation of the Institute for Urban 
Planning and Constructions (ISPROR), which was to develop the projects outlined by the 
State Committee.193 Later developed into the Institute of Architectural Design “Project 
Bucharest,” it came to occupy the center of a network of regional institutes of urban 
planning and design, established in the main cities in the country, subordinated to SCAC 
and locally supervised by the Local Councils.  
 Although the Resolution seemed to offer a thorough set of guidelines for 
constructing a modern socialist city, its implementation (obviously) proved to be more 
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challenging. A year after the resolution had been issued, when the chief architect of the 
capital, Pompiliu Macovei, was summoned to present the first results of the work on the 
systematization plan to the Council of Ministers, he had to explain why the plan had not 
yet been fully drafted. He exculpated himself by pointing out the inextricable link 
between the city’s systematization and the economic national Plan, which was itself 
being developed.194 Meanwhile, the significant housing crisis (a deficit of 40-50,000 
residential units in Bucharest alone) and the impossibility of the Local Council to fully 
control the constructions under way in the city emerged as two main conundrums. 195 
Macovei admitted that “the People’s Council could not maintain an efficient control of 
the building taking place in Bucharest [since] currently 1500 apartment buildings are 
being built in unhealthy conditions, which only worsens the actual state of inhabiting.”196 
 Macovei’s proposals stayed within the directions outlined by the 1952 
Resolution. At the 1953 meeting, he started by presenting the city’s evolution until 1945 
as having been “chaotic,” “extending outwardly in an uncontrolled manner through small 
buildings with rural character,” which produced a forced extension of the city surface.197 
In these conditions, Macovei suggested that the specialists start their work by 
demarcating a surface for the city out of the larger area that, for the moment, would 
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administratively mark the city limits.198 According to Macovei, this new area could 
provide for a population of 3 million, since the new multi-story buildings would be able 
to accommodate vertically the inhabitants that the older city had incorporated 
horizontally.199 The most efficient solution to the housing crisis, suggested Macovei, was 
to focus first on more peripheral empty areas, whose width could allow for a better 
organization of building sites while preventing the delay that any prior demolition would 
entail.200 This approach would not only offer a rhythm of work, “with teams moving from 
one site to another every 4 months,” but it would also “directly contribute to realizing the 
socialist character” of the city.201 That is, according to Macovei, a rapid change of the 
city skyline, especially at the periphery, would significantly enhance the city’s general 
outlook by stressing its new vertical form. 
 Even though he declared these suggestions to be “only hypotheses, which 
must be run by specialist[s] in different ministries,” Macovei confidently claimed that his 
team would be able to come up with a final blueprint of the systematization plan in the 
first semester of 1954 (that is, within the following six months). The indispensable help, 
however, had to come not only from the ministers, but also from another source: the 
specialists who contributed to “the construction of the grand cities of the Soviet 
Union.”202 More specifically, he proposed that a team of Soviet specialists be invited to 
Bucharest, so that they could offer recommendations based on a direct assessment of the 
city landscape, and then take them, together with the [Romanian] team report, and submit 
both to the Academy of Architecture of the Soviet Union. “Such help,” he emphasized, 
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“had been also offered to the Polish comrades for Warsaw’s reconstruction and for the 
reconstruction of Berlin.”203  
 Macovei’s presentation was met nevertheless with concern by the other 
participants to the debates, because he did not seem to realize the complexity of the 
operation and did not carefully assess all the stages that such a project would involve. 
Architect Bădescu cautioned that before asking for help from anyone else, the team 
should first come up with several variants of the plan, which the Committee for 
Architecture could then evaluate and approve before submitting one to the Council of 
Ministers for the final decision.204 Moreover, the two key political figures at the 
discussion table—the president of the Council and general secretary of the Party, 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, and the president of the State Planning Commision, Miron 
Constantinescu—were also critical of Macovei, for reasons that I will discuss below.  
 First of all, Macovei did not see anything problematic in asking for the input 
of Soviet experts in the development of Bucharest’s Master Plan. In the first years of the 
socialist regimes in all the satellite countries, to “ask for help” from Moscow—or, rather, 
welcome Moscow’s “help”—was unquestionable. This process lay at the core of the 
overall Soviet centralization of decision making and the redistributive system, which was 
moving experts, outlines and some types of resources vertically, from the center to its 
satellites.205 However, immediately after Stalin’s death, in June 1953, many of the 
satellites (that is, the local Party leaders in Eastern Europe) overtly or more subtly sought 
out strategies for distancing themselves from the center. In many cases, those strategies 
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involved a novel turn to local resources (military, labor, and means of production) and a 
relative economic autonomy from the USSR. Macovei’s proposal to boost the local 
team’s work on the city’s master plan with Soviet know-how was no longer palatable to 
the Romanian leaders. Seeking an increasing, but subtle, autonomy from the Soviets, Dej 
and his team wanted to cut a crucial segment out of the redistributive socialist system—
the segment linking Bucharest to Moscow—and thus obtain a newly re-centralized 
apparatus, one oriented around national resources and new economic alliances (even with 
the Western countries).206 In other words, they produced a system that had to expand 
horizontally in order to compensate for having discarded a now politically unpalatable 
verticality.207 
 This shift of the ultimate center of decision from Moscow to Bucharest led 
the Romanian Party leadership to deal with a situation that they had been aware of from 
the start: a deficit of both expertise and highly skilled labor.208 This new “awareness” 
became possible under the relative political relaxation that followed Stalin’s death, when 
the first wave of political prisoners had been released and brought back into the socialist 
labor force.209 Many of those released in 1954 belonged to the liberal professions in the 
interwar years, as engineers, architects, lawyers, doctors, etc., and their technical 
expertise suddenly appeared as a valuable and timely resource for a socialist state 
struggling to build itself while keeping a relative distance from the USSR. To this 
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relatively small group was added a larger segment of professionals, who had been 
eliminated or discarded to peripheral jobs in the first years of the communist regime 
(1947-1954). The pertinence of employing these “old elements” came up during the 1953 
Politburo discussions on the Master Plan. 
 When Macovei restated that the missing economic profile of the city 
development (the economic planning) prevented the team from completing the 
preliminary work on the plan, Miron Constantinescu, the president of the State Planning 
Committee, strongly intervened, challenging the former claims. 210 Constantinescu set the 
discussion within a different temporal framework, by pointing out the importance of 
drafting a plan designed for a 20 year span. Therefore, given the gravity of the task, the 
preparations would involve a significant amount of time and labor, which “cannot be 
carried out by medium cadres or even the leaders of the State Planning Commission.”211 
Rather, “several variants of the projects should be examined by a special commission, 
which included comrades from other institutions, from the Academy of People’s 
Republic of Romania, from the Academy of Architecture, and the most competent cadres 
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 Constantinescu asked not only for a shift in the temporal scale of the project, 
but also for a differently situated regime of expertise. That is, while subtly refraining 
from commenting in any way on Macovei’s proposal of fully relying on Moscow as the 
center of operation, Constantinescu endorsed the building of an extensive team out of the 
best specialists within the country. He drew upon the suggestion thrown on the table by 
other members of the Council, that of forming a special committee that would exclusively 
focus on the plan by bringing in the best specialists, and suggested that “the good 
constructors and architects from the past” should be included in this committee. 213 He 
supported the idea of supplementing the Institute of Architectural Design and 
Constructions with new personnel, especially with the architects currently holding 
positions where their expertise “could be not fully utilized.”214 Moreover, he insisted on 
having older architects among those new employees. His comments point to a significant 
shift in the regime’s official attitude towards the pre-1945 specialists: 
The employment of older architects has started this year [1953, the year when the first 
wave of the political prisoners had been released and brought back “into the labor 
force.”]. […][However], there are architects of great talent and experience who are 
still very little used/exploited by the Institute Project Bucharest. I think that the 
comrades in the Committee of Architecture must improve their methods of work and 
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recruitment.215 There is a certain sectarianism here, which must be jettisoned. We 
must engage the highly experienced engineers and architects, but [set them] under the 
supervision and line of the Party and the government, and not under their old 
beliefs.216 
 
 Despite his earlier criticism, in the end Constantinescu sought to absolve the 
Committee of Architecture, the team supervised by Macovei, of their failure to produce a 
complete outline of the plan by the meeting date. He pointed out that the team “had faced 
great difficulties and resistance from all the institutions” when attempting to supplement 
their ranks with architects and specialists.217 “They had tried several times, they had 
contacted all the ministers and institutions; they had come to the Office of Internal 
Affairs of the Council of Ministers.”218 However, as “the ministers did not have sufficient 
personnel, their request was left unresolved.”219 He suggested that “the Council of 
Ministers issue an ordinance compelling the ministers to help the Committee of 
Architecture and the Architecture department of the Local Council with a large number 
of specialists.”220 
 Constantinescu’s comments alluded to a much larger problem, which the new 
political regime had been struggling with since its formation: the lack of “qualified 
cadres,” that is, of professionals who could meet both criteria—that of being “politically 
correct,” faithful and committed Party members, having “healthy social origins,” and 
being simultaneously highly qualified, especially in scientific and technical domains. The 
Party leaders became increasingly aware of the difficulty of “growing cadres” while 
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engaging in a speedy process of “building socialism.” Under these circumstances, the 
Council of Ministers was much more willing to accept the recruitment of more 
experienced architects for Bucharest’s systematization—a crucial project for the Party. 
However, if this threshold (between the “new” and “old,” marking the “sectarianism” that 
Constantinescu mentioned) was to be broken, then control had to be reinforced under 
novel forms. Finding new modalities to increase political control at the very moment of 
expanding the professional circles appears as the main concern underlying Gheorghiu-
Dej’s concluding remarks. 
 After listening to the commentaries of the other members of the Council, 
Gheorghiu-Dej gave the final instructions. He insisted that “we need to force the strategy 
of development of the systematization plan.” “To force,” he elaborated, “does not mean 
to pursue a study that has no scientific basis, [but, in order] to achieve this, we need to 
expand the existing framework, to mobilize all the institutions that could contribute to 
systematic data gathering and preparation of the final form.”221 He expressed serious 
doubts about the deadline proposed by Macovei, pointing out that a more realistic 
deadline for the plan’s final draft should be the end of 1954. At the same time, given the 
importance of the plan, Dej asked that the State Planning Committee be the main 
supervisor and be responsible for the plan before the Council of Ministers. He insisted on 
a stronger centralization and a better organized distribution of tasks, under a strict 
schedule and a detailed set of deadlines.222 He suggested that the work on the plan be 
organized as a “military unit” and gave clear orders: 
[The work on the Plan must be] controlled by someone from the Government, 
someone who is more competent, comrade Miron Constantinescu. We need foremost 
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economists. We need to locate the brightest minds in different ministries to establish 
the economic profile of the city. [...] We need to stop this anarchy. We need [to] 
establish precise tasks, who should do what, and how to do it. We need to forego 
bureaucratic methods of work, we need to find operative measures, and work 
directly, cooperatively, and competitively. We need to search [for specialists] not 
only in Bucharest, but also in other parts of the country. Bucharest is the heart of the 
country, workers, constructors, engineers, architects from other regions should be 
brought in, and older cadres should also be employed.223 
  
 Thus, even though Dej seemed not to reject the proposal of getting the Soviets 
involved,224 he stressed that the main priority is to “grow cadres” and form a team of the 
best specialists in the country. By the very fact that he appointed Miron Constantinescu 
as the principal supervisor of the team, Dej endorsed Constantinescu’s preference for a 
domestic approach to the plan’s development. This approach implied, in fact, an 
increasing autonomy from the post-Stalin USSR and thus an immediate and exclusive 
command over the making of the city. We must note that Dej ignored the suggestions 
made earlier in the meeting by the Soviet councilor Zvedin, who had been assigned by 
Moscow as a direct and active “voice” and participant in the major decisions made by the 
Romanian Party leadership after 1947.  
 Commenting upon Macovei’s presentation, Zvedin criticized Macovei for 
“not knowing the city well” and proposed a more pragmatic approach to “the city’s 
reconstruction.” Expressing his concern that the Committee of Architecture did not 
consider the life of the city, he asked that the “planners become more attached to the 
ground, to walk on the ground.” He advocated in fact a more hegemonic form of control 
of the city, which could have been achieved only by “getting to know the city, all of the 
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streets, all of the paths, all of the corners.” He thus suggested that the Local Council 
“better grasp this issue of Bucharest’s reconstruction,” in a manner similar to the 
systematization of Moscow. 
 In his concluding remarks, however, Dej did not seem to find such a 
pragmatic knowledge of the city necessary, since he asked for an extension of the team 
working on Bucharest’s systematization with the best specialists in the country. To Dej, 
what was of crucial importance was that Bucharest’s spatial planning exclusively follow 
the economic planning (the Plan). As he put it: 
[the plan] must be the dictator in Bucharest with regards to any further constructions. 
The local council has a good heart, a large heart, it is very democratic [so that it 
allows for uncontrolled constructions to be erected] but this rotten bourgeois 
liberalism must cease now. No one is allowed to squander the goods of the state, to 
waste energy for nothing. There should be a controlling body, and everyone should 
know that they must submit to it. […] This control must be strengthened, we need a 
more severe control of the dispositions for construction. We must be very strict with 
the architects and everyone involved.225 
 
 In fact, in his comments Dej did not mention Zvedin even once. Dej was fully 
aware of the deep political implications of Bucharest’s systematization in the larger 
scheme of the new relations with the Soviets. A strong opponent of Khrushchev (who, 
after a tough fight for power, had become the First Secretary of the Party in the Soviet 
Union in September 1953) and especially of his agenda of political relaxation, Dej 
understood that “the only way to defend [his] political hegemony was to ensure the 
country’s economic independence.”226 As also becomes transparent from those 
stenograms, Dej’s leadership was very much influenced by Stalin’s strategy of total 
control. His “policy amounted to unwavering Stalinism: he favored breakneck 
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industrialization and waged a merciless collectivization campaign.”227 At the same time, 
Dej, a well versed politician, knew that he had to play a double game with Khrushchev, 
by trying to maintain full control over the country’s management while persuading 
Khrushchev of unwavering loyalty. We now know that Dej succeeded eventually in 
winning this game with Khrushchev, since it turned out that, after Khrushchev withdrew 
the Soviet troops from Romania in June 1958, Dej adopted a strategy that would ensure 
“a margin of autonomy against any Soviet injunctions for further de-Stalinization.”228 
 At the time of the discussion on the systematization blueprint, Dej knew that 
such autonomy was to be gained through a combination of strategic decisions. It was 
crucial for the Party to closely monitor every individual or institution directly 
participating in the drafting of the systematization plan. Otherwise, any extraneous 
interference (in the form of unplanned new buildings or designs) not only would have 
caused a breach in the targeted urban order, but it would also have hit into the system’s 
very core: such interventions might have broken the relation of subordination of the city 
to the economic Plan and thus call into question the totality of the central planning and 
thereby of the socialist system itself. This was one form of the “anarchy” so much 
criticized by Dej in his commentaries. 
 Another type of “anarchy,” which Dej could not yet overtly address, regarded 
the relations with the post-Stalin Soviet Union. He insisted on having autochthonous 
specialists, led by Constantinescu, who was entrusted to come up with a version of the 
Plan that would be then integrated into the urban form. The trick here was the awareness 
of the totality of this project and the exclusive interdependence of the systematization 
                                                        







blueprint (Plan 1) and the economic planning (Plan 2). The two Plans were forming a 
rather rigid mechanism, whose lack of flexibility allowed for a particularly powerful 
manipulation. In other words, who ever controlled the economic planning controlled 
Bucharest’s form, and vice-versa. That is, had the Soviets been invited to “contribute” to 
the making of the city (in fact, fully supervise the systematization), they would have been 
automatically given a free hand over the national economic planning. However, as much 
as he wanted to eschew such forms of “support,” Dej had to face the fact that the Soviets 
had already achieved major economic control over the country. 
 
 Aesthetic Reorientations as Political Shifts 
 
 According to the 1953 transcripts, the Politburo envisioned the city of 
Bucharest as an autochthonous socialist product, to emerge mostly out of the hands and 
minds of Romanian architects and urbanists, both “old” and “young” alike. Three-
quarters of its buildings were to be demolished, as they did not meet the standards of 
economic space usage and modern comfort. The socialist Master Plan did not account for 
the past in any form. On the contrary, as it had been agreed at the meeting, “the 
preparation [of the blueprint] on [a] scientific basis did not entail a preparation on a 
historical basis.”229 That is, technology and mass scale industrialization had to facilitate 
the employment of prefabricated materials in the production of serial residential units, an 
operation that Dej had already outlined at the end of the meeting: 
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Dej in 1957, together with Miron Constantinescu. If Constantinescu lived enough to be socially and 
politically rehabilitated by Ceaușescu, Chișinevschi would live his last years at the social periphery. 





We must gradually move to the industrialization of constructions. We also should 
know which technology we need and what kind of architecture. [We must know] how 
much of the built space is for practical use and how much is used for pure 
embellishment. For there are some who assign 30% for effectively utilized space, and 
70% for beauty. We must forego this approach. 
 
 With this subtle criticism of the socialist realist approach, Dej anticipated the 
doctrinal shift in architectural practice that would be announced by Khrushchev a year 
later. At the Conference of Builders and Architects in December 1954, Khrushchev 
overtly rejected the costly and gratuitous embellishment of the socialist realist 
architecture of the Stalin era and endorsed the standardization of construction techniques 
and materials as a solution for quickly increasing the mass of “more economical and 
functional housing.”230 This famous speech marked the official endorsement of a new 
phase in the architectural practice of the Soviet bloc. More specifically, it allowed—in 
fact, encouraged—the architects on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain to “critically” 
engage with the principles of postwar Western modernism in their projects.231 In her 
discussion of the occurrence and consequences of this shift in the architectural discourse, 
                                                        
230 Anatole Senkevitch, Jr. offers a summarized description of the shift produced by Khrushchev’s speech. 
He writes: 
The shift from extolling to repudiating the design validity of the Stalinist skyscrapers came in 
short order with Khrushchev’s denunciation of the decorative excesses in recent Soviet 
architecture in a speech to the All-Union Conference of Builders and Architects on December 7, 
1954. Proclaiming that Soviet building had urgently to adopt industrialized mass construction 
techniques in order to erect greater numbers of more economical and functional housing, 
Khrushchev denounced the Moscow skyscrapers for epitomizing the trend of individualized rather 
standardized design, with its emphasis on excessive ornamentation and on complex silhouettes 
with spires incongruously recalling medieval Moscow churches (a resemblance encouraged by 
Stalin). It was the excessive cost of constructing these elaborate buildings, rather than their artistic 
content per se, that proved the central focus of Khrushchev’s campaign. Still, his remarks bore 
unmistakable traces of aesthetic preferences and implications with the suggestion that such an 
approach revealed “the absence of taste on the part of certain architects” (Nikita S. Khrushchev, O 
shirokom vnedrenii industrial'nykh metodov, uluchshenii kachestva i snizhenii stoimosti 
stroitel'stva, [Moscow, 1955], 20). 
In Anatole Senkevitch Jr., "Art, Architecture, and Design: A Commentary," Slavic Review 37, no. 4 
(1978). note 11. 
231 As happened at the 4th UIA congress in 1955. Popescu, "Looking West: Emulation and Limitation in 






Carmen Popescu points out the peculiar chronology that these changes took in the 
Romanian context. She observes that in fact, the first criticism of “Socialist Realism’s 
excesses” occurred at the second Plenary of the Union of Romanian Architects in July, 
1954—something that she describes as a “paradoxical” occurrence, a “precocious 
reflection,” since it preceded “by four months” the USSR Conference of Builders and 
Architects at Moscow. Even though the criteria of economy and efficiency had already 
been addressed in earlier discussions in the journal Arhitectura RPR, Popescu notes that 
the novelty of the debates in the second Plenary was the “enhanced emphasis on this 
approach [functionality and efficiency instead of gratuitous beautification], presented as 
the direction to be followed.”232  
 A close reading of the transcripts of the Council of Ministers meeting in 
November 1953 situates the discussions of the second Plenary of Romanian Architects in 
a different light. In fact, I suggest that the debates occurring at the Plenary, during which 
the leading figures in the architectural field of Romania (including Pompiliu Macovei) 
overtly criticized the socialist realist approach and promoted instead modernist solutions 
as the “new” norm in socialist architecture, could not have happened had the Party 
leadership not already endorsed this significant shift in November 1953. A reassessment 
of the modernist principles appeared in fact as the only solution to the call for efficiency 
launched by Dej at the closed-door meeting of the Council of Ministers. More 
importantly, the November 1953 discussions indicate that the Romanian leaders (that is, 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej) strongly desired that the development of a Master Plan for 
Bucharest be pursued by relying as much as possible on autochthonous resources and 
expertise. Under the guise of (objective) praise for cheaper and more functional 
                                                        





architecture, which would meet the housing crisis more efficiently, Dej’s rejection of 
socialist realist architectural choices signaled a more pervasive change in his political 
agenda. His precocious push for a more efficient and function-oriented strategy of urban 
development simultaneously stood as a statement that, despite his stated loyalty to the 
USSR, he no longer wanted any further stylistic influence or any other form of 
“guidance” from the Soviets.233 
 The transcripts from the November 1953 meeting help us gauge the extent to 
which the Party leadership had to walk a fine line between rejecting a total supervision of 
the plan by the Soviets and responding to the external and internal pressures to speed up 
                                                        
233 This reading of Dej’s directives, as they were recorded in the 1953 transcripts, challenges an earlier 
interpretation of Dej’s position towards the changes in the architectural field in Romania of early 1950s. In 
their analysis of the emergence of a “second wave of modernism” in socialist Romania, Răuță and Heyden 
argue that it was only in 1958 that Dej, in response to Khrushchev’s radical move and as an attempt to 
secure his position as the Party leader, retrospectively claimed his full support for the reforms and the 
influences they had in architecture. Radu-Alex Răuță and Hildergarde Heyden, “Shifting Meanings of 
Modernism: Parallels and Contrasts between Karel Teige and Cezar Lăzărescu,” The Journal of 
Architecture, 2009 (1): 30. More specifically, as they put it: 
[Even though across the entire socialist bloc] almost all the Stalinist leaders were overthrown [,] 
Romania, however, proved to be an exception in that Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the secretary 
general of the Romanian Workers’ Party, was able to stay in power. His position, threatened by 
the shock-waves coming from Moscow, was only fully restored in 1958. That is when Dej chose 
to deliver a programmatic document depicting the new course to be taken by Romanian architects, 
following the lead of Khrushchev’s reforms. In this programmatic document Cezar Lăzărescu’s 
holiday houses […] were singled out as exemplary, on the basis that the architect had managed to 
cut costs to almost half of what competing projects were proposing. Referring to several similar 
projects allowed Dej to argue that the Romanian regime had already been following the course set 
out by Khrushchev in 1954. This argument supported his claim that destalinisation was already 
achieved and that his personal leadership was in line with Khrushchev’s reformism. The second 
wave of modernism was thus officially acknowledged.(30) 
Two issues must be addressed here. First, Dej secured his position already in 1956, when he (and 
the Party leadership) played a Janus-like role for the group of Imre Nagy, the reformers of the Hungarian 
Communist Party who sought refuge in Romania after the 1956 Hungarian revolution had been silenced by 
the Soviet tanks. Dej in fact proved his political loyalty to the new regime at Moscow by handing Nagy and 
the others over to the Soviets. At the same time, however, as Tismăneanu and others have already argued, 
and the 1953 transcripts prove one more time, Dej tried to achieve a relative autonomy from the USSR. In 
fact, ironically, Dej’s affirmation that “destalinization had already been achieved,” (31) which Răuță and 
Heyden read as a retrospective move to please Khrushchev, was in fact accurate. Behind the closed doors 
of the Council of Ministers, having already gotten rid of the Pauker group, Dej had already been preparing 
the steps for an indigenous destalinization way ahead of the “big brothers” in Moscow. This quest for 
autonomy, however, opened a Pandora’s box, since the immediate need for experts and highly qualified 
specialists in urban planning and design brought some of the “older” architects, marginalized until then, 






the plan’s execution. As mentioned earlier, the most pressing matter was Bucharest’s 
significant housing crisis, which was to be solved only by rapidly launching a massive 
building project of apartment buildings that would meet the dual criteria of functionality 
and maximal usage of the city space.234 As such, the closed-door meeting of the Council 
of Ministers prepared the way for a more overt shift of perspective from a penchant for 
“pompous, historicist aesthetics” of Socialist Realism to an emphasis on a functional 
architecture.235 
 The documents examined here must be read against a political context that 
was itself under radical change. From the installation of a socialist government in 1947, 
the issue of political control appeared as a sine qua non for the development of any grand 
project under socialism. During the period prior to 1953, this control was directly exerted 
from Moscow with the technical help of different Soviet councilors.236 Following the 
triumph of Gheorghiu-Dej over the Pauker group, and especially after Stalin’s death, this 
form of direct and total control of Moscow over Romania’s internal affairs shifted to a 
more mediated one, under which diverse forms of planning and other significant projects 
were no longer required to be automatically referred to the “Soviet specialists,” nor 
necessarily to be endorsed by the Soviet councilors.237 This shift of the ultimate center of 
decision from Moscow to Bucharest occurred simultaneously with—or, perhaps, due to—
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236 For a detailed analysis of the role of the Soviet councilors in Romania of the 1950s, see Raportul Final 
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a wider interest of the USSR to engage a more systematic economic and cultural 
exchange with Western Europe after Stalin’s death. Moreover, the search for relative 
political autonomy from the USSR led the regime in Bucharest to start their own form of 
“Thaw” by allowing specialists—in our case, the architects—to search for innovative and 
more daring technical solutions. At the same time, under an increasing awareness of the 
relative lack of highly trained specialists, the regime made another radical shift. It turned 
to a peculiar group as an alternative pool of highly qualified labor. This pool of expertise 
was mainly formed of the “disenfranchised” who had been stripped of their possessions, 
rights, and jobs, and many of whom had been thrown into political prisons during 
Romania’s Stalinization (1947-1953). At the same time, the question of how to keep the 
socialist project uncontaminated by “the old beliefs” of this category of experts lay at the 
kernel of the official discussions of that time. As the 1953 transcripts show, the 
immediate solution was an increasing centralization, which became then enhanced by 
another form of control: an appeal to the revived discourse of the Nation.238  
 The debates emerging within the architectural field at the end of the 1950s 
must therefore be analyzed from several distinct, but inextricably linked, perspectives. 
The first one illuminates a quest for the most suitable aesthetic form that could translate 
the socialist doctrine, as the Party leadership understood it at distinct political moments: 
the year 1953 represents the very beginning of the “national Stalinism” under Dej, 
according to Tismăneanu, signaling a gradual transition from Socialist Realism to the 
adoption of a (moderate) modernist vocabulary in architecture; however, the early 1960s 
bring about an increasing interest in “local specificity,” which architects aimed to 
                                                        







accomplish by adapting vernacular motifs to monumental scales, such as in the case of 
the civic centers (an approach that resembled earlier projects of the National Style 
movement emerging at the turn of the 20th century). An increasing concern with an 
aesthetic representation of the “nation” and the quest for “authenticity” and “specificity” 
in urban architecture in the early 1960s was accompanied by a state-endorsed interest in 
the restoration of historical sites.239 The case of the Old Court brings these two processes 
together, since it illustrates the tense arguments about historical preservation and 
diverging views on the practice of restoration among architects.  
 This perspective on the politics of architecture in early socialist Romania 
takes a political economic approach, one focused on the struggles over resources within 
and beyond the architectural field, an aspect that I have already discussed in the first part 
of the chapter. Such an analysis helps us to better understand the tempestuous disputes 
among architects, as well as between architects and urbanists, on one hand, and the 
archeologists working in the city, on the other, disputes triggered by the proposal to 
declare the Old Court area “a historical reservation.” Moreover, an analysis of these 
debates on the renovation of the Old Court area cannot be separated from a discussion of 
the urban remodeling of Union Square, a key area of interest in the economy of the city 
and thereby of Bucharest’s Master Plan. The prospect of having the Old Court area stand 
as a “historical reservation” in stark contrast to the radically remodeled Union Square 
appeared as a timely solution to the Party-endorsed project of transforming Union Square 
into a pinnacle of socialist modernist architecture.  
 The following section will discuss these two projects (the making the Old 
Court area into a historical reservation, and the remodeling of Union Square) as parallel 
                                                        





processes that could offer us some insights into how the Party leadership and the experts 
of the new state projected the dialectics of power onto the urban landscape of Bucharest. I 
start with an analysis of the debates on Union Square’s reconstruction, using the 
particularities of this case to develop an argument about the institutional rearrangements 
occurring within the wider architectural field in Romania of the early 1960s. I engage 
then in a detailed reading of a set of letters exchanged between 1962 and 1964 among 
central institutions on the topic of the preservation of the Old Court area, which some 
institutional actors deemed to be endangered by the radical remodeling of Union Square. 
These letters reveal reciprocal accusations among differently positioned institutional 
actors of ignoring the “national value” of the Old Court or, on the contrary, ludicrously 
attempting to modify the architectural past that the Old Court represented. Interestingly—
and perhaps, not surprisingly—among those actors we also find some of “older elements” 
that Dej endorsed in 1953, such as architects who had already gained a professional fame 
during the interwar period. In the last part of the chapter, I situate those debates within 
the emerging discourse of the (socialist) nation, revived in the mid 1960s and reaching its 
peak in the 1980s, in order to show that the arguments about architectural form and 
historical preservation in the case of the Old Court illustrate a more complex enterprise of 
the socialist state to rewrite a “new” national history into the urban landscape. 
History as Built Contrasts: Competing Temporalities in the Old Court and Union 
Square 
 
Spaces of the (socialist) future: Union Square as “the site of civic life” 
 
 Dej’s directives, expressed in the November 1953 meeting of the Politburo, were 






country”) and applied accordingly in every town and city. Moreover, an increased 
centralization was to be accompanied by a policy favoring an economical use of 
resources and an approach to the city’s remodeling that understood it as an industrialized 
process. However, from the Resolution for the Improvement of Urban Planning within 
the Local Councils, issued by the Council of Ministers on November 20, 1959 
(henceforth, the 1959 Improvement Resolution), we may surmise that the implementation 
of the systematization plan at the national level did not work quite as Dej had 
envisioned.240 In fact, the plan outlined by Dej carried the seeds of failure at its very core, 
because it aimed to combine elements that contradicted each other. That is, (1) the 
horizontal enlargement of architectural expertise was automatically constricted by (2) the 
centralized system of decision making, formed of the bureaucrats of the Party whose 
main task was to increase (3) the control over and thus the quantity of resources 
(construction materials, etc). 
Verdery helps us better understand the mechanisms of the failure, by identifying 
at the center of the socialist system an inherent tension between the tendency for 
accumulating resources at each of the nodes of the redistributive system and the center’s 
constant interest in accumulating decisional power, that is, distributive rights over these 
resources.241 As she puts it, “what counts most in the competition among social actors 
within allocative bureaucracies is inputs to one’s segment, rather than outputs of 
production.”242 Therefore, “one finds within the apparatus of management itself an 
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interest in mechanisms that subvert the system’s central logic.”243 Verdery uses 
Câmpeanu to capture the image of this tension: “This potential for revolt nourishes the 
organic mistrust the supreme entity has of its bureaucracy, which in turn nourishes their 
historical tendency to transform their separation into conflict.”244 
 
Figure 3 The Central market in the 1960s. The smaller building at the right is Manuk’s 
Inn (the front façade). The reconstructed Princely Palace of the Old Court is located 
behind the inn. Source: romania.ici.ro/images/bucuresti/oldb22.jpg 
 
 
  With this overview in mind, I would like to return to Bucharest’s systematization 
project and examine the changes that the 1959 Improvement Resolution tried to 
implement. Faced with a long series of dismissals of the systematization plan by the 
Local Councils across the country, the Politburo decided to endorse a shift in the 
relationship between the local architects and the regional People’s Councils (Sfaturi 
Populare). More specifically, the 1959 Resolution endowed the chief architect of the 
region (or the capital) with decision making power over the council, whereas the latter 
was responsible for populating the city’s architecture office with well prepared 
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specialists.245 In other words, the role of the architects among other categories of local 
bureaucrats grew significantly, which allowed them to carve out a special niche of 
expertise that became indispensable to the Party. This shift generated various forms of 
tension including those 1) among architects differently placed within this niche, and 2) 
between this professional category as a whole and others, especially the ones that also 
needed the ground of the city to establish themselves as a professional group—that is, the 
archeologists working in central areas of Bucharest. 
 The contest for proposals launched in 1959 regarding the urban remodeling of 
Union Square offers us an interesting venue to explore these tensions in more detail. 
Moreover, the debates surrounding the contest give us a better grasp of the role that 
Union Square continued to play in the symbolic economy of socialist Bucharest in the 
1950s and afterwards. We remember that before 1945 the appearance and the social 
mélange of the Square and the adjacent Lipscani area had already triggered intense 
                                                        
245 A more detailed explanation of the lack of interest shown by the regional People’s Councils could be 
read between the lines in the unsigned account of the 1959 Decision, published in Arhitectura. 
The People’s Councils (Sfaturile populare) had underestimated the role that the master plans 
(planurile de sistematizare) played for the development of our cities. [...] Another cause that led to 
those deficiencies had been the way in which the architecture divisions of the Local Councils 
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Those divisions had not kept under control the process of construction and reconstruction of the 
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regional institutes of urban planning and design [IRP, Project Bucharest Institute was the 
equivalent for the capital of those regional institutes, E.G.], kept away from the concrete problems, 
[those divisions of the local councils] had not been involved in the operative type of work, directly 
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departments of systematization, architecture, and urban design (Direcții de sistematizare, 
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the regional institutes of urban design and offices of systematization and architecture (Servicii de 
sistematizare și arhitectură) for cities. Both institutions are part of the local Councils, which will 
effectively be responsible for the [implementation] of the systematization projects. Those 
institutions will be set under the supervisions of the chief architect of the region. The job of the 
chief architect will thereby carry more leverage, while the issues related to architecture and 
systematization will be better coordinated within the local councils. 





debates over the site’s adequacy to standards of civic habitation. Cincinat Sfințescu, the 
first professionally trained urban planner working in Bucharest, had come up with a 
project of reordering the traffic in the area, while maintaining its economic function. 
Even if his ideas had not been pursued due to a lack of resources and the imminent 
involvement of the country in the Second World War, they were to be found among the 
principles of the new master plan for a socialist Bucharest, set up by the November 1952 
Resolution. However, Sfințescu’s insistence on maintaining the commercial character of 
the square by preserving the Central Market did not survive in the new master plan. The 
squares in the center of the city were given great attention in the 1952 master plan, but 
their role was mainly civic and political. 
In his presentation of the Master Plan to the Council of Ministers in November 
1953, Macovei stressed the key role that Union Square played in the general urban 
economy of the city. He suggested that a radical change in the city skyline be achieved by 
creating a series of taller buildings, which would be placed in key nodal points in the city 
center. One of those buildings, he proposed, could be an expanded version of the current 
building of the Municipal Council, located in the square. Macovei envisioned this 
building as being “elongated and expanded in length,” thus marking more strongly “the 
geometrical center of the city.”246 “While Victory Square [another major square of the 
city] will have a political character, displaying the central political institutions, [Union] 
Square will become the center of civic life, [marked] by the building of the People’s 
Council and other future establishments.”247 In other words, Union Square was regarded 
as a space containing and giving shape to the social life of the present and, especially, of 
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the future. The square would represent a pivotal area in the economy of the city, standing 
in sharp contrast with the area of the Old Court located in its immediate proximity. That 
is, the new economic and civic value conferred on Union Square embedded the futuristic 
quality of the city as a whole within a future-oriented temporal framework, which was 
further enhanced by an opposite (past-focused) temporality represented by the Old Court. 
I suggest then that the socialist urban planning in Romania of the 1960s did not reject 
“the past” entirely, but rather worked it out (or around it) in order to set stronger 
contrasting sites within the new urban landscape, which would increase the impact of 
novel socialist urban forms.  
  Given the importance of Union Square as “the major traffic node in the city 
center,” its remodeling appeared as a most timely pursuit. Around the same time when 
the 1959 Decision was issued to dissolve the departments of architecture and 
constructions of the People’s Councils, the Municipal Council of the city of Bucharest 
launched a contest for the urban remodeling of Union Square, by sending out a call for 
proposals that was opened to all the architects included in the Romanian Architects’ 
Union.248 This was not an ordinary event. In general, many of the projects concerning the 
remodeling of Bucharest’s central sites were automatically assigned to the mega Institute 
of Architectural Design and Planning “Project Bucharest.”249 As I mentioned at the 
beginning of the chapter, this institution appeared as a later product of the 1952 
Resolution which launched Bucharest’s Master Plan and the establishment of the State 
Commission for Architecture and Construction (SCAC), in charge of the supervision of 
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the systematization of all cities in socialist Romania. Already by the end of the 1950s, 
“Proiect Bucureşti” (Project Bucharest, henceforth) became then an indispensable 
organism for the socialist state, and its authority kept growing within the professional 
circles of architects and planners, as well as within the bureaucratic structure of the city 
as a whole. In other words, Project Bucharest kept accumulating not only indispensable 
resources (well qualified professionals, access to professional know-how [journals, 
books] from abroad, etc.), but also an exclusivity of those resources and decisional rights 
over their usage or redistribution. This became more transparent after the 1959 Decision, 
which granted more rights and decision-making power to the architects working with the 
People’s Councils across the country. Sometimes, however, Project Bucharest had to 
admit its own limits. 
The contest for Union Square was open to virtually all architects in the country 
because Project Bucharest could not find an adequate solution for the traffic regulation 
within the perimeter of the square, a difficulty posed by its peculiar trapezoidal form. 
Under these circumstances, “the Executive Committee of the Local Council decided to 
enlarge the sphere of possible solutions by organizing, together with the Architects’ 
Union, an open competition for proposals on the square’s systematization.”250 
Notwithstanding the very short time (the contest/competition was launched on September 
10, 1959, with the deadline set for November 10 of the same year), the People’s Council 
received a record number of proposals, “the highest ever received in a public contest [of 
architecture] in our country.”251 Even more interesting was the fact that many teams 
submitted more than one project, offering several different proposals. The explanation of 
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this rather peculiar fact was vague, but politically fashionable. The jury inferred that 
this massive participation, despite the difficulties posed by the geometry of the 
square and the short deadline, is attributable to an unhealthy mentality of the 
candidates. There have been noted […] different projects made by the same team. 
This proves that the team in question either manifested doubts about the projects, 
or relied on luck. In both cases, the quality of the project would suffer. 
  
The “unhealthy mentality,” leading the architects to come up with several projects, could 
be explained also as a radical strategy—see the record number of projects—to break 
through the monopoly created by Project Bucharest over the projects pursued in the city 
center, projects that regularly amassed an extraordinary number of resources (capital, 
know-how, etc). 
 
Figure 4 The winning project of the 1959 competition for the remodeling of 
Union Square. Arhitectura, 62, no. 1 (1960): 15. 
 
 The mounting tension between Project Bucharest and Romania’s other architects 
was reflected in the debates that followed the contest, when the members of the 
Architects’ Union (Bucharest branch) met to discuss the winning project. The project 
offered a solution for traffic regulation as well as an ordering of the economic activity in 
the Square. It did so by correcting the trapezoidal form of the square with three apartment 





the old Central Market. The entire square was to be surrounded by new buildings, which 
would also conceal the older houses in the Lipscani area. 
At the meeting, the discussions centered first on the organization of the contest, 
with some participants criticizing the ambiguous guidelines and some even questioning 
the decisions of the jury. Then, the architects debated the solutions proposed by the 
projects thrown into competition. Some of those projects had been rejected for relying on 
“imported solutions, which would work perhaps in other countries, but could not fit the 
local conditions.”252 Most of the debates concentrated on the adequacy of the proposals 
for traffic regulation. Of all the participants, only one architect put forth the issue of the 
historical monuments that could be affected by the square’s systematization. He pointed 
out that the historical monuments represented by the Old Court and the 18th century 
Manuk Inn would not be given enough importance. This comment provoked no further 
remarks. (However, as I will show later, this topic would be resuscitated in the internal 
documents circulating during that very year [1963] among central institutions of the 
architectural field.)  
The reconstruction of Union Square was to entail a complete remaking of the 
area, which was a modified version of the solution chosen in the 1959 contest. More 
specifically, the square would be circumscribed by new buildings—a grand hotel on the 
south side, buildings for the institutes of urban planning on the eastern side, a large 
commercial complex on the north, and at a later date, a new Opera building on the current 
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place of the Brâncovenesc Hospital.253 The open square would be aesthetically focused 
on the Union monument, celebrating the making of Greater Romania in 1918. 
  The new vision of the square allowed then for “the past” to be present only under 
the condensed form of the Union monument, while other forms (such as the Old Court) 
were planned to be erased. However, at the time of Maicu’s presentation in 1963, the 
issue of two other sites—the Old Court and the Manuk Inn—had already been brought 
back to the discussion table of the Cabinet of the Council of Ministers. This is because 
the struggle for resources partially emerged as an internal process within the architects’ 
guild, continuously reinforcing the division between specialists affiliated with Project 
Bucharest and the others, who aspired to be part of the first category or at least get a 
share of its exclusive resources.  
 
Figure 5 Proposal for the remodeling of Union Square by Horia Maicu. Arhitectura, 90, 
no. 5 (1964): 13. 
 
                                                        
253 To a certain extent, this reconstruction had eventually been produced via the making of the Civic Center 
of Bucharest in the late 1980s. This is an argument advanced by Maria Raluca Popa, "Understanding the 
Urban Past: The Transformation of Bucharest in the Late Socialist Period," in Testimonies of the City: 
Identity, Community and Change in a Contemporary Urban World, ed. Richard Rodger and Joanna Herbert 





 I discuss this process in detail in the last section of this chapter, where I look at 
the proposal advanced by architect Constantin Joja to renovate the houses in the Old 
Court/Lipscani area according to what he deemed to represent a “Romanian urban 
architecture.” Joja represents a very interesting case, as he was one of the “older 
elements” who had already gained a professional status through the projects he did or 
participated in during the interwar times. His take on “renovation” in the Old Court area 
came under criticism by other architects, especially the ones working in the Department 
for Historical Monuments, who dismissed Joja’s proposal as being inaccurate and 
quixotic. While the renovation of the houses in Lipscani came to represent such a point of 
contention, these disputes in the mid 1960s brought the Old Court back on the map, 
however, by making it more visible to the central authorities. This incident prevented the 
pursuit of the initial intentions of some of the architects well placed within the political 
system, such as chief architect Horia Maicu, who had envisioned the partial demolition of 
the Old Court area as a sine qua non preliminary stage in the expansion and remodeling 
of Union Square.254 
 At the same time, the increasing monopoly set by Project Bucharest on the city’s 
landscape also became contested by other professional categories, especially when the 
latter also relied on the same ground—or, more exactly, specific areas of this ground—to 
establish a disciplinary niche for themselves. Only by having established this niche could 
those groups ask then for institutional recognition—and thus resources—from the center 
(the redistributive state). Even more so, perhaps those categories aspired to organize a 
monopoly of their own. In order to understand these professional conflicts better, I turn 
                                                        
254 We also learn from the hand written comments added to the draft, that the response was also sent to 
architect Horia Maicu, who did not agree with the preservation and restoration of the Manuk Inn. AINMI, 






my focus here to the archeologists who since 1953 had been working on the digs opened 
in the center of Bucharest around the sites of Union Square and the Old Court. 
The remodeling of Union Square posed a serious problem to the archeologists 
working on the Old Court site, which bordered a part of the northern side of the square. 
At the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th, during the peak times of 
Bucharest’s urban growth, the economic role of the Lipscani area as the city’s major 
commercial center partially effaced the historical significance of the grounds on which it 
developed—the Old Court. The area’s historical importance was resuscitated under the 
post-1945 political regime, when the Old Court came to occupy a central point in the 
network of archeological digs opened in the city center. The results of the successive 
excavations—the unearthing of the walls of the court and some rooms of the royal 
palace—led the archeologists to lay new claims over the site.  
Why is the Old Court significant to the argument I have laid out thus far? I 
have attempted to show that both the Old Court and Union Square concentrated not only 
disputes over growing regimes of expertise but also diverging visions of how the city’s 
planning and architecture should reflect its economic profile. The rest of the chapter 
focuses then on the following two processes: 1) the disputes across disciplinary 
boundaries between architects and archeologists over the distinct value and meaning that 
the Old Court and its adjacent area carried for each profession, and 2) the inner fights 
among architects differently placed in the institutional network over the remaking of the 
Old Court into a historical reservation. Although I discuss these processes in 
chronological order, as they come out of the archival files, I approach them as 





as by diverging views on the representations of the (national) past in this particular area.  
 
Sites of the past: Architects and archeologists in the Old Court area 
 
In October 1963, the chief architect of the capital, Horia Maicu, outlined the 
Master Plan of the city of Bucharest to the plenary meeting of the national Architects’ 
Union.255 Presented as the “result of the scientific work conducted by circa 350 
architects, engineers, economists, technicians from the Local Council, the Project 
Institute Bucharest, ministers, institutes, and institutions,”256 the 1963 Outline of the 
systematization scheme directly reflected Dej’s instructions given ten years earlier. The 
blueprint gave detailed explanations on the remaking of the city by mainly invoking 
economic factors (traffic, electricity, infrastructure, etc). As a whole, the scheme did not 
differ much from the 1952 Resolution; rather, it was a much more complex project set on 
a similar goal: “the liquidation of improper constructions,” which had to unfold along a 
time span of several decades. According to Maicu, 
In order to maintain the demolitions and the relocation of families under the 
admissible limit, in the first stages the reconstruction of the city will be mainly 
conducted on large areas that are partially empty or with run-down buildings. 
[The process will be less focused on] the central zone, which is to be 
reconstructed only after 1980 [my underlining, E.G.]. The reconstruction of the 
central zone, which currently offers an inhabitable structure, will be done via 
gradual decommissioning.257 
 
At the same time, the creation of a sequence of public squares and civic centers 
constituted a focal point of the discussion. The 1952 Master Plan had already emphasized 
the urgency of creating (or enlarging) public central squares that would both regulate the 
                                                        
255 Horia Maicu quoted in “Plenara Uniunii Arhitecţilor din R.P.R. [The plenary meeting of the Union of 
Architects of the People’s Republic of Romania,” Arhitectura, 85/6 (1963): 54-57. 







central traffic and also confer a sense of order and centralized coherence to the new city 
in the making. By criticizing the “bourgeois regime” for not having been “able to endow 
the capital with any architecturally well organized public square,” chief architect Maicu 
drew in 1963 a direct correlation between this lack of “properly arranged” public squares 
and the general “chaotic development” of the city. The remodeling of the central major 
squares stood therefore among the top priorities of the new regime, as they represented 
crucial urban solutions not only for traffic regulation, but also for engendering novel 
forms of political subjectivity (since the larger squares constituted the perfect stages for 
mass demonstrations). 
At the time of the discussions held at the Architects’ Union office, the main 
concerns of the majority of the participants lay elsewhere—that is, with access (or lack 
thereof) to major projects of the systematization in the city center, which was controlled 
by Project Bucharest and the Local Council. The remodeling of Bucharest concentrated 
an extraordinary number of resources and political attention, thus making any form of 
participation in this project an exclusive and therefore much wanted capital in itself. This 
competition became even tighter in conditions when the pool of resources was more 
closely monitored, as happened after the third Party Congress in June 1960, when the 
leaders decided that “all the conditions must be met so that we could build more, better, 
faster, cheaper.”258 
Almost a year before Horia Maicu’s presentation of the general Master Plan at the 
Architects’ Union, the president of the State Committee for Architecture and 
Systematization, architect Nicolae Bădescu, received a copy of a document that was 









We have received this from the Academy of RPR. I think that the staff of the 
Museum of Bucharest might have had a hand in drafting the document. What 
do you think? 
Dinu V. December 24, 1962 
  
The original letter had been sent to the Central Committee for Culture, directly 
subordinated to the Council of Ministers, the supreme body of state administration 
according to the socialist Constitution.259 The text stood as an open accusation against 
two important institutions within the network of the socialist system of urban planning: 1) 
the Department for Historical Monuments (Direcţia Monumentelor Istorice, Department 
for Monuments henceforth), which was responsible for the monitoring and protection of 
the sites and buildings considered “historical monuments” within the larger institution of 
the State Committee for Architecture and Construction (Committee for Architecture, 
henceforth), and 2) the “Project Bucharest” Institute (Project Bucharest), subordinated to 
the first institution.  
The letter writers incriminate the two institutions for having ignored and 
thereby critically endangered two major historical sites of Bucharest: the ruins of the Old 
Court and the adjacent Manuk Inn. More specifically, given its exclusive focus on the 
radical transformation of the city, Project Bucharest is accused of sheer ignorance of 
Bucharest’s historical sites, while the Department for Monuments is described as a ghost 
                                                        
259 “Dinu V.” is the signature of Vasile Dinu, at that time (1962) head of unit (șef de secţie, in Romanian) in 
the Department of Propaganda and Culture (Direcţia de Propagandă și Cultură), led by Leonte Răutu, of the 
Central Comittee of Romanian Workers’ Party. Dinu was also professor at the University of Bucharest and 
the chair of the department of scientific socialism. Vladimir Tismaneanu, personal communication. Vasile 
Dinu is also mentioned as one of the “adjuncts” of Leonte Răutu. Vladimir Tismăneanu, Dorin Dobrincu, 
and Cristian Vasile, eds. Comisia prezidenţială pentru analiza dictaturii comuniste din România: Raport 
final,Bucharest: Humanitas, 2007, 631.Vasile Dinu is also mentioned in the diary of writer Petre Solomon, 
who noted that Dinu was in 1965 “the new vicepresident of the [Central Committtee] for Arts [and Culture 






institution, which does not show proper concern for the archeological monuments. Recall 
that Project Bucharest had overseen the 1959 contest on the redesign of Union Square. 
The letter also raises questions about the professionalism and political 
commitment of two important architects, who also played a key role within the Party 
central apparatus at the time: the chief architect of Bucharest, Horia Maicu, and the 
president of Committee for Architecture, architect Nicolae Bădescu (who held the rank of 
minister. Considering the great political leverage held then by those two political actors, 
it is perhaps easy to understand why the letter was not signed, but rather sent off as a 
collective reaction, under the name of the Institute for Archaeology of the Romanian 
Academy. More interesting is how this document ended up in this particular archive—the 
official archive of the Department for Monuments, one of the two institutions under 
accusation. 
If we believe Dinu’s hunch, then the first question we want to ask is: why 
would the Museum be so keen on trying to eliminate the Department for Monuments and 
on inveighing against Project Bucharest? Why would it not appeal to the Institute for 
Archaeology, instead? Also, why would the note presume the Museum of Bucharest’s 
involvement? I suggest that the letter had something more at stake. A close reading of the 
letter (and its response) will help us assess its broader implications in the reconfiguration 
of heritage as a political process. A map of the political and scholarly alliances and 
contentions at play in the process of heritage-making was being drawn in the background 
of the letter: one group, formed of the specialists employed by the City Museum of 
Bucharest, the Institutes of Archaeology, of Art History and of History of the Romanian 





another group, formed of seemingly ignorant professionals (planners and architects) and 
highly questionable institutions such as the Department for Monuments and Project 
Bucharest. This section will set the claims and reciprocal accusations advanced by the 
letters concerning the Old Court within the wider process of remaking disciplinary and 
professional boundaries in a newly centralized institutional network of the socialist state. 
In this network in which the resources distributed by the center became scantier, the 
various professional groups had to fight harder to assign stronger political meanings to 
their specific research interests if they wanted to obtain further funding. 
Given the anonymity of the letter, we cannot assume that the writers were 
automatically associated with (or employed by) the Museum. However, from an 
institutional point of view, Dinu was right: at the moment of the letter’s writing, all of the 
archeological sites on the city’s territory were included in the jurisdiction of the Museum 
of History of the City of Bucharest. The Museum had been established in December 
1956, at the decision of Bucharest’s People’s Council, while simultaneously the former 
Museum of Antiquities (the institution dealing up to that moment with the archeological 
sites all across the country) had been renamed the Institute of Archaeology, being 
included in the Academy of the People’s Republic.260 The Museum of the City of 
Bucharest belonged to the newly formed network of regional museums of history opened 
in the major cities, which were set in charge of drafting and displaying a narrative of 
regional history that had to fit the new ideological requirements of the state (see my 
earlier discussion on the formation of those museums in early 1950s, closely supervised 
from “the center”). Those museums took over the archeological sites of local importance, 
                                                        
260 Panait I. Panait, "Observaţii arheologice pe șantierele de construcţii din Capitală," in Cercetări 
arheologice în București (București: S.P. C. (Sfatul Popular al Capitalei) Muzeul de istorie a orașului 






while the Institute of Archaeology was entrusted with the archeological sites deemed to 
hold “national significance.” As the Old Court had not been included in the latter, 
someone would have easily deduced that the institution behind the letter was the same 
one in charge of the site—that is, the City Museum of Bucharest.  
The letter appeared under my eyes one winter morning of January 2007, when I 
was skimming through some thick files in the archives of the National Institute for 
Historical Monuments in Bucharest.261 According to the archivist, those files had been 
somehow hidden during the reorganization of the archive, so it appeared that I was the 
first researcher to consult them. As soon as I started reading through the documents, I felt 
the classic twinge of excitement that anyone has experienced while perusing archives: the 
file mainly included a significant volume of correspondence among various political 
institutions on the subject of Bucharest’s Old Princely Court. The anonymous letter was 
the first document in the file, representing in fact the nucleus of this set of documents, as 
the subsequent pieces in the file emerged as different forms of response or reaction to the 
letter. The letter then created the case of the Old Court and transformed it into a political 
issue. The debates that this issue generated for almost a decade are visually captured by 
the different scripts on the cover, carrying diverse descriptions of the file’s content. 
                                                        
261 When the archivist had brought the two thick files to my desk, he admitted, a bit surprised, that their 
content represented a discovery for him, as well, because he did not seem to remember having seen those 
files before. The archive of the Institute for National Monuments itself has a dramatic story, having been on 
the verge of being destroyed twice in the last fifty years. In Chapter 1, I have already mentioned the first 
episode, when the archives of the former Commission of Historical Monuments had been rescued at the last 
moment in 1947 by historian Oliver Velescu, who found the files lying in a courtyard. He preserved them 
until the Department for Monuments came to be established in 1953, as part of the State Commission for 
Architecture and Construction. The archive of the interwar Commission was then divided in two: the 
majority of the files had been sent to the Archives of Bucharest’s City Hall, while a smaller part remained 
in the archive of Department for Monuments. Then, after the second dismantling of the institution in 1977, 
the archive was temporarily placed in a basement, until a shelf of files fell and blocked the access door. As 
the archivist put it, this accident was a blessing in disguise, because the archive could be thereby kept intact 
until 1990, when it was returned to the recently re-established Commission for Historical Monuments. 







Figure 6 The front cover of the Old Court archival file (1962-1970), AINMI/2159. 
 
1962-1970 
Centrul de istorie/Centrul istoric 
“Curtea Veche” 
 
(Rezervația cuprinsă între 1848, str. Şelari, Smîrdan, Gabroveni)  
Resturile fostei curţi domneşti cuprinse între străzile Blănari, Smîrdan, 
Halelor şi Bd. 1848. 
 1962-1970 
The center of history [transformed into] The historical center 
“The Old Court” 
(The historical reservation delimited by 1848 [boulevard], Şelari, Smîrdan, 
Gabroveni streets) 
The remains of the former princely court, delimited by Blănari, Smîrdan, 
Halelor streets and Boulevard 1848 
 
It is precisely this uncertainty about the “real” subject of the file that points to 
the arguments among professional groups on what to do with—or, to make of—this 
specific area of Bucharest. The file’s cover becomes thus a political palimpsest, with the 
documents therein standing as assessments not of sites and buildings, but of diverging 
gazes over those sites and their accompanying visions of what is history. Those gazes, 
searching for the past in specific (often, exclusive) material forms or, on the contrary, 






recognition. Recall that these debates over historical value were occurring simultaneously 
with broad and intensive plans for remaking the city of Bucharest according to a 
modernist architectural vision. Such plans allocated extensive resources to the city’s 
architects, particularly those well placed in the politically powerful Architects’ Union. 
A close reading of the letter will help us gauge the intensity of this struggle 
among different professional guilds. The letter opened with a statement:  
I. Some monuments of high importance for our country’s history can be found 
in the immediate vicinity of Union Square—the former Flower Market. 
They are: 
1) the ruins of the old princely court of Bucharest, and 
2) the Manuk Inn [one of the inns established in the area at the end of 
16th century]. 
  
1). The monuments had been identified and located during the archeological 
digs carried out at this site by the Institute of Archaeology of Academy of 
People’s Popular Republic, in collaboration with the history Museum of the 
city of Bucharest. The study had been carried out in order to meet the 
assignment given [the Museum] by the Party leadership to clarify Bucharest’s 
historical development.  
 
 By pointing out the political importance of those sites and their crucial role in 
fulfilling the Party’s interest in a “true” history of Bucharest and its origins, the writers 
were trying to justify their decision to address the letter directly to the Council of 
Ministers. The letter then described the situation of the Old Court’s ruins, which had been 
“caught” within, and thus incidentally preserved by, the newer architectural landscape of 
the area. After the dismantling of the Court at the end of the 18th century, the older walls 
of the Palace became gradually incorporated into the new buildings erected on the site 
afterwards. According to the letter, those recently unearthed walls—rather, the ruins 
thereof—are “representative of the extremely beautiful Romanian architecture of the 16th 





in our country.” In contrast to those archeological monuments—the walls within the 
buildings—there stood the buildings themselves, described as 19th century architectural 
products “now shabby [insalubre] and scheduled to be torn down as soon as possible, 
starting in 1963.” This comment on the aesthetic inadequacy of the 19th century 
buildings had its own past, as it resuscitated earlier (turn of the century and interwar) 
debates about the import of foreign aesthetics into Romanian architecture (hence, the pre-
1945 long obsession with the formulation of a National Style).262 I will return to this issue 
in the next section of the chapter. 
The letter goes then to the core of the matter: 
- The team of urban planners at “PROJECT BUCHAREST” had no 
knowledge about the existence of those highly important 
monuments and came up with the plan of erecting new apartment 
buildings on the site. 
- Following the interventions made by the team coordinating the 
archeological digs in Bucharest [...] and the memos sent to the 
Science Section of the CC of PMR, the Local Council had been 
advised to pursue the conservation of those monuments within a 
reservation inside a green area. 
 A protocol was signed three months ago between the Museum and 
“PROJECT BUCHAREST” regarding the conservation of the 
archeological and historical monuments in the area of Flower Market. 
However, up to this point, the local council of the city has made no 
decision with regards to the conservation project of the monuments in 
the Flower Market, despite the imminent demolition works planned for 
1963 in the area, more specifically on [the part of the neighborhood 
facing] Union Square. 
  
 We learn thus that the letter came as an immediate reaction to the plans of 
remodeling Union Square, which I discussed in the previous part of the chapter. 
Moreover, it represented only part of a larger enterprise by which the Museum of the city 
                                                        
262 I owe the phrasing in brackets to Juliana Maxim. For a detailed analysis of the emergence of the 
National Style in Romania, see Carmen Popescu, Le Style National Roumain. Construire une Nation a 
travers l'Architecture (1881-1945) [The Romanian National Style. Constructing a nation through 






intended to claim the Old Court as a particular area and thereby “cut” it out from the city 
landscape to be reshaped by the Master Plan. Interestingly, the letter writers used two 
forms of walls—the unearthed ones, that had formed the basis of the Old Court, and those 
already existing on the ground as the Manuk Inn—to construct a continuous and 
somewhat complete material representation of the city’s past. These walls were being 
contrasted with the other walls, those forming the “shabby” 19th century buildings, 
scheduled to be demolished. At that time—1962—the site comprising the Old Court and 
the streets radiating towards Lipscani was an area of small shops, restaurants, 
warehouses, but also the home for 4,800 people, who very likely lived in the “shabby” 
buildings.263 In order for the area to be transformed into a historical site, it had first to be 
divested of the life therein. From an inhabited site, it had to become one put on display.  
If the Museum had managed to have both the Old Court and the Manuk Inn 
accepted as historical sites, they could then become administrators over a museum (the 
Inn, see below) and an open site (the unearthed Old Court). 
 The letter moved then to describing the importance of the Manuk Inn: 
  
 2). On this wing there is Manuk Inn, a monument of great importance for the 
country’s history. 
 Research carried out by the City Museum, by the Academy and the department of 
the history of architecture (prof. Grigorie Ionescu), has proved that many 
elements of the initial architecture of the inn have been preserved, including the 
famous portic (with the wood arcades and columns colonete)[…]. There is 
therefore the possibility that the Manuk Inn be preserved and properly put to use 
for cultural-educational purposes. The Institute of History of the Academy of RPR 
shares our point of view and supports the suggestions we put forward in this note. 
Also, many other specialists agree upon the conservation proposal of the Manuk 
                                                        
263 “Studiu de circulaţie și parcaje în zona Curtea Veche. Memoriu introductiv [Project for traffic and 
parking (regulation) in the area of the Old Court. Introduction],” In File Rezervaţia cuprinsă între 1848, str. 
Șelari, Smîrdan, Gabroveni. Resturile fostei curţi domnești cuprinse între străzile Blănari, Smîrdan, 








3). However, the architects of “PROJECT BUCHAREST” advanced the idea of 
cutting off the inn with an apartment building, [reasoning that this intervention] 
would help the systematization plan for Union Market advance faster. They had 
not, however, inquired into the current state of conservation of the initial 
architecture of the building, nor considered the possibility of preserving the inn 
and putting it to use. According to this plan—which had not been discussed by 
other specialists but exclusively within the teams of architects of Bucharest’s 
Local Council together with the State Committee for Architecture and 
Systematization—the quarter/neighborhood of the Flowers Market containing the 
monuments is divided into two separate projects. [This plan] leaves no room for 
an open view of the conservation of the monuments mentioned above (1) and (2).  
  
 Paragraph three above alludes to the privileged rights seized by the architects 
working for the Local Council and Project Bucharest, rights that the Museum wanted to 
challenge. It did so through a shrewd move, which proposed a different mapping of the 
area, reminiscent of older urban arrangements of the city. That is, the area delimiting the 
Old Court was integrated with the perimeter defined by the Manuk Inn and by the other 
older buildings marking the northern side of Union Square. According to the letter 
writers, the area that had to be preserved was then mapped over the older commercial 
center of Bucharest, including both Union Square and the Lipscani zone.264 
  As we will see below, the Museum accused Project Bucharest of ignorance on 
the topic of local urban history. By doing so, the Museum aimed perhaps to create a 
dichotomous map of the city, divided between areas of historical importance and others 
that were deemed empty of history. Should this map have been accepted by the higher 
political forums, then Project Bucharest’s exclusivity of rights and thus of an 
architectural gaze over the city would have been challenged by the Museum and its own 
disciplinary perspective. However, there was one more (important) obstacle: the 
                                                        
264 While I am not presuming the writers to be Museum staff, I intend to place the letter’s arguments in 






Department for Monuments, the institution that was part of the architectural “guild,” 
being subordinated to the State Commission for Architecture and also having employed 
mainly architects, art historians, and some archeologists. If the directorship of the 
Museum wanted stronger control over part of the city, they had first to eliminate the 
Department and then redefine what material forms were deemed to encapsulate “the 
past.” In other words, the Museum had to propose a slightly novel view of what a 
“monument” could be, under a form that would better fit their disciplinary focus on urban 
archaeology.  
 The letter continues then with an accusatory tone: 
  
 4). The explanation for this situation is that: 
 — All the problems related to this specific neighborhood and the existing 
monuments had been approached only through the interest of building new 
buildings, with no serious, methodical concern to preserve the monuments, as 
is done in other socialist countries or other cities of RPR [...see for instance the 
city of Iaşi]. 
— Department for Monuments does not properly care about the monuments of 
significance for the political and economic history of our fatherland, such sites 
being preserved due to the intercession of museums or other institutions. […] 
The Department for Monuments specialists focus mostly on monuments of 
religious significance [my Italics]. 
In contrast to other socialist countries, Department for Monuments (with a 
small working group) hasn’t sought the co-involvement of museums in the 
project of preserving the historical monuments. This represents a great mistake, 
since the museum network has been developing lately (from around 60 in 1950 
to a total of 214 in 1962). As the museums law has not been passed until now, 
there is no governmental bill that would outline the museums’ tasks, and line 
of development. This leads to a lack of coherent development at the national 
level. It also impedes the collaboration between museums and monuments 
[Department for Monuments]. 
— Returning to the monuments in the Flower Market area, we add that 
Department for Monuments did not pay attention to the archeological 
monuments (the ones linked to the old court of Bucharest). As for the Manuk 
Inn, they wanted to “restore” it under a totally new appearance in order to set 
their offices there (a project is already submitted to “PROJECT 
BUCHAREST”). The construction work was to be paid out of the fund 








3. Given that the demolition works, planned within the systematization of 
Union market, are scheduled for the beginning of 1963, only now and not later 
could the solution advanced by “PROJECT BUCHAREST” and [SCAS] on the 
segmentation of the Inn with a new building be challenged and a decision on 
the conservation and restoration of this unique historical complex be taken.[…] 
— It would have been commonsensical that such problems be solved by the 
local authorities of Bucharest that could implement the preservation of the 
described monuments and the establishment of the museum. Such a resolution 
is not possible however, because, on one hand, comrade H.M., the chief 
architect of Bucharest had not carefully reviewed the projects designed by his 
subordinates and advanced them to the Executive Committee of the People’s 
Council. Therefore, even though he is aware of the situation of the 
archeological monuments mentioned above, as well as the conservation state of 
the Manuk inn, he would not change his opinion for obvious reasons. [!] On 
the other hand, comrade B., the CSCAS president, is not directly responsible 
for the historical monuments. Every time he was informed of the critical state 
of those monuments, he did not appreciate their real importance and forwarded 
the memos to the Department for Monuments, an institution whose profile and 
attitude we have already discussed above. 
 
In a sense, we could say that our letter writers displayed a high degree of 
courage—or, depending on one’s point of view, of dangerous naiveté. This is because, 
even if the letter was not signed, it still represented an official document issued by the 
Institute of Archaeology of the Romanian Academy. That an institution dared to produce 
such strong accusations directed to highly placed individuals within the political 
apparatus of the time (the chief architect of Bucharest, and the president of the State 
Committee for Architecture and Systematization, who held the rank of minister) could 
have meant various things. Perhaps, as part of the recently politically cleansed Romanian 
Academy, the Institute of Archaeology found itself in a strong enough position to claim 
an exclusive expertise on history-making and preserving. This becomes obvious when the 






significance,” which, given the antireligious context of the time, implies that the 
Department for Monuments was a parasite institution concerned only with cultural 
nonentities.  
The writers do not stop here, however. They accuse the Department for 
Monuments of something that, at that time, especially, was equivalent to a serious 
crime—that is, they assert that the Department for Monuments has diverted government 
funds into the renovation (and not restoration) of the Manuk Inn in order to establish their 
offices there. To misuse the people’s common property in any way was highly punishable 
in Romania in the 1950s and 1960s.265 This is a far more serious accusation than the one 
directed to Project Bucharest, an institution depicted as being a bunch of inexperienced 
fellows who would pursue the systematization plan at any cost.266 When pointing out the 
institutional bodies excluded from the decision-making process in the systematization 
plan, the letter writers questioned the privileged position that “Project Bucharest” 
occupied, and asked that a concern for monuments be taken into account by the main 
actors involved in the remodeling of the city (the City Council and the State Committee 
for Architecture and Systematization).  
 Only later in the text, when we read that “the best resolution for this important 
historical monument [would be] its transformation into a museum,” do we begin to 
understand that the Institute wanted to take the Manuk Inn out of the authority of the 
Department for Monuments by including it within the newly burgeoning network of 
museums, controlled by a different body (the Ministry of Culture). Also, by directly 
                                                        
265 According to the communist law, this was a crime.  
266 In fact, this was a depiction shared by other specialists of the time, who viewed the “Project Bucharest” 
team as exclusively interested in developing modernist projects. Interview with architect Alexandru 





stating that the Department for Monuments “has not sought the involvement of the 
museums in the preservation of the historical monuments,” the letter aimed to fully 
undermine the Department for Monuments as an institution by questioning its ultimate 
function and adequacy to fulfill the political requirements of the time. Those allegations 
become more obvious in the conclusion. There, the situation of the monuments in the 
Flower Market is taken up as being representative of the inadequate approach to 
monument preservation in general, which so far has not met “the challenges of building 
socialism in RPR.” (Again, a serious political accusation, since any institution that would 
hinder the development of socialism could have easily been dismantled.) 
The writers propose instead the establishment of a separate commission that 
would work under the direct supervision of the socialist state’s supreme body: the 
Council of Ministers.267 This could be read as an attempt to reestablish an equilibrium not 
only among the institutions involved in monuments preservation, but also among the 
disciplinary fields. By demanding a new commission formed of experts in the fields of 
history, art history, and museography, the letter’s writers aimed at challenging the 
privileged position occupied by Project Bucharest and the Committee for Architecture in 
relation to the political apparatus (see, for instance, the third point in the letter, where the 
critical situation of the Flower Market area appears as a direct consequence of the 
decision solely taken by the Local Council and the Systematization Committee, without 
any involvement of other specialists.) The writers asked that the approach to monument 
                                                        
267 In socialist Romania, as in other countries of the Soviet bloc, the Grand National Assembly played only 
a symbolic role, as there was a great difference between the rights offered by the Constitution and the real 
power of decision making of this institution, which was far from being “grand.” In the Party was 
concentrated most of the power, and of course, in the Council of Ministers, which also functioned as the 
real body politic, in comparison to the empty one of the Grand National Assembly. Daniel N. Nelson, 






preservation be radically redefined by being taken out from the institutional umbrella of 
the Committee for Architecture and hence of architecture as a disciplinary field. 
The implications of this case permeate the entire letter: the writers request a 
special commission that would supervise a “unique museum in the country,” an open 
archeological site/historical reservation that differs from other archeological sites of 
national importance. As the letter reads, “although previous attempts at preserving 
archeological sites (such as the Dacian sites in the Orăştie mountains, the Histria site) had 
been successful, [given those sites’ remoteness] no museums had been organized around 
the sites that would educate the working people about those sites’ historical evolution.”268 
The Old Court situated in the middle of the city would have offered this opportunity, 
while the Museum would have reaped the benefits of the site’s exposure. In other words, 
through remaking the Old Court into a reservation, the Museum would have achieved 
much more visibility among the city’s institutions and thereby potentially acquired more 
privileges and resources from the center. 
Obviously, the letter stirred up a hornet’s nest within the State Committee for 
Architecture. A month after the letter had reached the State Committee, the vice president 
of the Committee drafted a strong response, accusing the initial document’s writers of 
using “false information, insufficiently investigated data,” in order to “discredit” the 
Department for Monuments.269 The draft document is heavily marked in red by a second 
reader (presumably, the president of the Committee, architect Bădescu), with comments 
                                                        
268 “Notă privind situaţia monumentelor de la Piaţa de Flori din București [Memo regarding the situation of 
the monuments of the Flower Market in Bucharest].” This is the initial document, officially sent by the 
Academy. AINMI, File 2159/1962-1970, 7 (6).  
269 “Notă privind situaţia monumentelor de la Piaţa de Flori din București (urmare notei Academiei R.P.R.). 
Memo regarding the situation of the monuments of the Flower Market in Bucharest (response to the note 





suggesting that the letter be “shorter, not polemical, [rather focused] on clearer proposals 
to solve the problems” [signaled by the initial letter].270 
The response turns the accusations around, by pointing out that the 
archeological sites had never been entrusted to the Department for Monuments. Instead, 
the Institute of Archaeology and (in the case of the Capital) the Museum of the city have 
been responsible for “archeological monuments that emerged through excavations or are 
still buried in the ground.” In turn, the second letter accuses those institutions—and 
especially the Museum—of passivity, by suggesting that “the Museum does not grasp the 
necessity of being actively involved and efficient in the scientific research underlying the 
work of restoration-conservation.” Moreover, the letter states that the State Committee 
for Architecture had already been aware of the “interesting artifacts preserved at the Old 
Court” and therefore had asked that a spot be reserved within the Master Plan of the 
city’s center.271 This would have “secured the unearthing and proper display of all the 
ruins at this site.”272  
The second letter adopts, though, a moderate tone regarding the historical value 
of the walls unearthed at the site, asking for “further research that could ascertain the 
scientific and aesthetic value of those ruins and the extent to which this research must 
stop the imperatives of the area’s systematization.” The State Commission had already 
                                                        
270 Those comments were addressed to “Comrade [Vasile] Bumbăcea,” apparently the one who produced 
the first draft of the letter responding to the accusations of the first memorandum. At that time (January 
1963), Bumbăcea was the vice-chairman of the State Committee for Architecture, Planning, and 
Construction (Arhitectura, 1963 [1], 60). He advanced rapidly within the system, as ten years after, in 
1973, he became deputy chairman of the State Committee on Local Economy and Administration 
(Gospodăria de Partid). Open Society Archives, 52-1-70, Report “Personnel Changes at the Subministerial 
Level in Rumania,” October 23, 1973. He also briefly occupied the position of Deputy Minister of 
Industrial Building (March 1975-November 1977). Agerpress, Guvernul Manea Mănescu II, 
http://documentare.rompres.ro/guverne.php, accessed on July 27, 2009. 
271 “Notă privind situaţia monumentelor de la Piaţa de Flori din București (urmare notei Academiei R.P.R.). 
[Memo regarding the situation of the monuments of the Flower Market in Bucharest (response to the note 
sent by the Academy of RPR)]. AINMI, File 2159/1962-1970, 14. 






“recommended that the decommission work in the area of the Old Court (the Flower 
Market) be carried out gradually, under the supervision of specialists (archeologists, art 
and architectural historians).”273 Those specialists could then “identify on the spot the 
valuable elements which could be either displayed in museums or be consolidated and 
preserved in its original site.” While acknowledging the high value of the Manuk Inn as a 
historical building, the State Committee points out that any attempts to preserve it must 
first take into account the systematization plan of this area. It concludes that a proper 
preservation of the historical monuments within the city could not be pursued without the 
help and financial support of the People’s Council, help that had not been offered in the 
past. 
 The response aimed therefore at restoring a political hierarchy and series of 
alliances potentially threatened by the first letter. The claims advanced by the latter 
document, I argue, should be understood through the institutional and epistemological 
framework that had been endorsed by the state already in early 1950s. As I have 
discussed in Chapter 1, the domains of architecture and archaeology had been assigned 
different temporal frameworks and historical spans, in their quality of representing the 
socialist future (architecture) and the past (archaeology). We should approach the letter 
exchange also as an attempt on the part of some institutional actors to challenge this 
binary political vision and redefine how political (and symbolical) capital was mapped 
out on disciplinary fields. At the same time, the letters themselves were a political 
assembly, as they appeared as a palimpsest of signatures and ink-written comments on the 
margins, signaling a network of alliances and conflicts paralleling the official system. As 
political palimpsests, they indicate the serendipity of actions that paralleled what 
                                                        





appeared as—and was intended to be—a perfectly controlled bureaucratic machine of 
socialist modernity. 
The exchange, mediated by the Culture Office of the Council of Ministers as 
the direct recipient of both letters, did not concern only a strict access to resources. It also 
aimed at securing and assigning political legitimacy to certain networks and forms of 
expertise. Far from exclusively mapping areas of expertise delimited by disciplinary 
boundaries, those struggles occurred both within and across such boundaries. In fact, they 
point to the porosity of those networks, vying for political recognition while being 
continuously permeated by the shifts occurring at the political center. More interestingly, 
as those networks came gradually to be inhabited by the professionals already established 
in the interwar period, with the Politburo’s endorsement, some of the pre-1945 debates 
percolated in a disguised form into the current quests for an architectural vocabulary that 
would match both the tight requirements of a centralized economy and the rising political 
interest in “the nation.”  
The following section looks at the debates this time occurring within the 
architectural field with regards to the renovation of the older houses in the Old Court 
area. Not surprisingly, most of the arguments advanced in the letters discussed above 
(1962-1964) are reiterated in the written exchanges between architect Joja, the chief 
coordinator of the renovation project, whose views were endorsed by other architects as 
well as by the People’s Council of the city of Bucharest, and the Department for 
Monuments, represented by architects Richard Bordenache and Cezar Miclescu. I use this 
case in order to illustrate how some architects, with the support of the local politicians, 






the architectural form, by purifying it of any trace deemed to be aesthetically extraneous 
in a socialist Romania. This enterprise, however, despite a feigned ignorance, reflected 
earlier quests for the formulation of a National Style. Ironically, as much as the socialist 
state rejected any kind of associations to a “bourgeois” past and wanted to do away with 
interwar views on “heritage,” which had been approached as a basis to build an urban 
architecture for a modern Greater Romania, these debates kept returning in disguised 
forms. 
More importantly, I argue that the institutional conflicts on the walls of the Old 
Court became so tense because what was at stake did not concern only a project of 
heritage-making, but also one of peoplehood-unmaking. As I have mentioned earlier, the 
commercial center neighboring the Old Court had been inhabited throughout the 19th 
century and during the interwar period by a cluster of people from various social 
categories, ranging from wealthier shop-owners and small traders to poor bohemian 
artists, as well as others participating in the socially blurry underground worlds of the 
black market and prostitution. As much as the new socialist regime wanted to erase this 
social world of the Lipscani quarter, which represented everything that a socialist citizen 
should not be (bohemian artist, capitalist entrepreneur, or smart slacker), they never 
succeeded. But they tried several times. The first instance of their attempts to socially 
purge the area was represented by the architects’ proposal advanced in 1959 to erase the 
old houses of Lipscani, including the Old Court site, and erect instead new apartment 
buildings. However, as this exchange of letter demonstrates, the architects’ initial plan 
was opposed by another scheme, understood also as transformation, but placed within a 





modernist architecture, the archeologists working at the site used the newly discovered 
walls of the princely palace to support a historical resignification of the area. By 
portraying it as the late medieval core of the city, the Old Court would have appeared as a 
historical site of national importance. In a way, the latter project represented a form of 
social purging of the groups living around the area in Bucharest of the 1960s by 
prioritizing the site’s historical value over other ways of valuing and inhabiting the space. 
In other words, the site would have been cleansed of historically non-representative 
people. As I will show in the next section, Joja’s project of transforming the Lipscani 
area into an architectural reserve by redecorating the facades could be approached also a 
form of encroaching on the current inhabitants of the area.  
Old styles, new politics: Redecorating facades in the Old Court area 
 
 Dej’s unexpected willingness to follow Miron Constantinescu’s advice to 
bring back the “older elements” of architectural expertise, which I discussed earlier in the 
chapter, announced the further changes that were about to come in the social and political 
landscape of post-1954 Romania. It was in the mid 1950s that an increasing number of 
intellectuals joined the Party, so that they could enter the central institutions and the 
institutes in the making. “Many of them were ‘liberals’ whom it would later prove 
difficult to dislodge.”274 Among such “liberals,” there was also a number of architects, 
already well established in the interwar years, who were now suddenly allocated a 
(sometimes peripheral) role in the central bodies supervising the design of Bucharest’s 
Master Plan.  
 As a number of recent studies have already pointed out, the aesthetic debates 
                                                        






that had occurred in interwar Romania ended up steadily permeating the architectural 
culture of the early period of socialism (especially the 1954-1967 period).275 As such, the 
socialist project to articulate a radically novel urban form turned out to be impossible. 
Under the appearance of novelty, the attempts to create a coherent architectural form of 
socialism—be it one directly drawing on Socialist Realism or a solution that would meet 
both criteria of “economic efficiency” and “local (and later, national) specificity” in post-
1954 Romania—drew on earlier (even though diverging) quests for representations of 
“the modern” in interwar Romania.276 It was then that both “National Style,” an 
architectural movement that focused on a decanted inclusion of local heritage in urban 
architecture, as well as a moderate modernism, had emerged as answers to autochthonous 
calls for modernization.277  
 However, as Popescu has pointed out, such influences were adamantly denied 
during both stages of “reinventing tradition” in a socialist style — during the short 
flourishing of Socialist Realism and in the post-1965 emergence of ”Lyrical Nationalist” 
architecture.278 Likewise, as much as it had been repudiated as a “bourgeois” expression 
during the Stalinization period, modernism came to be resuscitated as the only viable 
response to the call for efficiency already launched by Dej in November 1953 in the 
Council of Ministers, and later in the public arena after Khrushchev’s speech. Maxim 
insightfully argues that “the ‘modern’ under socialism oscillated constantly between the 
two extremes of the New and the Old, at once promising perpetual renewal and in the act 
                                                        
275 For instance, see Ana Maria Zahariade, “New Buildings and Forms,” Juliana Maxim, The New, The Old, 
The Modern, and Maria Raluca Popa, Restructuring and Envisioning Bucharest. Carmen Popescu discusses 
those changes in detail in her “Looking West.” 
276 Popescu, "A Denied Continuity: The Shift of ‘Heritage’ as Ideology in Romanian Socialist 
Architecture," 11-31. 
277 Carmen Popescu, “Looking West,” 114.  






of fulfilling that promise, becoming a mere repetition of a previous self.”279 Obviously, 
such influence could not have occurred if the Party had not relatively diminished 
ideological constraints after 1955. As Popescu writes,  
when the change of direction was initiated, the effects of censorship became more 
discreet, being presented as a doctrinal debate, a ‘critical’ reading of Western 
influence. This represented the second level of a purge by means of indicating the 
‘right’ sources and models. The assimilation of Western examples was not 
condemned anymore: on the contrary, it was considered necessary for the 
development of the new socialist architecture. 
 
 In fact, the moderate modernism of the interwar period, brought back by the 
“older” architects after 1953, coincided paradoxically with the Party’s support of a 
“critical adoption” of much more radical forms of modernism emerging in the post-war 
Western world.280 Through the strategic move of bringing the older architects back into 
the picture, the Party leadership in fact—perhaps unknowingly—maintained a stronger 
control over the new aesthetic forms emerging in architecture, as the members of the 
latter group could temper the younger architects’ desires to pursue more radical solutions 
offered by the experiments occurring at that time in Western Europe and the USA.281 At 
the same time, since some of those specialists had been at the core of the architectural 
debates occurring in pre-1945 Romania, they came to challenge and transform to a 
certain extent the architectural field of early socialism. 
 As a reaction to the strong impact of Socialism Realism that had frozen any 
alternate forms of expression, some of the interwar debates resurfaced in the late 1950s 
and became more acute during the 1960s, during the relative “thaw.” Popescu points out 
that “several examples of the Romanian architecture designed after 1955 restored the 
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dialogue with the production of ‘National Style’ in the 1930s.”282 Some of those debates 
were being brought back sometimes by the very actors who had initiated them during the 
interwar years. Among the architects who joined the state institutions after 1953 were not 
only those who had been actively engaged in the development of interwar modernism 
(such as Richard Bordenache, Horia Teodoru, Paul Emil Miclescu). There were also 
others, much more interested in the “national question,” who had already shown a 
propensity for identifying a coherent “Romanian style” in their earlier projects (such as 
Constantin Joja [1908-1991]), and who managed afterwards to find a niche for 
themselves in a socialist architecture increasingly captured by a hegemonic nationalist 
discourse.283 Those distinct perspectives resurfaced later in the debates occurring during 
the 1960s, when, under the impression of a delusive political relaxation, some of those 
architects engaged in arguments over what “historical preservation” was and how they 
should (could) engage in such preservation while constructing the modern socialist city. 
 One illustration of this process is represented by the heated arguments 
between Joja and his supporters, on one hand, and the group of architects associated with 
interwar modernism (such as Bordenache and Miclescu), on the other, with regards to the 
restoration of the older houses in the Old Court/Lipscani area. This dispute came as a 
result of the 1962 digs, conducted by the City Museum, when the archeological team 
discovered some of the original walls of the Old Court’s Princely Palace that had been 
incorporated in the Manuk Inn. Such “spectacular” findings triggered a chain reaction, as 
                                                        
282 As Popescu writes, “rather, the new regionalism was seen as an emanation of modernist architecture in 
its attempt to adapt itself to the site.” “A Denied Continuity: the Shift of ‘Heritage’ as Ideology in 
Romanian Socialist Architecture,” 22. 
283 For two detailed and insightful analyses of the interwar politics of the “Romanian style,” see Augustin 
Ioan, "Arhitectura interbelică și chestiunea identităţii colective [Inter-war arhitecture and collective 
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the anticipated redesign of Union Square, which was to entail possibly the demolition of 
some of the older buildings in the area, had to be brought to a halt. These “new” old walls 
of the court became very important not only for the archeologists working in the city, but 
also as symbolic resources for other actors, as well. The People’s Council of the city 
immediately designated the area of the Old Court as a “historical reservation,” which was 
to be renovated within “an urban arrangement in a period style and atmosphere.”284 A 
special committee, including specialists from the Institute of Art History, the Department 
for Monuments, the Institute of Architectural Design “Project Bucharest,” the Museum of 
History of the city of Bucharest, and the Institute of Architecture, was nominated by the 
City Council to produce a study of urban design of the area.285 Within a few months, this 
committee, led by architect Constantin Joja, produced a proposal for the planning of the 
“Old Court” area, which was submitted to the Technical Office of the City Council. The 
study bears powerfully the mark of Joja’s rhetoric about the uniqueness of “a Romanian 
urban architecture” and his endeavor to bring this architectural form back to life via the 
renovation of the Old Court quarter.286  
 Joja offers a detailed overview of his overall vision for the renovation project: 
One certainly could reckon from documents as well as from the buildings existing 
in Bucharest and other cities in the country, that the Romanian architecture to be 
found in the civil constructions of the 18th century was characterized by closed or 
                                                        
284 More specifically, the site designated the area “circumscribing the old administrative and commercial 
center of Bucharest within the perimeter delimited by 1848 [boulevard], Șelari, Smîrdan, Gabroveni 
streets.” Resolution 2410/24 august 1967, Sfatul Popular al Capitalei. In File 2159, (Rezervaţia cuprinsă 
între 1848, str. Șelari, Smîrdan, Gabroveni) Resturile fostei curţi domnești cuprinse între străzile Blănari, 
Smîrdan, Halelor si Bd. 1848. Vol I, 1962-1970, the Archives of the National Institute for Historical 
Monuments, Bucharest (AINM). (Henceforth, File 2159/1962-170, vol. I, AINM) 
285 Studiul detaliului de sistematizare al zonei “Curtea Veche,” [Proposal for the urban planning of the “Old 
Court” area], AINMI, File 2159/1962-1970. 
286 Joja, who was designated the project manager, signed the study, together with architect N. Nedelescu. 
“Studiu detaliu de sistematizare, Memoriu general,” not dated, 5 pages, elaborated by the Colectivul de 
proiectare format din colaboratori pe langa I.A.L Raion Tudor Vladimirescu. The document precedes Aviz 
2, January 15, 1968 of the Technical Office of the SPOB, approved by the president of the executive 







Generally, the urban Romanian architecture developed in the 18th century along 
two lines: architecture drawing upon village architecture, on the house with a 
closed verandah, and courtly architecture. Since we want the Romanian 
architecture to be displayed in its full value in the area [of the Old Court], the 
renovation project will center on the adoption of the urban civil constructions of 
the 18th century.287  
 
The project was immediately and without any reservation approved by the Technical 
Committee of the People’s Council of the city of Bucharest. In fact, this final version of 
the project proposal, endorsed by the City Council, offered a more detailed description of 
Joja’s intentions. The first stage of the project was to entail the “restoration of the facades 
of 92 currently degraded buildings…according to the most authentic [architectural style] 
of the epoch.”288 Moreover, some new constructions in the area were to be treated in a 
similar manner, by being aligned to the height of the existing buildings, and “having their 
facades treated in the style of the Romanian architecture of the 18th century ([with] 
opened and closed verandahs).”289 The most interesting element appears at the very end 
of the document: the author(s) suggest that a preliminary study of other “older” buildings 
in the city, which presumably display a “Romanian specificity,” could be used to identify 
those elements of “Romanian urban style” to be then “transplanted” into the Old Court 
area. Those elements could be brought in to enhance the “authenticity” of the renovated 
facades in the Old Court quarter.290 
 The aesthetic vision underlying Joja’s proposal was not at all new, as it 
directly dwelt on earlier (interwar) debates that opposed “a genuine Romanian aesthetic 
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288 Ibid, page 3. 
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committee, Ion Cosma, approving Studiu detaliu de sistematizare al zonei Curtea Veche, 5 pages. (The 
quotation is found on the second page of the document). AINMI, File 2159/1962-1970. 





form” to various “foreign influences.” As mentioned earlier, the diverging positions of 
architects involved in these debates took the form of distinct expressions in interwar 
architecture: the National Style movement and (a moderate form of) modernism.291 There 
was, however, an irony behind Joja’s claims the Old Court area should be “renovated” 
according to a neo-Romanian stylistic framework. The architectural style developing at 
the end of the 18th century, which Joja deemed to be “Romanian civil architecture,” was 
in fact a product of a historical period (the Phanariot time) that is considered to be not 
representative for the national historical narrative.292  
 Joja’s proposal raised eyebrows among some architects, and even caused 
consternation among others. Architects Richard Bordenache, at that time (1965-71) the 
director of the Department for Monuments, operating then under the SCAS, and Paul 
Emil Miclescu, who also worked then for the Department, adamantly opposed Joja’s 
plan.293 A long series of letter exchanges started between the Department for Monuments 
and the People’s Council regarding the renovation of the Old Court area. Following the 
                                                        
291 Carmen Popescu, Le Style National Roumain. 
292 The interwar and then socialist historiography depicts the “Phanariot” period (1711/1716-1821) as a 
time of economic and cultural decline, set under a strong Ottoman influence. During the “Phanariot epoch,” 
the Ottoman Empire attempted to strengthen its control over the Romanian principalities by anointing 
foreigners (especially, well-to-do Greeks from the Fanar quarter of Constantinople) as temporary princes. 
Despite the later portrayals of those princes as “the evil Phanariots,” who limited the authority of the local 
boyars and channeled most of the resources across the border, this period also is characterized by a 
significant development of civil architecture. As Mihai Chioveanu argues, those negative depictions—that 
he calls, “the myth of ‘the Phanariot evil’”— should be understood within “the antithetical models of Good 
Romanian and the Evil Phanariot which shape the Romanian historiography after the 18th century.” For a 
more complex discussion of “the emergence and development of this specific discourse on the Phanariots” 
see Mihai Chioveanu, "Echoes of the 'Phanariot Century'. Shaping National Identity and Historical Culture 
in Modern Romania," The Romanian Journal for Society and Politics 2, no. 4 (2004). 
 The aesthetic choices made by the next generation of the now autochtonized Phanariot families, 
who came to form the kernel of the budding Romanian aristrocracy in the second half of the 19th century, 
were strongly influenced by the 19th century French school of architecture, favoring a neoclasical, and then 
the romantic and eclectical styles. Such preferences came to be rebuked by the new generation of 
Romanian architects, led by Ion Mincu, who dismissed the 19th century architecture for having displayed 
petty cosmopolitism and ignorance.  
293 See internal memo sent by Bordenache to Miclescu, with hand-written comments on a typed document, 






decision of the People’s Council to assign the status of “historical reservation” to the area 
circumscribed by the Old Court and Lipscani (with Joja as the project manager),294 
Bordenache called upon the help of Gustav Gusti, at that moment the vice president of 
SCAS. 
 
Figure 7 Proposal for  the remodeling of Lipscani street. Constantin Joja, Arhitectura, 
113, no.4 (1968): 18. 
 
 Based on an assessment written by Bordenache and Miclescu, in late March 
1968 Gusti issued a resolution approving the decision only on the condition that the 
transformation of the area would observe a set of prerequisites.295 Among those 
conditions, one directly pertained to the issue of reviving a “National Style” via a 
transformation of the area buildings: 
[It is recommended that the renovation team] will constantly take into account the 
following criteria of urban planning: 
[…] b) the preservation of the urban character of the area at the scale of the old city, 
[to be achieved] via a harmonious spatial connection/junction to the constructions 
within the perimeter and without any addition of elements that could not be 
rigorously controlled from the point of view of the aesthetical-architectural 
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295 Letter issued by the State Council for Constructions and Architecture (Consiliul de Stat pentru 
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authenticity of the “reconstituted” motifs. It is only on this condition that we agree to 
the intentions [of the project description] as they were formulated on the second page 
of the letter [sent by] CPMB-CTS on March 6, [1968], that states: ‘the project will 
also entail the renovation of those buildings that will require complex façade 
reconstruction according to a national architectural [style] of the epoch.’296  
 
 Only a month later, in April 1968, the diverging views underlying those tense 
exchanges reached a much larger audience, when a public debate on the reconstruction of 
the “old historical center of the capital” was organized at the Architects’ House of 
Bucharest. Joja presented the project by stressing his innovative perspective on the area’s 
restoration. He mentioned first that  
[i]n the past, when they discussed the Romanian architecture, specialists and non-
specialists alike had in mind especially the religious architecture and boyar houses. 
Later on, the village architecture raised interest; however, [it was discussed] in a 
manner that downplayed its aesthetic dimensions. The urban architecture was never 
mentioned, [because] it had never been noticed. […] This urban architecture, which 
was widespread in the 19th century, ended up being regarded as a [form of] ‘Balkan 
architecture’ and [therefore] it was never researched, its motifs had never been 
exploited by any great architect of the 19th and 20th centuries.297  
 
He continued by pointing out the “originality” and “authenticity” of the closed verandahs, 
“which do not appear anywhere in the Balkans.”298 What was more important about this 
architectural vocabulary was, in fact, its modernity: “the continuous rhythm of the 
windows, a genuine curtain of glass that mediates between the interior and the exterior, 
[represents] exactly the form of modern architecture.”299 Moreover, he stressed, “the 
Romanian architecture—even the village architecture—is not picturesque, as had been 
argued, but it is in fact a monumental architecture, whose unity of volume, rhythm, and 
motifs […] bring it close to the classical vocabulary.” At the same time, paradoxically, he 
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claimed that “the urban Romanian architecture had neither occidental nor oriental 
influences, [which makes it] exceptionally authentic.”  
 
 
Figure 8 Proposal for the remodeling of an interior courtyard. Constantin Joja. 
Arhitectura, (1968): 23. 
 
 It was this claim—that the element of the closed verandah would 
simultaneously symbolize “tradition,” “authenticity,” and “originality,” on one hand, and 
“modernity,” and even “monumentality,” on the other—that must have struck some 
sensitive cords among the technocrats of the moment. Not only did the City Council seem 
to be persuaded by Joja’s vision of the reconstruction of the Old Court area, but also the 
architects at the core of the political system—such as Gheorghe Curinschi—appeared to 
resonate with his claims. By evoking what he called an “innovative approach for 
restoration,” Curinschi supported Joja’s decision of making the closed verandah into the 
main element of the renovation project. He argued that the employment of a single 





more modern interpretation of the traditional design.”300 More importantly, he pointed 
out that “such a perspective would meet both the principles of …the innovative approach 
to restoration, as well as the current pursuit of a contemporary Romanian architecture 
with a distinctive expression.”301  
 Curinschi admitted that such a pursuit was not new, as “the quest for a unique 
expression characterized the development of the architectural field throughout the 
modern epoch of Romania’s history.”302 He mentioned that the first attempt took the form 
of “the so-called ‘neo-Romanian’ movement,” which, despite “some progressive 
dimensions,” had been historically limited. As such, “it would be highly unlikely that a 
reiteration of this movement would be possible.”303 Instead, he suggested, a quest for a 
contemporary architectural expression should “regard tradition as a source of inspiration 
rather than a repertoire of elements.”304 
 Curinschi’s arguments must also be understood as a critical reassessment of 
radical post-war modernism, arising along with a resuscitated interest in the nationalist 
discourse. The paradoxical phenomenon of a socialist nationalism emerged in the post-
1965 period, to reach its peak in the 1980s.305 In architecture, it took the form of a 
politically-encouraged quest for a revival of “tradition” and “specificity” that led to the 
proliferation of “Lyrical Nationalism.”306 Even if this shift generated debates that 
mirrored the arguments about “modernity and specificity in the 1930s,” their resemblance 
                                                        
300 Gheorghe Curinschi, “Restaurare și inovaţie,” in Discuţii: Sistematizarea zonei ‘Curtea Veche,’ 
București, Arhitectura, 4/1968, XVI (113), 9. 




305 Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism. 







was adamantly denied.307 In fact, as Carmen Popescu argues, “if ‘National Style’ was 
denied, if not ignored, it happened also due to the influence of the historiography in 
Western contemporary architecture.” As Curinschi’s speech demonstrated, the architects, 
especially those occupying central positions in the political system, aimed to display their 
“progressive” attitude, by calling upon techniques used in the Western world, while 
“’National Style’ was explicitly condemned for being demagogical and obsolete.”308 
 However, in spite of the official take on ‘National Style,’ some voices 
expressed their appreciation of the movement by calling upon the valuable work of its 
leaders. These architects retorted to Joja’s statement that, through the transformation of 
the Old Court into a historical reservation, “an authentic Romanian urban architecture, an 
architecture proving the Romanian sensibility, would materialize for the first time.”309 
Aurel Doicescu rejected the introduction of the closed verandah as the main element of 
the renovation, considering it rather “an improvisation” without an “architectural value” 
of the originally opened, well-proportioned verandahs of the old Romanian houses (an 
allusion to the National Style vocabulary).310 As for Joja’s claim that a closed verandah 
could be treated as a precursor of the modern glass facades, Doicescu found it too 
“pretentious.” Instead of a “renovation based on imagination,” he suggested that “the 
buildings in the Old Court quarter be preserved with the forms that they had initially 
displayed, as much as they are still present: modest, but original.”311 
 Doicescu’s argument was further developed by Ion Dumitrescu. The latter 
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challenged Joja’s perspective that the architectural expressions produced at the beginning 
of the [20th] century would represent “distortions of the authentic urban architecture, as 
works of exclusively inspired by elements of religious architecture.”312 In fact, he pointed 
out, the separation of religious and civil architecture is flawed from the start, given the 
complex interferences of motifs from these two domains, and their further development 
in the works emerging at the beginning of the 20th century. To illustrate how those 
architectural elements represent “a successful adoption of autochtonous architecture,” 
Dumitrescu called upon works of Cristofi Cerchez, inspired by “the baroque forms of the 
18th and 19th century,” and the “compelling creations” of Grigore Cherchez and Nicolae 
Ghica-Budeşti (all of them major names of ‘National Style’). In line with Doicescu’s 
arguments, Dumitrescu described the closed verandah as “a decadent derivation” of the 
originally open verandahs (pridvor), initially emerging as intermediary spaces between 
the exterior and the house interior. Therefore, he argued that “an abuse of facades 
[redecorated with closed verandahs] would falsify the true character of the architecture of 
the time.”313 Instead, he considered that a focus on “the preservation of the picturesque 
atmosphere of the ensemble as a whole,” with “the employment of the 19th century 
elements that are still present in the area would offer an adequate solution to the 
project.”314 
 The point of view advanced by Doicescu and Dumitrescu—that of preserving 
the mix of various historical styles of the buildings in the area—came under a harsh 
criticism in the exposition offered by architect Nicolae Pruncu, another member of the 
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committee of the renovation project.315 Pruncu gave a detailed overview of the results of 
the latest archeological digs in the Old Court area, showing that the best solution would 
be the preservation of the vestiges of the Princely Palace in their initial location.316 More 
specifically, the ruins should be extricated out of the newer constructions, and be 
displayed within a larger circular area (of 2.5 ha), which would comprise walking paths 
for tourists. More importantly, the ground level of the area must be lowered to the one 
existing in the 18th century, a procedure that would greatly afect the urban development 
of the entire quarter.  
 While pointing out the complexity of the preservation project, Pruncu insisted 
that such an operation is a must, given the “exceptional archeological, historical and 
architectural importance” of the recent discoveries. He rejected the alternative opinions 
advanced by other specialists (see, for instance, Doicescu and Dumitrescu) of preserving 
some of the more recent buildings in the site. As Pruncu curtly put it, 
Some specialists understand “restoration” by rejecting any clearance of the vestiges 
of the parasitic constructions. [This translates] in our case, into the refusal to accept 
the demolition of the constructions [built in] the 19th and 20th centuries, which 
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zonei “Curtea Veche,” București, Arhitectura, 4/1968, XVI (113), (113), 25-27. Pruncu offers a detailed 
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mutilated the palace and which throughout all this time have masked valuable 
evidence. [Those new buildings fooled] many well respected historians, who, within 
less than one century since the abandonment of the Palace, had located the Princely 
Palace in the area [known as] Piața cu Flori (the Flower Market). How could we 
seriously advocate the viewpoint that the walls of the pubs whose construction 
entailed the mutilation of an ancient monument, be displayed together with vestiges 
of tremendous historical value? Accepting the risks of eventual criticism, our 
collective stood up to this question by requesting and acquiring the official approval 
[of the People’s Council] for the demolition of the parasitic constructions that have 
hidden the genuinely valuable vestiges.317 
 
 Only when we read Pruncu’s arguments can we begin to understand why 
Joja’s proposal appeared highly palatable to both the central political apparatus (i.e., the 
People’s council) and the architects well placed therein. The transformation of the houses 
in the Old Court quarter into symbols of an equally problematic representation of the 
vernacular architecture of the 18th century fit perfectly the needs of the post-1965 
socialist Romanian state, a state that needed to come up with an imagery of history that 
would fit the ideological requirements of the present. Joja envisioned the transformation 
of the Lipscani quarter into an “architectural reservation” that would function as an 
extension of the Old Court “historical museum.”318 Like Pruncu, Joja deemed most of the 
houses in the quarter area, which had been built between the end of the 18th and the end 
of the 19th centuries, “shabby and heteroclyte.” Instead, he wanted those houses to be 
“redone” in order to fit the temporal framework of the newly renovated Old Court, 
“brought back” to its time—the 18th century. That is, Joja suggested that they be moved 
one century “back” by being given closed verandahs, an element that would make them 
representative of “the 18th century urban Romanian architecture.” 
 Apparently, Joja’s concern with the renovation of the Old Court/Lipscani 
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quarter had its own history, dating back to the interwar period.319 In 1935, Arşavir 
Acterian published an article focusing on the new event of ‘the Month of Bucharest,’ in 
which he mused on this new form of city celebration that aimed to transform Bucharest 
into a vast theater.320 The project that Acterian selected as representative for this event 
was the (temporary) reconstruction of some of the long-vanished buildings in the Old 
Court quarter.321 Those buildings, considered signs of the “old” Bucharest, were the 
Colțea water tower (demolished at the beginning of 19th century); the old Sf. Gheorghe 
church (Biserica Sf. Gheorghe veche); the Antim house, “reconstituted on the basis of 
documentation from the Brâncoveanu epoch [and]offering a very successful Romanian 
interpretation of Baroque”; and the house with four bow windows. The author of this 
project was “young architect Constantin Jojea.”322 More intriguing are Acterian’s own 
thoughts on why this project would stand at the core of making Bucharest into a 
transitory urban spectacle. Acterian writes: 
the Month of Bucharest was born mainly out of the need for the sensational. [...] 
It is an invitation to jamboree.[...] The city officials ask us to celebrate this [new] 
Capital of 1935—their work of art. To enhance our wonder and admiration, they 
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reconstituted a part of the past of this city under the form of dioramas 
representing major monuments, street corners and scenes of the past, and they 
lay them in front of our eyes side by side: old and present images of 
Bucharest.323  
  
 Read retrospectively, we cannot help noticing the irony: even though the Old 
Court area had already been used by the interwar elites as a site of contrast with a 
modernized Bucharest, this did not impede the post-1945 leaders from employing a 
similar strategy. However, in order to make a clean break with this part of the city’s 
history, the latter resorted to the simplest strategy: they plainly ignored the previous roles 
assigned to the Old Court during the interwar times as part of a “bourgeois” history and 
denied it altogether. (This strategy represented only the first stage of the metamorphosis 
of the Old Court into a heritage site for the socialist state. As I argue in the next chapter, 
the archeological findings in the area offered a pivotal means to produce a “new” Old 
Court.) 
 Despite such a background, the 1967 debates present a Joja who did not see—
or, at least, did not admit to—any resemblance between his understanding of “Romanian 
architectural style” and the earlier quests for a ‘National Style.’ As paradoxical as this 
unawareness might have appeared to his critics, Joja was right, to an extent. The 
difference stems from the symbolical orientation of the two projects: whereas National 
Style represented a quintessential search for the “modern,” by conferring a modern 
interpretation to vernacular architecture, 324 the renovation of the Old Court, according to 
Joja’s interpretation, would have represented a move back into the past. The site’s main 
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role would have been that of a historical reservation, by standing as a symbol of 
authentic Romanian urban architecture made even more unique and different from the 
present and thereby contrasting with the modern socialist city center. The site would have 
represented not only a point of contrast with the socialist present, as a touristic attraction, 
but also an extension of a “past” that fit the ideological requirements of the present—a 
pristine past, rescued out of the debris of the “parasitic” 19th century, and brought back 
where it belonged—to the late Middle Ages, the historical period that would soon 
become the source of pride of the Romanian socialist nationalism. 
 In what ways does this particular debate complicate our understanding of the 
development of the architectural field in Romania of the 1960s? First of all, it points to 
the tensions underlying this field, especially at the moment of transition from a modernist 
expression, with its focus on efficiency, to a more acute call for a national expression and 
‘lyrical’ specificity. An awareness of (and perhaps, nostalgia for) earlier engagements 
with such themes seemed to prevail among some architects, especially those who had 
been directly involved in those disputes in the 1930s (such as Aurel Doicescu). As much 
as those specialists were “allowed” to express their appreciation of architectural work 
produced before the war, their views turned out to be ignored or even ridiculed by the 
specialists occupying key positions in the system (such as Curinschi or Pruncu). The tone 
of those debates—and particularly, Pruncu’s suggestion that such discussions on the 
renovation project of the Old Court should be “reserved only to a few who will be 
directly involved in the research”325 reveal the limits of the political openness elusively 
occurring at that time in Romania. Another telling detail is that the previous debates 
between Bordernache and Joja—that is, the Department for Monuments and the People’s 
                                                        





Council—had not even been mentioned in the discussions at the Architects’ House that 
were eventually published in Arhitectura journal, nor by anyone invited to speak on 
behalf of the Department for Monuments. 
 The (highly diverging) visions of the adequate renovation of the Old Court 
site and its neighboring quarter illustrate the intricate searches for a novel representation 
of the nation in architecture, an expression that would have to be ‘original’ and 
‘authentic,” and all the same time ‘different’ enough to offer an interesting contrasting 
point to the monumental socialist architecture of the present. Those debates indicate the 
concerns that the political leaders showed about reinventing not only the social and 
architectural landscape of the present, but also that of the past. To what extent did they 
succeed? Between 1967 and 1971, the renovation project and the debates surrounding it 
continued along with the archeological work at the Old Court site. The restoration of the 
Princely Palace led to significant changes in the area: the buildings on Soarelui street 
were eventually demolished and the walking level on the site lowered in order to leave 
room for the newly unearthed walls of the Palace, which was opened to the public as the 
“Old Court” Museum on January 27, 1972. Under Joja’s guidance, the restoration of the 
Manuk Inn began in 1969, and it was reopened as a hotel and restaurant in 1971. As for 
Joja’s dream of embellishing all the houses on Lipscani and its neighboring streets with 
sets of closed verandahs, it never materialized.326  
The reconstruction of the old palace and its transformation into a museum did not, 
however, change the social substance of the Lipscani area, as the alternative projects had 
envisioned. The plan to fully include the Lipscani area and its people into the economy of 
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a socialist Bucharest only partially succeeded. In fact, throughout the socialist times, the 
politically marginalized social worlds of Lipscani thrived. Even if the site of the Old 
Court, initially a marginal location of the area, was suddenly transformed into 
Bucharest’s historical cradle, some groups living in the neighboring houses never came 
even close to the state’s representation of “socialist peoplehood.”  
One explanation is a localized one: beginning with the mid-1970s, the project of 
building a Civic Center for Bucharest captured most of the funding and energy of the 
officials, technocrats and experts alike. Another explanation stems from the very 
workings of the socialist centralized economy, under whose shadow the black market 
flourished. Lipscani was the main area in Bucharest during the 1970s and 1980s where 
one could find many things that had long ceased to exist in the empty windows of the 
socialist stores. As much as the state officials initially tried to change the site and its 
people by opening the Old Court Museum and systematically bringing in delegations of 
workers and pioneers from all over the country to see the historical walls of Bucharest, 
networks of illegal commerce continued to prosper on the nearby streets. By the 1980s, 
the state officials gave up, allowing the provincial visitors who came to the Old Court 
Museum for their share of national history to acquire, under the knowing eyes of the 
police, also their share of black-market goods from next door. Nevertheless, the story of 
Lipscani is an exception. That is, the project of socialist homogenization was distinctly 
more successful in Bucharest than in other regions of the country. 
The systematic immigration of people from all over Romania into Bucharest 
between the mid-1950s and the late 1970s led not only to a doubling of the capital’s 





the 1950s, the socialist state drafted specific strategies aiming to change the city’s 
composition. It did so by a carefully monitored social mixing, which was achieved by 
altering the residential and professional profile of the middle-class, while propping up 
less educated people as new cadres in the system.327 The very fact that Bucharest became 
a “closed city” at the end of the 1970s, which stipulated that no one could be employed in 
the city unless she or he was born there or married to a Bucharest-born person, indicates 




 This chapter showed that Dej’s interest in securing his political position in 
relation to the USSR led to precocious changes in architecture and urban planning in 
socialist Romania, some of them anticipating the political changes occurring in the USSR 
starting in 1954. Dej appears to have agreed to the return of the “older elements” only 
because he perceived them to represent a compact group of well trained specialists, able 
to offer the best technical solutions and execute what they were told to do. Along with the 
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new cadres, those architects were to execute the Party’s orders and pursue the rapid 
development of a socialist Bucharest by “building in concrete and according to highly 
standardized plans.” They also had to learn to read the ambivalent directives offered by 
the leaders.329  
 I suggest that this ambivalence, or “double discourse,” stemmed from the 
encounter between two diverging temporal frameworks, indexing distinct perspectives on 
the meanings and scales of “history.” More specifically, the socialist ideology aimed at 
redefining not only the meaning of the present, as a time of progress and modernization, 
but also the form and meaning of the past. Since it could not acknowledge the 
“bourgeois” time as having represented anything else besides “exploitation,” the forms of 
modernization that had emerged before 1945 were rejected from the start. From the 
perspective of the socialist leaders and their technocrats, such attempts could not form a 
solid basis upon which to construct a modern socialist present. This is what Dej meant 
when he accepted that the “old architects with talent and substantial experience” could be 
brought back only on the condition that “they follow the Party line, and not their old 
convictions.”330  
 The stir caused by Joja’s unusual take on the renovation project of the Old 
Court area shows that the earlier debates of the interwar period informed, though in a 
disguised form, the tight negotiations around the project. Joja’s pre-1945 interest in 
questions of authenticity and the employment of the vernacular design came to underlie 
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his particular take on the “Romanian civil architecture,” which he wanted to revive in the 
perimeter of the Old Court area. He presented his interpretation of the “historical 
renovation” of the area as a unique project, one that was fully detached from earlier 
interpretations of vernacular architecture (such as the ‘National Style’ movement).  
 As such, Joja’s project offered a visual representation of “history” in the form 
of a revived “historical Bucharest” situated in the 18th century, represented by the 
recently discovered walls of the Princely Palace in the Old Court site. The houses were to 
be turned into extensions of the palace through their redecoration with a series of closed 
verandahs, deemed the quintessence of 18th century Romanian civil architecture. The 
result would have been a “reservation” of the “Romanian civil architectural style”—that 
is, a coherent narrative on the entire city’s history that would have satisfied all of the 
criteria of the official discursive field: authenticity, originality, and an exclusively 
autochthonous modernity, represented by a pristine architectural expression that had 
“neither occidental, nor oriental influences.”  
As I argue in detail in the next chapter, the City Museum was highly interested 
in Joja’s project, as it only furthered the Museum’s claims to transforming the Old 
Princely Palace into a historical reservation and, through Joja’s project, extending it to 
the entire area, up to Lipscani street. The reservation would have then allowed the 
Museum to lay stronger claims of institutional ownership over a key area of the city. Had 
Joja’s project been pursued, the houses would have been paired temporally with the 
Princely Palace, by “traveling” back in time, from the 19th century when most of them 
had been built, to an imaginary 18th century, architecturally represented by a series of 






mark of a late medieval Bucharest, cleansed of any “foreign influences” and ready to 
appear as an authentic and ideologically safe “old Bucharest.” Even though they mirrored 
earlier debates of the interwar period, these arguments were presented as “original” 
because Joja and his team did not want to signal any form of continuity with the 
“bourgeois” past, which could have endangered their institutional position. I suggest that 
Joja and his supporters highly favored a presentation of their project as an original 
venture. This perspective would offer them symbolic authorship and thereby secure them 
a place within the institutional landscape at a time when the architectural vocabulary had 
to accommodate a renewed focus on the nation. 
 As much as those bold statements seemed to please the local officials, 
including some of the architects well positioned in the central hierarchies, they came to 
be rejected by some of the “old architects,” now resuscitated and allowed to work for the 
socialist state. The latter took apart Joja’s project piece by piece as they rejected his 
choices of architectural design (such as the closed verandahs), his approach to the idea of 
a “historical renovation,” and the very concept of “Romanian civil architecture” that he 
incessantly evoked. They also questioned his claims about the project’s uniqueness, by 
alluding to the foundational work of the National Style representatives. While subtly 
placing their criticism within the discursive constraints of the given political context, the 
participants in those debates reiterated some of the themes—such as the relationship 
between authenticity (tradition) and modernity— that lay at the core of the interwar 
debates.331  
 One could say that, for the participants in the debate on the renovation of the 
                                                        






Old Court, the past, which the Party asked them to forget, kept looming in the 
background, thus making the regimes of expertise that the Party leadership tried to 
produce gradually more porous than they had initially envisioned. Those leakages in the 
networks of expertise complicate the picture of an institutional system exclusively 
working in a centripetal manner, with the “center” unequivocally controlling every 
possible project. In fact, as the disputes among architects in the case of the Old Court’s 
renovation demonstrate, diverging temporal frameworks underlying distinct architectural 
visions could bring significant tension into the process of decision-making at the core of 
the institutional system. The analysis is further complicated when we attempt to 
understand the diverging temporal frameworks emerging in the gap between distinct 
professional visions. The next chapter will examine the tensions occurring between 
architects and urban archeologists with regards to the Old Court, with an eye to 
understanding how those groups strove to institutionally “gain” this site by investing 








GROUNDING SOCIALISM: ARCHITECTURE, ARCHAEOLOGY, AND 





 The previous chapter showed how architects and urban planners sought to define 
an urban heritage for Romania’s capital city. In this chapter I will show how a different 
set of professionals, archeologists, jumped on the “heritage” bandwagon with a different 
destination for the capital, based on a historical narrative of Bucharest’s medieval origins. 
This chapter presents an analysis of the conflict between two professional groups 
simultaneously rising in the scientific hierarchies of the time—the architects working for 
the state-sponsored mega-institution of urban planning “Project Bucharest” and the 
archeologists employed by the City Museum. I examine how the latter attempted to create 
a privileged professional niche for themselves by advancing claims concerning the 
superiority of archeological artifacts over the documents produced by a pre-socialist 
(“bourgeois) historiography.  
 I argue that, by portraying the excavations as unique tools for the discovery of the 
past, archaeology as a method of scientific inquiry became also a political strategy that 
directly helped the socialist state to carve out a new historical map of the city. This map 
was perfectly laminated onto the teleological view of history advanced by the doctrine of 





such, the re-codification of the past proposed by archaeology enabled the state to 
retroactively carve its own history into the urban development of the city, a history 
perfectly fitting the state’s current agenda.332 
I argue that by promoting an imagery of history in the form of artifacts found 
during the excavations in the center of Bucharest, rather than written documents or even 
the architectural forms occupying a predominant area of the city since the 19th century, 
archeologists helped the state perform a multilayered operation. With the help of the new 
experts of the past, the political leaders could then: 1) “stretch” the past of the city into a 
pre-feudal time, and thus prove an ethnic continuity of both the settlement and its earlier 
inhabitants, 2) provide solid evidence for the feudal development of the city, which 
theoretically laid the basis for the establishment of a socialist order, as I will explain, and 
3) dismiss the architectural forms developing in the city across more than a century—
from the mid 18th century to the end of the 19th century—by claiming that this historical 
period was far too open to foreign influences, so that its architecture was not 
representative of “the national history.” This shift produced in the early 1960s had direct 
consequences for the radical restructuring of a large area of Bucharest in the mid 1980s 
(including one neighboring on the Old Court site), when entire quarters formed of 
“bourgeois” dwellings, built during the 19th century, could be easily erased precisely 
because they no longer counted as “heritage” to highly-placed professionals (mainly 
architects) and politicians alike.333 
At first glance, the scales of the two projects—one by architects, the other by 
archeologists— could not be matched. While the comprehensive remodelling of the city 
                                                        
332 I owe this formulation to Oana Mateescu. 






entailed a long-term project that relied on massive deployment of labor and expertise, the 
archeological digs opened in the center of the city were coordinated by a relatively small 
team of specialists, first supervised by the Institute of Archaeology and after 1958 by the 
City Museum of Bucharest. Symbolically, however, the two enterprises had similar 
revolutionary goals: whereas the first group was aiming to give form to a world de novo, 
the latter wanted to “unearth” a correspondingly pristine history, whose uncontested 
value appeared to be given by the very materiality of the artifacts in the ground. As such, 
both projects involved peculiarly similar dynamics: they were both concerned with 
different forms of “stretching,” be that of the city’s skyline or its own past. As many 
other scholars have already pointed out, the process of “stretching” the “people”—that is, 
the nation—out into an immemorial past was a crucial strategy via which the Romanian 
leaders aimed to fix socialism within a national narrative of absolute continuity.334 
Underground searches, hoarded artifacts: Creating a socialist heritage 
  
The fiery debates over the historical value of the Old Court site, especially of 
the ruins of the original walls that had formed the princely palace, must be understood 
within a larger context of reconfiguring the value of material forms. This operation of 
assigning new political meanings to materiality formed the backbone of the process via 
which the socialist state attempted to retrospectively create its own past that would fit a 
teleological vision of historical development. Searching for (or rather making anew) a 
                                                        
334 For an account of this process in socialist Romania, see Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under 
Socialism, Michael Shafir, Romania - Politics, Economics and Society: Political Stagnation and Simulated 
Change (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), Gail Kligman, The Wedding of the Dead: Ritual, Poetics, and 
Popular Culture in Transylvania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). For an analysis of the 
employment of the paradigm of historical continuity in the post-1989 scholarly production, see Gheorghe 






heritage that would represent this “new” past became then a domain of contention among 
different groups within and beyond disciplinary boundaries. The creation of new regimes 
of expertise was proceeding in parallel with the formation of new regimes of value for 
material forms.335  
 I employ Appadurai’s image of “regimes of value” because it captures the 
relational dimension of the process whereby in Romania of the 1950s specific forms of 
materiality (such as artifacts found during archeological excavations) could suddenly 
become more relevant than others (such as 19th century buildings) as potential carriers of 
the “historical truth.” For Appadurai, a regime of value “is consistent with both very high 
and very low sharing of standards by the parties to a particular commodity exchange.”336 
By talking about “regimes of value” instead of value in itself, Appadurai attempts to 
solve the problematic approach of looking at value as an abstract category, outside the 
specific configuration of the political domain. I would have found his argument more 
compelling had he approached the whole process of “tournaments of value” not as a 
unilateral diversion, but as relationally formed at the intersection between subjective 
interpretations of materiality, grounded hic et nunc, and a broader politics of exchange. 
More specifically, he does not account for tensions or even ruptures occurring within 
those regimes of value—such as, subjective appropriations and interpretations of 
                                                        
335 Appadurai, together with others (Bourdieu 1977, Miller 1987, Miller 1999), shows the other side of the 
coin, that is, the ways materiality can form and transform social worlds as much as the social world forms 
and transforms materiality. Arjun Appadurai, "Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value," in The 
Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, ed. Arjun Appadurai (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986). His piece triggered a whole literature stressing the importance of material culture. 
Notwithstanding this important point—of materiality as directly acting upon the social—Appadurai still 
operates within a very clear distinction between what “material” and “social” represent. Therefore, one 
could see his argument as still confined within a semiotic/material division. Appadurai does not really 
define what ‘things’ are and therefore his lack of clarity limits his challenging points to a certain extent. 
Also, he still sees separate regimes of value, which eventually come into contact by exchange, and not 
‘value’ as directly formed through or assigned to things. His analysis then does not broaden our 
understanding of how value is being produced. 






materiality that could be informed by former regimes of values, existing in the shadow of 
current politics of exchange. Moreover, what happens when exchange is not part of the 
equation, that is, when the circuits for moving things around, a process whereby the 
regimes of value are constituted in the first place, are being radically reformatted or even 
politically frozen? 
 I find Elizabeth Ferry’s approach to productively complicate Appadurai’s 
viewpoint. Ferry takes the practices of extraction and circulation of silver in Mexico as a 
site where the division between inalienability and exchangeability is challenged by the 
local actors who look at silver—as both commodity and patrimony—as part of a sole 
category of value. By doing so, Ferry sets up an analytical framework that considers the 
“coexistence of competing forms of value as a historical process rather than a fixed 
scheme of incompatible categories.”337 Ferry draws on Weiner’s discussion of inalienable 
possessions as material representations of “the intrinsic and ineffable identities of their 
owners.”338 She criticizes Weiner’s approach, however, for making “the distinction 
between categories [such as ‘inalienability’ and ‘alienability’] overly rigid.” 339 As she 
puts it,  
[even though] Weiner and others…examine the socially constructed nature of 
these categories, [they do not consider] the process by which people sort things 
                                                        
337 Elizabeth Emma Ferry, "Inalienable Commodities: The Production and Circulation of Silver and 
Patrimony in a Mexican Mining Cooperative," Cultural Anthropology 17, no. 3 (2002), 333. 
338 Annette B. Weiner, Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving (Berkeley Los 
Angeles Oxford: University of California Press, 1992).Anette Weiner, Inalienable Possessions: The 
Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992). 
Weiner distinguishes between ‘inalienable’ and ‘alienable’ possessions in order to open up the theoretical 
framework that classifies all property into ‘movable’ and ‘immovable.’ In doing so, she shifts the focus 
from ‘portability’ to ‘identity’ by showing how a mobility confined within social boundaries (such as a 
kinship group) in fact directly reifies the inalienability of a particular form of goods. As Weiner puts it, 
“what makes a possession inalienable is its exclusive and cumulative identity with a particular series of 
owners through time” (1992:33). Therefore, if one gives a particular orientation to the way a form of 
possesion circulates, that property will be exchanged only to be eventually returned, therefore will be kept-
while-given (1993:34). 





into one category or another and obscure the ways in which things may exhibit 
qualities of inalienability and exchangeability simultaneously.340 
 
 Drawing upon Ferry’s discussion of “inalienability” and “alienability” as 
historically situated categories, and especially of the possibility that one “thing” could be 
placed in both frameworks depending how one sees it, I suggest that, in order to 
understand the letter exchange, we should view the Old Court as one such thing. More 
specifically, to architects in charge of the remodeling of Union Square, the Old Court 
appeared to be “alienable,” simple ruins belonging to the same category with the 
“shabby” houses in the area. To archeologists, however, the same ruins appeared as 
“artifacts,” recently unearthed sources of historical truth and therefore obviously 
“inalienable.” 
 To an extent, the formation of novel regimes of value involved a paradoxical 
process of freezing mobile things into collections—be they for display in museums, as 
“the people’s property,” or even indeterminately “borrowed” by the Party apparatchiks 
for their official villas341—whereas the more fixed material forms, already imbued with a 
higher historical value by the old regime—such as old houses, castles, etc.—would be 
turned into more volatile (alienable) things. That is, different materialities were being 
assigned different places within these new hierarchies—for instance, the more mobile 
artifacts unearthed from the ground appeared to be more valuable than the old, ruined 
built structures of the city, especially when those built structures had been erected in “in-
                                                        
340 Ibid. 
341 Archeologist Eugenia Zaharia writes about the uncertain period 1948-1951, when many art collections 
and museums had been dismantled and some important objects were “lost” without trace. She also talks 
about the reorganization of the Royal Palace into the Art Museum, when many objects were “given away” 
at the request of the new authorities. Eugenia Zaharia, "Colecţii și muzee distruse [Destroyed collections 
and museums]," Ziarul Financiar (Ziarul de duminică), January 16, 2006, http://www.zf.ro/ziarul-de-







between times,” that is, times considered to be not representative for the development of 
the nation.342 
So great was this political demand to create hierarchies of historical time—for 
example, the time of the formation of the first Romanian states became highly 
important—that sometimes particular material forms (such as the artifacts) were 
forcefully “squeezed” into the more privileged time slots of history, deemed to be 
representative for the nation and the new state simultaneously. The Old Court stands as 
perhaps the extreme case for the willfully inadequate dating and classification of 
archeological data, which I will discuss at length in the last part of the chapter. First, 
however, I would like to lay out a more comprehensive argument on the meaning of 
material forms produced by archeological excavations for the making of the new state.  
The archeological artifacts unearthed from the ground became more important 
than the built structures of past times (the latter were to be fully replaced by the new 
buildings of the socialist urban aesthetics), for this newly found material met two 
requirements. First, it was “new,” so it could be directly claimed by the state without an 
intermediate process of appropriating and redefining the meaning of a form that had been 
previously owned by a different institution/individual. It thereby allowed the new state to 
immediately claim its own heritage. Second, often, the artifacts unearthed were mobile, 
that is, could be transported into the museums, to be better centralized and organized to 
fit perfectly into the teleological scenario of historical development that the new 
ideologues espoused. This distinguished them from the immovable ruins. 
                                                        
342 The chronology of those “in-between” times, periods deemed to be “nonrepresentative” for the history 
of the nation, had obviously been extremely malleable and, to a certain extent, self-contradictory. For 
instance, see my previous analysis of Joja’s project of renovation (Chapter 2) that aimed to bring back the 
architectural style of the Phanariot epoch (1711-1821) by presenting it as representative for the “Romanian 





 Obviously, the new institutional landscape and the relations developed between 
the two professional groups—architects and archeologists—cannot be portrayed only in 
black and white tones. The architects working for the Direction for Monuments had been 
involved in significant campaigns of built preservation and renovation all across the 
country, especially between 1955 and 1970. Rather, the competition between the 
Department for Monuments and the Institute of Archaeology played a decisive role, as 
both institutions were competing for the same pool of funds, targeting the historical 
research and preservation of the past. In other words, both institutions were highly 
interested in presenting their work—and the material forms they dealt with: built sites vs. 
artifacts—as being the most important. This competition came across very clearly from 
the first letter exchange of 1962-1964, which I analyzed in the previous chapter.  
However, the process of creating this new heritage was directly competing with 
the legitimization of the political order through a new spatial form—that is, the 
transformation of Bucharest into a socialist city. The struggle over the meanings of the 
Old Court, ranging from representing a historical site of national importance for 
archeologists to being dismissed as ruins buried underground by Project Bucharest’s 
architects working on the remodeling of the area, points out the more complex 
mechanisms of the struggle for resources through diverging disciplinary visions of what 
the past is and where could it be found. To understand those mechanisms, we must first 
examine the two operations underway in the middle of the city as interconnected projects. 
The stretching upward of Bucharest’s skyline starting with the end of the 1950s onward 
was to be temporarily accompanied by an opposite process, that of digging down into the 






Bucharest in fact?” the latter enterprise aimed to produce different forms of evidence—
archeological artifacts—that would supplement the scarce written data about the city’s 
development in its earlier times. 
The architects working for Project Bucharest, most of them formed under the 
auspices of modernist principles, were mostly looking for an urban function and form that 
would satisfy a changing society of the present, while being very little, or not all, 
preoccupied with “the past.” The past was not their business. It was, however, the main 
business of archeologists working for the City Museum of Bucharest who had been 
offered the unique chance of pursuing extensive research in the middle of the city. 
Suddenly, the area of the Old Court had to become extremely elastic, so that it could 
accommodate two kinds of pursuits pertaining to the urban form—one representing the 
future, another standing for the past. The compromise that the second letter mentioned—
that the main façade of the Manuk Inn should be doubled by a modern apartment 
building, in order to allow a proper systematization of the Unirii Square—stood as a 
quixotic hybrid, which was rejected by both the modernist architects involved in the 
remodeling of Union Square and those who wanted to preserve the Inn. Here both parts 
agreed: the hybrid would not work. What would work then? How elastic did the ground 
need be in order to accommodate both the demands of the present (to be built) and of the 
past (to be preserved)? How elastic was the very past of this ground? That is, what forms 
of “past” were being selected and which ones were rejected or ignored? How would the 
local and the Party leaders confront this issue? The final section of the chapter will 
attempt to answer some of those questions. 





1963 provoking much ado among the staff of the State Commission, came as an 
unexpected factor of variation into a seemingly well planned experiment—the socialist 
remodeling of a major square of Bucharest. One of the first reports on the results of the 
excavations proudly announced that the archeological digs that simultaneously opened in 
three central sites (Radu Vodă, Mihai Vodă, and Curtea Veche) in 1953 marked the initial 
phase of a “scientific study of the history of the Capital, from the earliest times to these 
days.”343 However, the local political apparatus did not envision the digs to remain 
forever open in central locations in the city.344 Indeed, their first role was to search for 
possible historical traces that would help elucidate the city’s origins. But their other role, 
equally important, was to “clean out” the ground in order to close it down for good and 
thereby allow for Bucharest’s landscape to be molded into a final and total socialist urban 
product. Such a ground, cleansed of significant material traces of history, was to become 
the pristine basis for laying out a new urban form representative of the grandiose project 
of socialist modernization. This development occurred at the intersection of two distinct, 
but concurrent, processes: 1) a wider reorganization of the disciplinary networks of 
expertise in alignment with the Party’s rising interest in promoting a “scientific 
activity,”345 and 2) the archeologists’ rapid awareness of the unique chance brought by 
                                                        
343"Șantierul Arheologic București," 287. 
344 In the November 1953 meeting on the systematization of the city, Dej and his team did not make any 
reference to the archeological digs opened in the center. 
345 Marxism claimed to create “scientific socialism,” so science held privileged status. The concern with 
scientific analysis underlies the 1953 report on the projects of the Academy, where the institutes of the 
Academy are criticized for not having pursued “work of exhaustive synthesis and scientific interpretation, 
that would have led to valuable historical studies.” As the writer put it, “a rejection of the scientific 
interpretation of the factual data had been illustrated by [a tendency] to factology, a simple series of facts 
and data.” P. Constantinescu-Iași, "Raport de activitate pe anul 1953 al secţiunii de știinţe istorice, 
filosofice, și economico-juridice a Academiei [Activity Report for the Year 1953]," in Studii și referate 
privind istoria Romîniei. Din lucrările secţiunii lărgite a secţiunii de știinţe istorice, filozofice și 
economico-juridice (21-24 Decembrie 1953) [Studies and Reports on the History of Romania. Excerpts of 
the Extended Session of the Department of Historical, Philosophical and Juridical-Economic Sciences 






the remodeling of the city, a remodeling that relied on the largest ever construction sites 
opened in the middle of Bucharest. In his report on the first years of activity of the City 
Museum, the director points out this encounter between the two groups: the archeologists, 
on one hand, and the architects and planners, on the other. 
[T]he activity of salvaging the relics of the past …appears as more necessary as 
a large part of Bucharest’s territory undergoes continuous changes and 
redesign, which have been developing with unique amplitude. …The large 
construction sites…often lead to the discovery of monuments of material 
culture. Such situations led the team of specialists of the Museum…to give 
great concern to the salvaging projects. There have been numerous cases when 
the Museum’s specialists have been contacted by the managers of the 
construction sites…to come to pursue archeological research on the large 
socialist construction sites in the city.346 
  
The director did not (could not) talk openly about the tensions between the two groups, 
even though we learn that the first archeological projects (initiated in 1953) had been 
pursued under difficult conditions, due to the construction sites in the Capital and the 
sewage works opened in the city.347 There was then an inherent tension between the two 
projects, since the archeologists’ extended periods of research in one area could have 
greatly delayed or even precluded any projects of urban remodeling pursued by architects 
in the same site. Moreover, the first group’s pursuits could have endangered the latter’s 
projects altogether, especially if the archeological research led to results that dramatically 
changed the historical significance of an urban area. In such cases, the architects’ plans of 
radically transforming those places were resisted by archeologists, who claimed new 
rights over a site suddenly deemed to be historically important. If such claims were 
bolstered by the state, then the architectural projects could have been indefinitely 
“frozen.”  
                                                        







Figure 9 The map of Bucharest in 1979 in Dan Berindei and Sebastian Bonifaciu, Ghid Turistic, 
Bucuresti: Editura Sport-Turism, 1980. Courtesy Craig Turp, www.bucharestlife.net. The red-
filled area indicates the site of the Princely Palace, which was opened as the Museum of the Old 
Court in January 1972. The larger area marked by a red rectangle shows the boundaries of the 
Lipscani neighborhood. 
 
 The Old Court and the debates over the multiple and diverging meanings of the 
site offers us a rich venue to reflect on those processes as well as see them unfold in 
unexpected ways. This is because the Old Court represents a rather special case in the 
development of archaeology in post-1945 Romania. It is here that the political 
implications of the archeological inquiries in the city became the most obvious. The 
argument that will unfold in this section is that in the case of the Old Court, the 
archeological team of the Museum used (in fact, abused) the privileged position that 
archaeology had already acquired within the scholarly hierarchies of the new state. That 
is, in order to create a niche for themselves, the team of archeologists—or rather, the 
leaders of the Museum—did so by grossly crossing some crucial boundaries: those 






this case and its consequences, I will first offer an overview of the specific context that 
made such a story possible in the first place. 
In order to advance their claims, the archeologists of the Museum of Bucharest 
relied on the ampler strategy of the socialist state to use archeological methods and object 
of inquiry for its own political legitimatization. The uniqueness of archaeology’s 
disciplinary approach to the past stood as the major argument in the first reports 
published by the teams of archeologists working in the city’s center. Those reports 
presented a flourishing research activity. According to them, following the party 
directives to “stimulate scientific, literary, and artistic activity,” the politically cleansed 
Academy of the Romanian People’s Republic, with “generous funds from the 
Government and the Party,” began pursuing archeological digs as early as 1949.348 
Research reports published by the Academy, immediately following the first digs, had the 
role of popularizing and grounding the new knowledge-in-the-making. These reports 
aimed to “reflect the contribution of [the collective of the Museum to] the great effort of 
the Romanian archeologists to document, on the basis of dialectical materialism, the 
faraway past of our people.”349 As the director of the Museum wrote in 1963, 
The contribution of archeological research to knowledge about the past of the 
Capital proved to be considerable. Questions on the historical evolution of the 
populations living on the territory before the formation of the feudal town 
                                                        
348 "Șantierul arheologic București," 285-87. The archeological digs in the country had started in 1949, but 
the first excavation in the city of Bucharest began only in 1953. The rumor was that the close friendship 
between Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej and archeologist Constantin Daicoviciu, whose post-1945 political and 
professional career itself represents a fascinating case, had a great impact on making the Party leadership 
channel important funds into archeological research, especially the digs opened in Transylvania. However, 
Mircea Anghelinu shows that this friendship between Dej and Daicoviciu played only a (perhaps 
secondary) part in the Party’s kindled interest in archaeology. Many interwar archeologists, some of them 
very much politically incorrect, such as the openly Germanophile Ion Nestor, had never been imprisoned, 
but rather had a smooth professional career right after 1947. (Personal communication, Professor Florin 
Curta, March 12, 2009) 
349 Emil Condurachi, "Prefaţă [Preface]," in Cercetări arheologice în București [Archeological Research in 





Bucharest, or those on the emergence and development of this town—issues on 
which the written documentation is absent or insufficient—could often be 
solved only via archeological investigations.350 
  
Such grandiose claims must be taken, however, with a grain of salt. Even 
though these reports were being published by the Romanian Academy in relative large 
editions, they mostly circulated among small circles of specialists.351 The groups of 
archeologists who started working on the digs in Bucharest had been limited to several 
specialists, helped by some students. This initial group, then working directly for the 
Romanian Academy, had also started training a new generation of archeologists, who 
then went to work with the local and regional museums opened in the country.352 The 
impact of this professional group could not have been compared with that of the planners 
and architects working for (or hoping to work for) Project Bucharest and other mega-
institutions directly connected to the political center. Whereas the latter displayed their 
plans and visions for the new city in exhibitions widely advertised and open to the 
public,353 the archeological excavations were cumbersome for both the planners and 
                                                        
350 Georgescu, "Introducere [Introduction]," 6.  
351 For example, the print run for Cercetări arheologice în București [Archeological Research in 
Bucharest] (Bucharest: S.P. C. Muzeul de Istorie a Orașului București, 1962) was 1,700 copies. 
352 Condurachi, "Prefaţă [Preface]." Condurachi attempts to offer a rosy picture of the relation between the 
Institute of Archaeology and the Museum of the city of Bucharest, whose staff “had started their 
apprenticeship next to the specialists of the Institute of Archaeology. [The Institute] had sought to support 
the activity of various teams of the regional museums. However, the more those teams gain research 
experience, the more important a role they should be given in the collective research efforts.” Those words 
hide a more complicated context, which I will discuss later in the chapter, as things got sour as soon as the 
Museum wanted to quickly obtain a higher visibility among the research institutions of Bucharest, thus 
endangering the position occupied by the Institute of Archaeology.  
353 The projects in the 1959 competition for the systematization of Union Square had been displayed in an 
exhibition at the Architect’s House, followed then by a “discussion of creation on the systematization 
solutions,” attended by almost 200 specialists. "Discuţie de creaţie asupra proiectelor prezentate la 
concursul de sistematizare a Pieţei Unirii [Debates on the projects accepted to the competition for the 






pedestrians (especially those living near the sites).354 In other words, in order to carry out 
their research and thus establish their own niche among the professional groups vying for 
recognition and resources from the state, archeologists of the Museum of Bucharest had 
first to cause a shift of perceptions concerning the ultimate scope of their research. That 
is, they had to present the excavations in the center as major projects of construction 
instead of potentially inefficient operations that turned the city upside down and thereby 
hindered architectural plans.  
 I suggest that the excavations at the Old Court came to be used as both forms and 
methods for two intertwined processes: 1) promoting a dialectical materialist view of the 
history of the city via the material forms excavated out of the ground, which were to 
replace historiographical accounts produced in the pre-1945 period; and 2) demonstrating 
the feudal origins of present day Bucharest, a condition that would guarantee not only an 
ideologically safe socialist development of the city, but also its place within the history of 
the Nation.  
 In what follows, I start by analyzing the rising importance of the particular forms 
of materiality in writing the history of (for) the socialist state. I return to examine the 
narrative about the medieval history of Bucharest in the last section, where I discuss how 
the Old Court was transformed from a borderline area in the symbolic geography of the 
city into a site of “national importance” for the country’s history. 
                                                        
354 As the report on the excavations at the Old Court points out, “one of the greatest difficulties that the 
research team had to face was the limited space that allowed for archeological research. […] In most of the 
cases, we were forced to dig in the very courtyards of the currently inhabited houses.” L. Lăzărescu-
Ionescu et al., "Săpăturile arheologice din sectorul Curtea Veche," in Studii și referate privind istoria 
Romîniei. Din lucrările secţiunii lărgite a secţiunii de știinţe istorice, filozofice și economico-juridice (21-
24 decembrie 1953) [Studies and reports on the history of Romania. Excerpts of the extended session of the 
department of historical, philosophical and juridical-economic sciences (December 21-24, 1953)] 





A socialist order of things: Endorsing history as a continuum of rearranged objects 
  
The new imagery of history promoted by the state was circumscribed by a 
perspective on those artifacts as “imprints,” carrying the exclusive feature of recording 
the past into their very materiality and thus becoming available to render this past into a 
pristine, objective version.355 Instead of approaching the material as a “text” into which 
they could decipher systems of thought, meaning, and social action, archeologists in post-
1945 Romania preferred (and were very much encouraged politically) to regard the 
archeological record as raw matter, free of any political meaning. The new state, in need 
of a new history, turned then to archaeology to provide it with this supposedly raw 
material that they could mould into “the past” they wanted. Those claims relied on a 
premise that the artifacts’ very materiality guaranteed an “objective” interpretation of the 
past, one that could remain untainted by any biases potentially informing the written 
sources. The materiality of the artifacts stood as the exclusive way to achieve 
“objectivity” and therefore grant a radically new historical paradigm the status of 
“truths.” By putting forward an interpretation of “historical materialism” that assumed 
that the material is the ultimate proof of truth, the things newly unearthed from the 
ground literally became “the scientific bases” onto which entire disciplinary realms, such 
as literature and history, had to be (re)built. The materiality was not, however, freer from 
ideology than texts. The artifacts’ semiotic porosity could allow for a wider range of 
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interpretation than a written document.356 They were therefore more politically malleable, 
precisely because they were presented as pristine and objective. 
 Archaeology played then a double role—it not only produced specific 
representational forms of the past, but it also stood as the discipline that was par 
excellence entitled to confirm or deny the historical validity of earlier documents.357 
Obviously, this process of production and reinscription of the past of Bucharest was 
described through metaphors of “salvage” and “discovery.” For instance, one of the 
research reports on the first digs opened in 1953 points out that “in addition to tracking 
down and salvaging some archeological vestiges, the archeological research carried out 
simultaneously with the construction work aimed to confirm the written sources on the 
basis of field research.”358 At the same time, archaeology was called upon to reject or 
verify “imagined legends” regarding the foundation of the city, such as the story that a 
shepherd, Bucur, was the founder of Bucharest (Bucureşti, in Romanian).359 The 
                                                        
356 By this statement, I do not want to imply that a written document is a static product, delivering the same 
information when read by different people, in different contexts. On the contrary, texts are themselves very 
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Bucharest’s origins as “fantasies.” (Those accounts include Gr. Musceleanu, Calendarul Antic pe 1875 
(București, 1875), 75, Alexandru Pelimon, Bukur, Istoria fundării Bucureştilor [the History of the 
Foundation of Bucharest] (Bucureşti: Tipografia Naţională a lui Iosif Romanov et comp., 1858). Both of 
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archeological research within the city should therefore have aimed at “obtaining 
information on those historical periods on which data are still scarce.”360 Therefore, “as 
long as the written documentation so far offers few and equivocal data regarding the 
history of Bucharest in the 14th and 15th centuries, it is necessary that the knowledge on 
this subject should be acquired via archeological research.”361 
Another project, pursued in parallel with the archeological investigations in the 
city, touches directly upon the emerging political role of specific forms of materiality. It 
involved the identification, research, and publication of a comprehensive collection of 
medieval inscriptions existing at that moment (the project started in 1951) on the territory 
of the city of Bucharest.362 This enterprise was presented as the beginning of a grandiose 
project of identifying, collecting, and organizing the medieval inscriptions across the 
country’s territory, as well as the research on those that had been destroyed or lost. The 
chronological scale, which defined the inscriptions as “medieval,” started with “the 
establishment of the Romanian feudal states [though no date was specified, other sources 
located this beginning in the 14th century] and ended around 1800.”363 The selection 
methodology—of identifying “Romanian medieval inscriptions” and separating these 
from others of different provenience or usage—reflected a larger political agenda set on 
finding different forms of Romanianness and distinguishing them from imputed forms of 
other (especially ethnic) groups.364 Presented as an alternative means of disclosing “data 
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of historical interest,” the inscriptions had to carry their “historical value” in a visible 
form. This meant that the pieces inscribed only with “saints’ names,” without any other 
date, or those carrying private names of “ordinary” people (in contrast to political 
figures), could not be included in the collection. Also excluded were those inscriptions on 
objects that “no matter their origins and historical importance, had not been produced on 
the territory of the Romanian [medieval] states [i.e., principalities] or had never 
circulated there in the past” (which meant that they exerted no influence on the culture of 
the local population at that time).365 
Like the archeological excavations carried within Bucharest, the project of the 
“Romanian medieval inscriptions” should be understood in the context in which feudal 
history and archaeology became very important disciplinary niches within the socialist 
state. Even though the inscription project had been initiated in the midst of a heavy 
sovietization of the Romanian Academy, the unique combination of linguistic and 
research skills required by the domain of epigraphy determined the selection of a 
particular team of specialists. As the majority of those researchers had acquired their 
expertise during the interwar years, with some of them occupying key functions within 
major institutions (such as the Commission for Historical Monuments), they brought a 
strong penchant for national history to the project.366 Therefore, during the first phase of 
research and selection of the inscriptions (1951-1954), in the shadow of a sovietized 
Academy, the project had already taken a form very much shaped by a nation-centered 
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model of history, which those experts had promoted in the pre-1945 period. 
  A unique characteristic of the inscriptions that stood as an additional proof of the 
data’s accuracy was their “fixedness”—as they often had a “private character,” they 
could not offer the wealth of information that one could find in written sources 
(diplomatic correspondence, narrative sources).367 However, 
the accuracy of the details provided [by the inscriptions] is higher. […] The 
inscriptions make available data that are in general more certain than of other 
contemporary sources, from a chronological point of view as well as of the 
facts and details that they render. In their stereotypical form, with a plain 
sequence of names and dates, the inscriptions are worded less ad probantum 
than miscellaneous chronicles representing the interests of a group of boyars or 
a particular deed made via doubtful stories or questionable arguments. […] As 
long as the majority of inscriptions describe contemporary facts, within their 
strict and limited materiality, and are not aimed to be called upon in front of a 
jury or support any interests of their authors, the veracity of the data they carry 
cannot be, in general, doubted. [As such, by offering] details on the conditions 
under which lay, military, but especially religious monuments had been built, 
[the inscriptions] represent an indispensable source for [documenting] the local 
history of the cities, towns, and a number of villages in the [medieval] epoch.368 
 
In addition to representing signs imbued with different forms of 
Romanianness—by being either produced or used by medieval Romanians—the 
inscriptions via “their strict and limited materiality” encapsulated the promise of 
rendering “objective” data.369 It was precisely their condition of not being included in the 
domain of manuscripts—written historical sources—that made them so valuable.370 In a 
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context where writing (on paper) had become an increasingly dominant form of 
communication, it was then the higher difficulty of producing text via alternative 
methods—that is, more difficult than writing, such as “carving, sewing, painting, and 
embroidering”—that made specialists deem the inscriptions potentially more 
“accurate.”371 
Since they had to communicate the kernel of one event (for instance, by 
engraving one name and one date), the epigraphic forms were then invested with the 
assumption that that kernel was “true” by default and therefore historically relevant.372 It 
is interesting to note, though, that the specialists applied their own understanding of 
history, set under chronological parameters, to the selection of the inscriptions. That is, 
an inscription with no date, or carrying only names, could not be considered “important,” 
even though the imprinting of those names required as much skill as the carving out of 
the dates. In other words, the inscriptions represented pivotal historical sources when they 
could meet both criteria of historical objectivity: that of functioning as chronological 
markers (through the dates inscribed) and of guaranteeing their validity by the very 
difficulty of the inscribing process. 
The project of analyzing and ordering the medieval inscriptions focused then 
on three closely interconnected elements that became crucial for the re-writing of history 
required by the Party leaders: materiality, feudalism, the Romanian nation. In other 
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words, the medieval inscriptions were viewed as unique sources of insight into the 
development of the Romanian nation since its origins: the formation of the first feudal 
states on the territory lying within the borders of current Romania. In fact, it was not the 
inscriptions themselves, but the procedure of identifying and selecting them that made the 
project uniquely suitable for political aims.373 The selection of the “representative” pieces 
according to their capacity to function as chronological devices, combined with the data’s 
accuracy supposedly given by their materiality, represented in nuce a more grandiose task 
that the state entrusted to the specialists (especially historians and archeologists). This 
task involved the production of a framework of historical continuity, which already had 
deeper roots in an earlier nationalist agenda (starting in the middle of the 19th century 
until 1945). This time, however, in order to accommodate a socialist order of things, and 
also create a niche for the socialist state within this historical framework, the emphasis 
was placed on the heuristic value of particular forms of materiality.  
As I have already suggested, in comparison to the interwar period, when the old 
built structures had been considered the major form of heritage, the socialist state sought 
to create its own heritage through a different kind of materiality, one that was both “new” 
and often more mobile (being thus able to be inscribed and displayed as state property). 
The archeological artifacts fulfilled this role, which prompted a vast enterprise of 
excavations across the country that led to an impressive collection of material. Again, 
what mattered was not only the material per se, but rather the project of amassing and 
ordering it within a comprehensive (and centralized) schema—the process of setting 
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those material forms within a historical narrative. This project was to unfold in a 
particularly easy manner, given the dichotomous perspective—that of approaching the 
artifacts as “imprints” and contrasting them with written sources as ideologically charged 
“texts”—that informed most of the archeological research pursued in post-1945 Romania, 
as well as in the entire region. As Timothy Kaiser writes, 
another consequence of the nationalist-inspired historical revival in the Balkans 
has been the adoption of essentially historical methods in archaeology. Chief 
among these methods is the use of artefact typology as a means of chronology-
building and of delimiting cultural boundaries. With their typologies and 
analyses of artefact style, archeologists have sought to construct a history of the 
Balkan past in the absence of written records. While a preoccupation with 
artefact typology is hardly unique to southeast Europe, it does seem that the 
enterprise is widely regarded as the most serious and important aspect of 
archaeology. Careers and reputations stand or fall on questions of chronology 
and typology.374 
  
In fact, this approach allowed archeologists to continue to work within a 
culture-historical model that favored “long-term historical continuity” over other possible 
interpretations of the data.375 As I have already pointed out in Chapter 1, the new turn to 
materiality promoted by the state therefore kept being set within a paradigm that had been 
pervasive in the interwar archaeology only to thrive afterwards in the shadow of 
dialectical materialism. That is, Pârvan’s search for “the essence of Romanianness” 
literally underground was further reproduced and developed in communist Romania, 
especially starting in 1960.376 What the regime promoted as dialectical materialism was a 
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376 1960 marks a clear separation of socialist Romania from the USSR, as it is the year when Dej opens 
trade with Western Europe (West Germany and France, and later with the US). However, as I have also 
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simplified and more rigid version of Marxism, which Romanian archeologists 
unfortunately hurried to employ.377 Instead of adopting a dialectical approach to the 
archeological data, one that would start from an analysis of material to derive a theory of 
“internal developments of past societies,” the archeologists in post-1945 Romania tended 
to favor an empiricist agenda.378 That is, the majority directed their studies within a 
dialectical materialist paradigm, which “assumes that material circumstances actually 
regulate the adjustment of the superstructural components and may ultimately lead to 
historical changes.”379 In other words, the more one dug out of the ground, the better a 
researcher she or he proved to be. This meant an increasing number of new sites being 
opened, which led to a larger and larger archeological collection that would then be 
displayed in key locations for political propaganda, such as the regional museums of 
history. 
 In addition to the major operations of nationalization and collectivization, this 
process of agglomerating artifacts stood as another form of channeling resources to the 
center—the key strategy by which the communist state aimed to consolidate its power.380 
Only recently have Romanian scholars approached the topic of the politics of 
archaeology in post-1945 Romania, remarking on the popularity the discipline benefited 
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from at that time.381 An incisive analysis of that period is offered by Mircea Anghelinu, 
who writes: 
Since it was now [post-1945] assigned a crucial part in the new holistic, all-
encompassing, and ideologically vital theory of history, archaeology suddenly 
gained an unexpected and unprecedented prestige in social and ideological 
terms. Its new status became evident instantly in such things as […] the 
generous institutional support the discipline of archaeology enjoyed.382 
  
 Here I would like to return to my argument on the tense negotiations over the 
city’s space between archeologists working for the Museum and architects of Project 
Bucharest. I have suggested that the exchange of letters analyzed in the previous chapter 
should be understood within a (disputable) agreement that archeologists would pursue 
their research at a speedy pace, by digging out all the material traces of the past and then 
“close down” the ground so that the architects could start building the socialist city. The 
Old Court suddenly became a highly problematic case, because, instead of closing it 
down, the archeologists claimed it as a historical reservation—that is, as a space to be 
removed from the systematization plan for the city’s center. Given the key role that the 
systematization of the city center was to play for the legitimization of the new leadership, 
how was it then possible that a bunch of archeologists from the Museum could eventually 
secure such an exceptional status for a site whose historical value had been relatively 
ignored? I suggest that an argument about a new history of Bucharest, to be written on 
the basis of “pristine” artifacts, played a crucial role in sustaining their case. However, 
this sole claim would not do, as many other archeological sites opened in the city’s center 
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also provided important data for the local history. The case needed supplementary 
grounds—and this was the description (in fact, the making) of the Old Court as a major 
feudal site for national history. In the next section I will first show why feudalism is so 
important for the development of a history of contemporary Bucharest. I will then turn to 
the site itself, to examine how the archeologists of the Museum went about making their 
own Old Court by creating a smooth and continuous historical framework out of 
temporally scattered material forms. 
Overstrained histories—or why does feudalism matter so much after all? 
 
Up to now, we have gauged by now the circumstances under which, as in many 
other contexts, archaeology in Romania of the 1950s became a key technology for 
crafting a new state by extending the politics of the present underneath the ground.383 
Initially, the Party leadership was mainly concerned with the present—that is, 
implementing the major reforms that would lay the basis of a centralized economy and 
society: collectivization, nationalization, the economic plan and the systematization of the 
cities. The Soviet experts who were called upon (or, better put, self-invited) to supervise 
those reforms relied heavily on the tropes of “science” and “scientific methods,” which 
had already been well tested in the 1920s and 1930s in the USSR. However, those forms 
of producing a new social imaginary aimed to generate not only a version of the future, 
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but also one of the past. That is, scientific methods had to be used also for assessing a 
politically proper theory of history for the new state.384 It was a multifaceted process of 
conquering space and the built environment, as the making of the socialist state 
presupposed a radical redrafting of the epistemological arrangement between history and 
archaeology. Archaeology, presented as the ultimate decoder of historical truth, could 
claim new territory, and this it did right away. 
The first digs that were opened in the center of Bucharest in 1953 had explicitly 
followed the model of the excavations already pursued by the Soviet archeologists in 
medieval Russian towns.385 One of the first reports on the 1953 excavations points out 
that their main goal was: 
to reveal to the country’s large masses what was the true multi-millennarian 
history of the places we inhabit today. We will thus provide just and objective 
information, similar to what the Soviet historians and archeologists have been 
doing for years via their ample archeological investigations in Moscow, 
Leningrad, Kiev, Novgorod, etc.386 
 
The latter research, set within a model of autochthonous development that ignored 
patterns of cultural diffusion and migration, aimed to prove the early cultural and 
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economic advancement of the Slavs, and hence, of the Russian people. These studies 
advanced the view that the Russian ancient settlements emerged simultaneously with, and 
developed equally along with the towns in, western and central Europe.387  
The Russian and then Soviet archeologists had attempted to build the field of 
medieval (or feudal) archaeology as an institutional framework in order to promote the 
theory of pan-Slavism.388 By adapting a previous discourse on Slavic (linguistic and 
ethnic) brotherhood that legitimized the Russian foreign policy of expansion in Europe in 
the late 19th century, the Soviets sought to resuscitate the myth of Slavic kinship in order 
to ground a socialist transnationalism with the USSR at its core.389 They gave a new twist 
to the “Slavic connection” by deeming it a crucial element for proving the ancient 
pervasiveness of the Slavic culture across the Central and East European region, a 
perspective informing all of the archeological research pursued in the Soviet bloc during 
the late 1950s and 1960s.390 Moreover, such a view was called upon to attest to the 
“superior development” of an early Slavic culture in comparison to those emerging in 
“the West.” Archaeology and its findings were then to play their part directly in a Cold 
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War competition, rooted in an early modern political geography of separation between 
the west and east, and employed anew to justify contemporary distributions of global 
power.391 
To have a history of feudalism rewritten on the basis of archeological findings 
was a crucial political issue all across the Soviet bloc in the 1950s. Searching for 
feudalism and thoroughly documenting it was a key strategy to justify the existence and 
necessity of the socialist project, according to a Marxist historical paradigm. As historian 
Elizabeth Brown points out,  
by incorporating ‘the feudal mode of production’ into their design, [Marx and 
Engels] endowed it with seminal significance. Their followers came to view the 
feudal stage as a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of socialism, and 
socialist scholars and activists sought traces of it throughout the world.392  
 
Apparently then, searching for the feudal origins of the major cities that were to be 
transformed into the socialist capitals of the new soviet satellites emerged as a key 
political task for the archeologists working in the eastern bloc. In Romania, the city of 
Bucharest, as the capital of the country and thereby a would-be pinnacle of socialist 
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urban development, was to play the principal role in this operation. According to the first 
reports on the excavation carried out in the city’s center, 
an extremely important issue [was] the expansion of the themes of 
archeological research. […] Whereas before August 23, 1944, there had been 
sporadic archeological research, only within the domain of the primitive and 
slavery-based social orders, the popular democratic state gives special attention 
to archeological research on the migratory period and the feudal order, as well 
as to the forging of a strong collective of specialists in feudal archaeology.393 
 
Indeed, the first reports presented proof of a strong Slavic influence over the local 
settlements found in the sites of the Old Court, Radu Vodă, and Mihai Vodă and initially 
dated as belonging to the 6th century (set within the period of migrations). However, 
within a relatively short interval, the specialists’ interest—and publications—turned from 
attempts to identify the “Slavic element” and its influence on “the local cultures” to 
research into the “(proto) Romanian element” within those cultures. That is, starting with 
the end of 1960s, the principal specialists of the Institute of Archaeology of the Academy 
started publishing extensively on the theme of “proto-Romanian culture.”394 Those 
studies aimed to assert, now with archeological data such as pottery shape and design, the 
                                                        
393 "Șantierul Arheologic București," 287. 
394 The scholars in 1980s Romania who came to be named “the protochronists,” whose “studies” aimed to 
place the Romanian people at the core of the world’s history, picked up those earlier arguments advanced 
by historians and especially archeologists in the late 1960s. One of the most famous “protochronists,” 
Răzvan Theodorescu, has become well known due to his extensive studies of art history as well as a 
thriving professional career under the socialist regime and especially afterwards, in Romania of the 1990s. 
In 1974, the year marking the official beginning of protochronism with Edgar Papu’s article “Romanian 
protochronism,” Theodorescu published his doctoral dissertation, focused on proving that “the first superior 
forms of medieval political, religious, and artistic life” had emerged “only and only” within the territory 
between “the two extremities of the Romanian Danube.” Theodorescu cites at length well known 
archeologists starting with 1958 (a year when Dej marked a firm distancing from Moscow). See Ion Nestor, 
"Contributions archéologiquè au probleme des proto-roumains. La civilisation de Dridu," Dacia II (1958), 
Maria Comșa, "Contribuţii la cunoașterea culturii străromâne în lumina săpăturilor de la Bucov," SCIV 1 
(1959), and "Sur l'originè et l'evolution de la civilisation de la population romane, et ensuite protoroumaine, 
aux Vie-Xe siecles sur le territoire de la Roumanie," Dacia XII (1968). In Răzvan Theodorescu, Bizanţ, 
Balcani, Occident, la începuturile culturii medievale românești: Secolele X-XIV (București: Editura 
Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1974). For a discussion of protochronism, see Katherine 






continuous inhabitance of the territory between “the Carpathians and the Danube” by the 
same population—the proto-Romanians, living here starting in the ninth century.395 
Instead of being “peacefully assimilated” by the Slavic migratory groups, as the 1954 
studies published by the same Institute had argued, those local proto-Romanians, due to 
“their higher number, the stability of their settlements and the superior stage of their 
material culture and the Roman-Byzantine heritage,” succeeded in asserting “the victory 
of the Romanic element” over the Slavic influences.396 This move was fully in keeping 
with Dej’s autonomist policy, discussed in Chapter 2. 
In other words, the establishment of feudal archaeology in Romania of the 
1960s, far from grounding a history of regional feudalism set under a pan-slavic 
influence, favored in fact stronger arguments about an earlier emergence of the Romanian 
nation. We come to understand then why the Old Court offered a great promise to 
archeologists and local politicians alike of supplying the material evidence to prove the 
continuity of the Romanian presence in the city from early medieval times until the 
present day. The next section will examine the arguments and especially the particular 
material forms that those groups made use of in this enterprise of making the Old Court 
into the heritage site of the city of Bucharest.  
 
Forged encounters: Walls in the ground and misdated artifacts  
 
The research at the Old Court was carried out in three distinctive stages. The first 
digs had been opened in 1953 and continued through 1954 under the supervision of 
                                                        
395 Theodorescu, Bizanţ , Balcani, Occident, la începuturile culturii medievale românești, 32. 
396 Dinu C. Giurescu, Horia C. Matei, and Nicolae C. et al. Nicolescu, Istoria României în date (Bucharest: 





archeologist Dinu V. Rosetti, then associated with the Institute of Archaeology of the 
Romanian Academy. The most accurate archeological research had been conducted at 
that stage, which led to important data, including especially a part of the walls of the 
western part of the princely palace, built in the second half of the 16th century. Between 
1955 and 1958, no other excavations had been pursued, and the research was limited to 
the analysis of the artifacts and further attempts to identify ruins of the Old Court still 
existing at the ground level. With the opening of the new construction sites in the area in 
1959-1960, a second stage of archeological research was launched. It consisted only in 
archeologists closely supervising the excavations occurring at the construction sites, 
which covered the territory lying to the east of the Old Court site, between the Flower 
Market and the main boulevard. As the City Museum had already taken over the 
responsibility of the archeological research carried out within the city’s perimeter, the 
1959-1960 study was entrusted to archeologists Dinu V. Rosetti (now working for the 
Museum) and Panait I. Panait.397 The third stage of research was pursued between 1967 
and 1971 during a “long excavation campaign” leading to “the discovery of some riverine 
stone walls,” identified as having been part of the first court, established by Prince Vlad 
the Impaler. 398 This long awaited “discovery” had been the main goal of the excavations 
in the area since their beginning in 1953, as the archeologists eagerly wanted to find a 
material trace of this court, which had appeared for the first time as “the fortress of 
                                                        
397 After the Local Council of the city of Bucharest had decided on December 10, 1956, to reestablish the 
Museum of History of the city of Bucharest, the Museum was opened on January 23, 1959, marking the 
city’s 500th anniversary. Panait I. Panait, "Observaţii arheologice pe șantierele de construcţii din capitală," 
in Cercetări arheologice în București (București: S.P. C. [Sfatul Popular al Capitalei] și Muzeul de istorie a 
orașului București, 1962),149. 
398 Panait I. Panait, "Studiu introductiv [Introduction]," in Curtea Veche [the Old Court], ed. Ioan Negrea 






Bucharest” in a 1459 chronicle.399 To my knowledge, there are no published research 
reports on the 1967-1971 campaign. Before starting a discussion about the more 
ambivalent political context underlying this absence, I will focus my analysis on the first 
and second research stages.  
The first research report on the results of the excavations, focusing on the “first 
princely court of Bucharest,” appeared in 1954 as part of the larger study of all the 
excavations opened in the center of the city.400 The major argument underlying the report 
was that of historical continuity, with the site of the Old Court described as marking a 
series of earlier settlements developed and continuously inhabited as early as the 
Neolithic. Moreover, in contrast to other sites dated in the 4th and 5th centuries, 
discovered at the periphery of Bucharest, “at the Old Court one found much larger and 
intensively inhabited settlements, [where] a vital life had pulsated.”401 Some of the 
pottery is identified in the report as belonging to the 6th century, “which corresponds to 
the typology of the Slavic pottery,” and is invoked as evidence attesting to the fact that 
the local population lived according to “the Slavs’ way of living.”402  
 
                                                        
399 Ibid., 8. 
400 Lăzărescu-Ionescu et al., "Săpăturile arheologice din sectorul Curtea Veche." 
401 The urgency of proving the historical importance and continuous habitation of this site comes forth in 
fragments such as:  
the settlement at the Old Court presents therefore the characteristics of a settlement where an 
indigenous local culture had been developed. As the locals had quasi-permanently been engaged in 
defense fights, the inventory of the material culture is quite poor. 
 Ibid., 473.  
That is, instead of raising the hypothesis of a more dynamic habitation of the area, comprising more diverse 
population movements, the argument remains stuck within the continuity paradigm of the culture-historical 
model. Another sentence is even more amusing: “[t]he fact that we could not track down social differences 
[in the material culture] at the Old Court does not prove that such differences had not existed.” Ibid., 473. 






Figure 10 The archeological site of the Old Court (1953-1971). "Şantierul arheologic Bucureşti," 
Figure 1, 408. I have marked the subsequent archeological sites with different colors: 1) the area 
delimited by red lines marks the sites opened in 1953, 2) the one in green points to the aproximate 
location of the construction sites carried out in between 1959 and 1961, and 3) the area in brown, 
in the western part of the Old Court site, marks the later stage of excavations, pursued in the 
period 1967-1971. 
 
Then, even though the excavations did not reveal any form of material culture 
between the 6th century and the 14th century, the proof of continuity is found in the fact 
that “the earliest stage of the feudal period at the Old Court directly overlaps the 
prefeudal settlement, of which the first is separated by a very thin stratum.[…] The lack 
of fertile soil (humus) could be explained by old leveling work.”403 According to the 
report, the middle and late feudal period (the 14th to the 16th century) is much more 








Old Court by the second half of the 16th century by the prince Mircea the Shepherd.404 
The Ottoman pottery dated in the 16th-17th centuries proves the commercial 
development of the town at that time. The multiple kinds of material culture of the 18th 
and the 19th centuries found in all the digs (coins, jewelry, mortuary inscriptions, etc.) 
illustrate the social life of the traders established in the area starting with the end of the 
18th century. The excavations had been carried out in multiple points of the site (as 
shown on the map), leading to a collection of archeological data that made the specialists 
conclude that “despite the richness of the material found [in these locations], the 
documentation about the princely court is relatively poor.” 405 The most important 
finding, however, was a part of the initial foundation of the princely palace (more 
precisely, the western corner of the palace, shown below). This foundation, of which only 
the western corner of the wall had been kept, being enclosed within a house built later on 
the premises, turned out to be part of a large (32 meter long) vaulted hall.406 The kind of 
construction method and material used for this wall led the specialists to place it within 
the middle or even early 16th century. The age and the “beauty of the construction and its 
vaults, and the fact that it is the sole construction left from the old buildings of the 
Princely court” caused the team working on the site to propose that this room should be 
classified as a “historical monument and [be] transformed into a museum-lapidarium.”407 
The aim of this lapidarium was to collect and display some of the inscriptions and other 
types of artifacts found during the excavations. 
                                                        
404 Ibid., 474. 
405 Ibid.  
406 Ibid., 483 






Figure 11 The model of the ruins of the Princely Palace. 1967-1968. Arhitectura, 113, no.4 
(1968): 27. 
 
Despite its ideological biases—such as the attempt to work within the framework 
of a continuous habitation of the site, as well as to prove the presence of the “Slavic 
culture” in the area—the report on the 1953 digs offers very detailed explanations on the 
methodology employed (including details on the dating of the artifacts via comparison 
with similar material found at other sites, stratographical drawings, pictures and drawings 
of pottery and coins, photographs of the stages of excavations). In contrast, the (much 
shorter) report on the 1959-1960 research in the area neither gives as many details, nor 
presents a stratographic analysis. More interesting, even, the second document challenges 
some of the data offered by the 1954 report. For instance, the pottery that archeologist 
Rosetti had first identified as “Slavic pottery” produced in the 6th century was re-
analyzed by the same Rosetti and now placed in the 9th-11th centuries, that is, the 
beginning of the Middle Ages, when the first feudal states had been formed on the 
territory of current Romania.408  
                                                        






This reference is crucial, as it points out not only the political turn away from the 
“Slavic connection,”409 but also the rising importance of the Middle Ages for the new 
theory of history advanced by the socialist state, aiming to prove a “Romanian” 
continuous presence from feudalism to socialism. In other words, the second analysis 
produced an important political shift in constructing the history of Bucharest on the basis 
of archeological data, by taking what the 1954 report had described as “an intensively 
inhabited settlement” of the 6th century and moving it up on the scale of history to the 
9th-11th century period. The pottery was then used as pivotal evidence that would 
“prove” that the settlement was a central one for the early feudal history of the city, and 
that the 16th century Princely Court came later to be established “directly” on this earlier 
settlement. Having established this key moment in the history of the city—the early 
medieval period—the report then points out that “the centuries to follow [covering the 
period between the 12th and 14th centuries] are still very poorly documented.”410 The 
question of “what historical process determined the abrupt decline of archeological data 
[characteristic of] the 12th-14th centuries” remains unanswered.411 However, the 
possibility that the area ceased to be inhabited within this interval is not even considered. 
What is certain, the report contends, is that “starting with the first half of the 15th 
century, there is more frequent habitation on the site that will likely host the walls of the 
princely Court at the end of this century” [sic! that is, of the 15th century, not of 16th, as 
had been documented by the earlier report]. The proof of this habitation comes from a set 
of pottery dated to the 15th century and found in a hut (bordei). As this dwelling was 
found in the immediate proximity of the Old Court site, the report concludes that the 
                                                        
409 Note also that in the 1962 text, the 6th century is no longer linked to the “Slavic culture.”  






princely palace had been built on the site previously occupied by some peasant 
residences.412 More importantly, the report describes the site under research (see map) as 
“a chaotic agglomeration of walls and cellars built between the 17th and 20th centuries, 
[among which] one could find isolated material from the earlier stages of the history of 
Bucharest.” The main culprit of this destruction of historical proof for “the first phase of 
the city’s development” is then to be found in the “constructions erected after the 
auctioning of the Old Court, [which] greatly modified the topographic aspect of the 
center of the capital.”413  
To summarize, there are important differences between the two reports in their 
approach to the research site, methodology, and accuracy of dating. While both reports 
are characterized by an analytical model set within a theory of historical continuity, their 
points of interest differ: while the first one identifies the beginning of the site’s habitation 
in the 4th-6th centuries, in order to prove the Slavic connection, the second document 
amends this conclusion by setting the key moment four centuries down the road, 
somewhere between the 9th and the 11th centuries. Also, while both reports acknowledge 
the lack of archeological data during important stretches of time (ranging from the 5th to 
the 14th century in the first report, or from the 9th-11th centuries to the 15th century in 
the second), they start from the premise that the site had nevertheless been continuously 
inhabited, only that such proof is yet to be discovered through further excavations or, 
even more definitive, that it had been destroyed during the capitalist stage of the city (end 
                                                        
412 Ibid., 145. 
413 Ibid., 147. I remind the reader that the Princely Court, established by the middle of the 16th century, had 
functioned as the political nucleus of the region until the end of the 17th century, when a fire destroyed the 
site and the Court had to be moved to a different location. After the fire, the terrain was divided and 
auctioned to the traders and craftsmen who kept moving into the area. This process led to the formation of 






of the 18th century until the beginning of the 19th century). The last point is directly 
made in the unsigned introduction to the 1954 report.414 As the writer(s) put it, 
the results of the archeological excavations carried out at the Old Court, Mihai 
Vodă and especially Radu Vodă would have been even more fruitful (successful) 
[in identifying] the strata of material culture dating from the migrations and early 
feudal periods, had the bourgeois regime […] not practiced a systematic policy of 
destruction of those monuments because of poor funding [resources for 
preservation.]” 
 
In the previous chapter, as part of my discussion on the renovation of the Old 
Court in the mid 1960s, I have pointed out that some architects (i.e., Joja and his 
supporters) grounded their vision of renovation in a temporal framework circumscribed 
by the 17th and 18th centuries. They asked that the renovation project strive to “bring 
back” those times as the only one representative for Bucharest’s past. In contrast with this 
apparently “pure Romanian” history of the city, there stood the period between the end of 
the 18th century and the turn of the 20th century, depicted as a time engendering “chaotic 
construction” and “radical changes in the city’s topographic [map],” representing a 
potentially destructive agent of key moments of the (feudal) history of the city. It is 
important to note the similarity of those arguments, because, as I will show later in the 
chapter, they underlie a common vision of the “matters” of history—what it is and how it 
should be represented. At the moment, I want only to point to this account, especially 
because it kept being invoked by both reports as a key argument in justifying the lack of 
archeological material for critical time frames.  
That the analysts tried so hard to prove a continuous habitation of the site of the 
Old Court from the Neolithic up to the present did not go unnoticed. In fact, the 
specialists of the Institute of Archaeology became extremely critical of the findings of the 
                                                        





archeological research (the second stage, 1959-1960, but especially the third, 1967-1971) 
carried out under the supervision of the City Museum of Bucharest. In what follows, I 
rely only on one source of information: a series of email exchanges and phone 
conversations with a Romanian professor of archaeology. Even though he was not a 
direct participant in or even witness to the process, he had direct access to “the gossip 
within the archeologists’ guild” regarding the excavations carried out at the Old Court in 
the 1960s and 1970s. According to this professor, the digs performed at the Old Court 
and especially the subsequent analysis of the archeological data extracted at the site 
represent “the ugliest story of the archaeology of Bucharest.” This is because the 
Museum’s team of archeologists working on the Old Court site had been accused of 
wrongly dating the artifacts found within the perimeter of the ruined walls of the first 
court, established by prince Vlad at the middle of the 15th century and unearthed during 
the 1967-1971 excavations. More specifically, as the professor put it, the Museum’s team 
assumed that the artifacts were contemporaneous with the walls, and therefore were dated 
as “having been from the time of Vlad the Impaler,” that is, the 15th century, when in fact 
they had a more recent provenance. With the auctioning of the land surrounding the 
Court at the end of the 18th century, the ruins of the Court became abandoned and 
transformed temporarily into the garbage site of the then increasingly populated 
commercial area of Lipscani. As such, the artifacts found within the walls of the court 
could easily have been objects that the later inhabitants of the area lost or disposed of as 
garbage. Therefore, some of those objects came to represent the material proof of the 








Figure 12 Photograph of pottery in the 1962 report, presented as belonging to the 9th-11th 
centuries. The same artifacts had been depicted by the 1953 report as “Slavic pottery,” produced 
in the 6th century. Image 2 in Panait, " Observaţii arheologice pe şantierele de construcţii din 
Capitală," 142. 
 
As the professor suggested, from the very beginning, the team working at the site 
“had to prove that the artifacts found there were from the Middle Ages,” so that the City 
Museum could then justify further requests to the state to fund additional excavations that 
would document Bucharest’s rich medieval history. This explains why there was no 
stratographical analysis of the research in the 1959-1960 report, which could 
scientifically ground the dating of the artifacts. Moreover, due to a combination of 
factors, including the fuss unleashed by the memorandum exchange in 1962-1963 and 
further pressure from different institutional actors, the City Museum succeeded 
eventually in securing a rich endowment for further pursuing the research at the Old 
Court.  
The more important question, however, raised a different issue: what combination 
of factors caused the City Museum to promote the Old Court as the sole representative 
site for the history of Bucharest? Bucharest had emerged as a polyfocal city, with several 
sites that developed simultaneously, instead of being characterized by a unique center 





Moreover, why had so much pressure been put on displaying the Old Court as the oldest 
site of the city? Other archeological excavations in the city’s center had led to the 
discovery of some early medieval walls as well as a great variety of artifacts identified as 
belonging to an earlier time (that is, the 6th and 7th centuries). (Interestingly, despite the 
great importance of those artifacts found in a central area of Bucharest—the Batiştei 
street, located 3 km west of the Old Court—and of some reports published on the 
excavations, none of the objects had ever reached the Museum. The professor suggests 
that the archeologists who worked on the site had colluded with the architects who built 
the new apartment buildings in the area, both groups being then engaged in this operation 
of “erasure” of a potential key historical site.)  
  The making of the Old Court into the “historical center” of the city must be set 
against the backdrop of a “more profound conflict” already looming due to the 
institutional niche occupied by archaeology at the time. More exactly, following the 
second round of archeological studies in the Old Court area and especially after the last 
excavations, the specialists in Early Middle Ages employed by the Institute of 
Archaeology started to openly criticize their homologues working for the City Museum 
for shallow archeological research, accusing them of incompetent excavations (in that 
area, but not only), inaccurate analysis of the data, and overall destruction of the city’s 
built heritage. A more intriguing aspect of this harsh criticism is that it seems that from 
the very beginning the Institute looked upon the Museum in a condescending manner, as 
if they [the Institute] had waited for the Museum to make a mistake, so that they could 
then eliminate it.415 According to the professor, these circumstances stemmed, in part, 
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from the conflictual relations (“clash of personalities”) between the director of the 
Institute, Ion Nestor, and the director of the City Museum, Dinu V. Rosetti. At the same 
time, the Museum and the Institute were competing for a common pool of resources 
distributed by the state. Moreover, the tension became even more acute as the City 
Museum managed to secure funding in 1959, while the Institute struggled to obtain more 
resources for their own research agenda (including the publication of the Archaeological 
Repertory [Directory] of Romania).416 The particularly rich endowment of the City 
Museum with significant state funding could be explained by the high interest invested 
by the state in the celebration of the city’s 500-year anniversary since the first reference 
                                                        
416The difficulties faced by the Institute appear in detailed account, written by Alexandru Păunescu. He 
writes:  
 The 1949 working plan of the Institute of History and Philosophy included the elaboration of the 
Archaeological Repertory (Directory) of Romania. This work was aimed at gathering and grouping the 
information on the archaeological finds in our country grouped territorially according to localities. Thus, a 
scientific tool has been built up in view of ensuing field research, speciality studies and establishing a base 
for carrying out the archaeological map of the country. […] Consequently, the archaeological repertory 
(directory) has been conceived as a topographic dictionary of the ancient monuments on Romanian territory 
from the oldest Palaeolithic times until the Romanian Principalities were established. […] 
 It was decided that the Repertory should be worked out by a team of qualified researchers, 
recruited from all over the country, having two working centres, the main one in Bucharest, as part of the 
section of Ancient History of the Institute, and a regional one, based in Cluj, belonging to the local Institute 
of History and Philosophy of the Academy. The work was organised according to regions, a criterion 
entailed by the almost exclusively topographic subject. In principle, the Cluj center tackled the material on 
Transylvania and Banat, while the Bucharest one that on Wallachia, Little Wallachia, Moldavia and 
Dobrudja. […] 
 Since 1953, due to the need for financial saving and the law of labour, the collaborators have not 
been paid any more. The work at the Repertory has been done by a few employees of the Section of 
Ancient History and of the National Museum of Antiquities, as they gave for the Repertory just 20% of 
their activity. […] 
 The effort to deliver for publication the Archaeological Repertory (Directory) at the end of 1953 
failed first of all from lack of financial support.[…] Almost six years later the issue of the Repertory was 
resumed. Thus, the report handed in to the Scientific Council of the Institute by the secretary of the 
Repertory team.[…] After 11 years, more exactly in 1973, the Scientific Council of the Institute of 
Archaeology, under the leadership of Professor D. M. Pippidi, took the decision to publish the 
Archaeological Repertory (Directory). In order to prepare for completion and updating the material for 
publication it was necessary to regroup the whole material depending on the new territorial-administrative 
organisation of Romania (1965) according to villages, communes, within the counties in question. 
Alexandru Păunescu, “The History of the Archive [of the Archeological Repertory of Romania]” 
http://www.cimec.ro/Arheologie/Digitalarchives/1ARR%20Archive/M.htm 





to the “Bucharest fortress” in a 1459 charter. In fact, the re-opening of the City Museum 
in January 1959, after it had been closed down in 1940, was to mark this celebration.  
 However, the subsequent research allocation that the City Local Council 
generously offered the City Museum specifically for further excavations at the Old Court 
starting in 1967, even while the Institute could not publish its most important work (the 
Archeological Repertory) due to a lack of funding, only added fuel to the fire. Under 
these tense circumstances, the City Museum had to identify a specific niche within the 
institutional landscape, in which most institutions and disciplinary branches were 
competing for the state’s whimsical allocation of resources. (Self)-eliminated from the 
local “guild” of the Early Middle Age specialists, who looked condescendingly upon the 
Museum’s medieval archeologists, contested by the architects of Project Bucharest for 
having aimed at institutionally “owning” central areas of the territory of “their” city, the 
City Museum of Bucharest had to find a means to promote itself as “unique in its own 
profile,”417 that is, as indispensable to the state. And a means it found: the recently 
unearthed walls of the Old Court, which would come to represent “medieval Bucharest.” 
The letter that landed on an official desk at the end of 1962 was only the first 
document of a large correspondence involving all the institutional actors discussed in this 
paper. The parts reached an agreement in August 1969, when after long debates, the 
Council of Ministers officially declared the Old Court “a historical reservation.” The site 
became then a concentrated representation of the city’s past—the place memory of the 
old Bucharest—being advertised as such by the brochures, guides, and scientific reports 
published by the Museum of the city. The Museum of the Old Court was officially 
opened on January 27, 1972, set under the supervision of the City Museum. 
                                                        







Figure 13 The inauguration of the Old Court Museum, January, 1972. Panait I. Panait and 
Aristide Ştefănescu. Muzeul Curtea Veche. Palatul Voevodal (Muzeul de istorie a municipiului 




The image of a medieval Bucharest, encapsulating a history that the Museum was 
to promote and protect, became a pivotal currency for the different groups of specialists 
working on, under, or with the city’s territory. I suggest that an increasingly stronger 
association of this image of a medieval Bucharest on the site of the Old Court played an 
important role in the tense negotiations over the area between the different factions of 
archeologists and architects, formed within or even crossing over disciplinary niches. 
Moreover, the discovery of (a part of) the original walls of the princely palace buried in 
the ground contributed significantly to the creation and maintenance of this association. 
The walls, as signs of a political past of a medieval Bucharest, turned to be a more 





the walls offered, through their immobility, a promise of monumentality that further 
enticed specialists and larger audiences to envision an old Bucharest that was more 
similar to popular images of (Western) medieval towns. Those latter images became all 
the more ubiquitous in architectural journals after the mid 1960s, following the 
movement on the preservation of historical cities in western Europe against modernist 
urban planning. This movement advocated a rehabilitation of the “historical district” of a 
city, a district that architecturally represented a palimpsest of the city’s development 
around the medieval loci of power (the town hall and the market). This imagery of a 
unifocal, circularly developing site as the initial core of a future European city was 
embraced by some architects occupying key positions within the professional hierarchies 
of Romania of the 1960s. By attempting to fit a multifocal Bucharest into the model of a 
city with a “historical center,” those architects (such as Joja, Curinschi, and Pruncu, 
whose arguments I discussed in the previous chapter) turned out to be instrumental for 
the Museum. (As I have already suggested, under the conditions of an increasing 
centralization of resources and a rearrangement of the institutional hierarchies in line with 
the Party’s agenda, this campaign represented a maneuver on the part of the Museum to 
acquire a more powerful position within this institutional network by advancing stronger 







Figure 14 A stamp of Bucharest of the 18th century. This image became very popular in many 
accounts of Bucharest’s history published in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
In fact, only now can we fully understand why the Museum openly endorsed the 
campaign for architectural renovation of the facades in the Lipscani area. Purified of the 
“foreign elements of 19th century French influence,” and redecorated according to what 
Joja deemed to be an authentic “Romanian urban architectural style,” those houses could 
“travel” back in time, like the artifacts found between the walls of the Old Court. Within 
the “historical reservation” of the Old Court envisioned by Joja and the archeologists of 
the City Museum, both the (redecorated) houses and the (misdated) artifacts would have 
shared a materiality remodeled to fit the “right” historical and therefore aesthetic model 
of the late Middle ages. 
The walls of the princely palace, unearthed from the ground, then played a pivotal 
role in propelling the Museum to advance those claims, by putting forth the Old Court 
site as the historical urban core of a socialist Bucharest, as well as a site that represented 
the quintessence of Bucharest’s past, and by extrapolation, of the country as a whole. In 





to Romania, an approach that had already emerged by the end of the 19th century, only to 
be systematically reinforced through the interwar cultural and educational policies.418  
 
Figure 15 The restored Old Court, 1980. Image reproduced in Ágnes Ságvári, ed. The capitals of 
Europe. A guide to the sources for the history of their architecture and construction. [Les 
capitales de L'Europe. Guide des sources de l'architecture et de l'urbanisme]. München New 
York London Paris: K G Saur, UNESCO, 1980. 
 
The new regime relied on the historical pervasiveness of this centralist vision when they 
put to the fore a plan for the country’s socialist reconstruction that would start with the 
reformatting of Bucharest’s urban landscape according to the Soviet model of urban 
planning. Since according to the political leaders of the time, “Bucharest [was] the heart 
of the country,”419 the Museum shrewdly exploited this centralist model in order to 
promote the Old Court as “the hearth of the city”—an image pervading all of the research 
reports and historical studies about the Old Court that have been published by the 
Museum.420  
                                                        
418 Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building & Ethnic 
Struggle, 1918-1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). 
419 “Proces verbal al ședinţei prezidiului Consiliului de Miniștri și Biroului Politic al Comitetului Central 
PMR din 25 Noiembrie 1953.” ANR, Fond Stenograme Consiliul de Miniștri, 9/1953, 235. 
420 See, for instance, Panait, "Studiu introductiv [Introduction]," in Panait I. Panait and Aristide Ștefănescu, 






Within this narrative of the city’s history, the ruins of the princely palace signified 
Bucharest’s political centrality in the late Middle Ages, a time deemed the “moment of 
maximum development of the [cultural and political] establishments,” marking “a new 
stage in the history of our [Romanian] culture and its place within the southeastern 
European context.”421 Only within this context could we come to understand the 
comparison drawn in the 1962 anonymous memorandum between the Old Court and the 
two most important archeological sites on Romania’s territory—the first century BC 
Dacian fortresses within the Orăştie Mountains, and the Histria colony on the Black Sea 
Coast, dated 630 BC. From an archeological site of secondary value and through a 
cunning strategy of employing the discourse of the Nation together with some 
manipulation of the archeological data, the Museum could then reposition the Old Court 
as the historical core of the city. Its recently unearthed walls came to be restored and 
displayed as invaluable material forms encasing the history of the city as a whole. 
Moreover, as the memorandum stated, the Old Court site could have potentially been 
even more important than those other archeological sites. That is, given their remoteness, 
no museum would have ever been opened in those areas that could teach the “true history 
of the nation to the working people.”422 The Old Court, via its centrality and thereby 
accessibility, represented the ideal location for such “a museum of national 
importance.”423  
                                                                                                                                                                     
(București1973), and Dumitru Almaș and Panait I. Panait, Curtea Veche din București (București: Editura 
pentru turism, 1974). 
421 Theodorescu, Bizanţ, Balcani, Occident, la începuturile culturii medievale românești, 11. 







Figure 16 Visitors at the Old Court Museum. Photo: V.Stamate, 1975. Postcard 110207. 
 
If the site had not appeared as such from the beginning, then during the 1950s and 
1960s some of the specialists of the Museum invested serious energy, imagination, and 
political lobbying/political clout/political resources into making the Old Court appear 
increasingly important and “unique” historically. By allegedly setting walls and artifacts 
within the same historical time—the feudal era of Bucharest—while erasing other (also 
feudal) walls as non-representative (see, for instance, the Batiştei episode), the specialists 
of the Museum had simultaneously accomplished two key tasks, each built upon the 
other. The first was the creation of a smooth uninterrupted historical framework for 
“their” Old Court portrayed as the feudal core of the socialist city. This description 
perfectly fit the socialist state’s frenzied interest in feudalism, which came to offer the 
key to inquiries on the origins of the Nation as well as of the current socialist state. The 
second operation that the Museum managed to perform was that of uniquely promoting 
itself, by succeeding in occupying—both metaphorically and literally—the now most 






it offered the socialist state the perfect “heritage” site in the unearthed walls of the 
princely court that simultaneously embedded the promise of the new and the old. Hidden 
underground, the walls had never been owned (or deemed) as “heritage” by former 
political regimes, so they were pristine, as it were, from a symbolical point of view. At 
the same time, they stood as a sign of a feudal political history of the city, thereby fitting 






Creating European Heritage at the Margins of Europe: Cultural Recognition as 
Economic Decentralization in Romania (1999-2007) 
 
 The turn of the millennium has been marked by a massive reappraisal of history in 
many parts of the world, but especially in Southeastern Europe, where the transformation 
produced by the region’s full incorporation into global markets was accompanied by new 
kinds of dislocation as well as by efforts from various groups to redefine meaningful 
community. Scholars have sought to understand how the transformations of economic 
and political systems in the former socialist bloc have helped create new cultural 
categories and forms of community.424 Such studies have shown that the cultural 
categories and social logics of postsocialism are in fact embedded in previous economies 
and forms of sociality, representing “reconfigurations and recombinations” of them.425 As 
a new space opening up to the global economy and promoting the free movement of 
capital and people, the postsocialist bloc has witnessed deep changes in narratives of 
belonging. One such change has involved the reconfiguration of space: land and houses 
restitution not only produced different geographies, but also transformed people’s senses 
                                                        
424 Among the most representative historical-anthropological analyses of the postsocialist context, we can 
find: Daphne Berdahl, Where the World Ended: Re-Unification and Identity in the German Borderland 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Michael Burawoy and Katherine Verdery, eds., Uncertain 
Transition: Ethnographies of Change in the Postsocialist World (Lantham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishing, 1999); Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, The Politics of Gender after Socialism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000); Chris Hann, ed., Postsocialism : Ideals, Ideologies, and Practices in 
Eurasia (London: Routledge, 2001); Katherine Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare: Property and Value in 
Postsocialist Transylvania (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
425 David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East 






of self and place.426 A discussion of the mechanisms, negotiations and political 
maneuvering underlying the processes of devaluation and re-evaluation that shaped not 
only Romania’s economy, but the entire field of social relations in the 1990s, is pivotal 
for an analysis of the processes of heritage (re)making that emerged at that time.  
 Drawing upon ethnographical and historical research, the second part of this 
dissertation will discuss in depth the specific processes of heritage making occurring in 
two locations in Transylvania—Sibiu, a city established in the 12th century by Saxon 
colonists, who built up its historical urban core, and Bonţida, a multiethnic village in 
central Transylvania, a region with the largest number of ethnic Hungarians in Romania. 
Starting in 2000, the re-making of the historical center of Sibiu, a lieux-de-mémoire of 
Transylvania’s Saxons, has been financed mostly with private and governmental funding 
from Germany.427 Only in 2005 did the Romanian government decide to fund part of the 
renovation. Likewise, one of Transylvania’s most famous sites, the Bánffy castle in 
Bonţida (once known as the “Versailles of Transylvania”) has received funding mostly 
from Hungary, the UK, and the USA—with fewer forms of financial support resources 
coming from within Romania. By analyzing the multilayered negotiations underlying the 
processes of heritage making in these two case studies, I show that the idiom of cultural 
                                                        
426 For a complex discussion of the ample transformations of social relations and senses of identity that 
accompanied the process of land restitution in postsocialist Romania, see Katherine Verdery, The 
Vanishing Hectare. For an analysis of how kinship networks were revived through the restitution claims set 
on Bucharest’s old houses during the 1990s, see Liviu Chelcea, "Ancestors, Domestic Groups, and the 
Socialist State: Housing Nationalization and Restitution in Romania," Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 45, no. 3 (2003): 714–40. Chelcea shows how centrally situated (several decades) “old” houses 
represented more than pure economic capital. He argues that some of these houses also functioned as 
mediators of other kinds of social relations, such as the revival of kinship ties among the inheritors. 
However, even the fate of these houses as potential kin-makers was sealed when the inheritors decided to 
sell them on the market. 
427 The Saxons came to Transylvania during the 12th and 13th centuries, whereas the other German group, 
the Swabians, arrived much later in the 18th century, at the invitation of the Archiduchess of Austria, Maria 





heritage has played a central part in a more complex mechanism of reconfiguring culture, 
politics, and meanings of “community” in the postsocialist region. 
During the early 1990s, Romania’s economy seemed to have imploded, being on 
the verge of collapse while still heavily centralized and closely supervised by the old 
networks of the reformed communists who managed to retain political power after the 
Romanian revolution in December 1989. Between 1990 and 1996, Romania was 
characterized by a highly uncertain economic and legal environment, where a series of 
banks and mutual funds kept announcing their bankruptcy as a means to acquire 
immediate capital, later invested in million dollar deals, while leaving thousands of 
people with no means of subsistence. The political regime repeatedly made use of 
violence in order to end street protests against the former communists’ taking power.428 It 
was also the reformed communists, who, under the slogan “we don’t sell our country!” 
played a major role in sealing off the country from potential foreign investors while 
shrewdly maneuvering a systematic and speedy destruction  — or even “disappearance” 
— of the valuables of the former socialist centralized economy.429 Many quietly observed 
that the destruction of those valuables was a necessary step for their eventual re-
acquisition by those who previously administered them, ranging from managers of 
regional factories to central figures in the ministries managing large industrial plants. 
People who had already been involved in external commercial relations with western 
countries before 1989 also benefited from these swift political negotiations, since they 
                                                        
428  Such were the events of June 1990, when, at the government’s request, miners came to Bucharest to 
violently put a stop to the protests organized by the opposition, events leading to more than two hundred 
dead and 5,000 injured. The June events made western countries consider Romania “a failed democracy,” 
and triggered the first major wave of emigration after 1989, during which more than 100,000 people left 
Romania to solicit political asylum abroad. 
429 A form of “disappearance” is amply discussed in Katherine Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare, whose title 
nicely captures the complex maneuvering through which some plots of land that initially appeared on the 






were among the few who knew “how to do business” in a crowd still learning the 
market’s basic rules of supply and demand.  
In her analysis of the land restitution occurring in Romania in the late 1990s, 
Verdery points out that this “unmaking of the socialist property regime” was informed by 
simultaneous strategies of “devaluation and re-evaluation” of the goods and economic 
and social relations that had formed the centralized socialist systems.430 As she put it,  
[t]he central problems for many actors were to discover what was valuable now and 
how one could get it, what practices were relevant to the valuations newly 
emerging, and how one could escape from things whose value was now plunging or 
make such things into assets—what or whom did one have to know and what did 
one need to have, so as to find value in someone else’s liability. 
 
Romania of the early 1990s represented an extreme example of these sweeping 
economic transformations. The country’s unstable political context was very much fed by 
the neocommunist government’s strong reactions to the opposition, on one hand, and, on 
the other, by their direct interest in projecting an image of a fledgling democracy for the 
western countries and international organizations so that the latter would grant them 
financial aid. The socialist-era elites could maintain their political and economic power 
through the thick networks of obligations and reciprocity forged during the socialist 
years. But they also strengthened their political alliances through their in-depth 
knowledge, also acquired and refined in the previous economy, of the assets they had 
administered as part of the centralized system. Due to this thorough knowledge, they 
knew better than anyone how to treat these goods (state enterprises, state farms, industrial 
plants, buildings, estates or land) as jigsaw puzzles that could be arranged and rearranged 
according to the economic demands of the current context. In other words, I argue, 
drawing upon Latour’s concept of “assembly of things,” that these groups or individuals 
                                                        





became the masters of rearranging the relations between people and things by 
manipulating the ways in which things were ordered in relation to one another.   
The former socialist elites, managers, and local officials knew better than others 
how to forge new economic networks by relying on the social networks already formed in 
the previous period, through whose nodes they consolidated their political power and 
thereby continued to preserve for themselves privileged political and economic access to 
resources. As Verdery and others have amply shown, these managers and local officials 
had acquired, by virtue of their previous administrative rights, the knowledge of how to 
separate assets from liabilities, or how to transform assets into liabilities so the 
transaction would always be to their benefit.431 
At least, this is what they had been doing extensively during the first cycle of 
privatization, which took place in the early 1990s in Romania. Starting in 1996, when a 
newly elected liberal government “opened up” the country to foreign investors, by 
offering them more advantageous conditions to develop businesses in Romania, the local 
former-communist managers who had turned into entrepreneurs had to compete with 
more powerful economic external actors, such as international investors or corporations. 
However, the former networks of reciprocity and obligations that these managers 
managed to strengthen during the early 1990s proved to be extremely resilient, and the 
corruption-ridden economic deals made it very difficult for external investors to pursue 
business opportunities in the country. Therefore, for the most of the 1990s and even early 
2000s, the restructuring of Romania’s economy was rather slow. This was also the case 
                                                        
431 In addition to Katherine Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare, see, for instance, David Stark,“Recombinant 
Property in East European Capitalism,” in Gernot, Grabher and David Stark, eds., Restructuring Networks 
in Post-Socialism: Legacies, Linkages, and Localities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 35-69, and 
Elizabeth Dunn, Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business, and the Remaking of Labor (Ithaca: Cornell 






with the processes of restitution of the movable and immovable valuables (land, 
buildings, forests or estates) that had been taken away by the socialist state to form a 
centralized economy.432 
An important segment of restitution claims was formed of the demands set forth 
by the ethnic groups in Romania, especially by those who had possessed an immense 
wealth in various forms of private or collective ownership (for instance, land and estates 
owned by the Lutheran church, to which most of the Saxons of Transylvania 
confessionally belong, or many of the castles and mansions in Transylvania, formerly 
owned by Hungarian families of noble descent). The state response to those claims was 
rather slow. As late as 2006, external institutions, such as the Lutheran Church in 
Germany and in the USA, converged their own efforts and diplomatic lobby with the 
Lutheran Church in Romania in order to have the Romanian central officials respond to 
their claims to receive back the land, estates, and buildings that had been confiscated in 
1948 by the socialist regime from the Lutheran church. These claims were grounded in 
arguments that these goods represented a part of the Saxon community’s heritage. The 
preservation of the Saxon heritage stood at the core of a special project sponsored 
immediately after 1992 by the reunified Germany, which involved an exhaustive data 
collection about the vernacular Saxon architecture in Transylvania. The German project 
devoted special attention to situations where most of these buildings (houses and 
churches) had been deserted by their Saxon owners who had emigrated to Germany. In 
Chapter 5, I address these claims for restitution and the forms in which they had been 
formulated by the Saxons currently residing in Transylvania. 
                                                        





Many of the castles and mansions in Transylvania, which before 1945 had 
belonged to by Hungarian lesser nobility, have similarly been surrounded by a series of 
problems concerning their restitution.  Despite some attempts at renovation or 
rehabilitation pursued by state conservation specialists during the 1960s, by the beginning 
of the 1990s many of these sites were in a deplorable state. Already alerted to this 
situation, the Hungarian government offered to provide, via its Ministry of National 
Heritage, generous support for the reconstruction or rehabilitation of the churches, 
castles, and vernacular architecture that stand as symbols of the Hungarian legacy in 
Transylvania.433 However, fewer of the rightful heirs of these buildings’ former owners, 
most of whom who were born and raised abroad, were willing to take up the difficult 
process of fighting for their ownership rights with the Romanian state and to spend the 
necessary time and money in court trials that could last for several years. Some of them 
found this courage only when they were encouraged and actively supported by private 
foundations or NGOs interested in saving the castles by assigning them heritage value 
and developing projects of built heritage conservation at the sites. One such case will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
This second section of the dissertation moves toward a situated analysis of how 
heritage projects in the two sites became locations for asserting political leverage in 
postsocialist Romania using varying views of history as a political currency. Part II has 
two primary aims: first, it draws directly from the insights and arguments outlined by 
scholars of postsocialism, who have pointed out the selective continuities in political 
                                                        
433 The territory known as Transylvania had previously been either part of the Kingdom of Hungary or a 
semi-autonomous Principality with largely a Hungarian nobility, until the settlement after the first World 
War incorporated it into Romania. Some Hungarian never accepted this, adding impetus to the idea of 






knowledge and alliances between ‘socialist’ and ‘post-socialist’ periods; and second, it 
assesses how various political actors on the ground acknowledge, erase, or subvert the 
centralized socialist system of expertise and institutional recognition surrounding 
heritage-making discussed in the dissertation’s first half. 
My work contributes to the scholarship on postsocialism, which I have already 
discussed at the beginning — specifically to preexisting work on land and house 
restitution in Romania. I expand on these insights by looking at how various ethnic 
“minority” groups have used the notion of heritage-as-restitution – combined with heavy 
investments of capital from outside Romania’s borders – to leverage political currency in 
the “new Europe” and simultaneously stake a claim in Romania’s cultural and social 
landscape. 
I argue that the two cases offer different perspectives on the strategies of 
devaluation and re-evaluation of the former assets of the socialist wealth, in which these 
castles and buildings had been included. More specifically, I show how the negotiations 
surrounding the ownership status of these estates (such as the houses in Sibiu’s historical 
center or the Bánffy castle) are grounded in distinct understandings of history and of the 
specific historical framework that each group deems to be more valuable than others. I 
therefore approach these two cases of heritage making (or re-making, depending on what 
group we ask) as simultaneously representing transformations of regimes of property and 
the political and economic forms of access to ‘assets’ contained therein. My discussion of 
the cases draws closely upon Verdery’s advice. She writes: 
[…]Empirical analysis must show what the central values are and through which 
relations and devices their appropriation takes place. Also to be discovered are the 
characteristic idioms for making claims. […] Some of these claims find greater 





claims are adjudicated, such as by using mediators, court trials, uncountered 
force, or divine sanction.434 
 
 Following this analytical framework, I find some important crossroads in the 
ways claims for restitution of immovable goods, especially those advanced by minority 
groups, meet claims for constituting cultural heritage as a form of legitimating cultural 
difference, and therefore cultural diversity, in the European Union. More specifically, in 
the fifth chapter, I discuss in detail how the political representatives of the Transylvanian 
Saxons, helped by external actors, set out claims for economic autonomy and 
decentralization by pushing an agenda of heritage as recognition. This idiom of cultural 
recognition matches a new turn in the EU cultural policy, in which the search for a 
common European identity is rooted in cultural diversity. At the same time, these 
demands for cultural and economic decentralization are fiercely fought by some of the 
local Romanian officials. They used to have full administrative rights over the state-
owned houses, estates and castles that are now being reclaimed as heritage sites, and 
therefore part of the larger European heritage domain. Some of them, by shrewd 
maneuvering and by mobilizing local and regional networks of reciprocity and 
obligations, managed to exploit these sites to their own benefit, during and even after the 
communist period. The restitution claims advanced by other, mostly external, actors have 
spoiled the hopes of these local officials, many of whom held positions in the local 
political apparatus in the socialist times, as well. I show how throughout the 1990s, these 
local officials holding only administrative rights have engaged in a systematic process of 
devaluing these sites by leaving them to decay or even gradually destroying them, in the 
hope of eventually acquiring them for cheap, or, even better, for nothing. 
                                                        






In sum, the following two chapters show how, in contrast to the cases in Part I, 
where “heritage” was built in support of political legitimation and a quest for autonomy 
from the Soviet Union, here the idiom of cultural heritage becomes a means for laying 
claim to political, economic, and social forms of restitution available in a contemporary 
“Europeanizing” Romania. I discuss how different actors attempt to negotiate ownership 
rights over the current two ‘historical sites’ in Transylvania by first invoking an 
ownership of diverging historical frameworks during which each of these groups had 
access to these sites.  In other words, the heritage making in contemporary Romania 
reveals processes of devaluation and re-evaluation as a dynamic conflict among 
hierarchies of historical narratives, where distinct groups engage in producing qualitative 
differences between such narratives in order to justify economic and cultural difference in 






HISTORICAL PRESERVATION, ETHNIC BELONGING, AND SYMBOLIC 
GEOGRAPHIES IN SIBIU/HERMANNSTADT 
 
I don’t understand why everyone wants to study the Saxons, now that they are all gone! 





 It all started, the rumor goes, when the deputy Minister of Culture of Luxembourg 
visited Sibiu for the first time in 1998 and caught the conversation of two elders on the 
main street. They were speaking a dialect that was so close to the one spoken in 
Luxembourg that he immediately wanted to know what it was and why was it so similar, 
and to learn more about the history of Transylvanian Saxons.435 Another account for 
“how everything began” is that the same Minister of Culture came to Sibiu and met his 
Romanian homologue, then actor Ion Caramitru, who had already been particularly 
interested in issues of heritage preservation. They played the piano together, had a 
pleasant conversation, and decided to organize a project.436 
 Like all rumors, they partially match the “official” story: that the partnership 
between the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Sibiu had emerged as a result of the 
international symposium “Sibiu—European Confluences,” held in Sibiu in May 1998. At 
the suggestion of the Council of Europe, Romanian Minister of Culture Caramitru invited 
                                                        
435 I got this story from a historian from Luxembourg, whom I met at a conference in March 2006. 
436 Discussion with an official from Luxembourg who coordinated the common projects developed between 
associations in the Duchy of Luxembourg and Sibiu for the program “2007 European cultural capitals: The 





high officials from Germany and Luxembourg to discuss strategies of “salvaging the 
historical center of Sibiu.”437 The symposium participants convened on several projects. 
The representatives of the German state decided to sponsor a GTZ office in Sibiu, where 
a team of German architects would draft and supervise the rehabilitation of the Old 
Town.438 (GTZ stands for Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeiten, an institution 
sponsored by the German Ministry of External Affairs that focuses on projects of 
development in “ non-Western” areas of the world.) The Luxembourg officials decided to 
sponsor the development of a project between Sibiu and Luxembourg within the larger 
initiative of “European Cultural Itineraries,” and the restoration of one of the old 
merchant houses in Sibiu’s Old Town, which was considered emblematic for Sibiu’s 
history.439 
Be they official reports or merely rumors, all those accounts carry the same thing 
at their kernel: the story of an encounter, echoing a long series of others, going back into 
the past. All of them, occurring among various ethnic, social, and political groups, have 
left their traces on the city itself, transforming it into a unique urban palimpsest still 
waiting to be deciphered. This is what the symposium stood for: an invitation to 
remember shared histories by identifying their mark on Sibiu’s urban fabric; a call to 
current political actors in western Europe to rediscover the historical ties to this city (and 
by extension, to Transylvania as a whole), ties that had been seemingly severed during 
socialist times. It was clearly an official invitation of the newly reformed Romanian state, 
                                                        
437 Mayor Johannis mentioned that the symposium theme was “Salvage Sibiu’s center.” Interview with 
Klaus Werner Johannis by Răzvan Brăileanu, “Dezvoltare durabilă la Sibiu,” “22” Magazine, July 13, 
2007. 
438 Hermann Fabini, „Das Schaser-Luxemburg-Haus am Kleinen Ring: Bericht über ein 
Restaurierungsprojekt in Hermannstadt,“ Allgemeine Deutsche Zeitung für Rümanien (ADZ), August 11, 
2004, 3.  
439 Fabini, “Das Schaser-Luxemburg-Haus am Kleinen Ring.“ I discuss the story of this house at length in 





under a liberal reformist government, for some of the countries within the EU zone not 
only to remember but also to draw upon those past ties in order to recreate political 
alliances in the present. This invitation was taken up and developed by the local elites of 
Sibiu—especially after the German Forum, the party of the Democratic Forum of 
Romania’s Germans (the Forum, henceforth), had won the local elections for two 
consecutive terms (2000-2004 and 2004-2008) and the Forum representative, the Saxon 
Klaus Johannis, was elected the mayor of Sibiu.440  
The mayor and his team treated the renovation of the historical town as a key 
project of their mandate. As the mayor put it, “the historical downtown is an asset of 
universal value, therefore we must preserve it.” The mayor and other Forum 
representatives engaged in intensive lobbying for Sibiu by establishing connections with 
external governmental and private organizations, especially with those in Germany and 
Luxembourg. Funding started coming in from various sources (the German government 
through its Development Bank [KFW], the European commission, World Bank, etc.). 
With this funding and under the supervision of the GTZ office, opened soon after in 
Sibiu, the project of renovation started. Also, German specialists and architects 
collaborated with Sibiu’s professionals to apply for UNESCO patrimonial protection for 
Sibiu’s historical downtown. (The application was not successful). Like Germany, 
Luxembourg lobbied for Sibiu in Europe as well as funded various projects in Sibiu, 
including the renovation of the Baroque merchant house in one of Sibiu’s old squares, 
                                                        
440 As of 2010, Klaus Johannis is still the mayor of Sibiu, having won his third mandate in 2008. As 
recently as December 2009, his political star flew even higher in Romanian politics, as he was invited to 
become the new prime minister, should the alliance formed between the Social Democrat Party and the 
Liberal Party have won the presidential elections. It did not, and Johannis remained the mayor of Sibiu, 
“the place where he belonged,” as he declared in a press conference following the December 2009 
elections. Interview with Klaus Werner Johannis by Răzvan Brăileanu, “Dezvoltare durabilă la Sibiu,” 





currently known as Luxembourg House; moreover, invoking a common historical past as 
well as a shared linguistic present with the Saxon community of Transylvania, 
Luxembourg invited Sibiu to apply together to the Council of Ministers of Culture of the 
European Union in 2004 for the title of European cultural capital in 2007, which they 
won. 
The rehabilitation of Sibiu’s “old city” was approached and promoted as one of 
the major means of legitimizing Sibiu as a European cultural capital. The historical 
downtown of Sibiu represents an architectural symbol of the Saxons, being one of the 
first cities to be built by this ethnic group that came to Transylvania in the 12th century. 
The Saxons had played a major role in the economic and cultural development of the 
region of Transylvania. If at the beginning of the 20th century the Saxons represented 
almost 60% of Sibiu’s population, most of them had left for West Germany between the 
late 1960s and the early 1990s, together with other Romanian Germans. Now, the Saxons 
in Sibiu make up only 1.6% of the inhabitants. However, their presence on the political, 
cultural, and symbolic map of the city is far greater, as various institutions opened in 
Sibiu, ranging from tourist offices to the headquarters of the Forum, have systematically 
tried to highlight the intimate relation between the Saxon community and the city. 
Due to his immediate and concrete results, Mayor Johannis and the Forum 
became, in Romania but especially abroad (i.e., Germany and Luxemburg), an epitome of 
local initiative and managerial spirit, which proved to be successful with no help from the 
“state,” here translated as Romania’s central government. Moreover, the mayor was 
critical about the passivity of the Romanian government at that time (before the 2004 





promises.441 Indeed, even after Sibiu received the title of European capital of culture for 
2007, the funding coming to Sibiu from the Romanian government was scarce. Between 
2000 and early 2005, most of the funding came from abroad, which often made the 
headlines of the local media: “German money for Sibiu!” This deepened the already 
weak image of “the state,” essentialized as the 2000-2004 central government in 
Bucharest, which appeared to be physically as well as politically distant from Sibiu and 
autonomous plans of regional development, in general. 
Only in 2005 did the project receive much more visibility at the national level. 
Within months, the newly elected central government came to grasp the political 
significance of “Sibiu 2007” for Romania’s image on the European political scene, 
especially at a time when the state needed the support of as many international actors as 
possible to lobby for Romania’s acceptance into the European Union in 2007. Sibiu’s 
reconstruction suddenly became one of the priorities of the Romanian government, and in 
2006 all the funds for the renovation of historical monuments at the national level were to 
be exclusively channeled to Sibiu. If, under the previous government, discussions about 
the rehabilitation of the historical downtown of Sibiu had been relegated only to the 
relatively marginal Institute for Historical Monuments, beginning in 2005 the topic came 
to represent a key investment for national politicians’ public image, as their involvement 
in the project “Sibiu 2007” stood as a proof of their European civic attitude and openness 
                                                        
441 Later (June 2007), the mayor revealed that the Romanian Minister of Culture “had forgotten” to forward 
to the City Hall of Sibiu the official invitation sent by the Minister of Culture of the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg to the Romanian central authorities in Fall 2003. The government of Luxembourg had invited 
Sibiu to co-apply, together with the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, for the title of European capital of 
culture in 2007. Mayor Johannis mentioned that only in January 2004 did his team find out directly from 
the Luxembourg officials about this invitation, which they immediately accepted. The candidacy proposal 
was prepared in two months, and in May 2004, Luxembourg and Sibiu were being offered the title for 
2007. Interview with Klaus Werner Johannis by Răzvan Brăileanu, “Dezvoltare durabilă la Sibiu,” “22” 





to multicultural values. The Minister of Culture announced: “Sibiu represents Romania. 
Through culture we will enter Europe!” She became very involved in the project, and 
remained so even after her resignation several months after her appointment.442 The new 
minister quickly stepped in, by declaring that he would invite the Romanian government 
to hold one of its meetings in Sibiu, with the members of the European Commission at 
Bucharest and the mayor of the city of Luxembourg as guests of honor.443  He also 
mentioned that he would persuade Romania’s prime minister and president to celebrate 
New Year’s Eve in Sibiu and Romania’s first day as an EU-member state. 
Notwithstanding their emphatic tone, these declarations pointed out a shift of register in 
the attitude of the central authorities toward Sibiu. Their proposal to politically mark the 
urban space of the city by having a government meeting in Sibiu represented a form of 
symbolical recognition of the sudden centrality of the city on Romania’s political map. 
(The proposed governmental meeting, however, never took place.) By approaching Sibiu 
as no longer a self-contained, middle-range city in Transylvania but rather a meeting 
point for “European confluences,” the Romanian central officials aimed to spur a 
snowball-like process of political and symbolic resignification of the site, one that would 
trigger further investment in the region and in the country as a whole.  
In order for potential foreign investors to “put their faith in Sibiu” and start 
business in the region, they could not be lured in only with vague promises of economic 
                                                        
442 In August 2007, Mona Muscă resigned from her ministerial position after the press had publicized 
documents proving her former collaboration with the Secret Police before 1989. She maintained, however, 
her position in the Romanian Parliament and continued to actively support “Sibiu 2007,” being appointed 
the president of the International Support Committee for Sibiu. “Mona Musca lasă locul lui Iorgulescu,” 
Rondul de Sibiu, Supliment “Sibiu 2007- Capitala Culturală Europeană,” Teodora Gheorghiu and Elida-






stability in a country located at that time outside of the EU “safety zone.”444 Those 
investors were more likely to assume the risk of opening joint-ventures in the region only 
if they were provided with more persuasive arguments. Such arguments, I contend, would 
come from revisiting a longue durée history of ties and exchanges between Sibiu and 
other regions in Europe, which could be invoked in order to bolster the confidence of 
current EU-located entrepreneurs.  
On one side, this process entailed a renewal of those ties via transnational 
projects, which focused on the inclusion of Sibiu in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg’s 
(eventually successful) application for the title of European Capital of Culture in 2007. 
But those ties in the making would still have been far too loose had they been expected to 
emerge exclusively out of “remembered” shared histories. Such nostalgic arguments 
would just not do for the potential foreign investors, who were oriented very much to the 
present, and especially the future. To be persuaded, they needed a stronger, stable, and 
more immediate ground. The city of Sibiu became this very ground. The rehabilitation of 
the old center of Sibiu was approached as the main strategy of ordering the urban space 
by giving it a form that would signify thriving development, a vibrant urban culture, and 
cosmopolitan and hip forms of circulation of people, goods, and services—exactly what 
the EU expected from its new candidate members. 
 At the same time, a promise of contemporary development had to be set within an 
inviting and persuasive historical narrative. All those forms of potentiality needed a 
history, and this history was to be represented by the (rehabilitated) buildings of the old 
center. It was the historical city—the houses with their roofs with “eyes,” the hidden 
                                                        






courtyards behind the imposing wooden gates, the labyrinthine quality of the old center, 
with the sinuous streets and the corridors between houses, the bridges, the bastions and 
the walls—that created an urban atmosphere fascinating to tourists, potential investors, 
and ethnographers alike. It was this uniqueness of the medieval center among other cities 
in Transylvania that led the Council of Europe to seek long-term strategies for the 
preservation of Sibiu’s center as a “European cultural heritage.”445 The 1998 symposium 
was the first event out of a series of projects involving different groups of political actors 
that focused on the rehabilitation of Sibiu’s historical center as a vital priority in the 
region. The city emerging out of those projects appeared as an interesting oxymoron, 
thriving on contrasts, since the city’s potential development relied on a rebirth of the 
city’s very past. 446  
 I will examine the complex process of remaking Sibiu into a European city-site as 
an archaeology of memory: a “deciphering” of European signs from the city’s material 
ground (buildings, shapes, local institutions). As yet another attempt at deciphering, my 
analysis will ironically reveal the limits of this metaphor by discussing the multiple 
illusions, nostalgias, and expectations underlying a history of Sibiu as it was being set 
under revision. At the first glance, this process—the salvaging of Sibiu and its 
transformation into a meeting point of European confluences—was envisioned as a 
restoration of the “forgotten” Europeanness of Sibiu. In fact, as I will show, it represented 
a form of making, a process of construction very much grounded in multiple 
                                                        
445 Sighișoara was another fortified town, with a smaller population. Sighișoara’s fortified old center had 
already been included in the UNESCO World Heritage list in 1998. 
446 The preservation of “the image of the old city” was the number one priority in the project “Romania – 
Europe—a common heritage—Sibiu 2000,” launched by the Ministry of Culture and Cults of Romania, 
with “financial support of several states- Germany, Luxembourg, France, Belgium and Italy.” For a short 
presentation of the project see http://www.eukn.org/romania/themes/Urban_Policy/Urban_environment/-





contemporary agendas and political concerns, and informed by histories much more 
convoluted and tense than the beautified image of a pan-European “unity in diversity” 
promoted by the Council of Europe. 
The enterprise of making Sibiu a European cultural site has proved to be a 
challenging one, as various actors involved in the project have engaged in significant 
struggles over representations of “culture” and “Europe.” Underlying these struggles we 
find competing claims for the legitimization of various “pasts” and “presents” as 
“history.” In contrast to the Romanian central officials’ declarations, other claims, 
advanced by local or international actors, questioned political geographies set under 
spatial projections of the “nation-state” and proposed instead transnational forms of 
mapping history onto space. The latter claims put forth symbolic geographies set within 
earlier political imaginaries of a medieval or a turn-of-the century imperial Central 
Europe that challenged centralist projects of the nation-state, grounded on an assumed 
territory-based commonality. Not surprisingly, such arguments for a subtle, but gradual 
distancing from the institutional framework of the nation-state have resonated in the 
recent years with the attempts of the European Union to validate itself institutionally by 
intensively promoting an all-encompassing and primordial “European culture,” thriving 
beyond and often despite national borders. 
The project of reviving Sibiu’s Europeanness and thereby economic potential 
through the historical preservation of the city’s old center revealed many political 
fantasies on which different groups fed. This chapter will focus first on how various 
actors searched for “heritage” in Sibiu as well as the arguments they deployed to justify 





under the GTZ’s enthusiastic supervision, houses of Sibiu’s old center have been 
simultaneously transformed into representations of Saxon heritage for international 
tourists and into means of civic education for their residents, whereas some of the Saxons 
currently living in Sibiu have not wholeheartedly shared this enthusiasm. The second part 
of this chapter will zoom out from the project of rehabilitation to analyze on the broader 
institutional strategies and diverging political agendas at play in this process. I will 
discuss how the changes occurring within Romania’s structures of power, triggered by 
the election of a liberal government in 1997, met other interests of political actors in the 
EU. More specifically, those interests included Luxembourg’s project of consolidating a 
national identity and its position among other European countries, Germany’s concern 
with the historical and current position of the German minorities in the Eastern bloc, as 
well as the interest of EU organizations, such as the Council of Europe, in creating new 
frameworks for producing novel forms of identifications of various states and regions 
with a shared “European culture and identity.” 
 
The Development Model and the Making of Contemporary Germany: GTZ in Sibiu 
and Abroad 
 
I began my fieldwork in Sibiu before I knew that its houses would become central 
research subjects for my dissertation. In Fall 2005, I spent my first two months in Sibiu 
wandering the streets for hours and paying attention to how the city, especially the old 
city, was inhabited. I compared my perspective with what I had seen two years before, 
during my previous visit in summer 2003. Within two years, the city had become much 





of the historical city center.  Small restaurants and jazz clubs opened in some of the old 
houses’ cellars, sandwiches were made and sold on the spot by a resident-turned-
entrepreneur through his kitchen window conveniently opening to one of the central 
squares, while Italians moved to Sibiu to become restaurant owners and sell the best 
pizza, hot chocolate and ice cream in the region. Meanwhile, the houses of the old center 
changed as well: some of their old window frames were being replaced by plastic ones, 
deemed to be more efficient in blocking noise, heat, or cold, as well as “modern,” 
standing as the most visible sign of any elevation of the residents’ social status. An even 
greater sign of such upgrades were the mansards arranged under some of the houses’ 
roofs, which some of the house owners managed to create before the city hall forbade any 
radical transformations of the rooftops and the roof windows in the old center.447 Poorer 
residents, who did not have the means to change their window frames, would still paint 
them in vivid colors and sometimes even stick to the glass colorful advertisements they 
would find in their mailboxes, generously distributed by various companies vying for 
market visibility. The windows of the houses in the old center not only displayed the 
outside world to the house residents, but also offered clues about the residents’ economic 
status and aesthetic preferences to the outside viewers.  
 To a smaller extent, if someone paid close attention, other elements of the houses 
could also offer more insight about the lives and means of the residents: entrances with 
shabby, or, on the contrary, reconstructed and even new metal gates; roofs with old and 
often missing tiles, contrasting to others, on which (too) brightly red new tiles replaced 
                                                        
447 This method of expanding the occupancy extended also to the socialist apartment buildings, whose 
residents would contract with construction companies to erect an extra floor of apartments on top of the 
buildings, which they would then rent or sell. During the year I lived in Sibiu, many a 4-level apartment 





the old ones; interior courtyards showing large hollows in the ground, with the skeleton 
of a run down car deposited in a corner, strikingly different from others, nicely paved 
with cobblestones. 
 
Figure 17 The “eyes” of the houses in the Little Square, Sibiu, April 2007. 
 
 In fall 2005, the houses of the old center of Sibiu were a wide combination of 
colors and elements: dark wooden window frames, adjacent to bright white plastic ones; 
windows with Maggi ads stuck in a corner, next to some displaying embroidered, 
expensive curtains; mailboxes of multiple sizes and colors spread on the entrance walls; 
house facades painted in bright turquoise, with a strip of fake marble added on the lower 
side, abutting on ones dully covered by grey tones. The 1,200 historical buildings were 
then the mirrors of their residents’ lives, approximately 20,000 people sharing the 90ha 
territory of Sibiu’s old town, which was for the first time mentioned in an 1191 chronicle 
as Villa Hermanni (Hermann’s town, hence the city’s German name, Hermannstadt).448  
                                                        
448 The real number of the current (temporary and permanent) inhabitants of the historical center 
represented a controversial topic while I was in Sibiu in 2005. The GTZ officially estimated the number to 
be around 14,000, but they were aware that besides these “official” residents, there were many others who 
lived there, even though they did not declare their residence. Other officials thought that the real number 
was much higher, reaching in fact 25,000 people. Already in 2003, one of the local newspapers wrote: “The 
aim of the City Hall is to downsize the number of the historical center’s inhabitants from 25,000 to 10,000 
exactly [as it was] during the Middle Ages.” “Centrul istoric va pierde 15.000 de locuitori [The historical 
center will lose 15,000 residents],” Rondul, July 7, 2003. In the absence of more specific data, I offer the 





 The necessity of focusing on the entire historical center as a historical assembly 
became evident during the first official discussions initiated in 1998 by Romanian 
officials, aiming to find strategies for the site’s preservation. The specialists admitted that 
the previous interventions had focused on specific buildings, while a project of 
rehabilitation of the entire site had never been envisioned due to the exorbitant costs as 
well as the complex management of a plan for the residents’ temporary relocation.  
In 1999, GTZ (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeiten, the German 
Agency for Technical Cooperation) began a pilot research project, during which the 
rehabilitation needs of the site had been assessed, and plans began to be drafted. The 
GTZ team concluded that “the gradual degradation of the original building material, the 
high population density, and the precarious living conditions were the most evident 
symptoms of a massive deterioration of the historical center.”449 They set as the main 
objectives of their project the improvement of the living conditions within the historical 
center, the historical preservation of the buildings and the transformation of the site into 
an economic resource for local development through the promotion of cultural tourism. 
The historical preservation of the city’s old center was approached as a strategy of 
renewal of the city’s economy. More important, the project was also promoted as a 
strategy of raising awareness and developing civic engagement among the city’s 
residents, especially those living in the buildings on the site, by encouraging them to 
understand their houses’ historical value, seek professional assistance for their potential 
redecoration plans, and understand and promote the preservation program.  
                                                        
449 Cristina Muntoiu and Michael Engel, “Sibiu Historic Centre Rehabilitation Project: An overview of 
activities during the period 09/2000 - 04/2007” (Sibiu / Hermannstadt: the Joint Romanian German Project 





One of the immediate effects of the rehabilitation program has been a relative 
gentrification of the old city center. In fact, I will discuss at length in the second section 
of this chapter, the gentrification was not only helped out by the local agendas of heritage 
promotion, but also has legitimized the very quality of a site transformed into heritage: 
the buildings had become signs of a romantic(ized) past, of the times when the “civilized 
Saxons” inhabited the city center. Automatically, the current owners should be like their 
buildings. However, a significant percent of the population currently occupying the old 
center of Sibiu is formed of old and/or relatively poor people.450 They represent the 
former tenants brought in by the socialist urban policies. Even though they managed to 
buy their apartments from the socialist state, they have been recently sued by the families 
of the former house owners. The latter had either been the Saxons who emigrated to 
Germany during the 1980s and were forced to give their nice houses to the state in order 
to obtain a passport, or had been rich “bourgeois” old families, whom the socialist state 
sent to prison or expelled to poorer regions of Romania. Therefore, the investment in the 
buildings’ renovation has been kept to a minimum due to the uncertain ownership. 
In September 2000, upon the opening of the GTZ office in Sibiu, the project was 
officially launched. It mainly entailed free consultancy offered by rehabilitation 
specialists to the owners and tenants living in the historic center, and it funded limited 
interventions on some buildings.451 The full restoration of the buildings was never an 
                                                        
450 In January 2005, the chief architects of the city, Szabolcs Guttmann, offered the following statistics on 
the social fabric of Sibiu’s historical center: “we have 1000 buildings in the center, of which 20 % are 
rehabilitated. Another 20% are individually owned, and 40% are collectively owned. The most difficult 
cases are the mixed ones, in which both private owners and the state partially own the building. These 
represent 28% of the buildings, where the houses are either occupied by people who are too poor to buy 
their residence, or their final ownership is still legally uncertain, as the former owners sued the socialist 
state and asked for the buildings’ restitution. Interview with Szabolcs Guttmann by Iulia Nagy, “Nu putem 
tăia panglica în Piața Mare în 2005,” Tribuna, January 17, 2005, page 17. 





objective, and the GTZ team proposed an alternative, step-by-step model, which would 
distribute the funds to a wider range of buildings to solve their most severe and urgent 
structural problems.452 In 2004, upon receiving more funds from the German 
Development Bank KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) through the program of 
financial cooperation between Germany and Romania, the GTZ team expanded their 
range of projects. In addition to the rehabilitation work on the houses, the other projects 
included: training sessions for specialists (architects, craftsmen, civil engineers, etc) as 
well as non-specialists, such as the residents of the historical center who would apply the 
preservation techniques in their own homes; institutional support offered to Sibiu’s City 
Hall for drafting the Rehabilitation Charter and other urban management long-term plans; 
and various public campaigns aiming to offer more information about “an integrated and 
careful rehabilitation of the historical center.”453  
 
Figure 18 The larger banner reads “Trecutul Sibiului devine Viitor” [Sibiu’s Past becomes Sibiu’s 
Future]. November, 2005. 
 
                                                        
452 Ibid, 11. 





As I will discuss in the second part of the chapter, the GTZ campaigns 
represented strategies of educating the residents on how to look at and inhabit their city in 
a novel way. These strategies conflicted, however, with other forms of habitation, and 
especially with local understandings of “place” and “history.” 
To better analyze the rationale underlying the GTZ projects in Sibiu, I will first 
situate them within their broader institutional context. GTZ is a large organization 
working under the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development of the 
German state. Established in 1975, it has initiated and supervised projects in more than 
60 countries, projects promoting “decentralization and local governance, poverty 
alleviation, the development of urban services and an environment-friendly urbanization, 
and the cooperation between the public and the private sectors.”454 Since its beginning, 
GTZ developed only five projects directly focused on the rehabilitation of urban heritage, 
a very small number within the total projects that GTZ has coordinated. The organization 
continues to support three projects of urban rehabilitation in historical cities, of which 
two had been included on the UNESCO World Heritage List (Alep in Syria, which 
started in 1993, and Shibam / Wadi Hadhramawt in Yémen, which began in 1997).455 The 
third one has been Sibiu, which was launched in 2000. Within GTZ policy as a whole, 
this particular kind of project—the rehabilitation of historical cities—appears then to be 
an exception.  
As a GTZ specialist, Ursula Eigel has pointed out that, as much as such projects 
are very well developed and sponsored in Germany, the German state is not in general 
                                                        
454 Ursula Eigel, “Le patrimoine culturel dans les projets urbains de la GTZ,” in Partenariats pour les villes 
du patrimoine mondial. La culture comme vecteur de développement urbain durable. Proceedings of the 
workshop “Héritage partagé, responsabilité commune,” held during November 11-12 in Urbino, Pesaro – 
Italie. Centre du patrimoine mondial de l’UNESCO, Paris, 2004, 75-77. 





interested in funding projects of cultural heritage preservation outside Germany. Such 
projects are considered to be too costly, requiring significant funding, while their main 
focus on the historical buildings’ preservation does not directly support the German 
state’s international development policy.456 According to Eigel, the German state views 
the investment in cultural heritage to be “a luxury, which only the rich countries could 
afford to offer themselves,” a perspective in general shared by the countries where 
German-sponsored development projects are being initiated.457 Since the protection of 
cultural heritage is not considered an area of development for GTZ, all of the GTZ 
enterprises of urban rehabilitation had emerged “within fortuitous circumstances and 
following individual initiatives.”458 In her comparative analysis of three such projects, 
(Alep, Shibam, and Bhaktapur in Népal, whose supervision GTZ transferred to the 
Nepalese state in the early 1980s), Eigel noted a series of similarities. First, all three sites 
had already been included in the UNESCO World Heritage list, and the local authorities 
in all of the three locations had as their main goal to revitalize or preserve the sites so that 
they remained on the UNESCO List. Second, starting from the historical preservation of 
the sites, they aimed to develop a broader plan of urban management of their cities. In 
Alep and Shibam, one of the project aims was the rehabilitation of private historical 
buildings. Another goal was to spur and sustain the participation of the city’s residents in 
the rehabilitation and conservation projects.459  
The notable difference between the earlier GTZ-sponsored projects of urban 










been included in the UNESCO World Heritage list. In 2000, when GTZ opened its office 
in the city to begin the rehabilitation of Sibiu’s historical center, the local team had, 
among its plans, a proposal for the inclusion of Sibiu in the World Heritage List. 
UNESCO experts visited Sibiu in 2004, but the proposal was not granted. In this respect, 
Sibiu’s case within the GTZ broader development agenda was unique. The touristic 
potential of the city was obviously persuasive enough, but it could not have matched that 
of a World Heritage site, which would attract many more tourists every year. Why did the 
German state agree to fund such an expensive project of rehabilitation of a potential 
UNESCO site? 
The answer is not to be found in the rationale of the German state’s agenda for 
international development. As everyone in Sibiu knows, the rehabilitation of the city’s 
old center, which was promoted as a strategy of local development, has been in fact a 
more complex political project of 1) memory preservation of Transylvania’s Saxons and 
2) a move from political recognition to economic redistribution for those Saxons who 
stayed in Transylvania. More specifically, the preservation of the old center’s houses, 
built and inhabited by Transylvania’s Saxons for centuries, aimed to preserve the 
memory of these people, now that most of Sibiu’s Saxons had left for Germany at 
different moments in the 20th century. The houses stood for the people now gone. As 
such, the old center of the city was to be transformed into an authentic heritage site, a 
museum of an almost extinguished people.460 
The GTZ project also signaled a policy shift in the German state’s approach to the 
ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe and Russia. After Germany’s reunification in 1992, the 
political inclusion of those of German descent from East Europe into contemporary 
                                                        





Germany was no longer an institutional option. The German state moved then from an 
inclusive model of political recognition to that of economic redistribution, by sponsoring 
projects of local development and democratization in the countries of the former socialist 
bloc which once had a significant German population. 
 
Tertium non datur? Transylvania’s Saxons in socialist Romania461 
 
Frau Henrietta Ackerman, a Saxon lady who had lived in Sibiu all her life and had 
been involved in many social activities told me at one moment that the three most 
important things for the Saxons were their language, their school, and their church.462 At 
the same time, however, she complained about children from mixed marriages who speak 
“an awful German” and about the fact that most of the children at the Brukenthal high 
school were in fact Romanians, with fewer and fewer Saxon teachers to speak a “clean” 
German and even fewer younger people coming to the church on a regular basis. 
Underlying many conversations with most of the middle aged and older Saxons that I met 
in Sibiu, such complaints index fears of losing a sense of belonging to a community 
defined along linguistic and religious boundaries. At the same time, such comments also 
point to a particular understanding of the Saxon ethnic community, one rooted in an 18th 
                                                        
461 By choosing this subtitle—tertium non datur (there is no third option)—I would like to point not only to 
the debates that emerged after the Second World War, but also to the ways in which they became part of 
the very process of defining a Saxon ethnic belonging after the war. I employ this title from the chapter 
“Bleiben oder Gehen—tertium non datur? Eine empirische Studie zum Auswanderungskonflikt unter den 
Siebenbürger Sachsen nach dem 2. Weltkrieg” in Georg Weber, Armin Nassehi, Renate Weber-Schlenther, 
Oliver Sill, Georg Kneer, Gerd Nollman, and Irmhild Saake, Emigration Der Siebenbürger Sachsen: 
Studien zu Ost-West-Wanderungen im 20.Jahrhundert, (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2003).  
462 She was the wife of an important member of the Forum, professor at the Theological Lutheran seminary, 
but also someone who would be more associated with the “traditional” Saxon ladies, did not go to Teusch 
Haus, did not really mingle with the “local” intellectuals, would be attending the church and 





century Herderian political imaginary promoting linguistic and religious purity as key 
markers of ethnic difference.463  
Those fears were far from new. For Transylvanian Saxons, they took different 
forms throughout the 20th century, especially after 1918, when the new Romanian state, 
whose territory significantly increased with the annexation of Bukovina, Transylvania, 
and Bessarabia, pursued an intense program of cultural homogenization in order to build 
up a strong ‘national body’ of Greater Romania. As historian Irina Livezeanu has 
demonstrated, the identification of the regional elites with the new Romanian state did 
not happen smoothly; on the contrary, it involved profound social and cultural crises, and 
these directly affected the ways in which the concept of “Greater Romania” was cross-
regionally constituted, and regionally negotiated and legitimized. Livezeanu points out 
that a major problem that the post-1918 Romanian state had to confront was the lack of a 
significant Romanian urban middle-class in the newly annexed territories. The state saw 
as a mandatory condition of nation-building the formation of a Romanian urban middle 
class. This middle class would directly contribute to economic development as well as 
follow and implement the concept of the nation that the state promoted.  
However, the Romanians who had succeeded to enter the circle of professional 
urbanites were very few in comparison to the non-Romanian groups.464 Before 1918, in 
the annexed provinces, Romanians had largely constituted the lower-class rural 
population. Therefore, Livezeanu argues, the state engaged in a systematic program of 
Romanization through education and cultural policies in an attempt to replace the urban 
                                                        
463 I am aware that Sibiu’s Saxon “community” does not represent a homogeneous group. However, due to 
its size—very small, forming 1.6 % of the population of Sibiu—as well as the disproportionately high 
percentage of rapidly ageing members, I will treat it as a unitary social unit. 
464 Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic 





non-Romanian elites with the newly formed, Romanian ones.465 The central authorities’ 
agenda of erasing regional differences was met, however, with strong criticism by the 
local elites of the newly annexed territories. Of course, the non-Romanian elites had 
obvious reasons to protest such an intense agenda of Romanization. Moreover, the local 
professionals of Romanian origins, as few as they were, did not like the state’s pervasive 
nationalist agenda. Therefore, they rejected the model of nation that the state proposed 
and asked to be given political legitimacy to make the unification and Romanization 
happen in the ways they envisioned it.466  
In the case of the Transylvanian Saxons, the increasing centralization orchestrated 
by the Bucharest-based politicians determined a parallel increase in the centralization of 
decision-making processes within the Saxons’ political and social organizations (such as 
the local Nachbarschaften, local corporative forms of reciprocal help and cooperation, 
and the political structures, such as the Saxon People's Party [Sächsische Volkspartei]).467 
Confronted with a relative political and economic marginalization in a new state that 
pushed for an ethnicity-based form of modernization, which aimed to create a Romanian 
                                                        
465 Livezeanu shows that the first step was to educate the Romanian rural class and invite them to become 
an ally of the state, by moving to town, joining the bureaucracy and thus playing a more active and visible 
role in building the nation. Therefore, the state pursued an intense program of monitoring and centralizing 
the country’s educational infrastructure: Romanian became the only language of the education system, 
while the languages of the minority groups were banned; a national curriculum was implemented; the 
number of non-Romanians who would graduate high-school was strictly monitored, etc. The universities 
were to become major sites for the creation of a national elite. Thus, with the tacit approval of the state, the 
universities became highly politicized sites. An immediate consequence was the development of 
nationalist, extreme-right new elites. At the same time, the state also initiated a series of reforms, such as 
the emancipation of Jews, the redistribution of the great estates to the landless peasants, and the 
establishment of universal male suffrage.  
466 Sometimes the rejection took the form of more intense political activism on the part of the minority 
groups as well as regional Romanian elites, as happened with Transylvanian Hungarians and Romanians 
who coined the concept of “Transylvanism.” By claiming that the Transylvanians, no matter their ethnic 
background (Romanians, Hungarian, German, etc.), were much more alike, by the virtue of their common 
territory, than the inhabitants from other regions, be they of the same ethnic descent, this group pointed out 
Transylvania’s particular multiculturalism in order to justify a relative political autonomy in the region. 
467 Peter Haslinger. Review of Harald Roth, Politische Strukturen und Strömungen bei den Siebenbürger 
Sachsen 1919-1933. HABSBURG, H-Net Reviews. April, 2000. 





middle-class in all of the regions of Greater Romania, the Saxon leaders reacted by 
promoting paternalistic ruling methods and asking for a high degree of social and 
political conformity in the interest of the ethnic group as a whole.468 This kind of 
conformism imposed through localized social structures, such as the Nachbarschaften, as 
well as through a rhetoric of political unity, enabled the Saxon leaders to promote a 
politically and socially homogeneous image of the Saxon group. They used this image of 
unassailable harmony among the Saxons in order to forge alliances with the Romanian 
politicians at the center as well as maintain or even develop business relations with non-
Saxon entrepreneurs.469 However, by the early 1930s, as a reaction to these forms of 
pressure from above, a rising interest in modernization and democratization understood 
as a stronger individualism among the new generation allowed the National Socialist 
ideology to percolate into the political agenda of the Saxon group.470 Under these 
circumstances, the ideological tensions among the leaders of the Saxon group and the 
eventual capturing of the political leadership of Verband der Deutschen in 
Grossrumänien (Association of Germans in Greater Romania) by Nazi-oriented 
politicians, led to an increasingly fractured sense of ethnic belonging among 
Transylvanian Saxons during the late interwar period. 
                                                        
468 Ibid. 
469 For more details on one of the most important Saxon leaders in interwar Transylvania, Hans Otto-Roth, 
and his wide breadth of economic and political connections with the Romanian state officials, see Vasile 
Ciobanu, Contribuții la cunoașterea sașilor transilvăneni, 1918-1944 (Sibiu: Hora, 2001). 
470 In fact, the interest in the Nazi ideology among the Saxon youth preceded and provoked the shift in the 
"Volksprogramm," the common program to which the members of the Saxon group were expected to 
adhere. What in 1932 had already started as a cooperative movement promoting the rhetoric of Selbsthilfe 
(self-aid) as a strategy for modernization, by mid 1933 developed into an organization openly supporting 
the Nazis and pursuing the destabilization of the earlier structures of the Saxon community. Peter 






Whereas before 1918 the Saxons had formed one of Transylvania’s largest 
groups, during the interwar period this number began to decrease. This was a direct effect 
of the radical population movement, orchestrated by the Nazi regime aiming to rearrange 
all of the people living in Europe at that time according to the racial grid of the Third 
Reich. In 1930, the number Germans in Romania was approximately 745,000, which 
included the Saxons in Transylvania, the Schwaben (Swabians) in the Banat region, and 
the ethnic Germans in Dobruja and Bessarabia regions.471 In 1940, invoking the Heim ins 
Reich policy by which Nazi Germany aimed to consolidate as well as “purify” its body 
politic, Hitler ordered the Romanian government (with which it was allied in the war 
effort until 1944) to send the Germans of Dobruja and Bessarabia (approximately 
200,000 people) to the territory included then in the Third Reich. Before 1944, the adult 
ethnic Germans in Romania were obliged to enroll in the German army, which meant that 
at the end of the war they were considered German citizens and sent back to Germany 
together with all of the POWs. By 1948 there were 348,000 ethnic Germans in Romania. 
In comparison to other countries of the Soviet bloc (such as, Czechoslovakia and Poland), 
the ethnic Germans in Romania were not relocated to Germany in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. This meant that the largest community of ethnic Germans in the 
region was to be found in Romania after the war.472 After the war, the status of the ethnic 
                                                        
471 More precise, the number was 745, 421. Hans Hartl, “Die Lage der Deutschen in Rumänien,”  in 
Sudosteuropa Mitteilungen nr. 4 1981, 21 Jahrgang, 33-48, 35. OSA Box 1100 Germans. Hartl draws upon 
the national census of December 29, 1930, published by Sabin Manuilă, București, Bd. II. This number 
included 633, 488 ethnic Germans who lived within the Carpathian region (Transylvania, Banat, and 
Maramureș), and the others, located in Bessarabia, Bukovina, Dobruja, and Wallachia (Bucharest). 
472 In September 1944, the German ethnic communities in Northern Transylvania accompanied the German 
troops in their withdrawal. However, the Red Army sent back to Romania a significant number of these 
people, who were placed in labor camps upon their return. Notwithstanding an initial intention of the 
German state to evacuate the ethnic Germans from Romania with the Romanian government’s agreement, 
this transfer was never pursued. Vladimir Tismăneanu, Dorin Dobrincu, and Cristian Vasile, eds., Comisia 





Germans worsened, as they had been accused of collaboration with the Nazi regime. Due 
to those accusations, between 1945 and 1948 they lost their political rights, such as the 
right to vote, and their land and other possessions (houses, etc) were confiscated by the 
socialist state. Under Stalin’s order, in January 1945 all of the “able-bodied” Germans 
then residing in Transylvania were deported to Siberia for forced labor, to return only by 
the end of 1940s.473  
 The political pressure put by the socialist regime on the ethnic Germans decreased 
somewhat in the mid 1960s, as some of those Germans returning from the USSR were 
given back their houses or a plot to build new ones and “invited” to join collective farms 
(although technically they were not supposed to be allowed in).474 The Romanian 
authorities allowed the reopening of German schools and the reissuing of German 
language newspapers.475 At the same time, from the increasing pressure of Transylvanian 
German groups who had already arrived in Germany during and after the war, the Federal 
Republic of Germany started increasing their official requests for the Romanian state to 
allow the reunification of families. The Association of the Transylvanian Saxons (die 
Landsmannschaft der Siebenbürger Sachsen), the foundation established in 1949, was 
instrumental in persuading the government of West Germany to begin negotiations with 
the socialist Romanian state that eventually resulted in the 1978 agreement guaranteeing 
                                                        
473 More specifically, men between 17 and 45 and women between 18 and 35. Meanwhile, a part of the 
Catholic German-speaking Swabians of the Banat were deported to the southern part of Romania.While 
10% of those deported died in the labor camps, the majority (75%) returned to Romania, while a smaller 
group went instead to Germany and Austria (20%) or remained in the USSR (7%). Ibid., 531-533. 
474 They were not supposed to be in collective farms (GACs), but some GAC presidents let them in 
anyway. I thank Katherine Verdery for this clarification. 
475 RFE report “Romania’s German Minority,” Romania SR/5, April 18, 1986, signed M.S. [Michael 






the yearly emigration of ethnic Germans.476 The Association also attempted to maintain a 
political awareness of the culture and history of Transylvania’s Germans in post-war 
Germany. It established a museum, a daily newspaper, a research institute with its own 
journal, with an accent on the Volkundlandeskunde, an interest in an approach to cultural 
studies emerging from the Volk philosophy of the German understanding of nation. The 
foundation promoted a representation of the history of the Saxons in Transylvania as a 
group completely coherent and independent—a point of view that was accurate as far as 
it referred to pre-1918 Transylvania, and a cohesive Saxon group, almost ignoring any 
forms of difference in terms of social status and residence (urban or rural). In a way, the 
rationale of the foundation was to provide the Transylvanian Saxons in post-war 
Germany a subtle form of refuge in a different temporal framework, that of the turn of the 
20th century Transylvania, in which the Saxon group was firmly rooted in unquestionable 
social and economic institutions undergirded by an unquestionable Weltanschauung.  
Almost as if the war had not happened, the foundation remained caught in an idyllic 
image of a homogeneous Saxon group, thereby replicating, to a certain extent, the 
strategies of the Saxon politicians in post-1918 Greater Romania.  This institutional 
strategy—that of reconstructing an imaginary pre-war Transylvania in post-war 
                                                        
476 For a discussion of the political role played by the Association and the conflict emerging out of the 
diverging points of view of Saxons’ emigration to Germany, see Georg Weber et al., eds., Emigration der 
Siebenbürger Sachsen: Studien zu Ost-West-Wanderungen im 20.Jahrhundert, 517. Starting from the 
question that preoccupied every Saxon in Transylvania immediately after the war—should they leave for 
Germany or stay in their home country?—the authors discuss the ways in which this question was 
approached by the two main organizations established by the Transylvanian Saxons in post-war Germany: 
the Help Committee (das Hilfkomitee) and the Association. The Committee, which had been established in 
1946, and set under the supervision of the Lutheran church and the Red Cross, focused more on the 
integration of the recent émigrés into the Lutheran church in Federal Germany. In other words, the 
Committee understood their main role to be that of a voice on the behalf of the Lutheran church in 
Romania. In contrast, the Association claimed to be representing the political voice of the Transylvanian 





Germany—had long-term consequences for the kind of relations developed between the 
Saxons who emigrated and those (very few) who decided to remain in Transylvania. 
Following the implementation of the 1978 law for the reunification of families, 
the foundation acquired even more political leverage among the Transylvanian 
immigrants in Federal Germany. Even though the term did not mention where this 
reunification should take place (in Romania or West Germany), it was assumed that the 
official language disguised a request that the relatives of those already in Germany be 
allowed to emigrate as well.477 Since the Romanian government had become increasingly 
interested in reestablishing economic relations with Western Europe, those official 
pressures led to some results. Following Romania’s agreement to resume diplomatic 
relations with West Germany in 1967, a secret agreement between the two states was 
signed in January 1978 after long negotiations, with the Romanian state grossly 
exploiting the situation by beginning to “export” its ethnic Germans in exchange for hard 
currency.478 According to a 1986 report of Radio Free Europe (RFE), starting in the mid-
1970s the ethnic minorities of Romania, including the Transylvanian Saxons and the 
Catholic Swabians of the Banat, increasingly felt the communist state’s pressure to forge 
“one single Romanian socialist nation.”479  
 In post-1947 Sibiu, the major institutions of the Saxon group had already 
undergone significant changes. These institutions, immovable representations of the 
Saxon heritage, such as banks, the Lutheran church, or exclusively Saxon schools, which 
                                                        
477 Hannelore Baier, personal communication. 
478 The agreement provided for 11,000 ethnic Germans with relatives in Germany to emigrate on the 
condition that West Germany pay about 5,000 DM per person. RFE report “Romania’s German Minority,” 
Romania SR/5, April 18, 1986, OSA. 
479 Ibid. The report also mentions that “the Romanian Communist Party has proclaimed ‘national 





played a pivotal role for Transylvania’s Saxons to maintain an ethnic belonging as well as 
a privileged social status, had been ripped apart by the socialist state. They were either 
closed down, such as the banks, drastically impoverished, such as the Lutheran church 
(whose possessions had been nationalized), or significantly altered, as an ever increasing 
number of Romanian children were entering the German-language schools. Under these 
new political circumstances, the Saxons developed alternate cultural practices as forms of 
retaining a Saxon cultural identity when national state policies began to encroach on the 
Saxon institutions. However, these new, more mobile forms of ethnicity-making and 
legitimating were also more up for grabs. As I develop later in this section, the “new” 
cultural practices of Sibiu’s Saxons began to be mirrored by non-Saxons, especially by 
the well-to-do Romanians, as a form of proving and marking a high status within the 
local social hierarchies. 480 
 Already by the early 1980s, the increasing number of ethnic Germans who were 
leaving Romania offered the government the perfect alibi to drastically curtail state 
support for German cultural life. In such conditions, key institutions of the German-
speaking ethnic group were altered or disappeared altogether. Also, with the departure of 
many Lutheran pastors, the communities formed around the local churches, especially in 
                                                        
480 More interesting is that this phenomenon occurred despite a notable change in the ethnic distribution of 
the local population, in which the number of Romanians almost tripled after 1945 (from approximately 
37,000 in 1948 to around 120,000 in 1977), while the number of Germans and Hungarians remained within 
the same range (25,000 and 5,000, respectively). Populaţia României, 1977. This major increase of the 
Romanian group indicates that Sibiu was one of the cities officially open on the national map of population 
redistribution, which meant that people from other regions could come to work in the city. In other words, 
Sibiu was not a closed city as Bucharest became by the 1980s. 
 However, a significant shift in the local social composition already became evident by the early 
1980s. A graphical depiction of this social shift was offered to me by a Romanian historian, who would 
travel yearly to Sibiu to attend the jazz festival. As he put it, by 1980 he noted a key difference on the 
streets of Sibiu: gogoașa (an O-shaped doughnut, sold in general on Bucharest’s commercial streets and in 
the eastern part of Romania) replaced langoașa (a cheese-filled and better tasting doughnut of Hungarian 
cuisine, very popular in Transylvania). What he meant was that this culinary change signaled a change in 
the locals’ food preferences, which further indexed the strong influences on the local taste brought along by 





villages with a Saxon population, were slowly dissolving.481 Many of the German-
language secondary schools in cities with a high ethnic German population were closed 
down or obliged to open classes for Romanian-speaking pupils.482 While the departments 
of German studies in the universities were being “frozen,” with no students admitted 
starting in 1985, it also became increasingly difficult for West Germany to send teachers 
to temporarily work in these schools, as the Romanian government would no longer 
allow “foreigners” to teach future Romanian citizens.483  
 As much as we must approach the RFE documents critically, this gloomy view of 
the vanishing of German ethnic groups in Romania is shared by other sources, as well. 
                                                        
481 At one moment, as a measure to reduce the numbers of ethnic Germans emigrating to Germany, the 
German Federal Republic had to pass a decree that should they decide to emigrate, the Lutheran pastors 
coming from abroad were no longer allowed to serve the church in Germany. 
482 Deutsche Tagespost/Katolische Zeitung für Deutschland, „Die deutschen Schulen in Rumänien müssen 
schießen,“ [The German-language schools in Romania must be closed down], February 26, 1986. [Having 
been written before the German orthography reform of 1996, the article uses the older German 
orthography.] OSA, Box 187, File 1100 Ethnic Minorities: German 1986, page F-540. Drawing upon a 
report published by Sieberbürgische Zeitung, the article mentions that the central institutions in Bucharest 
started systematically closing down the schools of the Romanian Germans in Transylvania and Banat. The 
writers pointed out that, beginning with the [1985-1986] academic year, the last four German-only high 
schools would also enroll Romanian pupils. As the latter spoke only Romanian, the national language [die 
Landessprache], this situation automatically led to the Romanian German pupils learning and speaking only 
Romanian, as well. Pupils of ethnic German descent no longer had the possibility of taking their high-
school entrance exams in the German language, a right that had been previously granted to the German and 
Hungarian minority groups. Also, the newspaper mentioned, the situation of the German-speaking teachers 
was just as dramatic, as the only high school preparing future teachers for German-language school was to 
be closed down as soon as the most recent cohort graduated in 1988. In parallel, the number of students 
pursuing a degree in German studies at the University was “drastically reduced.” The newspaper concluded 
that from then on, German would be treated in the national schools’ curricula only as another foreign 
language. 
483 RFE report “Romania’s German Minority,” Romania SR/5, April 18, 1986, OSA. See also Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, “Rumänien bedrängt die Deutschen,“ [Romania presses the Germans], January 30, 
1987, in Box 187, File Ethnic minorities: Germans/1987, page F-505. The article points to the constant 
intensification of the nationalist discourse and practices in Romania, which led to an increasing conflict 
with the neighboring countries. West Germany became directly affected via the impact these attempts 
toward national homogenization had on the ethnic Germans living in Romania at that time. As the article 
points out, at the disposition of the central authorities in Romania, “out of ten lecturer positions opened to 
foreigners to come to teach in Romania, four were cut.” Two of these positions were to be allocated to 
German lecturers, one in Timisoara, the cultural center of the Banat Schwaben, and the other in Bucharest. 
Lecturers from West Germany were allowed to apply only to two locations: Klausenburg (Cluj, in 
Romanian, the largest university center and city of Transylvania, situated in the region with the largest 
Hungarian minority) and Jassy, the largest city in the region of Moldavia. In comparison to Timisoara and 





For instance, starting from her ethnographic observations in a multiethnic village in 
Transylvania in the late 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, Verdery noted that “for 
Romania’s German community overall, ethnic identity has become far less central to life, 
far less publicly visible, and far more individualized than was once true,”484 a 
phenomenon that she described as the “unmaking” of German ethnicity in Romania. In 
comparison to the RFE report, Verdery argued that the 1980s governmental policies 
directed at ethnic groups in Romania were not the main cause of the shift from a strong 
sense of ethnic belonging to a more individualized self-identification for ethnic 
Germans—in other words, a shift from “what they were” to “what they are not.” 
According to Verdery, it was rather a combination of historical factors, such as the 
dwindling importance of the former institutions that consolidated the German ethnic 
group in Transylvania, and contemporary changes in the international political context, 
especially the post-1978 possibility of emigration to West Germany, that led to “the 
declining salience of ethnicity” among Germans in Romania.485  
 At the same time, the ethnic Germans were employing strategies that were fully 
consistent with former social practices and collective attitudes that this group especially 
had relied upon in the past. It was only at this time, as Verdery shows, that such strategies 
took a rather strange twist, as their application undermined the very social network 
through which German ethnicity had previously been built. More specifically, the history 
of the Germans of Transylvania overlaps with a history of a series of economic 
                                                        
484 Katherine Verdery, "The Unmaking of an Ethnic Collectivity: Transylvania's Germans," American 
Ethnologist 12, no. 1 (1985), 63. 
485 Verdery, “The Unmaking of an Ethnic Collectivity,” 64. The historical and institutional factors 
maintaining a clearly defined German ethnic group included: the Lutheran church, the particular economic 
niches occupied by the Germans, the professional associations (die Vereinen) closed to non-Germans, the 
banks and credit systems also favoring a German clientele, and the specific forms of socialization 
especially in the rural areas, such as die Nachbarnschaften (neighbor-oriented groups), die Jugend ( the 





privileges, economic behavior and rules, and specific access to intra muros know-how 
and resources that had enabled them to thrive as a social and ethnic group without 
lobbying much for direct political power. These means of ethnic identity formation, 
centered on a model interlinking religion and economic attitudes, led to a (self)-
understanding of Germanness as primarily based in being economically successful and 
politically mobile.486  
In socialist Romania, however, the pursuit of economic institutional independence 
became out of the question, while the policies of social homogenization led to an increase 
in social and geographical flexibility and interethnic marriages. Under those specific 
circumstances, the German ethnic group chose to resort to a form of political passivity, 
combined with an investment in professional training that would facilitate a better 
integration upon their emigration to Germany.487 Verdery contends, however, that 
“emigration promote[d] the ultimate individualization of German ethnicity,” as it focused 
exclusively on individual enterprise, with one family or a person always competing with 
others for a passport and an exit visa.488 This point is crucial for a more subtle 
understanding of the emergence of novel social practices in Transylvania in the late 
socialist period (the late 1970s and the 1980s). As I will show, “the individualization of 
German ethnicity” played a pivotal role in the development of specific social practices in 
Sibiu at the conjunction of 1) situated histories of multiethnic habitation in Transylvania, 
especially of the relations between the Germans and the Romanians, and 2) the centralist 
state project to create a form of socialist personhood through various means of cultural 
and social homogenization. 
                                                        
486 Ibid, 74-75. 
487 Ibid. 





 My conversations with older Saxons and Romanians in Sibiu about the social 
atmosphere of the city during the 1980s conveyed a similar picture to one described by 
Verdery.489 As most of the Saxons were becoming focused on emigration, they began 
living in the future (in Germany) more than in the present (Romania). As one of my 
Saxon interviewees mentioned, starting in the 1980s when her friends, all of them 
Saxons, would meet at soirees or dinners, the only topic of discussions was “have you 
received your passport?”   
 As many of the ethnic Germans were witnessing the disappearance of the ties and 
institutions that used to bind them into a cohesive ethnic group, they gradually stopped 
associating their sentiment of ethnic belonging with Transylvania, as earlier generations 
did (“we have been in Transylvania for 800 years,” etc.). While no longer interested in 
                                                        
489 During my volunteering at the “Carl Wolff” home between October and December 2005, I helped with 
various chores in the “home” section, where most of the elderly do not require complex medical assistance. 
During most of the afternoons of these three months, I was bringing food to the bed-ridden patients, sorting 
the medicine for each patient, while I also tried to engage in a dialogue with some of the patients there. I 
could thus learn from them aspects about everyday life in Sibiu and especially within the Saxon community 
in the 1970s and 1980s, the deportation of Romania’s Germans to the USSR, local forms of building up 
communities within the Saxon group, and their family’s life story.  
Opened in 2000 by the Lutheran Church in Romania, with funds and know-how from the Lutheran 
church in Germany, this institution had been initially designed as “a home away from home” for the elderly 
Saxons who were living alone in the villages that no longer had a numerous Saxon population and could no 
longer care for themselves, thereby “staining the image of the [Lutheran] Church.” As the number of the 
older Saxons requiring assistance has gradually diminished, the “Carl Wolff” home has recently begun to 
accept elderly from other ethnic groups and confessions, such as Hungarian and Romanians. Besides the 
professionally trained medical personnel, the home relies also on volunteers from abroad, most of them 
young people from Germany or Austria who come to Transylvania as part of the social work program to 
experience something new before embarking on studies at the university level, or who prefer doing social 
work instead of military service. The home stands then as a particular meeting point of two groups that 
often have nothing in common except the language (and, rarely, an acknowledged sharing of the Lutheran 
faith). Even then, the linguistic commonality is relative, since the elderly could use their “language” (the 
Saxon dialect, Sächsich) only among themselves, as most of the personnel and the young volunteers do not 
speak it. 
 I also noticed that, to a certain extent, volunteers’ input has replaced the work of the community’s 
youth and adults lost through the emigration of most of Romanian Germans between 1980 and 1990. This 
is why it represents, together with other sources of help (such as funding and expertise), a mechanism of 
strengthening the relationship between the German state and Romania’s dwindling Saxon community. At 
the same time, I suggest that volunteer work is also looked upon as a marker of an ethnic identity, more 
specifically of Saxon-German identity. Many informants told me that volunteering is not a “Romanian 
custom,” “there are no Romanian volunteers.” This remark appeared in a different form in other cases of 





maintaining a strong identification with the Saxon group and a concept of ethnic-
belonging rooted in territory (Transylvania), most of the ethnic Germans and especially 
those in urban areas who had been educated at German-language high schools and 
therefore were fluent in Hochdeutsch and less interested in speaking Saxon became more 
interested in cultivating their German ethnic identity. This offered them a privileged 
status: that of being able to leave a gloomy Romania in order to enter Germany as 
citizens fully entitled to benefits from a wealthy welfare state, meanwhile receiving 
parcels of Lindt chocolate, Burda glossy magazines, and other goods that the non-
Germans, especially many of the Romanians without “connections,” could only fantasize 
about. To an extent, the ethnic sentiment (of being Saxons) ceased to be associated 
with—and reinforced by—immovable material forms, ranging from houses, which would 
have been left behind, given to the socialist state in exchange for a passport, to place as a 
political, ethnicized territory. The Saxon houses in Transylvania, be they in the villages 
or in the cities, no longer functioned as a sign of ethnic belonging for the would-be 
German citizens. It was in Germany that the Transylvanian Saxons wanted to get actively 
engaged in crafting a stronger ethnic self, one that would match the criteria set by the 
German state and would also allow them to become socially and culturally more 
accepted.  
 Consequently, German ethnicity was being remade through other, more mobile, 
cultural forms. Even if the majority of the young and middle-aged ethnic Germans were 
focusing only on emigration as their life project, some of them kept and cultivated the 
social ties within the local ethnic network. According to some elderly Saxons with whom 





cultural nuclei where the German culture and language were preserved—such as, in the 
choir of the Lutheran church; among Saxon women, who were much sought after by 
well-to-do Romanian parents wanting to raise their children bilingual; and especially in 
small groups resembling the model of German private or professional small associations 
(Vereinen), which focused on the collective pursuit of different hobbies ranging from 
knitting to amateur botanical research and mountain trekking. Some of these associations 
remained in placed also after the regime change; others disappeared.490 
 However, the boundaries of those groups, which had emerged as exclusively 
Saxon assemblies, were becoming more fluid as their initial members started leaving for 
Germany. Frau Drucker, who had been trekking the mountains around Sibiu every 
weekend for more than forty years—she was 92 when I met her and still had a vibrant 
and witty personality—told me that the Saxon members of the mountain trekking group 
“The Friends of the Mountains” were not initially willing to accept Romanians into the 
                                                        
490 Almost every week during several months in Fall 2005 and Winter 2006, I went to one of those circles 
to (try to) knit, together with some of the Saxon ladies in Sibiu, most of whom have been attending this 
group activity on and off for almost twenty years. I was lucky enough to be brought in by one of the 
women holding a high status among Sibiu’s Saxons, thus having the members of the group “forced” to 
allow me to temporarily join them. Obviously, I had to meet the mandatory condition of exclusively using 
German during my presence there, which was seized upon by some of the group members as an 
opportunity for endless attempts to correct my pronunciation, and ask all of the possible questions about my 
origins, my research, my haircut, and my life, in general. I say “lucky” because these women keep their 
circles very tight—no outsider is allowed, especially a Romanian (I attended one such episode during 
which a Romanian woman dropped in, uninvited, to mention [in Romanian] that she heard of this circle, 
that she loves to knit, and asked whether she could join them. This intrusive visitor provoked an immediate 
rebuke on the part of the most vocal woman, the group’s charismatic leader, who immediately said in 
German to the other women that she does not want any foreigner to come to the group. This rebuke was 
then translated into Romanian in a more diplomatic form by another lady, who told the visitor that they do 
not want other new members, that the room is small and there is no space for others.) While I was attending 
the work circle, at the suggestion of one of the group’s leaders I went to visit a similar women’s circle, this 
time organized by a Romanian woman with closed links with the Saxon community. It was in fact a 
women’s get-together, hosted by this Romanian lady every week over tea and coffee. She also sometimes 
attempted larger events, by inviting a woman guest speaker to give a topic-focused presentation. When I 
told my Saxon women friends that I had visited this circle, they commented that “these Romanians meet 
just to talk and drink coffee, whereas we meet to work and then talk.” To me, going every Thursday to the 
Kränzchen was a great opportunity to meet some wonderful, witty and sharp-tongued Saxon ladies, to learn 
a lot about the various tensions among different social factions and actors in Sibiu’s Saxon community 
within a relatively short interval, as well as to succeed in making one (!) glove in three months and finally 





group to replace their long term colleagues who had already emigrated to Germany. 
Some of those Saxon “friends of the mountains” insisted on speaking German as a form 
of separation, even when Romanians were present, until they had to give in, realizing that 
they would be left alone—even literally, on the mountains—had they continued to hold 
onto this linguistic boundary. 
 Here, I would like to return to Verdery’s observation on the “individualization of 
German ethnicity.” It is this “individualization,” I suggest, that allowed for a very 
interesting phenomenon of class distinction as ethnicity-substitution to emerge in Sibiu, 
and very likely, in other urban sites in Transylvania whose history was deeply enmeshed 
with that of the Saxons. More specifically, by relying on my observations in Sibiu and 
especially my conversations with Saxons and Romanians about the city during the 1980s, 
I would argue that the non-Germans, especially the Romanians who constituted the 
majority in the city, seized this shift from a collectivity-determined German ethnicity to 
an increasingly individualized form of ethnic identity in order to build a higher symbolic 
position for themselves within the local hierarchies of the city. That is, well-to-do 
Romanians began to mirror cultural and social practices of their Saxon co-urbanites as a 
situated form of social mobility. What emerged as forms of heritage-as-practice that 
would guarantee a form of ethnic and social belonging for Sibiu’s Saxons during the 
1980s began to be mirrored by local well-to-do Romanians as a part of a symbolic 
competition within the local social structures of the city. 
 This phenomenon was not new, but it took on novel connotations in the context of 
the impending emigration of a distinct group that created and defined the social and 





was to leave empty crucial positions within the social hierarchy of the city, which many 
of the locals (mostly Romanians) hurried to occupy. In order to prove that they were 
worthy for these positions, the new elites had to meet first the central authorities’ criteria 
of political fitness (that of having a “clean” past, without any “bourgeois” background) 
and Party faithfulness. However, even if they passed the first test, whereby the 
bureaucracy of the socialist state would acknowledge their belonging to the cluster of the 
“Romanian socialist citizens,” the would-be elites of Sibiu would have yet to face another 
scrutiny, this time a symbolical and localized one. They would have to show that they fit 
the cultural and social criteria of the city, which were still heavily marked by the Saxons’ 
local institutions and cultural requirements. Hence, many of well-to-do Romanians in 
Sibiu would join clubs, pursue hobbies, trek the mountains around Sibiu along with their 
Saxon co-urbanites, or/and offer their children private music lessons and hire them Saxon 
nannies. Some of them moved into the houses gradually deserted by the Saxons leaving 
for Germany.  
 Due to the cultural homogenization endorsed by the Romanian socialist state, it 
seems that ethnicity was no longer a social institution adequate to the workings of 
Romania’s social system in the 1980s. The social grid of socialist Romania underlying 
the making of a “socialist personhood” appeared to be rather dichotomous, separating 
people with “connections,” which were in general the people within the political system 
and ranking high in the Party, from “the rest,” those without “connections” and relatively 
marginal. Even though this grid was supposedly situated within a post-class, post-ethnic 
form of socialist personhood, in fact, in Ceauşescu’s Romania where the doctrine of 





to social and cultural practices that sometimes even contrasted with the regime’s political 
ideology. The case of appropriation of Saxon ethnicity-markers by the well-situated 
Romanians in Sibiu is illustrative of the deep contradictions underlying the political 
project of building socialism in Romania (and beyond). Sibiu’s case shows how the 
centralizing project of creating a “socialist personhood” of the ethnically diverse groups 
of Romania was countered by more convoluted social practices, which emerged as 
adaptations to the political context of socialist Romanian in the 1980s, but were also very 
much informed by former social configurations, economic hierarchies, and situated 
systems of value connected to deeper histories of multiethnic cohabitation. 
 
Performing Ethnicity, Dreaming of Germany: The Saxons in post-1992 Period 
 
 These situated social practices of the 1980s have strongly informed the political 
and social developments in contemporary Sibiu. More specifically, I suggest that the 
GTZ project was contested by a part of the local elites who directly benefited from the 
Saxons’ increasing absence during the 1980s and early 1990s. In Sibiu in 1989 there were 
around 7,000 people who declared themselves to be Lutheran (which, more often than 
not, signaled their Saxon ethnicity). In 1992/1993 (the first census after 1989) there were 
fewer than 3,000.491 As Erwin Ackerman, one of the founders of the German Democratic 
Forum, remembers, in December 1989 he publicly pleaded with Sibiu’s Saxons to choose 
Transylvania over Germany. In the balcony of one of the central buildings in the Great 
Square, which once hosted the local organization of the then recently dismantled 
communist Party, he remembered calling out: “’Do not leave! Do not leave! Do not 
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leave!’ To no avail. Most of them left within a year.” As Herr Ackerman explained to me, 
for so long many of them had been building all of their life plans on the expectation of 
emigration. Some of them had had their visa requests denied several times, for different 
reasons (including that of not procuring enough deutschmarks for various bribes). When 
the borders suddenly opened in 1990, they had already been living “on hold,” propelled 
to leave as soon as that became possible. They could no longer imagine that they might 
stay, so they left, afraid that the borders might close again.  
 Herr Ackerman forgot to mention one important element. The ethnic Germans (or 
those who could emigrate under this category) who left right after the regime change 
(between the beginning of 1990 and the end of 1992) benefited from the same privileges 
that had been offered to everyone who had entered Germany before 1989 under the title 
of Aussiedler (“out-settlers”), a status designating persons of German descent who had 
remained outside the borders of West Germany after 1945 and were considered entitled 
to “repatriation” and to a wealth of different forms of support from the German state.492 
By immigrating under the title of Aussiedler (“out-settlers”), these persons were 
immediately offered German citizenship as well as “various integration assistance 
packages, paid as if the expellees had been born and had worked in the Federal Republic, 
including the payment of pensions, unemployment and welfare.”493 
                                                        
492 For a discussion of the political connotations of the term Aussiedler, see Amanda Klekowski von 
Koppenfels, "Second-Class Citizens? Restricted Freedom of Movement for Spätaussiedler Is 
Constitutional," German Law Journal 5, no. 7 (2004), Rogers Brubaker, " Migrations of Ethnic Unmixing 
in the “New Europe”" International Migration Review 32, no. 4 (1998), Rogers Brubaker and Jaeeun Kim, 
"Transborder Nationhood and the Politics of Belonging in Germany and Korea," (Los Angeles: UCLA, 
2009), work in progress, 
http://www.ihc.ucsb.edu/research/identity%20articles/Brubaker%20Transborder%20Nationhood. 
(Accessed on August 18, 2009.) 
493 For an analysis of the law on granting asylum to expellees, Bundesvertriebenengesetz, see Koppenfels, 
"Second-Class Citizens? Restricted Freedom of Movement for Spätaussiedler Is Constitutional." For a 





 In contrast to the common model of migration as a strategy of identity-
preservation, Brubaker argues that in the case of the ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe 
and Russia emigrating to Germany in the 1980s and early 1990s, the incentive of 
migration generated a process of identity-remaking. As he put it:  
Not only was German ethnicity as a “lived reality” not decisive in motivating 
migrants, but the highly prized opportunity to migrate—as a citizen!—to the 
fabled “new world” of Western Europe generated strong incentives to cultivate, 
retrieve, reinvigorate, invent, or otherwise acquire the requisite official 
ethnicity.494 
 
Indeed, this incentive was so powerful that even those who would not otherwise 
identify with the Saxon group in Sibiu sought stronger ties with a remote history of 
belonging to the German ethnic group, in order to facilitate their departure to Germany. 
Take for instance the case of a family whose surname, Baier, indexed them as ethnic 
Germans. The family spoke Romanian at home and had been formed through an 
interethnic marriage between a Romanian woman born in Sibiu and a Swabian whose 
family had been deported from the Banat to the southern part of Romania in the late 
1950s. The woman’s husband understood German but could not speak very well, while 
she spoke and understood none. Being a couple of intellectuals who were well anchored 
in the local social networks of Sibiu, however, they were able to offer their three children 
the best education, including their having a Saxon baby-sitter and a Saxon piano teacher; 
due to the children’s own industriousness and intelligence, they graduated from the 
German-language local gymnasium in Sibiu. Upon graduation, in the early 1990s, one of 
the children decided to pursue his university studies in Germany. In order to benefit from 
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the incentives offered to the immigrating ethnic Germans, he had to create a case for 
himself, by collecting family documents and testimonies from his father that helped him 
successfully prove his identity as an ethnic German. At the same time, I suggest, he 
would never identify himself as a Saxon or Swabian, but rather as a Romanian-born 
German citizen keeping his ties with his family residing in Sibiu.495 
 This case illustrates how forms of ethnic sentiment and belonging could “skip” a 
generation and become lost, or on the contrary, resuscitated according to the new values 
attached to belonging to one ethnic group under specific political circumstances. It also 
points to the situated means to remake one’s ethnic identity that would suit those political 
circumstances, in this case the emigration requirements. That is, the know-how and 
resources in crafting or retrieving such an identity—an emigration industry, as it were—
developed especially in those urban settings that had had a larger number of ethnic 
Germans and consequently had been experiencing more significant shifts in the 
interethnic distribution of the local population. Therefore, I suggest that besides the 
strong expectation to leave, built up over the years, that Herr Ackerman talked about, the 
development of this “emigration industry” particularly in those sites with sizable German 
populations such as Sibiu further enticed those who wanted to leave the country and 
could prove that they belonged to the German ethnic group. These networks of 
“emigration expertise” might also have eased the process of departure even after the 
borders were opened with the political regime change in December 1989.  
                                                        
495 While he did not say this directly, I suggest this is the case due to his consistent distancing from any 
forms of his potentially being associated to any of those groups. He consistently used jokes and irony when 






 The case of the non-Saxon Sibian turned into a German citizen also offers an 
interesting example of the ways in which the social status was acquired mainly through 
an education pursued according to an ethnically-defined canon (German high-school, 
private tutoring, etc), which, as I mentioned earlier, some of the children of well-to-do 
Romanians benefited from as early as the 1980s as they occupied the places formerly 
occupied by the Saxons’ children. Moreover, it proves how in some cases, this social 
status was used by well educated Romanian nationals to put forth ethnic claims of 
recognition so that they would be considered of German ethnic descent. This situation 
could offer a possible, and very unexpected answer, to the tertium non datur question—
that is, the fact that there was no third option for the Transylvanian Saxons who could 
either leave for Germany or stay in Transylvania. A bold assertion would be that the 
emigrated Saxons remained in Sibiu in the forms of Saxonness set forth by the 
Romanians. They also remained symbolically imprinted on Sibiu’s urban fabric, in the 
form of the historical center that recently became a means of attracting capital into the 
city. 
Currently, this presence has begun to matter again, as it was used by various 
factions within Romania, ranging from local Saxon politicians in Sibiu to central officials 
of the Romanian state. More importantly, Sibiu’s Saxons have also been approached as a 
form of cultural capital by a series of external political actors. The German state stands 
out within this group, and its powerful involvement in Sibiu through the GTZ project 
signals multiple political shifts. First, it illustrates the policy shift of the German state 
towards the ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe and in Russia as it emerged after 1992. 





rapidly shifted from an immigration-focused model, which promoted an all-inclusive idea 
of “repatriation” for all of the ethnic Germans fleeing the world behind the Iron Curtain, 
to a more pragmatic paradigm of democratization as local development. In other words, 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the newly reunified German state replaced a now 
obsolete rhetoric of “human rights” with that of “local development, democratization, and 
infrastructure building” in the former socialist bloc. 
 Even though, before 1989, the German Federal Republic state appeared to have 
exclusively relied on the ethnic national model, which allowed the new settlers to be 
considered German by the virtue of their ethnic, and not territorial, belonging, Brubaker 
and Kim point out to the broader geopolitical contexts underlying the immigration policy 
of the German state in post-war Europe. They argue that the ways in which the German 
state created or shifted its political categories of subjects, by delimiting “outsiders” from 
“insiders,” were directly informed by Cold War dichotomous political geographies and 
claims for ethnic belonging in a Europe cut in half by the Berlin Wall. They write: 
Within a Cold War frame, the embrace of Aussiedler, like that of Übersiedler 
(resettlers from the GDR), was used to highlight the opposition between openness 
and closure, freedom and oppression. The sufferings of transborder Germans—the 
expulsions themselves, of course, but now, in an ironic reversal, the restrictions 
on exit and the lack of institutional support for the preservation of German 
culture—were recoded in universalistic language as human rights violations.496 
 
 Due to the difficulties that they faced in leaving their countries of origin and the 
yearly “quotas” imposed by the socialist states, the immigrants who entered Germany 
before the mid 1980s (about 35,000 annually) could be more easily accommodated within 
the welfare system. After 1992, however, the situation changed. The “exodus” caused by 
the opening of the borders that brought almost 2 million ethnic Germans to Germany 
                                                        





within an interval of two years intensified public debates on the meaning and utility of 
this process of “repatriation.” Already coping with the rising costs of reunification and an 
increasingly unstable labor market, Germany no longer showed a strong interest in fully 
welcoming the Aussiedleren, but rather aimed to support the countries with a large 
population of ethnic Germans (hoping that their significant funding channeled into “local 
development” would also have a direct impact on the German group, as well). In 
Romania, for instance, the funding sent from Germany reached an important sum in 
2000.497  
 The GTZ project developed in Sibiu between 2000 and 2006 represented such a 
political project. It illustrated the shift from political recognition-as-inclusion to 
economic redistribution that the German state adopted towards the presence and history 
of the ethnic Germans in the countries that once belonged to the former socialist bloc.  At 
the same time, it also represented a form of place-marking as place-making, since, by 
investing in the rehabilitation of the historical houses of Sibiu’s historical center, many of 
which had been confiscated by the socialist state from the Lutheran church during 
nationalization, the German state made a visible political statement. It marked Germany’s 
clear insistence that the postsocialist Romanian state grant full recognition to the ethnic 
minorities by restituting their former possessions (especially land and buildings). As 
such, it illustrated a process of postsocialist decentralization occurring at the 
simultaneous pressure of external and internal actors, who converged in their attempts to 
                                                        
497 Between 1990 and 2002, the German state offered the Romanian state a non-reimbursable credit of more 
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the non-reimbursable sum of 7.66 million euro given by Germany in 2001, which were given for the 
rehabilitation of historical towns, mainly the city of Sibiu. In 2002, the non-reimbursable sum was 6 million 
euro. Declaration of the minister secretary of state Andrei Popescu in the meeting of the Senate, the 





push for the restitution of the cultural and economic capital that once was used by the 
socialist state to make its own body politic.  
This form of decentralization as a rearrangement of cultural capital was justified 
through claims for cultural recognition and heritage-(re)making of Transylvanian Saxons, 
claims set forth by both the German state and the local Saxon leaders in Sibiu. 
Simultaneously, then, the project of Saxon heritage-remaking in Sibiu represented a form 
of forging closer transnational relations and endorsing some new symbolical geographies 
in the context of the EU-expansion. As such, the project spoke directly to the ways in 
which the EU is a continuously shifting network of influence and negotiation among its 
most powerful member states, which are highly interested in creating and sponsoring 
differently shaped transnational symbolic geographies with the new members states in 
order to have a stronger political leverage within the EU-system of decision-making and 
economic cooperation. 
Beautifying a City, Becoming a Citizen (ein Burger): The GTZ Campaigns in Sibiu 
 
Since its inception, the rehabilitation project had been a major discussion topic for 
Sibians as well as for political actors abroad. This was because it brought to the fore other 
key debates, such as: local ethnic politics and interethnic relations; the relation among the 
state, the individual, and public space; the politics of urban aesthetics; ideas of “past” and 
“present”; the political production of “history”; the relation between “history” and 
“memory” and their link to “space”; etc. Thus, the public and closed-doors debates 
among various local and national institutions over the arrangement of Sibiu’s urban space 
implicitly became debates over the social and ethnic geography of the city. These debates 





(which of course triggered further debates). As one of the coordinators of the renovation 
project pointed out to me, commenting on the project’s title—“Sibiu’s Past Becomes Its 
Future”—one of the questions underlying these debates is “how far into the past do we 
want to go?” I would like to complicate his point by further asking: on which of these 
“pasts” should and/or did one focus in the attempt to transform this city for “the future”? 
What other “futures” were being silenced and excluded? Also, in what ways were ideas 
of state authority contrasted with ideas of local autonomy and initiative, which were 
further mapped onto ethnic histories and ethnically reconfigured spaces of belonging?  
I begin by describing the campaigns that GTZ coordinated between 2004 and 
2007, whereby they aimed to instill a sense of “civic consciousness” in Sibiu’s urbanites, 
and especially in the residents of the historical center. I then analyze these campaigns by 
looking at how they were envisioned as complementary strategies to support a particular 
understanding of “urbanity” as a form of living in and identifying with a city. I bring a 
complementary perspective, that of a Saxon professor living in Sibiu at the time of my 
fieldwork, to bear on my analysis of the GTZ project of heritage-making as local 
development. By putting in dialogue these two perspectives, I try to show how the 
rehabilitation of the city center stands as a more complex political project of memory 
preservation of Transylvania’s Saxons and a shift from political recognition to economic 
redistribution for the Saxons currently living in Transylvania. 
Beginning in 2004, various campaigns funded and coordinated by GTZ, together 
with the mayor’s office, were initiated in the city. GTZ distributed flyers that explained in 
detail what a proper renovation of an old building entails, starting from the complex 





the aesthetic aspects of the building renovation. No changes in the structure of the 
buildings were allowed, and the materials and the technologies that were to be used 
should as much as possible be keeping the “natural, organic” character of the downtown’s 
old buildings. By presenting the old houses as historical monuments, they asked that no 
alterations be done to the structure of houses, while all the materials and technologies 
used should be as close to the “traditional” techniques as possible (for instance, one must 
use wood window frames, wrought iron and not plastic frames). The publicity around the 
methods of rehabilitation and preservation of the historical center was structured 
according to the main elements of a building. It was a fragmentary campaign, in that 
these instructions were published extensively in the local mass media, which week after 
week focused on one building element (the windows, the gates, the interior courtyards, 
the house facades, etc). With photos and examples, clearly marked: “Like this!” or “Not 
like that!” (in Romanian, Aşa Da, Aşa Nu, which, funny enough, were linguistic 
remainders of the former communist times, when any situation that could not fit the 
socialist social model, ranging from lazy workers or a plan that was not fulfilled to 
women wearing far too short skirts on the street was marked “Aşa Nu!!” [Not like 
that!]).498  
The roofs and their traditional shingles made the first page of the local 
newspapers one week. The GTZ team asked that, as “the tourists were impressed by those 
roofs,” the original shingles be preserved or at least replaced by similarly colored tiles 
and the old chimneys left in their original place, even if they were no longer functional. 
The roofs represented a serious problem for GTZ, as I later found out, since some of the 
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main buildings in the old center, centrally located, had been renovated with funds from 
the Romanian government. The funds were given to a different construction company, 
which fully replaced the old shingles with new ones of a strikingly red nuance, visibly 
contrasting with the roofs repaired under GTZ supervision. One of the architects working 
for GTZ pointed out these bright roofs to me, as an example of the stupidity and 
carelessness of the Romanian officials. He said that it would have been much cheaper and 
more appropriate for their historical preservation had the original roofs been mended 
selectively, by leaving the good original shingles in place and replacing only the broken 
ones. 
 
Figure 19 Sibiu’s Large Square in July 2006. One could distinguish the renovated roofs by their 
bright red-orange color. 
  
The facades were also a major element of the campaigns. It was clearly stated that 
the houses’ facades be renovated according to their original colors and building materials, 
which must be reconstituted after old photographs or drawings. Other flyers displayed 





the interior entrance wall of some of the houses, right after the gate, and contrasted them 
with others, of similar format, carefully arranged one in line with another. (I will let the 
reader guess which of the two situations would have received the label: “Like this!”) The 
courtyards offered another set of contrasts: photos displaying old cars or bicycles thrown 
in a corner of the yard were opposed to others, showing courtyards nicely arranged with 
trees and a table for guests. One of the GTZ architects, talking about the courtyards of the 
houses, stressed that “[they] are historical proofs as much as any other element of an 
historical house. The courtyard needs to be a common space and be felt as a common 
space. It needs to be treated as an extension of the house.” Many inhabitants of the old 
houses treated the courtyard as a warehouse, she said, where they stored all the things 
they wanted to get rid of later. As she put it, “This is a question of mentality.” The 
residents of the historical center were also invited to attend workshops during which 
German specialists would show them how to restore and repaint an old door or window 
frame, as a cheaper and more adequate alternative to the replacement with new ones, 
which was no longer allowed. 
A major campaign was dedicated to the windows of the historical houses, more 
specifically to the window frames. Under the title “No plastic in the historical center!” 
the GTZ team asked the residents to cease changing the original wooden frames and 
replacing them with plastic, “modern” frames. They suggested that the wooden frames 
must be renovated, or, in case this was no longer possible, replaced with new wooden 
frames. In order to raise awareness about the potential destructive effects of the plastic 
window frames on the historical look of the houses, the campaign involved groups of 





and distribute flyers with more information. Between February and March 2006, the 
students were asked to distribute this information in each mailbox of the 1,200 houses in 
the center, as well as tell to whoever would have liked to listen to them, that the plastic 
windows could hamper the potential inclusion of Sibiu’s old center in the UNESCO 
World Heritage List. As a newspaper documenting the campaign put it, “the City Hall, 
the Architects’ Union, and the GTZ declared war on the use of plastic in the historical 
center!”499 
Among other programs linked to the renovation of the old town GTZ also 
sponsored yearly competitions and prizes for the best renovated houses, prizes that went 
to the owners of the house, not to the architects. Of course, many of them were well-to-do 
people, who were able to afford a thorough renovation with “traditional” materials, such 
as wood, bricks, and wrought iron, materials more expensive than the ones currently used 
in construction.  These competitions were extensively discussed in the local media, the 
winners were interviewed, and the history of their houses presented in detail. 
In short, a major focus of the GTZ complex project was the preservation of a 
specific aesthetic of the historical houses. However, their rehabilitation concept also 
produced a major shift: from complex forms of habitation and sociality, the houses were 
reduced to a list of elements that were mostly visible from outside (roofs, windows, 
facades, doors, chimneys, etc). Moreover, the monitoring of these elements according to 
a dichotomous evaluation, by separating the properly preserved ones (Aşa Da!) from 
those inadequate from an aesthetic point of view (Aşa Nu!), created a strange hierarchy 
among the houses within the city, as if they were divided between representations of 
proper social subjects and that of inadequate ones. If we continue this parallel, from this 
                                                        





point of view, the competition for the most beautifully renovated houses would appear as 
a kind of beauty pageant. In fact, as I will discuss below, the rehabilitation project 
increasingly appeared to be a form of social beautification rather than a project of built 
heritage preservation. 
 
Figure 20 A GTZ flyer illustrating some of the façades that were too “brightly” painted. “Sibiu 
Historic Centre Rehabilitation Project,” 14. 
 
GTZ also funded the publication and distribution of the “Municipal Action 
Program 2001-2004,” the official guide of Sibiu’s City Hall, which outlined its vision of 
the city’s future: “the inhabitants need to identify themselves with their city” and “they 
are invited to actively participate in the city’s development.”500 As for the “historical 
city”, which had its own chapter, the guide stressed that  
the unitary character of the old city need[ed] be maintained, while also being 
given a new life force.  Commerce, crafts, tourism and culture [would] help the 
old city develop new urban functions … The residence in the old city [was to be] 
maintained while the living conditions need[ed] to be gradually improved 
especially by downsizing the population density.501  
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In other words, the objective was to reconstruct a city that was not necessarily for the 
people living there, which were too many anyway, but one for visitors, tourists, and those 
who would be able to afford maintaining and living in one of the old houses.  
 More importantly, however, was a complementary focus of the GTZ team, which 
was then to represent the entire project before an international audience: the public space. 
As an international GTZ report wrote: 
Sibiu (German: Hermannstadt) in Romania has added a key element to the mosaic 
of its urban development strategy. The authorities and inhabitants now know that to 
make the old town really worth living in, it will not be enough to just restore the 
fabric of residential buildings. Public space is on the agenda, along with road 
traffic.502 
 
Indeed, the GTZ project also entailed a social and political project of changing 
ideologies about the public space, as it was accompanied by a specific vision of 
reconstructing the downtown as a novel social space. Not only were buildings redone and 
squares rearranged; the physical marking of the space became also a project of 
transforming its inhabitants as well. The local officials characterized the renovation of the 
downtown as also a collective social project. Thus, by using tropes invoking both 
historical specificity and a cultural universalism—such as the rhetoric of heritage—the 
local officials asked Sibiu’s urbanites to start identifying with their city, very often (too 
often) essentialized to the historical downtown. The renovation of the major squares in 
the old center was treated as a priority goal. In 2004, the World Bank offered 1 million 
euros for the restoration of one of the major squares in the historical center, which hosts a 
wide range of restaurants (the Little Square). The project for the renovation of the Main 
Square triggered intense debates among the local specialists, some of whom accused the 
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mayor of spending a fortune on a project that did not match any preservation criteria for a 
medieval square and that would fully spoil its historical character.503 Despite these 
accusations, the mayor promoted the project, justifying it as a gift to the Sibians. He said 
that the Main Square “must become alive and be transformed into a place that represents 
Sibians.” As the mayor put it, Sibians needed to think of the Large Square as their living 
room, where they could invite guests as well as feel at home.  
In a nutshell, the GTZ project had two main goals: 1) that of making Sibiu’s 
urbanites, and especially the residents of the historical center, more aware of the exterior 
of their houses, and 2) that of enhancing the social value of the public space, especially 
that in the historical center, through a thorough refurbishment of the major squares. In the 
next section, I will discuss the social and symbolic implications of GTZ’s vision of 
rehabilitation. 
 
Shift of Perspective: Sibiu’s Historical Center as an Assembly of Houses 
 
During my time in Sibiu, I came to realize that, while I enjoyed knowing those 
houses through the various and colorful lives they had at the present, the heritage 
specialists wanted to set them in a coherent urban aesthetics. This aesthetic urban form 
that the GTZ experts wanted to apply to Sibiu’s old center was not necessarily the one 
that the houses’ inhabitants wanted to create. What the latter displayed in their homes 
was an aesthetic of heterogeneity that they employed as a sign of ownership of their 
domestic space. The residents’ aesthetic choices were therefore generated by a local 
combination of functional needs of habitation and desires of modernization and 
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“normalcy” in a postsocialist world beguiled by the promises of readily accessible 
modernity in the form of IKEA or Praktiker goods.504 As Fehervary has argued, relying 
on her research in a town in Hungary formerly considered the epitome of socialist 
urbanism, an expectation of “normalcy” understood as postsocialist prosperity and forms 
of subjectivity increasingly defined through the dictum “freedom of expression” have not 
emerged only under the influence of capitalist consumerism. Instead, they appeared as 
even stronger responses to the state-endorsed forms of homogenization as social 
equalization that had been produced by the urban and social design promoted by socialist 
adoption of Modernist tenets.505 This argument could be easily applied to postsocialist 
Romania, where especially starting in the late 1970s until the end of Ceauşescu’s regime, 
consumption, as a “hidden object of desire,” had been highly regulated by the socialist 
state as a form of political control. As reactions to earlier attempts of the socialist state to 
increase its subjects’ submission by reducing their consumption options, post-1989 
consumption practices in Romania, as well as across the former socialist bloc, have 
become pivotal means for redefining not only urban spaces and aesthetics, but also social 
relations and understandings of ‘person’ and ‘community.’506   
To return to the houses of Sibiu’s old center, I suggest that they stood as perfect 
examples of this postsocialist search for a better, “normal” life that Fehervary witnessed 
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in a Hungarian town, which, in contrast to Sibiu, could be perceived as an instance of the 
“non-heritage,” or “anti-heritage,” represented by socialist modernist urban design.507 
The highly unordered variety of aesthetic preferences, manifested by the ways in which 
the residents have chosen to make the house interiors into their “homes,” inevitably 
permeated the way the house facades came to be seen by passers-by. It was precisely this 
lively but aesthetically destabilizing lack of order that the GTZ project rejected, trying to 
tame it down and create instead an appearance of urban continuity and order. More 
importantly, this desired urban aesthetic reflected an attempt to restore a sense of 
historical continuity in a multiethnic city that went through significant upheavals 
throughout the 20th century. 
The GTZ project to transform those houses into unitary objects for tourists to 
admire aimed, to an extent, to give the impression that the number of tenants in the house 
remained the same as at the turn of the century. At that time, most of the houses of the 
old center were inhabited by the Saxons, then the majority in Hermannstadt, a city of the 
Austro-Hungarian empire until 1918. Not only did the tenants change after 1945, when 
most of the houses were confiscated by the socialist state from their individual owners as 
well as from the Lutheran church that had many of the central houses in its patrimony, 
but the number of tenants had also fluctuated. The grand apartments occupying the entire 
floor of the house were partitioned so that they could accommodate up to four families or 
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even more. The rooms right under the large roofs, designed as storage units, were 
transformed into living places, as well.  
At the same time, as much as the new political regime attempted to infiltrate its 
vision of social order into these houses by dividing them into much smaller housing units, 
doubling or tripling the number of tenants and sometimes redistributing the bigger 
apartments to local cadres of the new political hierarchies, those houses stood 
nevertheless as signs of Saxonness, still representing a vision of the world of those who 
built them several centuries ago. Their compact appearance, with high windows, tall and 
seemingly impenetrable gates, and wide, heavy roofs, marked a clear division between 
the private and the public realms. Even though occupied by an increasing number of non-
Germans as their former inhabitants began leaving for Germany starting in the 1960s, to 
an extent they were still perceived as representations of the Transylvanian Germans.508  
To discuss how the GTZ project attempted to enhance this semiotic potential, by 
transforming the houses themselves into proxies of the absentees (most of Sibiu’s Saxons 
who had left for Germany between the 1960s and the 1990s), I employ Keane’s view of 
things as potential means of representation. Keane points out that objects have their 
porous strata potentially prone to signification, but there is a kernel that is left unchanged, 
unsignifiable. Keane analyzes representations “both as entities with their own, particular, 
formal properties and as kinds of practice, distinct and yet inseparable from the full range 
of people and everyday activities.”509 While “[i]t works at the unstable boundary at which 
the ‘material’ and ‘symbolical’ meet, reinforcing or undermining one another,” however, 
                                                        
508 After some of them had been stripped of their Romanian citizenship, accused of collaboration with the 
Nazi regime, and deported to labor camps in the USSR between 1945 and 1950. 





“a medium of representation is not only something that stands ‘between’ those things that 
it mediates, it is also a ‘thing’ in its own right.”510 Keane argues that 
objects are not open to any arbitrarily imposed set of meanings […] [T]heir 
very materiality makes a difference both in the sources of their meanings and 
in their destinations[…]. In asking what, and in what way, objects “represent”, 
we must also look at their production, the transformation they undergo, the 
vicissitudes to which they are prone, and the alternative trajectories against 
which representational practice seeks to confine them.511 
 
Even though he maintains that the meanings of objects should be understood 
through the “shifting physical, economic, and semiotic contexts” to which they 
are subjected, he does not explain how the semiotic contexts themselves initially 
emerge. Latour adds a new perspective to Keane’s discussion, as he argues that 
things capture meaning by the ways in which they are set in relation to other 
things.512 
This is leads us to think that the rehabilitation of the old center and its description 
as a project of heritage-(re)making is grounded in a perspective on the houses of the old 
center different from that of the residents themselves. We might compare our view of 
Sibiu’s houses to the strategies that GTZ employed, including the program of urban 
aesthetic education that they publicized across the town starting in January 2006. GTZ 
aimed to revive the potential of the houses in Sibiu’s old center to represent in miniature 
a Saxon Transylvania. They did so by redefining the ways in which the houses were 
situated in relation to each other and then in relation to the public space of the city. 
Whereas I was paying close attention to the various ways in which those places were 
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inhabited, the GTZ architects were approaching them from the perspective of the tourists 
who would eventually come to the city to wander on the streets and look at the historical 
center as an assembly of houses.  
I suggest that the GTZ program aimed to produce a new semiotic arrangement 
that would endorse a new relationship between the houses and their inhabitants. This new 
relationship would emerge out of a new angle that GTZ proposed from which to 
contemplate the houses and give them meaning. More specifically, I argue, GTZ wanted 
to produce a perspective shift—from focusing on the inside, on the house as their home, 
the tenants were asked to look instead at their homes as secondary parts of the house, as 
the background of the houses’ facades, to be admired by tourists. By aiming to show the 
city to onlookers, temporary flaneurs on Sibiu’s streets, the GTZ transformed the latter 
into the main active subjects of the city. The GTZ did so by shifting the ways the houses 
were looked at, by aiming to transform them from individual, (too) aesthetically diverse, 
individual “homes” into unitary, packaged heritage objects. 
This shift of perspective, which GTZ aimed to endorse through the multifarious 
campaigns and programs developed in the historical center, did not happen in a vacuum 
of signification. On the contrary, as I will show in the subsequent section, the GTZ’s 
vision of “heritage-making” was informed, to a certain extent, by local ideas of ethnic 
difference cherished especially within the local Saxon community, and the ways in which 
some of the Saxon leaders understood these ethnic differences to be codified by distinct 
forms of habitation. In the following section, I briefly discuss the contemporary Saxon 
community of Sibiu, relying on my ethnographic observations. I move then to discuss the 





me by one of the leaders of Sibiu’s Saxon group. I then compare these statements with 
the vision of heritage-building that was endorsed by GTZ. 
 
Carrying History on Their Shoulders: Houses and Saxon Self-narration in 
Contemporary Sibiu 
 
 Despite the fact that the Saxon group represents a relatively small segment (1.6%) 
within the city’s entire population, the city has preserved its role as the center of 
Transylvania’s German group. This historically grounded role has been currently 
imprinted within the city’s landscape by the centrally placed sites of the two key 
institutions grounding the Saxon group in Transylvania: the Lutheran church, with its 
General Consistory and Lutheran theological seminary, and the Democratic Forum of the 
Germans in Romania, located right across from the seminary, within one of the buildings 
the state recently retroceded to the Lutheran church. Having won the local elections three 
times in a row (2000, 2004, 2008), the Forum represents much more than a political 
party—in fact, it seeks to stand as a forum. Along with the Lutheran church, the Forum 
lies at the kernel of the Saxon community, as to a certain extent they both influence and 
guide the social practices and small projects of the Saxon group in Sibiu. 
 Both the church and the Forum have been very active in sponsoring frequent 
series of cultural and social events, which are held in two main locations: in the main 
conference room of the building hosting the Forum, in the famous Hall of Mirrors, and on 
the premises of the “Friedrich Teusch” Center for Cultural Dialogue, which hosts the 
archives of the Lutheran church in Transylvania. Besides being a research center and 





Transylvania, the “Teusch Haus,” as it is known in Sibiu, has functioned as a cultural and 
social site of the Saxon community there, organizing scholarly lectures, presentations of 
books and documentaries, temporary exhibitions on themes related to German culture 
(Landeskunde), as well as talks given by politicians especially from German-speaking 
countries, sometimes set in the form of an open dialogue with Sibiu’s officials. (The 
presentations and other events target a German-speaking audience, since most of them 
are held in German).  
 If we are to return to Frau Ackerman’s statement that the Saxon community is 
grounded in three things—the church, the school, and the language—we would note that, 
to an extent, her description could still be applied to Sibiu’s current Saxon group. For all 
that it appears as a much rehearsed cliché, grounded in a 19th century political imaginary 
of “the people” (das Volk), the statement’s peculiar veracity derives from the particular 
characteristics of the Saxon group in the present, that is, a group whose older segment is 
disproportionally high, and hence, given its small size, it has become much more 
homogeneous than before along the lines of age and political orientation. Under these 
circumstances, the church comes to substitute for many an institution that would have 
offered a richer cultural and social landscape. (Such institutions have developed in the 
last decade, sponsored mostly by funding and programs from abroad, but they are not 
much frequented by the members of Sibiu’s Saxon group.) Moreover, the Forum also has 
a tight relationship with the Lutheran church, with some of the local political leaders 
occupying prominent positions within the church as well. 
  As much as this perceived homogeneity could appear politically enticing, as it 





the group, it also can be exploited for opposite purposes. That is, a culturally 
homogeneous group, formed especially of older subjects, invites questions about its 
political representativeness. Allegations of the group’s exploiting transnational agendas 
and resources by virtue of “politically correct” entitlements and claims for minority 
rights, or even more subtle, and thus more difficult to reject, forms of mockery come 
from more cosmopolitan subjects, such as German ex-pats, volunteers, or young tourists 
who, confronted with the cultural and linguistic forms of Sibiu’s Saxon group, reject 
them as being “conservative,” that is, as traditional or just plain “boring.” 
The irony is that many of those Saxons, especially the older ones, identify themselves as 
being Germans living in Transylvania. A Saxon historian pointed out to me the 
persistence with which some of the Saxons maintain or even recreate ethnic boundaries 
by constantly choosing specific cultural and linguistic forms over others: 
As for those who live here [who never emigrated], or those who lived here in the 
past century, the 20th century, but also many of those currently living here, they 
watch only German television programs, now that it is possible, read only 
newspapers and magazine received from Germany, they know everything that 
happens in Germany, but they are not so interested in what is going on in 
Romania. For the majority of them, this identification with Romania has never 
happened.  
 
 During my time in Sibiu, I was able to observe some instances of this complex 
process of cultural bovarism, in which many of Sibiu’s Saxons engage by symbolically 
living in-between a Germany constantly imagined and approximated via visits to 
relatives, media channels, and other material forms, and a Transylvania where they have 
been feeling increasingly marginal as political actors.513 Indeed, the Forum, the Teusch 
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Haus, or Evangelische Akademie (a German foundation for interconfessional and cultural 
exchange), constantly organized events, presentations, talks, and round tables. These 
meetings focused on topics such as Romania’s integration into the EU (this was in Fall 
2005), religions in Europe, talks on Luxembourg and immigration to Transylvania, 
linguistic connections between the Luxembourg and Saxon dialects, celebratory exhibits 
of the Grimm brothers, economic cooperation and European regionalism. Often I heard 
some comments among the participants trying to adequately convey the requisite cultural 
knowledge and interest in broader contemporary issues on European agendas that 
characterize those events, and by extension, their (mostly Saxon) audience. (The implicit 
comparison was with the parochial approach to those topics displayed by the events 
organized by some [Romanian] governmental or local institutions in Sibiu, such as the 
“Astra” museum and the local library, the local Department for Culture and Patrimony, 
and even the Orthodox church. Those comments carried their truth, as well as pointing to 
broader negotiations of the meanings of culture and history and competing projects of 
memory-work unraveling on the surface of the city.) 
 Indeed, most of the members that ordinarily form the audience of such events 
belong to the elites of the local Saxon group, such as professors, teachers, historians, 
artists, journalists, and bookish students. Despite a strong penchant for cultural bovarism, 
manifested through direct comments or more subtly, through aesthetic and cultural 
choices, the members of the Saxon group in Sibiu, I suggest, have also been actively 
engaged in a constant process of translating, literally and symbolically, between cultural 
and linguistic realms. For instance, other events, such as the talk given by a Romanian, 
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Bucharest-based journalist Cristian Pârvulescu, a well known voice among those 
intellectuals supporting the (then) political opposition under a regime formed mostly of 
neo-communists, or the talk given (in German) by a German historian, Georg Herbstritt, 
on the launching of his book on the collaboration between the East German Stasi and the 
Securitate, had a fully packed house and stirred a lot of talk within the Saxon circles in 
town.514  
 Among Sibiu’s Saxons, Professor Bonhoeffer is famous. He is one of the founders 
of the German Forum, a Saxon theology professor who has been a leading figure in 
Sibiu’s Saxon community since his decision to leave West Germany in 1985 and return to 
Transylvania, in order to “show solidarity with the 300,000 Germans living [there].”515 
Professor Bonhoeffer, as I will call him henceforth, was a Saxon who left Transylvania 
during the war to become a Wehrmacht soldier, ended up in Germany as a war prisoner, 
then pursued his education and had a successful career in West Germany, only to decide 
to return to Transylvania at the moment when most of the Saxons wanted to emigrate (by 
the mid 1980s). In contrast with them, Professor Bonhoeffer came back to Transylvania 
with a sense of mission exactly when the situation worsened for most of Romania’s 
citizens, including the ethnic Germans. His bravery and determination made him a 
reference figure for Transylvania’s Saxon group.  
He and his wife kindly invited me to join them for breakfast one morning in 
October 2005. When I told them that I wanted to better understand how interethnic 
relations, especially those between Saxons and Romanian, had developed after December 
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1989 in Transylvania, he began by telling me that “the world of the Saxons and the world 
of Romanians has always moved in parallel, never intertwining.” At this point, his wife 
interjected that the Saxons had suffered greatly when the Romanian socialist state 
confiscated their houses. It is for this reason, Professor Bonhoeffer added, that the past is 
different for Saxons than for Romanians. He offered the following explanation: 
The Saxons carry their past on their shoulders in a different way than Romanians: 
whereas Romanians live as part of their generation or of their parents, the Saxons 
live in a longer history, they think of the history that they carry on their shoulders. 
When the Saxons come to ask for their houses to be restituted, they think of their 
forefathers. They would say, “it is our house because it is the house of my 
forefather.” This is why it was unbearable for the Saxons to find out, upon their 
return from the labor camps in the USSR, that their houses and belongings had 
been taken away, and when they asked for them to be returned, they began 
receiving anonymous letters, written by Romanians, that read: “What land do you 
want now? when you came here [to Transylvania], you had none!” 
 
This statement is thought-provoking for several reasons. It offers an “encapsulated story,” 
that is, a well-rehearsed narrative, that provides an origin story—“we have been here for 
850 years” and an additional dimension of accountability, that “Saxons carry their history 
on their shoulders.” That is, Professor Bonhoeffer intimates that it is not only an 
awareness of spatial continuity, but also an active engagement with maintaining this 
sentiment of continuity at the core of one’s sense of ethnic belonging that defines what a 
Saxon should be. In a way, this description of one’s identity being constructed through 
keeping history on one’s shoulders entails a concept of the person seen as a sum of what 
Strathern calls “dividuals” (or “partible persons”), in which various people participate in 
creating one social self.516 In comparison to Strathern’s dividual, who is relationally 
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formed especially in the present through complex social and economic relations with 
others, we encounter a different form of “dividual” in Professor Bonhoeffer’s account, in 
which a Saxon could be a Saxon only if he or she is willing to acknowledge the self as 
part of the past, of understanding himself as more a carrier of a larger history than a 
maker of one’s own.  
 The glue that makes possible this self-identification with someone who precedes 
one by 850 years, however, must take a form that is more prone to objectification than a 
sentiment or a political discourse; that is, we encounter an objectification of history as a 
burden-like thing, which needs to take a material form that can ideally stay the same 
across generations, something that offers the promise of sameness—that one is (through) 
his or her ancestors—because it embeds it. The promise of “sameness” that would be 
embedded in a house or a piece of land and would extend then to an understanding of 
“history,” as a thing to be carried along, relies then on a particular cultural imaginary and 
on specific understandings of materiality and material form.  
 The process is therefore dialectical: one is Saxon not only because he inherited 
the house, but also because he honored and took care of it as such, as a container of his 
ancestors’ lives, imprinted onto the forms in which the house had been inhabited, and 
which therefore could mould the current owners’ lives, as well. The conditions of 
possibility for them to be Saxons are offered via specific material forms—such as a house 
or a piece of land—presuming that the current inhabitants honor the past as it is inscribed 
in the house. The statement “It is our house because it is the house of our forefathers” 
signals an understanding of a house as being both static and dynamic, standing as the 
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proof and promise of sameness while being invested with a certain form of agency—that 
of shaping the lives of the individuals living therein and transforming them into 
“Saxons.”  
 By extension, “the house” could come to represent a fortified town, a church, or 
even a city. Professor Bonhoeffer’s account resonates with an explanation that I received 
from a Saxon art historian, who had studied Transylvania’s fortified churches at length. 
According to her, a very strong sense of ownership had been formed during the Middle 
Ages, when “one had to heavily rely on community in order to survive.” As she put it, 
Especially the Saxons who, at the moment when they had decided to leave [their 
homeland in northwestern Europe] for a place that they did not know, were aware 
that there was no way back. Hence the royal edict [that brought them] had to be so 
fabulous, so as to persuade them to leave everything behind and come here, to a 
place where hic sunt leones. Since they knew they could not go back, they 
developed an extremely strong connection to the land and belongings they 
acquired here [in Transylvania]. They knew that if they fled in front of the Tatars, 
others would come to occupy their land. Hence, the fortified towns. 
 
She concluded by describing the Saxons’ relationship to their place in absolute terms: 
“without your place, you were dead!” 
With this strong statement in mind, I return to my conversation with Professor 
Bonhoeffer to suggest that his account offers not only an interpretation of the story of 
origins (“we have been here for 850 years”). By pointing to the lack of identity that 
results from the absence of ownership—what land do you want? when you came here, 
you had none!—it also stands as an allegory of a potential project of ethnic destruction 
through the redistribution of material forms that were imbued with cultural meaning. 
Professor Bonhoeffer’s explanation echoed the argument of the art historian in that the 





elements in representing an imaginary of ethnic kinship developed through a particular 
understanding of “property.” In that sense, this account also illustrates the 
anthropological approach to “property” understood not as a relation between people and 
things, but rather as one between people through things.  
 Noteworthy in Professor Bonhoeffer’s account is that it sets the narrative of 
historical continuity of the Saxons in Transylvania within a moral framework, a 
framework of accountability for one’s past. As such, he implicitly (but perhaps 
unwillingly) points to an idea of Saxonness that needs to be assumed and permanently 
produced through one’s willing adoption of the narrative of continuity. To be part of the 
Saxon group implies an act of labor: one must carry one’s history on one’s shoulders in 
order to be recognized as a Saxon. Another implication of the professor’s account is the 
relationship he draws between a labored place—such as, the cultivated land or the 
house—and the making and reification of the Saxon identity.  
 Even more interesting is the way he chooses to ground his argument. That is, he 
draws upon a contrast between “the Saxons” and “the Romanians,” with the latter 
understood as “living only within their own generation,” implying that they live in a 
present as it is, without strong ties to the past. Professor Bonhoeffer aimed to strengthen 
the contrast by bringing in an image offered by Lucian Blaga, an interwar Romanian 
philosopher from Transylvania who aimed to produce a theory of culture grounded in an 
understanding of space: “A [Romanian] shepherd traveling with his herd through a Saxon 
village encounters the fortified church: they are two worlds that live in the same place, 
but [inhabit] different spaces.” By stating that they live in “parallel worlds,” Professor 





different temporal coordinates. More interesting are the elements that he selected to 
exemplify the distinction—a shepherd, who would stand for Transylvania’s Romanians, 
and the fortified church, that would symbolize the Saxon group; that is, the very symbol 
of transhumance set in contrast to a symbol of stability and endurance. Moreover, he 
offers a depiction of the Romanians as newcomers to Transylvania, whose historical and 
ethnic roots are more perishable than those of other groups. He extrapolated the contrast 
when I inquired upon his opinion about the discussions triggered at the time (October 
2005) around the urban arrangement of Sibiu’s Large Square. He answered bluntly:  
the Romanians never had a sense of urbanity. They want the park back, the park 
that used to be in the square.517 They cannot bear the open space, to be able to see 
the square. [From their point of view, the square] should not be seen. They don’t 
even want to see the others or even themselves. 
 
How could I approach these statements, offered by a senior professor, someone 
carrying significant prestige and holding an important political role among Sibiu’s 
Saxons? If his previous comparison drew upon a theory of history as formative of a sense 
of Saxon ethnic belonging (while the absence of a historical awareness would 
characterize a form of Romanianness), in the last statement Professor Bonhoeffer offers a 
different strategy of ethnic formation and differentiation: the presence or absence of an 
urban sense, of being able (or not) to identify oneself as part of a larger social group; to 
be able and willing to look at others, sustain their gaze upon you, and thereby incorporate 
them into your own identity formation. Moreover, this ability (or lack thereof) is captured 
and inscribed by a specific relation to space: according to Professor Bonhoeffer, Sibiu’s 
Saxons approach the Main Square not only as a material representation of their own 
                                                        






history that was established, together with the entire Old Town, by the first Saxon 
colonists who arrived in Transylvania, but also as a proof of their urbanity, their ability 
and willingness to relate socially to others—to “see” them. 
 Indeed, someone could argue that such statements are far too essentialist and elide 
a more grounded analysis of the specifics of the political disputes going on at the local 
and governmental level. Another analyst would raise a question about the peculiar 
position that Professor Bonhoeffer has occupied since his move to Sibiu more than 
twenty years ago, in 1985. Even though he has retired, he remains very active socially 
and intellectually. He is often invited to give the opening speech at various meetings, 
such as one held by the World Monuments Fund in Sibiu in September 2005, or to be the 
discussant for scholarly papers or panels hosted by the Teusch Haus. As such, his 
viewpoint weighs heavily within the local Saxon community and still permeates, at least 
on the surface, the current political atmosphere of the German Forum. Given his pivotal 
political and symbolical position within the local hierarchy of the city as well as the 
broader Saxon group in Transylvania, I suggest that his statements should be approached 
as being representative for many of Sibiu’s Saxons, especially given the higher degree of 
homogeneity of this group, a double effect of the group size and the age of its members.  
It is here that I would like to return to the vision of social order underlying GTZ’s 
project of rehabilitating the historical center. I suggest that there is a very interesting 
concordance between the Professor’s statements and the main goals of the GTZ team. 
That is, Professor Bonhoeffer’s description of the houses as dialectical receptacles and 
makers of Saxon ethnic identity conveyed an understanding of habitation as an ethnically 





had been formerly owned by the Saxons before most of them emigrated to Germany used 
to function as pivotal means for their owners to produce a sentiment of ethnic belonging. 
Only by being properly inhabited by their residents would the houses help the Saxons 
“carry their history of their shoulders” by making them continuously adjust to and 
reproduce the ways in which their forefathers had also inhabited the same house.  
If the houses offered a material ground to reinforce the narrative of historical 
continuity for each family, at the same time, they also functioned as connectors between 
the residents and the larger social group in the present. According to this vision, the 
houses stood as nodes between distinct temporal frameworks as well as points making 
and defining a form of public space intra muros, within the Saxon community. By being 
set within a clearly defined spatial network, which would mirror a social configuration of 
economic and moral obligations, the Saxon houses would create a community 
simultaneously defined and linked by the public space and a narrative of historical 
continuity. As such, the houses were not only receptacles and makers of an ethnic 
sentiment among their current residents, but also instruments through which the 
community could assess whether these residents fit the criteria of ethnic belonging by 
observing how they inhabit their houses. This dual quality of the houses—as mediators of 
history and parts of an assembly through which the community was continuously making 
itself through proper forms of habitation—would make the Saxon group into a self-
reliant, functioning social network. This interpretation of Professor Bonhoeffer’s 
statements echoes an understanding of the Saxon community as a confined, fully self-
reliant corporation of perfect social order and unassailable harmony, which was the view 





life trajectory and his youth in Transylvania during the 1920s and 1930s, it is no wonder 
that his statements closely match earlier self-representations of the Saxon group.) 
 
People in Houses, Houses as People: Minority Politics, Diverging Property Regimes, 
and Imaginaries of a Saxon Peoplehood 
 
 More interesting is that Professor Bonhoeffer’s conceptualization of the 
relationship among houses, public space, and Saxon ethnicity parallels the GTZ’s vision 
of rehabilitation as being mainly a social project. However, despite these parallels, 
divergent understandings of “heritage” and especially its function underlie the two 
statements. As I have already pointed out, the GTZ project entailed a shift of perspective: 
it asked the residents of the historical center to look at their houses in a novel way. More 
specifically, it required them to translate themselves from the inside to the outside of the 
house, and thereby to become, to an extent, tourists in their own town. This shift of 
perspective became a new condition for proving one’s civic status, that is, one’s desire to 
be considered a proper citizen, a resident of the city, not only of his or her own 
apartment. This shift of perspective was pursued through two main strategies: 1) by 
making the inhabitants more aware of the aesthetic importance of the external elements 
of their houses (roofs, facades, window frames, entrance gates, etc.), as well as of these 
elements’ social value, and 2) by inviting them to forge new links among themselves, the 
interior of their homes, and the public space, which should be treated as an extension as 
their own living room, as the mayor suggested. 
This new understanding of urban aesthetics was set, however, within a framework 
of social and civic responsibility, as the flyers advertised the key message that local high 





the plastic window frames would directly endanger not only the urban quality of the city, 
but also the city’s very symbolical value in the eyes of UNESCO representatives.518 In 
other words, the residents were told to think first of UNESCO, and then of their own 
civic status, before pursuing any replacement of their window frames. 
Therefore, both perspectives—the one set forth by Professor Bonhoeffer and the 
one promoted by GTZ—present the houses as civic vectors par excellence, as instruments 
for the residents to signify or reject a form of social belonging. However, whereas for 
Professor Bonhoeffer the houses represented a means to inscribe social belonging onto 
place through the categorical and exclusive reinforcement of a primordial ethnic 
belonging, for GTZ the houses appeared as vehicles to transform their residents into 
proper “citizens” (in the German sense of the word, die Bürger). Therefore, the GTZ 
project aimed to persuade the current residents of Sibiu’s historical center to take on the 
social behavior of the former residents of this center: the Saxons. Moreover, by 
compelling the contemporary residents of Sibiu’s downtown to decorate their houses 
according to their original look, by relying on old photos or drawings, the GTZ team 
seemed to be engaged (unwillingly, perhaps) in a kind of project of social engineering as 
well, in which the residents would become citizens in the shadow of the houses’ former 
Saxon owners. 
 This is the point where the potential parallel between Professor Bonhoeffer’s view 
and GTZ’s vision ends. For GTZ, the project of rehabilitation is a social project because 
it envisions local development as emerging from a change of social practices. Moreover, 
this change of social practices is promoted through the reinforcement of local symbolical 
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hierarchies rooted in ethnic differences between the Romanians and the Saxons. The GTZ 
project therefore encourages the current residents of the historical center (mostly 
Romanians) to undertake new social roles by appearing as good imitators of forms of 
urbanity understood as ethnic markers. In other words, the residents are compelled to 
become as “Saxon” as possible in order to satisfy the sophisticated aesthetic desires of 
cultural tourists as well as to actively contribute to the making of their city into a 
“European capital.” Simultaneously, the houses themselves are transformed into 
substitutes of their former Saxon owners. By attempting to make “Sibiu’s past into its 
future,” as the title of the whole GTZ project runs, the rehabilitation of the historical 
houses becomes a social project as well, that of transforming Sibiu’s historical center into 
a museum of the disappeared people: the Saxons who left Transylvania.  
 This form of rehabilitation as memorialization is, however, categorically rejected 
by the Saxons who are still living in Transylvania and who aim not only to be treated as 
alive social subjects but also to be given full recognition as political actors on the 
contemporary map of Europe. Professor Bonhoeffer’s statements indicate a double 
criticism of the GTZ perspective. First, by pointing out the claims for the houses’ 
restitution set forth by the Saxons on the premise of historical continuity—“it is our 
house because it is the house of our forefathers”—the Professor makes a statement about 
ownership as being ethnically marked. That is, he indicates that ownership has value as 
long as it is preserved within the ethnic group, the Saxon community. By adding then that 
“the Romanians never had a sense of urbanity,” the Professor emphasizes a class 
distinction as being frozen within a grid of ethnic difference, which can never be 





current Romanian residents to become Saxon-like, and therefore more “European,” by 
changing their ways of relating to the historical houses of Sibiu’s center. From his point 
of view, the moral value of the house transcends the economic market value of some 
shabby houses in need of complex and costly reparation. Even more so, the current run-
down condition of some of the houses in the historical center stands as the most visible 
proof that the current owners did not care about these houses as the Saxons would have 
done, precisely because the houses carried no moral or historical value to the current 
residents. Consequently, these residents do not deserve these houses because they are not 
and cannot ever become Saxon. 
As such, the Professor’s strong statement must be understood as a deeper 
conviction that the conflicts over the houses are in fact conflicts among different kinds of 
peoplehood, in this case, represented by the Romanians and the Saxons. According to 
him, the multifarious differences between these peoplehoods stem from a wide span of 
smaller contrasts, ranging from the different ways of inhabiting a private place (the 
house) which are seen as being biologically inscribed, to that of inhabiting a wider social 
space (the Main Square), to even an ability to “see”—that is, comprehend—the difference 
itself by knowing how to observe and accommodate the others in an open space. The 
Professor’s statement directly questioned a project that promoted an EU-endorsed vision 
of creating a “common European heritage,” while attempting to make it happen at the 
margins of Europe. As I will show, his view was grounded in a specific situation in which 
the Saxon group found itself after the massive emigration of ethnic Germans from 





 The Professor’s comments must be situated within the broader context of the 
minority politics of the postsocialist Romanian state. At the time of my conversation with 
Professor Bonhoeffer (October 2005), there had been an immense external and internal 
pressure on the Romanian government to expedite the restitution of the buildings that had 
been in the possession of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Romania, to which the 
majority of Transylvania’s Saxons belong. A law granting the restitution of all buildings 
that belonged to ethnic communities, and were confiscated between 1940 and 1989 had 
been passed in 2004.519 In 2005, the newly-elected Romanian government passed another 
law, which amended the 2004 legislation and broadened the scope of the restitution 
process, by stipulating that farm and forest land and other real estate be returned to ethnic 
communities as well as religious groups.520 Notwithstanding these amendments, which 
aimed to simplify and expedite the restitution process, many buildings continued to 
remain in the property of the state. This situation made the bishop of the Lutheran Church 
in Romania, which serves the German-speaking community, invite the bishop of the 
Lutheran Church in America and the president of the Lutheran World Federation for an 
official visit to Romania.521 One of the major goals of this visit was for the American 
bishop to exert more pressure on the Romanian government to facilitate the return to the 
Lutheran church of immovable goods that had been confiscated by the socialist state. 
Moreover, this situation did not even address the countless cases in which the Saxons 
who emigrated before 1989 had to “sell” for a symbolic sum or even give their houses in 
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exchange for a passport. Many of those Saxons could not ask for the restitution of their 
former possessions in Romania after 1989 because they were not willing to apply for 
Romanian citizenship.522 
 As a leader of the Saxon group in Sibiu, directly involved in the political life of 
the German Forum and in the internal debates of the Lutheran Church council, Professor 
Bonhoeffer was fully aware of the complex factors at play in the GTZ’s project of 
resignifying the meaning of the houses. The Professor’s statements were pointing out that 
the houses of the historical center were part of a larger cluster of immovable material 
forms that represented the heritage of the German Lutherans in Romania, which meant 
mostly the Saxons. He also wanted to show that as much as the GTZ hoped to redefine 
Sibiu by conferring it a “Saxon” medieval look, this project was shallow, because it did 
not directly help the Saxons currently living in Sibiu. According to the Professor, the 
remaking of the Saxon community was to happen only when the houses of the historical 
center, together with other immovable possessions, would be restituted to the Lutheran 
Church and therefore became again material forms of ethnicity-making. From his 
perspective, the GTZ vision of rehabilitation as beautification of the city was 
categorically not a project of heritage-making.  
 I suggest that Professor Bonhoeffer’s comments must be understood as a very 
shrewd maneuver whereby he calls upon an idealized world of the Saxon community, one 
reminiscent of the ways in which the Saxon group promoted itself during the interwar 
period and thereby maintained an economic autonomy which allowed it to thrive even 
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when its political importance had diminished. The Professor employed almost the same 
tactics as his forebears, the Saxon politicians in Greater Romania, in order to justify 
claims of political recognition that the Saxon community set forth in the present, in a 
Romania about to join the EU. (At the time of the interview, Romania was not yet a 
member state. It joined the EU in 2007.) Therefore, he aimed to make a point, which 
echoed the general discourse of the Forum: that the Saxons of Transylvania have not 
disappeared, despite their very small number, and that they want to be given the political 
attention that they deserve. Professor Bonhoeffer was also making a subtle criticism 
regarding the German state, by alluding to the fact that economic support for local 
development, in the form of the beautification of the city’s center, did not replace the 
political support that the ethnic Germans expected from the German state. (As I 
mentioned earlier, this political support had existed, but it was withdrawn when Germany 
adopted the policy of local development after 1992.) 
In his comments, the Professor was addressing the most pressing problem of the 
Saxons currently living in Transylvania: that such a small community does not have 
enough political leverage to pressure the state for the restitutions of an immense wealth, 
which used to belong to a thriving Saxon community before the war. (Despite the politics 
of centralization orchestrated by the interwar governments, this community was able to 
fully preserve its economic autonomy.) Therefore, the strong contrasts that Professor 
Bonhoeffer drew between the Saxons and the Romanians must be set within the current 
circumstances of Romania’s national politics, where the ethnic Germans have been 
treated more as pawns to signal a multiculturalism on the surface than as actors 





signal Professor Bonhoeffer’s deep frustration with the uncertain situation of the ethnic 
Germans in Romania, an uncertainty that was especially high at the moment of our 
discussion (2005), in a Romania not yet an EU member and more than ten years after 
Germany’s radical shift of policy concerning the emigration of ethnic Germans from 
Eastern Europe.  
In fact, those frustrations echoed earlier ones, which had been poignantly 
formulated by the honorary president of the German Forum as early as April 2001. At 
that time, the Forum was facing the radical institutional rearrangement of government 
ministries following the December 2000 elections, which had been won by a government 
formed mostly of the former communists, regrouped under the umbrella of the Social 
Democratic Party in Romania (PSD). One direct result of the elections was the 
dismantling of the Department of National Minorities and its transformation into an 
office for interethnic relations attached to the Ministry of Information. This change raised 
serious questions as to whether the councilors for minorities, formerly working in the 
Department of National Minorities, would still be able to hold on to their position in the 
new government. Confronted with such changes, the Forum’s honorary president 
officially closed the 2001 general meeting by saying: 
The long-standing tendency is that those circumstances that open up special 
possibilities for us as German communities in Romania (namely, possibilities to 
fully involve and develop ourselves for the good of all) are being developed 
without us and pass us by, because neither Bucharest nor Berlin think that we 
have a truly catalytic potential. Some see us as a house plant that can be shown to 
certain visitors, while others regard us as objects to be looked after, to which they 
were once obligated to care for, and thus still feel obligated.523 
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This statement pointed to a profound sentiment among the ethnic Germans of being left 
“in-between,” currently recognized as a fully fledged political community neither by the 
Romanian government nor by the German one. 
 Even though some of the Saxons currently living in Transylvania, such as 
Professor Bonhoeffer, continue to use an idyllic image of the Saxon community by 
selling it to those who seek it in order to acquire resources and other forms of support for 
the present needs of the local communities, Romania’s ethnic Germans want to be 
approached as modern political actors fully anchored in the present. Even more so, their 
leaders portray themselves as being more progressive than other political and economic 
actors in Romania, a viewpoint permeating most of the speeches of the Forum’s 
leaders—such as, for instance, the declaration of the honorary president of the Forum, 
Paul Philippi, that the Forum understands itself as a catalyst within Romania’s political 
field, or Mayor Klaus Johannis’ statement that one should make use of the advantages of 
being a small community (that is, more flexible and adaptable to various changes).524 
Another example is the analogy to the realm of technology employed by the Forum’s vice 
president, Hans Klein, who, prior to Romania’s accession into the EU, affirmed that the 
ethnic Germans represent “the locomotive” that would bring Romania into Europe.525 
Therefore, the current leaders of the German ethnic group in Romania engage in a 
peculiar process of seeking and maintaining a political profile that must satisfy two very 
different sets of needs and standards. More specifically, those leaders must adjust their 
political program in order to meet the interests and values of an aging and increasingly 
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smaller community, whose values are perceived as more traditional, while maintaining an 
optimistic and future-oriented agenda persuasive enough to acquire further economical 
and political support from governmental actors from Romania and abroad.  
 A strategy of maintaining a relatively consistent image among these highly 
diverging factors has been for the political leaders to portray themselves as morally 
virtuous/“better” kinds of people: hard-working, carriers of a long history on their 
shoulders, catalysts that would transform an entire city, and locomotives that bring about 
progress and development, having acquired these special skills by belonging to the Saxon 
ethnic group. In other words, the Saxon leaders aimed to produce for themselves an 
image of a people of a different kind, which, notwithstanding the community’s dwindling 
size, is worth much more value to what they promote as being ethnically innate qualities 
of industriousness, honor, and morality. These are claims that are not made 
straightforwardly, but they undergird the claims for political recognition that the Saxon 
leaders continue to set forth. Those claims are crucial for the Saxon group to retain not 
only a cultural identity in Transylvania, but also to recuperate many of the former 
belongings of the Lutheran Church from the Romanian state. In order for them to recreate 
their heritage, therefore, the Saxons of Transylvania must be as visible as possible on the 
European and international political scene.  
 This is why the GTZ project of development as rehabilitation was welcomed, but 
with reservations by some of Sibiu’s Saxons. The project of rehabilitation as 
memorialization of Sibiu’s Saxon past appeared as a form of support that in fact 
accentuates something they wanted to avoid: having themselves portrayed as one-





political borders of Germany. The German state was very much encouraging 
development, but a development seen only via the historically preserved urban landscape 
that would further investment and tourism. 526  
As a German scholar visiting Sibiu said to me, those actors (the “Europeans”) 
wanted to make Sibiu into a genuinely German historical town, something that they no 
longer have in post war Germany.527 This remark underscores that the GTZ project aimed 
to give Sibiu’s historical center an atmosphere of Saxon authenticity, whose main role 
was to transform the city into a representation of European culture. However, as I have 
already shown, GTZ’s approach to the remaking of Sibiu’s center into an epitome of 
Saxon heritage did not follow the classic steps of an enterprise of historical preservation. 
Instead, they chose to teach the current residents how they could transform their own 
houses to become more aesthetically like those of a German town. In other words, they 
tried to offer to the residents themselves the guidelines for the city’s transformation into a 
European site. Also, as I have already mentioned, GTZ invited the residents to change the 
ways in which they related to their houses and to the city, in general. In short, GTZ aimed 
to teach Sibiu’s residents to become European citizens and prove their newly acquired 
Europeanness through the ways in which they respected the historical value of their 
houses, by changing their habitation practices and aesthetic preferences as well as 
developing a new relation to public space.  
I suggested earlier that this project was a subtle invitation to the Romanians 
forming the majority of Sibiu’s urbanites to become more “Saxon,” by adopting social 
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practices of urban habitation that had been associated with Saxon ideas of citizenry and 
urbanity. In other words, the Saxon past that GTZ aimed to revive in Sibiu through the 
beautification of historical houses was made into the form of a European past which the 
current residents in Sibiu, mostly Romanians, were invited to embrace by becoming 
Europeans themselves. Obviously, as Professor Bonhoeffer clearly stated, this approach 
strongly collided with the perspective of Sibiu’s Saxons that “Saxonness” cannot be 
something that can just be taught. On the contrary, it must be cultivated and transmitted 
through generations, distinct kinship and economic associations, as well as inheritance 
systems, as he pointed out.  In fact, the major problem of the GTZ approach to heritage-
as-practice—as something that could be learned—hit a chord among the Saxons precisely 
because it could annul claims for inheritance that they had set forth. That is, GTZ’s 
heritage-as-practice philosophy, which aimed to make Sibiu’s Romanians more “Saxon” 
and thereby more “European,” contradicted Transylvanian Saxons’ interest in promoting 
a form of heritage-as-cultural-recognition. This framework would not only underscore the 
distinct, non-processual quality of Saxon heritage and set forth a claim for cultural and 
political recognition of the Saxon ethnic group in contemporary Romania, but it would 
also directly ground the group’s request for the restitution of the immovable goods that 
used to belong to the ethnic group before the Second World War. Therefore, in a way, the 
GTZ project, if understood as a project of local development sponsored by the German 
state, which would illustrate Germany’s 1992 policy shift from political recognition to 
economic distribution, in fact endangered more complicated processes of local economic 






Villa Hermanni: Place-making in Sibiu and Luxembourg’s Search for a European 
Identity  
 
The GTZ project and the vision of heritage-as-development that it tried to 
promote must also be set in comparison to another project of rehabilitation: that of the 
Baroque Schaser house in Sibiu, whose full refurbishment was sponsored by the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg. In fact, the comparison was made by GTZ itself in one of its first 
reports. There, the restoration of the Luxembourg house—called there, the Red House, 
due to its new color—was used as a complementary illustration to the vision of 
rehabilitation promoted by GTZ. That is, the report explained that there were two ways to 
go about the rehabilitation of Sibiu’s historical center: 1) by identifying the most 
important and perhaps most historically valuable buildings and pursuing a thorough and 
adequate renovation of them (an approach illustrated by the Luxembourg House) and 2) 
of distributing the funding among smaller interventions on a larger number of buildings, a 
perspective on rehabilitation underlying the project coordinated by GTZ.528  
Whereas GTZ claimed that these two approaches to historical preservation 
represent “two faces of one target,” that is, “they do not contradict, but rather complete 
each other,” many other specialists, including local architects in Sibiu as well as 
Bucharest-located specialists from the National Institute for Historical Monuments, were 
very critical of GTZ’s approach. As the former director of the Institute put it, “historical 
preservation is a complex process,” which GTZ did not take into account.529 “They were 
not concerned with the major problems of the buildings, and nothing was done on the 
infrastructure of the historical houses.” Instead, they focused only on “roofs, facades, and 
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some courtyards.” In fact, she said, “from the start, GTZ did not set a major task for 
itself.” She pointed out that the GTZ team had two goals: 1) to make the residents aware 
of the value of their houses and encourage them to become active in the houses’ 
preservation, and 2) to demonstrate how the buildings could be better preserved in the 
future. Consequently, from her point of view, GTZ’s enterprise was not a legitimate 
project of historical preservation.  
 
Figure 21    A 2007 stamp of Grand Duchy of Luxembourg showing the renovated Luxembourg 
house in Sibiu. www.pt.lu/portal/Philatelie/stamps/pid/2609. Photo: Menn Bodson, Bridel. 
 
 In comparison, the Luxembourg Haus project was commended by specialists in 
Sibiu as well as in the central institutes in Bucharest for being an exemplary 
accomplishment of historical preservation. The consolidation and restoration carried out 
between 1999 and 2003 revealed that a gothic house had been initially attached to the 
wall circumscribing the Huet square, which meant that it had been built on the first 
precincts of the fortification Villa Hermani, Hermannstadt. Standing in the cradle of the 
city, the house thus represents then the history of the town in nuce. During the 17th 
century, the house was expanded and redecorated, acquiring a Central European Baroque 





service of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Currently owned by the Lutheran church, 
the house hosts a pub downstairs and a cultural center at the first level, with a guest house 
on the second and third levels. On March 30, 2004, the Luxembourg house was officially 
opened in the presence of the Grand Duke and Duchess of Luxembourg. On that 
occasion, the Lutheran pastor of Sibiu declared to the royal family: “We are like 
brothers,” with the Duke replying that he “no longer feels a guest in Sibiu.” 530 
 I suggest that the refurbishment of Luxembourg Haus should be approached as a 
project of place-making that had different goals than the GTZ project of rehabilitation. 
First, by deciding to sponsor the renovation of a pivotal house for the history of the city, 
the Luxembourg government aimed to reaffirm and literally ground a historical 
connection to Sibiu, which verged on the border between myth and history. That is, by 
promoting this renovation, Luxembourg wished to reinforce the story that the first 
colonists who established Sibiu in 1191 were originally coming from the territory that is 
now included in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. The renovation of the house 
represented only one form through which Luxembourg wanted to reestablish this 
historical link.531 Another project that Luxembourg partially funded was also the research 
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Luxembourg-Sibiu under the title “European cultural capitals” in 2007, “the German Forum [was] more up 
front about this myth [that the Saxons who established the town of Sibiu migrated from the region of 
today’s Luxembourg].” She mentioned to me that the Forum had even tried to apply for a project under 
“Sibiu 2007” that would focus on the historical ties between Sibiu and Luxembourg and the early migration 
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attesting this migration. Conversation in Sibiu, April 2006. 
 Notwithstanding these remarks, the connection to Sibiu played an important role in allowing 
Luxembourg and the Greater Region “to project itself beyond its borders,” as Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime 





and completion of the dictionary of the Saxon dialect, which was claimed to be 
linguistically close to Luxembourgisch, the local language currently spoken in 
Luxembourg, which is a form of German with a strong admixture of French. 
 These two smaller projects preceded the much more important one that 
Luxembourg began in 2004—that of inviting Sibiu to apply together for and share the 
title of European Cultural Capital in 2007. The application was successful, and a complex 
collaboration between Sibiu and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg ensued in order to 
prepare Sibiu to meet the standards of a European Cultural Capital by 2007. In fact, the 
success of the dual application for the title persuaded more external institutions, including 
the World Bank and the German state, this time directly through its KfW Development 
Bank, to further fund the GTZ rehabilitation project, which thereby could be extended for 
another two years (2004-2006). 
 In Romania, and especially in Sibiu, Luxembourg’s generous sponsorship and 
invitation was greatly welcomed. Many of the local leaders also approached it as an 
unexpected and fully gratuitous gesture, which gave them even more reason to strengthen 
                                                                                                                                                                     
through this link with Sibiu, Luxembourg could directly contributed to the expansion of an European 
cultural domain, grounding a “a common European identity.” The connection between Sibiu and 
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The exceptional bond between Luxembourg and Sibiu allowed them to overcome the 1400km 
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European Capitals of Culture [ECOC], namely to engage with lesser-known regions of Europe. 
Sibiu – or Hermannstadt in German – initiated an extensive programme of renovation of the old 
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12th century, when ‘Saxons’ from Luxembourg and the surrounding region emigrated to 
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the diplomatic and cultural ties with public and private institutions in Luxembourg. 
Moreover, I would suggest, in comparison to a more convoluted relation to the German 
state and consequently a more ambivalent attitude towards the GTZ project of 
rehabilitation, which I already discussed, this relationship with Luxemburg seemed to be 
almost free of any political embroilment. The invitation to be in the center of attention in 
Europe for a year, as European cultural capital, an invitation especially granted at a 
moment when the inclusion of Romania in the EU was still uncertain (2004), offered 
Sibiu, and especially Sibiu’s Saxon community and its political leaders, a crucial means 
through which to negotiate political representation in the present. By extending the 
invitation to Sibiu as a way to reinforce historical connections between the two sites, 
Luxembourg reinstated the Saxons of Sibiu on the map of contemporary Europe. In other 
words, instead of using them as representations of the past, and moreover a past that 
could be imitated by non-Saxons in Sibiu, as the GTZ project might have (unwittingly, 
perhaps) pursued through its approach to “heritage-as-practice,” Luxembourg, through 
the gesture to serve together as representations of European culture for a year, offered 
Sibiu’s Saxons a chance for political and cultural visibility undreamt of before. Under 
these new circumstances, the Saxons of Sibiu were no longer appearing as “house plants” 
for the Romanian government to use as tokens of multicultural policies, but were, instead, 
given full recognition.  
 What some political actors in the central offices of the Romanian government may 
not have known at that time was that Luxembourg itself had begun in 2002 a more 
complex political enterprise of “preparing the country’s future” by having its National 





demain au Luxembourg, henceforth VIVRE).532 As one of the participants in the 
program, Sonja Kmec, explained, the first target of this program was  
to find a solution to the question of the definition of a collective identity, which 
rallies for instance around the monarchy, the constitution or a shared ethic, while 
being at the same time open to the future.533  
 
In her conference paper, Kmec discusses one of the research projects that was funded 
through VIVRE, a three year collective project on the role of lieux-de-memoire in the 
formation of collective identities. According to her, this project was developed in order to 
offer insights into the “interplay between memory and history” and the impact of this 
relationship upon the formation of national lieux-de-memoire in Luxembourg. The 
project was funded also because it met stringent political concerns of the Luxembourg 
state. As she put it,  
This is considered "a vital question for our country," which is said to have been 
confronted with profound economic, cultural, educational and identity changes in 
the last thirty years and which is expected to face even more profound changes in 
the future due to globalisation, the European integration process and inner 
European migrations towards Luxembourg. Not just the population's living 
standards, but its cultural identity is considered to be at stake, caught in a 
"dilemma" between the "national" — considered to be "irreplaceable" — the 
regional (bigger region) and the global. 
 
One of the requirements of the VIVRE program was that the results of the projects 
funded be readily available not only to other researchers, but also to economic and 
political actors, as well as the larger public.534 This particular research project was 
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published as a nicely illustrated, bilingual album displaying a variety of lieux-de-
memoire in Luxembourg. 535 
 Even though Kmec does not mention Sibiu in her paper, I suggest that this project 
and its broader political rationale are crucial for a better understanding of the recent 
cultural and political alliances that Luxembourg has developed with the city of Sibiu 
since 1999. In fact, the sponsorship of the refurbishment of the house now named after 
the country signaled a project of creating a lieu-de-memoire outside the national borders 
of the Luxembourg state. Moreover, the sharing of the title of European cultural capital 
with Sibiu was in itself a clear gesture of endorsing novel transnational symbolical 
geographies of contemporary political significance. Therefore, Luxembourg’s invitation, 
as much as it could have been one of gratuitous generosity, also offered an important 
political compensation. That is, by calling upon historical ties, and a form of shared 
“heritage,” Luxembourg, a minuscule state, after all, aimed to secure political visibility 
not only for Sibiu and its Saxon community, but also for itself on the grander European 
political stage. 
In conclusion, the GTZ project of rehabilitation and the renovation of the 
Luxemburg haus could be approached as projects of heritage-making with clear political 
goals. They represent metaphorically as well as bring new insight into the symbolic 
geographies that are simultaneously created by and negotiated among various EU 
members, in an attempt to secure more political leverage within this transnational union. 
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 This chapter has shown that heritage-making in contemporary Sibiu is a 
multilayered process, which must be situated historically and geopolitically. First, I 
offered a historical discussion of the social and political transformations of the Saxon 
community in Transylvania during socialist times. I suggested that the centralist project 
of social and ethnic homogenization was turned on its head in a very interesting way in 
Sibiu during the 1970s and 1980s, as many Romanians started mirroring cultural forms of 
Saxonness in order to pursue and signify a higher social status within the local hierarchy 
of the city. This example offers an illustration of forms of heritage-as-practice that 
various groups relied upon to counter the socialist state’s attempts to erase ethnic and 
cultural differences on a national scale. 
 At the same time, if heritage-as-practice was something that Saxons in Sibiu 
relied upon, in the absence of stronger institutions that the socialist state had encroached 
upon, heritage-as-practice in contemporary Sibiu is no longer viewed as salutary by the 
dwindling community of Saxons. I showed that the GTZ project of rehabilitation of the 
city’s historical center, as much as it contained the implicit promise of offering 
Transylvania’s Saxons political visibility and agency before the central government, 
raised further questions about the political viability of the Saxon community. I suggested 
that the approach to heritage-as-practice that GTZ proposed, by inviting the residents of 
Sibiu, most of them Romanians, to become more “European” by adopting social practices 
of habitation formerly associated with the Saxon group, ended by questioning the very 
core of Saxon ethnic identity. In short, the project pointed out that ethnic belonging could 





inheritance. This radical perspective not only raised questions of the ethnic distinctions 
that the Saxons in Sibiu continue to hold onto as a way of (very successfully, in fact) 
retaining political visibility. It simultaneously added a new nuance to the debates about 
Saxon heritage, which directly bear on the claims set forth by the Saxon group in 
Transylvania for restitution of the vast range of economic resources, including buildings 
and land, that used to belong to the Lutheran church and that the socialist state 
confiscated. 
The intense debates around the projects of heritage-making, mainly represented 
by the rehabilitation of the historical center, which preceded the official transformation of 
the city into a European cultural capital in 2007, also illustrate an interesting adaptation 
of earlier interests in heritage as development that emerged in the 1980s, which I 
discussed at length in the Introduction. If, at that moment, a perspective on heritage as 
development was supported by UNESCO as an attempt to even out the huge economic 
discrepancies between the wealthy north and the poor global south, in the case of Sibiu 
we observe a similar relationship between Germany and ethnic Germans still living in 
eastern Europe. The perspective on heritage as development that was promoted by GTZ 
in Sibiu signaled the shift of policy from that of political inclusion for ethnic Germans, by 
inviting them to emigrate to Germany, to that of helping build a framework in which 
these groups could develop in the countries of their birth. However, as I showed, this 
approach to heritage as development sometimes conflicts with local approaches to 
heritage as cultural and political recognition, a recognition sought at national and 





heritage becomes crucial for them to justify the restitution of a vast wealth to a currently 
dwindling community (60,000 people). 
 Under these circumstances, Luxembourg’s invitation to Sibiu to co-participate in 
the competition for European Cultural Capital in 2007, appeared as a salutary 
complementary mechanism of bringing the Saxons of Sibiu back onto the map of Europe. 
I suggest that this invitation also must be understood not only as a local endorsement of 
“common European heritage” in the contemporary EU, but also as attempts to create 
specific clusters of transnational cultural identities in the present that are consolidated 






CONFLICTING  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORKS AND BUILT HERITAGE 




The previous chapter revealed the multiple and diverging political interests 
underlying the project of making the historical center of Sibiu into a representation of 
“European (Saxon) heritage.” As I pointed out, many of these conflicts stemmed from 
different understandings of what heritage is and what it is good for. Some of the 
specialists in historical preservation from the central institutions in Bucharest were very 
critical of the approach to the city center’s rehabilitation pursued by the GTZ team. While 
the first group viewed historical preservation as an end in itself, the latter offered a more 
pragmatic orientation to projects of heritage-making as being mainly a form of local 
development. The GTZ project was quintessentially a social project of transforming the 
relationship between Sibiu’s urbanites and their lived environment by asking them to see 
their city differently, especially the houses of the historical center. This shift of 
perspective was not promoted only through an exclusively aesthetic argument, but rather 
as a form of producing and reinforcing the civic participation of Sibiu’s residents as well 
as encouraging them to prove their own social value, by showing themselves worthy to 
be living in the now European Sibiu. 
This chapter offers a relatively similar story, which is, however, differently 





development, and regional symbolical competition. I propose an analysis of an ongoing 
project of heritage revitalization—the reconstruction of the Bánffy castle in the village of 
Bonţida, Cluj county—as a site for examining diverging processes of heritage-making as 
opposite systems of resignification of material forms. More specifically, I show how the 
creation of a “European heritage” in the contemporary village of Bonţida has involved 
multiple negotiations and conflicts among not only various local and external actors, but 
also distinct and even diverging historiographies, historical frameworks and regimes of 
property. Those temporal frameworks are: 1) pre-war times, when the castle was owned 
by the Bánffy family, imagined by foreign specialists in building conservation as a turn-
of-the-century idyllic and multicultural Transylvania, 2) the socialist period, when the 
castle had been seized by the socialist state to be used by the new local leaders for 
various more or less legal purposes, until it was abandoned in the early 1970s, and 3) the 
postsocialist context, in which an NGO, Ardeal Trust, relying on mostly external funding, 
has tried to symbolically and physically revive the castle, by widely promoting it as a 
European heritage site while also trying to persuade the villagers to participate in this 
radical resignification. The estate was formerly owned by a Transylvanian Hungarian 
aristocratic family in a village in which the majority is currently Romanian 
(approximately 70%). The local Hungarians as well as the Roma each represent 15% of 
the population.536  
Historians and art historians have considered the Bánffy castle one of the most 
important architectural assemblages of Transylvania. The castle’s overwhelming luxury 
has prompted visitors to regard it as the “Versailles of Transylvania.” After 1945, when 
                                                        






communists seized power, the castle, together with numerous other private estates of pre-
communist Romania, was confiscated by the new state. During the socialist period, it 
fulfilled various roles, ranging from a storage site for machinery parks, to a mushroom 
plant and a beer bottling plant, until it was abandoned in the mid 1970s. Since 1998, the 
NGO Ardeal Trust (the Trust, henceforth), with initial support from the Hungarian and 
Romanian governments, as well as grants from the EU and other private foundations, has 
initiated the reconstruction of the Bánffy castle as an international site of teaching 
traditional crafts.537 
To better understand the negotiations over what “heritage” represents and to 
whom it should belong I place the material and symbolical transformations of the castle 
within the broader changes occurring in the village throughout the 20th century. More 
specifically, I investigate how the villagers related to, valued, or rejected the castle at 
different political moments, which were mapped onto the wider political projects of 
social and economic revaluation of the relationship between people and things. I argue 
that the castle became a pivotal means for the post-1945 socialist leaders in the village to 
built up and ground a new capital by appropriating the castle as their own belonging. 
Such a maneuver was far from being singular, as it was just one of the multiple instances 
starting up a more complex process of post-1945 new class formation through the 
collection and reevaluation of the assets that used to belong to the groups holding social 
and political power in the interwar period. This was the major strategy through which the 
socialist regime in Romania acquired political legitimacy. Bonţida represented just a tiny 
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part of the larger project of centralizing economic and symbolic goods, which, as I have 
shown in the second chapter, was set up by the socialist state as early as 1947.  
At the same time, a close examination of the dismantling of the Bánffy castle in 
Bonţida and its piecemeal transfer into the village in the form of bricks, statues, some 
pieces of furniture, roof tiles, window frames, pieces of wood ceiling, and other things, 
reveals that this transfer was not exclusively dictated by “the center,” but in fact was 
pursued by the locals who found themselves in power positions in the post-1947 political 
apparatus. As early as 1947, the Commission for Historical Monuments, alerted by the 
recently established Union of the Hungarians in Romania, tried to stop the looting and 
willful destruction of many of the castles and mansions in Transylvania, which mostly 
had been expropriated from well-to-do Transylvanian Hungarians. However, due to the 
impending dismantling of the Commission in a time of radical political transition, with 
the new communist government pursuing a Stalinization closely supervised by the USSR, 
the project of preservation of the Hungarian architectural sites in Transylvania was 
abandoned. Late, at the end of the 1960s, the newly re-established Department for 
Historical Monuments aimed to pursue a larger project of historical preservation of some 
important castles and mansions in Transylvania, including the former Bánffy castle. 
There is archival evidence, which was supported by the conversations I had with 
historians and art historians in Cluj, that the local party leaders in Bonţida actively 
opposed the central institutions’ attempt to renovate the castle. The conclusions I draw 
from the archival data go against the prevalent argument, set forth by many of the foreign 
specialists pursuing rehabilitation projects mostly in Transylvania after 1990, that the 





acknowledging some of the earlier efforts of the Romanian specialists to pursue state-
sponsored projects of built-heritage rehabilitation through the national Department of 
Historical Monuments, at the beginning of the 1990s foreign specialists claimed that it 
was they who brought forth know-how and resources to revive the lost built heritage of 
Transylvania. 
In the second part of the chapter, I analyze Ardeal Trust’s stated intentions to 
“train and re-train” the local craftsmen in traditional building skills, which the NGO 
assumed to have been neglected and mostly forgotten in post-socialist Romania. I suggest 
that such a process of reinventing “craftsmanship” could be understood as a particular 
form of re-learning history via teaching traditional crafts. This operation carries a new 
valuation of a specific past, embedded in historical buildings. However, during this very 
process, another chunk of time is de-historicized and thus taken out of the past. This is 
the communist period, which is rendered an ahistorical time; in other words, a no-time. 
For the past that those specialists reclaim and would like to “revive” stopped in 1945, and 
they aim now to link it directly to the post-1990 era. The process of learning or re-
learning particular traditional skills illustrates how structures of knowledge are radically 
rearranged and redefined, whereas other forms of knowledge are deemed obsolete and 
inadequate. By critically examining this process of teaching and (re)learning skills 
involving different actors (British and Romanian craftsmen, EU experts, international 
specialist, governmental actors, etc), I aim to understand if such an operation also 
becomes a way of rearranging historical and contemporary reality. In other words, in 
what ways do global arrangements of hierarchies of knowledge and skills call upon the 





of “traditional sites” (or regions)? I investigate the paradox underlying the current regime 
of heritage promoted by the NGO, in which tradition, in the form of traditional building 
techniques, becomes resignified as a path to development and democratic modernization.  
I move then to discuss another program developed by the Trust that was intended 
to complement the traditional building skills teaching program. More specifically, 
beginning in 2002, the Trust launched the yearly Bonţida Cultural Fair as a strategy to 
promote the site by opening it to the public, including the villagers. According to one of 
the Trust managers, this project has been approached as a means to “bring the village 
community back into the castle.” However, this invitation was not necessarily welcomed 
by the people in the village, some of whom consider this event as a kind of circus 
combined with a temporary flea market. I discuss the divergent meanings of materiality, 
emerging from the distinct temporal frameworks in which the Trust and the villagers 
situate themselves and their actions.  
In the last part of the chapter, I pay attention to the different usages of history and 
the diverging meanings of heritage employed by the Trust and the local authorities. The 
case of the Bánffy castle becomes yet another example of the multilayered process 
whereby a form of socialist heritage (the heritage of the new socialist state, a regime 
without a history in the political context of Romania ) was formed out of a rearrangement 
not only of things, but especially of the relationships among them. From a coherent and 
compact private estate, under the approving silence of the local officials, the castle and 
the park nearby had been disassembled into separate parts, to be then spread into the very 
fabric of the village or even appropriated by these local officials to pursue individual 





used as a basis by the current local officials to ground a claim over the castle based on 
their conviction that it represents the village’s heritage. I suggest that these officials had 
taken up the discourse of heritage, which had been brought to Bonţida by the Trust, only 
to turn it on its head. They did so in order to justify their continuous claims over the 
castle, which used to be under their supervision as part of the socialist state’s public 
domain.  
By drawing upon previous analyses of conflictual forms of heritage, I propose 
that these officials’ take on heritage is grounded in an approach to heritage as proximity, 
in which they rely on an understanding of recent history as a continuous process, without 
a clear cut between the socialist period and the postsocialist 1990s.538 I counterpose this 
approach to the position taken by the Trust, set within an approach to heritage as 
recognition, as one instance in which a group, in order to sustain claims for political and 
social recognition, must first identify and select representations of their difference and 
freeze them as “endangered cultural heritage.” In this case, the Trust sees the restitution 
of the castle to its original owners, the Bánffy family, as a political act that would 
acknowledge the rights and history of the Transylvanian Hungarian former nobility. An 
analysis of the conflicting claims over the Bánffy castle offers an interesting angle on the 
strategies employed by various groups in contemporary Romania to gain political 
visibility by employing the trope of “cultural heritage” while drastically redefining it to 
their own benefit.  
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We encounter here an important shift from the political and economic 
environment that I discussed in Part I. In socialist Romania, local authorities functioned 
as proxies of the central institutions and thereby owned a monopoly over the distribution 
of resources as well as the “politically correct” representations of “heritage” and 
“history.” However, as much as they tried after the 1990s to hold onto their privileges 
that they had acquired in the previous economy, these local actors have found themselves 
in a much more vulnerable position. In a postsocialist context in which the centralized 
redistributive system no longer functions and consequently the field of cultural 
politicking is much more fragmented, they have shifted from their previous role of 
distributors of resources to being just another set of consumers, always set in competition 
with others. Therefore, the struggles over the historical meanings and the cultural and 
economic value of the Bánffy castle render a vivid picture of the broader reconfigurations 
occurring within the postsocialist social and economic landscape.   
 
The Bánffy Castle and the Village of Bonţida: Historical Ties and Social Tensions 
 
The Bánffy family, one of the mightiest aristocratic lines of Transylvania, owned 
the castle without interruption between 1347 and 1944. Continuously modified, 
expanded, and reconstructed by different generations of successors, the site was shaped 
not only by the family’s resources, but also by its high aspirations within the political 
hierarchy of the Hapsburg Empire. An imposing palimpsest of architectural styles 
(baroque, renaissance, neo-classicism), the castle faithfully reflects the larger historical, 
political, and aesthetical shifts during 18th and 19th century Europe.539 The image it 
                                                        






acquired by the middle of the 18th century, via an embellishment with human-size statues, 
a French-style park, and marble staples, mirrored the tastes of the imperial aristocracy 
dominated by Viennese baroque architecture. Its last owner, count Bánffy Miklós, was a 
key figure in the literary and political world of turn-of-the-century Transylvania, when 
the province was still part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. After 1926, he directly 
contributed to the cultural and political revival of the Transylvanian Hungarian 
community, which felt deprived of much of their political and cultural power following 
Transylvania’s incorporation into Romania after the First World War.  
 
Figure 22 The northern wing of the castle, modified at the end of 1930s. Courtesy of József 
Bálint. (Photo included in the album “Castelul Banffi, com. Bontida, jud. Cluj,” by Constantin 
Rusu, 1968.) 
 
A significant dimension of the project of rehabilitation of the castle, initiated by 
the Trust in 1999, has involved the revival of the estate as a cultural site, together with 
the memory of its last owner. Calling upon an idyllic image of a multicultural turn-of-the-





the hearth of the community, and thereby to restore a historically deep link between the 
castle and the village, which was destroyed under the communist regime. 
In this section, I do not aim to offer a simple history of the castle, but rather use 
the castle as a starting point from which to unearth the multiple histories of the social and 
political landscape in which the castle is embedded. I argue that the changes within the 
local economy of the castle index a shifting social fabric and diverging ethnic allegiances. 
By drawing upon archival material and secondary sources as well as some villagers’ 
remembrances about the castle before and after the Second World War, I analyze the 
castle’s non-static meanings as a part of the dynamic social fabric in the region and town. 
I show that the castle has been differently incorporated into villagers’ understandings of 
the locale, while the interethnic tense and deep history taking shape in the background of 
the castle conflicts with the neatly packaged historical narrative promoted through the 
NGO’s version of the castle as the village’s heritage. 
Up until the middle of the 19th century, the commune of Bonţida (Bonchida in 
Hungarian) was strictly dependent on the Bánffy domain. As some of the Bánffy owners 
held significant political positions at the Viennese imperial court, they had the power and 
wealth to orchestrate some influx of labor into Bonţida that would directly contribute to 
the development of the Bánffy domain, and indirectly of Bonţida itself.540 In 1750, people 
                                                        
540 The privileged political and social status that the Bánffy line had among Transylvania’s nobility had a 
direct influence on Bonţida’s position on the administrative map of the region. Beginning with the mid 18th 
century until mid 19th century, Bonţida represented an administrative center within the historic comitatus 
(county) of Doboka in the Austro-Hungarian empire. The site lost its centrality due to the administrative 
changes that followed the 1848 revolution. In an attempt to strengthen the endangered power of the 
Hapsburg empire, the imperial court implemented from 1849 on various strategies that would make the 
counties more dependent on the administrative court offices. In 1854, the counties’ organization changed, 
and Bonţida was incorporated into the larger district of Kolozsvár (Cluj). Aurel Loșonţi, Trecut și prezent 
despre Bonţida: Studiu Monografic [Past and Present About Bonţida: Monography] (Cluj-Napoca: 





of different ethnic backgrounds were brought to work as serfs on the land.541 The 
establishment of a dual Monarchy (Austro-Hungarian) in 1867 marked also, from an 
economical standpoint, the rise of a relatively independent Hungary, whose size allowed 
sufficient flexibility on the speedier global markets, while also profiting from the 
protection ensured by the empire’s mercantilism and unity.542 The industrial take-off 
additionally determined a more systematic influx to the urban centers, which affected 
Bonţida as well.  
By the end of the 19th century up until the Second World War, younger people 
started to leave Bonţida in search of jobs.543 Many of them, especially those without land, 
knew they could not make ends meet if they remained in the village. To climb up the 
social ladder, they were forced to leave behind the feudal system of the village and dash 
into the booming urban markets in search of a better destiny. As an old peasant woman 
told me, “if you had worked for the grof [derived from the German Graf, nobleman], you 
could not build even a tiny house (căsuţă), because the grof did not pay well at all. But, if 
you went to town [for work], you could [manage to gain money and built yourself a 
house].”544  
                                                        
541 Those people brought into Bonchida as new serfs for the Bánffy lands further diversified the ethnic 
background of the locals, as a significant part of the new population was Armenian. (This fact led to the 
establishment of the local Catholic community). The development is also shown by statistics. In 1721, there 
were 76 households in Bonchida, of which 22 Hungarian and 54 Romanian, including 6 nobiliary 
households, 30 of serfs, 12 temporary laborers (free peasants paid by day), and 28 other. In 1785, there was 
a population of 1290 people, organized in 242 households, out of which 147 did not own land. Loșonţi, 
Trecut și prezent despre Bonţida,175. 
542 Katherine Verdery, Transylvanian Villagers: Three Centuries of Political, Economic, and Ethnic 
Change, 340. 
543 Compare population in 1900 to 1930. The 1900 census recorded 2, 223 people, of which 1,139 
Romanians, 999 Hungarians, 71 Germans, and 14 belonging to other ethnic groups (Jews, Armenians, 
Gypsy). Loșonţi, Trecut și prezent despre Bonţida,176. 
544 Interview with Ms. Floarea, who worked for seven years in a hotel in Bucharest, together with her 
husband. They regularly sent their savings back home, to her parents, in order to build a new house. The 
parents build a house according to the instructions send by Ms. Floarea, who wanted a porch with columns, 





Especially after the 1918 unification of Transylvania with Romania, the 
Romanians of Bonţida (but also some Hungarians) looking for better jobs could easily 
travel to the “old kingdom” (the “old,” pre-1918 Romania). In interwar Romania, most of 
them started working in hotels and middle-class households. Many of my interlocutors 
admitted that Transylvanians were in high demand for such positions because they were 
viewed as “clean and responsible.” Many people left, leaving their children behind with 
the grandparents, to work in Bucharest for extended periods (sometimes up to ten years). 
Others emigrated as far as the United States.545 The money they regularly sent home 
represented an important capital for the development of local households. This is the time 
when small old cottages were demolished for the sake of new, larger and grander houses, 
some embellished with obviously modern elements the new owners encountered in the 
cities during their Wanderschaft (i.e. a journey in search for jobs). For instance, some of 
the houses built between 1920 and 1940 in Bonţida contain architectural traits of the sites 
where Bonţideans had worked. The current owners pointed out such elements to me, 
stating that their parents “wanted columns resembling [hotel] Modern.”546  
Whereas before 1920 most of the strongly built houses in Bonţida had been part 
of the Bánffy family property, between 1920 and 1940 the continuous influx of capital 
brought about a relative economic development in the commune as a whole.547 Lots of 
new houses were built at this time in Bonţida, which radically changed the overall 
appearance of the village. However, these changes did not occur in a historical vacuum. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1944, she returned to Bonţida following the Romanian troups that entered Transylvania upon the country’s 
shift to the Allied side. (Between 1940 and 1944, following the Vienna Award, the northern half of 
Transylvania was part of Hungary.) 
545 Loșonţi, Trecut și prezent despre Bonţida, 49. 
546 A luxurious Bucharest hotel, where many Bonţidans worked in the interwar years. 





On the contrary, the radical remapping of this part of the world due to Transylvania’s 
unification with Romania after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy 
brought about novel ethnic geographies that reflected the strong tendencies of 
Romanization carried out by the Romanian state. If in 1920, Bonţida had, among other 
groups, 1,316 Romanians and 950 Hungarians, ten years later, in 1930, the Romanian 
population had kept its size (1310 people), while the Hungarians had diminished by ¼ 
(768 people).548 This ethnic redistribution mirrored the new social and economic 
hierarchies.549  
 Consequently, after 1918, because of important land reforms and labor migration, 
and especially on the ground of political and thereby ethnic reconfigurations, the Bánffy 
domain ceased to be the main provider for the Bonţideans. More than half of the land 
formerly owned by the Bánffy family was distributed in line with the 1921 land reform to 
those who fought during the war, while more land was being bought with the money 
coming from outside.550 This was why workers from mountain villages were temporarily 
hired for the summer on the count’s land (moşie), while quite a few Bonţideans worked 
their own new land. The personnel of the castle was recruited from the Hungarian-
speaking people of Bonţida or the neighboring villages; often their entire family was 
hired on a yearly contract. Peasant agriculture was a great resource for the newly born 
                                                        
548 Even if many villagers worked outside Bonţida, they were declared as residents and registered as such 
by the census statistics. 
549 For instance, many of the houses owned by Hungarians before 1918 (hence, the street’s old name, uliţa 
ungurească, the Hungarian alley/pathway), were progressively acquired by Romanians due to the influx of 
capital sent by the relatives working in the cities. 
550 In 1912, the Bánffy domain had covered 4,862 ha, which represented 67. 2% of the total land of Bonţida 
commune (including the neighboring village Válaszút/Răscruci), whereas the peasants had owned 1,253 ha, 
representing 23.7% ha. In 1928, the Bánffy land covered only 1,253 (17.3% of the land surrounding 
Bonţida), while the peasants now had 5,239 ha (72.4% of the total land). Source: Petru Spânul, Herghelia 
Natională Bonţida [the Bonţida National Studfarm] (Bucureşti: Ministry of Agriculture and Domains, The 





Romanian state. Peasants received a strong impetus from the state to become more 
qualified in agriculture and develop a more capitalist approach to production. The latter 
consequently shifted from a subsistence economy to competition and high production.551 
 
Figure 23  The western wing of the Bánffy castle, 1936. Unknown author. Courtesy of József 




Moreover, after 1918, a new site began to gain more interest for Bonţida at the 
regional and national level: the Bonţida national stud farm (Herghelia Naţională 
Bonţida). Opened in 1907 by the Hungarian state as a military stud farm, it became the 
property of the Romanian state upon the 1918 unification. Besides the common goal of 
breeding horses, it seems that additional subtle political tensions underlay the farm’s 
competition with the Bánffy castle. In a sense, the stud farm was a certain type of proxy 
for the (Romanian) state closely watching the Transylvanian (Hungarian) nobility. As 
such, the farm might have also contributed to the widening of the gap between the village 
                                                        
551 This was part of a larger social project of transforming the relationship between the individual and state 
in interwar Romania. See Maria Bucur, Eugenics and Modernization in Interwar Romania (Pittsburgh, Pa.: 





and the castle by setting as its mission “to erase the lack of education and to teach skills 
in the field of agriculture and animal raising in these villages.”552 
Indeed, starting in 1935, the farm administrator, the agronomist Silviu Pop, also 
one of the most affluent men in Bonţida, offered regular summer courses on agriculture 
and other related fields, in an attempt to improve the peasants’ education and skills.553 
While the local peasants were encouraged to attend such classes, count Bánffy 
György(1843-1929) searched for solutions to become more independent from the type of 
production that would need a constant and significant labor force.554 The castle was 
therefore to be regarded as private property, whose boundaries were not to be 
transgressed. At the same time, its influence over the commune’s internal affairs 
remained high, as the local administrators and politicians were still old allies of Bánffy. 
555  
The pre-1918 class divide between “the Bánffy castle” and “Bonţida,” which 
almost naturally fit the picture of the imperial economic order of late feudalism, was 
congruent with the ethnic social divisions promoted by imperial politics. After 1918, once 
the ethnic policies changed dramatically, by virtue of which fact Romanians felt entitled 
                                                        
552 Spânul, Herghelia Naţională Bonţida [the Bonţida National Studfarm], 16. 
553 “Din activitatea Camerei de agricultură a judeţului Cluj,”Patria (Romanian daily), Cluj, August 20, 
1933, page 3.  
554 Besides raising thorough-bred horses (horses were his grand passion), he replaced a stone mill with a 
(quicker, and therefore, more profitable) electric one, thus adding new revenues to those acquired from the 
orchard, the pig farm, and the winery. DJAN Cluj, Fond Bánffy, File 1537, page 150 (130). Nemes Gyula’s 
memoirs (“A tékozló fiú és zék régi emlékem” [A wandering son and my memoirs]). I thank Lorand Sallai 
for his translation.  
555 With their economic and especially political status already consolidated, some Romanians in Bonţida 
tried to undermine the Bánffy family’s influence on the commune’s organization. A 1935 regional daily 
mentioned the plan of key figures of Bonţida’s Romanians (forming obştea sătenilor) to organize new local 
elections. Their goal was to allow the members of the (newly elected) communal council to fire those who 
had been close collaborators of the Bánffy family, especially the president of the current local council, who 
was a good friend of the Bánffys. However, they failed, and the president was not changed. Patria, 1935, 
20 January, p.4. The connection between the president, Onos Sándor/Alexandru and the Bánffy family is 





to act as the majority in before the Hungarian “minority,”556 the divide suddenly became 
highly questionable. The former aristocrats of the empire were now politically equal to all 
Bonţida’s other inhabitants under the umbrella of the young Romanian state. In such 
circumstances, notwithstanding the close contacts between some of the Bonţida elites and 
the Bánffy family, the castle’s importance within the local symbolic economy started to 
decrease. From being the “natural” center of the commune, the castle appeared as private 
property, relatively disconnected from the locals’ social world.557  
 The intense and systematic political centralism practiced by the post-1918 
Romanian government aimed at significantly tearing apart the social and political fabric 
of the substantial group of Transylvanian Hungarians. Under these conditions, any kind 
of nostalgic resistance, dreaming of the pre-1918 Hungary, seemed, politically speaking, 
an immature utopian gesture. Instead, increasingly more Hungarian elites felt that they 
must first come to terms with the new political configuration that turned them from first-
class into second-class political subjects, and subsequently initiate an active and 
systematic identity movement that would preserve the awareness of Transylvanian 
Hungarianness.558 Notwithstanding the deep frictions among them, these elites pursued 
strategies which were purportedly the best way to maintain an ethnic identity of 
Transylvanian Hungarians as a whole.  
                                                        
556 I am using the political terms of that time. 
557 Compare this context to an earlier relationship developed between the villagers and the castle’s owners, 
illustrated by a scene in Bánffy Miklós’s Transylvanian Trilogy, in which villagers come to the count as to 
their father, for advice. This description complements remarks received from some of my interlocutors in 
Bonţida, who told me that the count often would be the godfather for the children of the people working at 
the castle. 
558 Lucian Nastasă, "Maghiarii din România şi etica minoritară. Repere istorice, 1920-1940 [the Magyars of 
Romania and the Minority Ethics. Historical Milestones, 1920-1940]," in Maghiarii din România (1920-






One such strategy proposed a holistic approach to post-1918 Transylvania, in that 
the region was promoted as a politically and culturally unique social space, wherein the 
boundaries between the intra muros ethnic groups (Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, 
and others) were in fact more dialectical. In fact, the interethnic boundaries were more 
blurry than the boundaries separating Transylvania from the other regions. In other 
words, the Transylvanians, no matter their ethnic background, were much more alike than 
the inhabitants from other regions, be they of the same ethnic descent. This view 
undergirded “Transylvanism,” a current which invoked Transylvania’s particular 
multiculturalism to justify a relative political autonomy in the region. This seemed to be 
“a logical solution of creating a regional parity, with no ‘minority’ and ‘majority,”” but 
rather with ”Transylvanians” only.559  
 Bánffy Miklós, the castle’s last owner after his father’s death in 1929, was one of 
the strongest promoters of Transylvanism, by initiating and coordinating a group of 
Hungarian intellectuals and artists, “Erdélyi Helikon,” which edited its own journal 
between 1928 and 1944. Moreover, Bánffy tried to give rise to a solid cultural network of 
young artists and writers of interethnic orientation, who promoted Transylvanism as a 
multicultural interethnic awareness of a “common destiny.”560 It seems that  
it is mostly thanks to him — given the circumstances — that Transylvanian-
Hungarian literature and cultural life between the two world wars started 
flourishing. He supported young writers and financially supported talented 
students, established a Transylvanian Fine Arts Circle, [and set up] connections 
with Transylvanian-Romanian and German authors.561 
 
                                                        
559 Ibid., 36. 
560 Ibid., 34. 
561 Györgyi Kusztos, "A Model of Unifying Innovation and Reproduction — Bánffy Miklós and 






As the president of the Hungarian Community (the representative organization that 
replaced the Hungarian Party after 1938),562 Bánffy Miklós was among those 
Transylvanian Hungarian intellectuals who tried to persuade the Budapest-based 
government to tame the repressive policies towards the Romanian minority after 1940, 
when Northern Transylvania was incorporated into Hungary under the 1940 second 
Vienna treaty.563 When presenting the activities of Transylvania’s former Hungarian 
Commission in front of the Hungarian Parliament, he pointed out the “freedom” and the 
political recognition the Transylvanian Hungarians had been previously given by the 
Romanian government, thereby calling for a similar attitude towards Transylvania’s 
Romanians, who found themselves inhabitants of Hungarian territories almost 
overnight.564 Bánffy had the merit to be among the Transylvanian Hungarian politicians 
who attempted to reduce the escalation of violence as well as the repressive measures 
taken by Horthy’s regime against the non-Hungarian groups in Transylvania. 
More importantly, between 1934 and 1944, he published a 1,400 page novel— 
Erdélyi Történet, translated as The Writing on the Wall: A Transylvanian Trilogy.565 
Partly autobiographic, the trilogy depicts a pre-1918 Hungarian nobility, completely 
unaware of the radical political upheavals emerging all around them. They were 
                                                        
562 After March 31, 1938, King Carol II banned all the political parties in Romania in order to endorse his 
dictatorship. Bánffy Miklós was elected as the president of the Hungarian People’s Community, which was 
to supervise all of the social, economic, and cultural activities of the Hungarian community in Romania.  
563 Under the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, signed at the end of the first world war, Hungary was forced to cede 
Transylvania and the Banat to Romania. The ill feelings and resentments of the Hungarians over this great 
loss played a significant part in Hitler’s pressuring Romania in 1940 (when both Romania and Hungary 
were Germany’s allies) to return the northern half of Transylvania to Hungary. (This besides other 
territories given to the USSR and Bulgaria.) In 1940, under the Vienna second award, Romania lost a third 
of its former territories. Keith Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947, (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1994), 450. 
564 Tribuna Ardealului, “Discursul Contelui N. Bánffy” [Count Bánffy’s speech], by Artur Anderco. 
December 25,1940. 
565 The title alludes to the biblical scene from the Old Testament book of Daniel, where “the hand of God 
writes in letters of fire upon the wall of the King’s palace: MENE- the Lord hath counted thy 
kingdom….But no one could see the writing because they were drunken with wine and wrath with 





portrayed as lacking any kind of historical and political consciousness, seeking instead 
pleasure and beauty in a multitude of forms. The novel also includes beautiful pages 
describing the castle and the park on the Bánffy domain in Bonţida, which appears under 
the name of “Denestornya” in the book. Bánffy wrote with wit and humor, and a certain 
irony about the group he himself belonged to. At the same time, the book is traversed by 
a strong awareness of Transylvanian identity that could not be justified by an imperial 
understanding of an all-encompassing concept of Hungarianness. While abandoned in the 
early times of communist Hungary, due to its “reactionary” topic as well as its author’s 
aristocratic origins, the book was “rediscovered” by a Hungarian literary critic, István 
Nemeskürty, who wrote a review of the trilogy in 1980.566 Also, between 1999 and 2001 
an English translation came out in London, thereby definitely exposing Bánffy Miklós 
and his world to a much wider audience. 567  
It is in fact this book that has made Bonţida and the Bánffy castle known outside 
its regional and local boundaries, as it stirred the interest of English-speaking nostalgic 
romantics. Thus, the castle came to embody both the fascinating, still unknown, 
Transylvania, and the dying aristocracy of fin-de-siècle Central Europe. As such, the 
publication of the English translation immensely helped the Trust’s project of 
rehabilitation, insofar as it stimulated on a much larger scale nostalgic imageries of the 
                                                        
566 Foreword by Patrick Thursfield. István Nemeskürty deemed The Transylvanian Trilogy especially 
“important because of its historical authenticity and ‘document-style description of the era’.” (Nemeskürty 
in Kurtosz, 2006).  
567 The translation was supported by the Hungarian Ministry for Cultural Heritage via a translation grant 
offered by the Hungarian Book Foundation, which sponsored the translation and editing costs of the last 
two volumes. Source: http://www.hungarianbookfoundation.hu/subventioned_books/7?year=1999, 
Accessed June 20, 2008. The translators—among whom was Bánffy Miklós’ own daughter, Katalin Jelen-
Bánffy—were awarded the Weidenfeld Translation Prize, while the first volume (They Were Counted) 






lost, yet still fascinating world of imperial Central Europe, and especially drew attention 
to its endangered heritage in the form of abandoned castles and manors.568  
In sum, my discussion of the relationship between the castle and the village prior 
to 1945 points out several things. First, far from being directly economically dependent 
on the castle, the villagers in fact were more flexible and preferred to search for better 
paid work in the expanding urban settings after 1918 and even abroad. Such 
independence was also encouraged by the law of agrarian reform in 1921, when people in 
the village who took part in the First World War were given plots of land. During the 
interwar years, after the return of Bánffy Miklós from Budapest in 1926, the castle 
independently developed into a place of cultural gatherings of the literati of Transylvania 
and other artists and writers from Hungary. In that sense, it could be looked upon as a 
heritage site for the Transylvanian Hungarian elite of the interwar period. Second, the 
severing of economic ties combined with the new political configuration infused with an 
even greater tension the relationship between the castle and the villagers. The ambiguity 
of this relationship (of hostile and even envious admiration) came up during my 
conversations with older Bonţidans.569 One of the most common lines in these 
conversations was that the gates were closed and that only a few privileged people could 
                                                        
568 As the castle’s guest book records, quite a few English-speaking visitors had “already fancied this 
beautiful place by reading Bánffy Miklós’s They Were Counted trilogy.” And the same visitors admit, “it is 
wonderful to see it coming back to life.” This resurrection imagery permeates most of the notes written by 
the foreign guests. Another visitor puts it even more convincingly: “After …reading about it in the novel 
‘They were counted,” I finally made it to Bonţida. What a grand chateau it was in the past! I truly believe 
the phoenix will rise again from the ashes. And I shall return that day.” A note written by the UK IHBC 
chair reinforces the Phoenix metaphor by saying “a historic place waking up from a deep sleep, and skills 
are born again!” Most of the notes are in English, with a few written in French and German, in addition to 
the higher number of comments made especially in Hungarian, but also Romanian. From what I gathered 
during my stay in Bonţida, Bánffy’s trilogy (especially the English edition) and the Trust’s project of 
strategic renovation actively complement one another. If one was not aware of it until a visit to the castle, 
one would surely find out about Bánffy’s book and very likely buy it. Conversely, upon reading the trilogy, 
one would be even more enticed to travel to Transylvania to see “the real castle.” 
569 I borrow the term of “hostile admiration” from Katherine Verdery, Transylvanian Villagers: Three 





get inside. Very few among them expressed nostalgia about the castle. Such wistfulness 
was usually characteristic of those who were more familiar with the castle and even lived 
on its premises (as, for instance, the daughter of the last forester). For many people, 
however, these times represented the harsh period of growing up without their parents 
who either became temporary migrants, or, if they stayed, were toiling on their land day 
in and day out. 
Somehow, to the villagers of Bonţida, the castle and its architectural beauty 
remained visually muted, while the park was a “dream,” as if an invisible boundary had 
been drawn around the castle, making it disappear from people’s social horizon. This 
sentiment of inaccessibility of the Bánffy domain, including the castle and the immense 
park, remained a kernel of the local sense of place the villagers developed of their own 
Bonţida. Thus, contrary to the manager’s arguments on its centrality in the village’s 
economy, the castle had simultaneously been within and outside the village long before 
1945.  
The radical change of borders in 1940  triggered ample moves of population, as 
well as violent reactions of the groups on both sites of the new borders. The members of 
each ethnic group were trying to protect themselves by fleeing to safer zones (if they 
could, Hungarians from the Old Kingdom and southern Transylvania fled to the north, 
while Romanians fled to the south).  There was a wave of purges on both sides of the new 
border: out of accumulated frustrations, Hungarians felt entitled to “punish” the 
Romanians for the early political and social treatment they had received from the 
Romanian state, while furious Romanians on the other side of the border wanted to take 





who were left behind in the south.570 Older Romanians in Bonţida still vividly 
remembered what “they went through when the Hungarians came.” According to those 
interviewees, Romanian children were forced to learn Hungarian in school, as they were 
not allowed to speak Romanian or display any form of allegiance to the Romanian 
state.571   
 In 1944, after the Romanian state switched sides to join the Allied forces, Bonţida 
and the neighboring villages again became a dangerous zone. Also, as soon as Cluj 
county was conquered by the Romanian army, a new wave of ethnic purging started 
especially in this region as a reaction to the earlier acts of violence pursued by some of 
the Hungarians towards their Romanian neighbors. The latter wave of violence was a 
politically-endorsed retaliation of some of the Romanians towards their Hungarian 
neighbors.572 Some older Hungarians from Bonţida told me that when they heard the 
Soviet and Romanian armies were coming closer, they went to hide in the forest and 
stayed there for days. During this time, some of the Romanians from Bonţida came home 
by following the Romanian army—as an old lady remembered, “I followed them [the 
army] closely [in order to protect herself], carrying my infant along, until we reached 
home (Bonţida).” 
                                                        
570 Gál Mária, Gajdos Balogh Attila, Imreh Ferenc, eds., Cartea Albă despre atrocitătile anti-maghiare din 
toamna anului 1944 [The White Book of the Anti-Hungarian Atrocities of Fall 1944], (Cluj: UDMR, 
1995). Translated from the Hungarian original, “Fehér könyv” az 1944 oszi magyarellenes atrocitásokról 
(Kolozsvár: RMDSz, 1995). 
571 Learning Hungarian proved to be good cultural capital later on, as some of those children, now adults, 
were able to make use of their Hungarian language skills when they would travel to communist Hungary, in 
search of better jobs. 
572 In the neighboring village, Răscruci/ Válaszút, there were reports that “gendarmes confiscated the 
properties of farmers, beat up men and took the majority of them to unknown destinations.[…] The most 
characteristic element of all these dastardly events was that these bullying persons were assisted by the 





At the end of the war, the Bánffy castle also suffered greatly. The German army 
had established a camp hospital in Bonţida, in the castle, which they set on fire when they 
withdrew north, before the Soviets and the Romanians conquered the commune on 
October 12, 1944.573 The fire destroyed one central body of the castle, but then the local 
people came in and destroyed even more—they stole the furniture and the wine bottles in 
the cellars, they destroyed the 26,000-volume library as well as the Bánffy family’s 
archive, by throwing them into the nearby river or setting them on fire.574 Many people, 
Romanian, Gypsy, and even Hungarians, participated in this act of destruction. There was 
no one to stop them; one of the few people who would have taken care of the castle, the 
reformed priest, fled Bonţida to avoid capture by the Soviets and Romanians.575 
However, during my fieldwork there were very few people in the village who 
acknowledged that the locals had been directly involved in the destruction of the castle 
and its extremely rare valuables. A formerly silent class warfare, which had been 
developing underground during the interwar times as the village had increasingly become 
economically independent from the castle, had burst into the open as soon as a fuzzy 
social landscape ridden with uncertainty and the absence of any norms emerged at the 
end of the war in the summer of 1944. The complex feelings of rancor that some of the 
locals had accumulated towards the Bánffy family underlay their violence towards the 
                                                        
573 There are various stories here contradicting each other: according to what the Trust’s staff now tell the 
visitors, the Germans set the castle on fire in revenge against Bánffy, who on behalf of the Hungarian 
government had secret talks with Romanian politicians, such as Iuliu Maniu. He came to Bucharest to 
persuade the Romanian government to reach an agreement with Hungary. It was a failed attempt. However, 
other versions contradict this story, because, they say, the Germans always put fire on the sites they 
transformed into hospitals, because they did not want the whole equipment to fall into the enemy’s hands.  
574 Dávid Gyula A Bonchidai Bánffy kastély [The Bánffy Castle of Bonţida] (Kolozsvár: Polis Kiadó, 
2001), 212, citing Csatári Dániel, Forgószélben (Budapest: Akadémiai,1969). 





castle, in which the destruction of the archives and the immense library meant a 
deliberate erasure of the family’s history as well as their high cultural and social status.  
It was then that a radical fragmentation of the castle’s material goods took place, 
as the locals who took part in the castle’s assault after the departure of the German troops 
brought to their homes as much as they wanted. As a Hungarian woman remembered, her 
own grandmother had scolded her grandfather, who returned from the castle with a few 
bottles from the wine cellar for not having brought more durable things. If this man did 
not take much, others made sure to take as much as possible, from expensive pieces of 
furniture, such as beds and wardrobes that would adorn their bedrooms for many years to 
come, to statues and other more precious goods. Some of these valuables were much later 
sold to traders who would travel throughout Transylvania, asking the villagers whether 
they had “old things” to sell. Others kept being hidden in various closets, to be shown 
only to a few trustworthy relatives and close friends.  
 Almost half a year after the castle had been set on fire and then looted, Bánffy 
Miklós returned to Bonţida in the spring of 1945, trying to secure part of his domain. 
According to the 1945 law for agrarian reform, he was still entitled to retain some of his 
land, the orchard, and a part of the park.576 Also, he was entitled to the first crop of the 
terrain that had already been distributed to the local people. However, he failed in his 
attempt: a large group of Bonţideni, both Romanians and Hungarians, signed a petition 
whereby they claim that he fled Bonţida together with the German army, leaving his 
properties behind. As such, the petition stated: “he no longer has rights over his former 
                                                        
576 Prefecture Cluj, Departamentul pentru aplicarea reformei agrare. No 7850/1945. Către comitetul local de 





domain.” 577 A week later (April 1945), a larger number of Bonţideni (50 Romanians and 
22 Hungarians) signed a memorandum, drafted in the wooden language of communist 
propaganda, in which they request Bánffy’s immediate departure. 578 
According to my interviewees, having failed to obtain anything back and 
humiliated by the locals, Bánffy left the village on foot—he walked the 3 km from the 
center to the station.579 Even though he was forced to live quite poorly in Cluj, without 
any books or papers, Bánffy managed to keep his spirits up by writing his memoirs about 
his political career in Budapest in the 1920s, an analysis in fact of the political rivalries 
and clash of visions and values within Hungary’s government at that time.580 In a way, 
this was a “natural” method of taking himself out of a social space he no longer belonged 
to, by writing down his memoirs about a time in which he played a key cultural and 
political role. In 1949, Bánffy eventually managed to obtain a passport to leave and join 
his family in Budapest, where he died shortly thereafter, in 1950, without having again 
visited Bonţida.  
Caught in Between Historical Moments: Hungarian Castles in Transylvania after 
1945 
The Bánffy castle therefore represented a heritage site only for a specific group of 
Transylvania’s Hungarians, as it stood as a symbol of a pre-1918 Transylvanian 
                                                        
577 The petitioners further asked: 
How does count Bánffy have the guts to come back to Bonţida, where he starts to pursue the land 
allotment by himself, thus ignoring the local council’s decisions? Has he any official approval  
from the County Council? The local population is very angry about the count’s actions. Why does 
he not, such an ultra-democrat, leave for good, to a different region of the country? The village 
ploughmen have already started allotting the Bánffy domain, to a first group of 120 enfranchised, 
formed by returning soldiers and widows in Bonţida. The allotment is supervised by the village 
committee, together with the notary helping the local council.  
Plugarii, 1945, April 4-11, p.3 (In Romanian, in original.) 
578 Plugarii, 1945, April 18-25, p. 5. 
579 One older Hungarian described to me the locals spitting on Bánffy Miklós.  
580 Patrick Thursfield, "Introduction to the Phoenix Land: The Memoirs of Count Bánffy Miklós," in The 
Phoenix Land: The Memoirs of Count Bánffy Miklós, transl Patrick Thursfield and Katalin Bánffy-Jelen 





aristocracy relatively muted by the centralizing nationalist policies of the new Bucharest-
based regime of Greater Romania. The ethnic dimension of Transylvania’s mansions and 
castles, most of which had been built and were owned by a Transylvanian nobility of 
Saxon or Hungarian origin, was overplayed in the central politicians’ post-1918 agenda. 
These ethnic meanings came to be more powerful after 1918, when the class divides 
underlying the social distribution of the suddenly doubled population of Greater 
Romanian were very much translated as (and reduced to) ethnic differences. Stripped of 
their noble titles and special rights, the Transylvanian former nobility sought a political 
refuge in their castles and mansions, which stood as marginal oases within the tumultuous 
years of post-1918 Transylvania, when Bucharest-based politicians were trying to further 
control the leaders of the newly included regions. Up to 1945, these buildings still offered 
a sense of stability and prosperity to their owners. After that, however, the state 
confiscated them, together with their luxurious furniture, paintings, and other cultural 
valuables. 
Sometimes this peculiar form of “transfer” did not happen at all, as the destruction 
of Bánffy’s immense personal library clearly illustrates. Whereas the looters still deemed 
the castle’s paintings and furniture precious enough to take them into their own houses, 
the books quintessentially represented a disappearing world, whose values appeared to be 
forever obsolete and consequently fully dispensable. The destruction of the library stands 
therefore as a sign of a radical devaluing of the castle itself. In order to fit the “new 
world” of the post-1945 political regime, it had to be stripped of its difference. From the 
castle having been “worlds apart” from the village during the interwar times, the locals 





physical dissolution into the rural fabric. All of the castle’s components, from the 
luxurious furniture and paintings to roofs, tiles, and in the end, bricks, became gradually 
incorporated into the village. Some Bonţideans hid statues in their closets, others brought 
furniture into their bedrooms, while others were happy to use the castle’s bricks to erect 
the walls of their new houses. 
The looting as well as other forms of less abrupt but systematic destruction that 
followed during the years after the war did not happen only in Bonţida. In fact, such 
episodes occurred throughout Transylvania. The 1945 Law for Agrarian Reform was one 
of the major laws passed by the post-war government, which guaranteed the 
redistribution of the land to the peasants, especially those who participated in the war.581 
This meant, however, the expropriation of the land, as well as of the mansions, castles, 
and other major buildings that had been located on that land from the landowners, most 
of them middle to upper class Transylvanian Hungarians. The former owners were kicked 
out of their former estates, being sent to prison or socially marginalized, while the new 
government was concerned with far more important matters, such as the manipulation of 
the first post-war elections by the Communist Party. Those buildings were left deserted, 
often to be destroyed by those who were living nearby.  
                                                        
581 Law 187 of March 23, 1945 guaranteed “the expansion of the agrarian land of the households that 
owned less than 5 ha, the establishment of new agricultural households for those agricultural workers who 
owned no land” (article 2, points 1 and 2), while other land was expropriated, land that belonged to the 
following categories: 1) ethnic Germans in Romania, who were accused of having collaborated with Nazi 
Germany (article 3, point 1), “war criminals and those who were guilty of the disastrous situation of the 
country,” (article 3, point 2), those who fled the country after August 23, 1944, together with all of the 
absentees (point 3 and 4), and those who owned more than 50 ha (point 8). The law also specified that “the 
buildings, mansions, roads, orchards, together with all of their facilities” were to be confiscated, the owner 
retaining the right to choose only one place of residence, within the maximum of 50 ha. The law was 
initially published in Monitorul Oficial, number 68 of March 23, 1945. Electronic version found at 





At the beginning of 1947, the Hungarian People’s Union of Romania (the Union, 
henceforth), concerned with the situation of these highly endangered buildings, petitioned 
the Ministry of Arts to establish a special Commission for the Hungarian Historical 
Monuments in Romania.582  This commission, formed of Hungarian specialists was to 
work under the supervision of the central Commission for Historical Monuments.583 The 
                                                        
582 In the petition, sent on February 4, 1947, by the president of the Hungarian People’s Union of Romania 
to the State Secretary of Nationalities, the wooden language of the communist propaganda did not entirely 
erase a sense of urgency about the dramatic situation of the mansions and castles of Transylvania: 
“In most places, the peasant victors not only occupied the estate and the park, but they also destroyed the 
castle, using its material to build houses or other sites.” The typed petition is also endorsed by the signature 
of Camil Suciu, the State Secretary for Nationalities, who asked that the Ministry of Arts be immediately 
alerted about this situation. ANIMI/ACMI, File 3842, “Protejare, amenajare, restaurare. Corespondenţă 
generalităţi, 1947-1948,” Page 7. 
 The Hungarian People’s Union in Romania proved itself to be an important asset for the 
consolidation of the Communist Party in the new government. The Union had gained consistent support in 
the November 1946 elections, when it attracted the votes of all Hungarians in Romania (8.6%), including 
those of right to more centrist political leanings. The Union then established a close link with the Union of 
the Democratic Parties, in which the Communist Party played the leading role, which resulted in many of 
the key members of the Union gaining positions in the newly established political apparatus (many of them 
became leaders of the county Party organizations, whereas the Union’s president was elected into the 
Grand National Assembly, at that date the supreme institution of the Romanian state. The Union thereby 
showed its commitment to Romania’s Hungarians but also succeeded in persuading the central authorities 
of the Party that it was its faithful ally. Lucian  Nastasă, “Studiu introductiv," in Maghiarii din Romania, 
17. For more information on the Union, see Löhnhardt Tamás, Uniunea Populară Maghiară în perioada 
instaurării regimului comunist în România (1944-1948) [The People’s Hungarian Union at the time of the 
Communist Regime’s Establishment in Romania], Cluj, Editura Argonaut, 2008.   
 Since it had indirectly helped the Communist Party to gain the majority in the new 1946 
government, formed after the elections and more and more left-oriented members of the Union were 
entering the communist political apparatus, the central government gave the Union’s requests serious 
attention. This was reflected also by the success of the Union’s petitioning the central authorities to offer 
immediate support for the preservation of the Hungarian sites in Transylvania and their inclusion in the 
national list of historical monuments.  
583 The central Commission for Historical Monuments agreed to work with the Hungarian specialists 
proposed by the Union, architect Kós Károly and historian Szabedi Ladislau, were appointed corresponding 
members of the Commission for the Hungarian historical buildings on Romania’s territory.  
 Ladislau Szabedi was the director of the Szeklers’ Museum in Sfântu Gheorghe. Kós Károly 
(1883-1977) was a renown architect, politician and intellectual figure among the Transylvanian 
Hungarians. He is the author of several sites of civil and religious architecture in Budapest and 
Transylvania, built before 1918. After 1918, he chose to return to Transylvania, where he actively took part 
in the political and intellectual life of the Hungarian community. He was also a good friend of Bánffy 
Miklós, whom he also advised on the reconstruction of one of the wings of the castle in Bonţida in 1934. 
Together with Bánffy, he was also one of the editors of Erdély Helikon, the magazine that captured the 
intellectual energy of most of the Transylvanian Hungarian literati. Like Bánffy, Kós also joined the 
“Transylvanism” movement, which focused on Transylvania’s particular multiculturalism to lay claims for 
a relative political autonomy of the region.(See also my description of Transylvanism in the earlier section 
of this chapter, where I discuss Bánffy’s political and cultural views and activities in the larger context of 





phrasing of the petition revealed a sense of urgency regarding the dramatic situation of 
many of those buildings.584 The petition offered two major reasons for the preservations 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Kós also played a key role in the quest for a national Hungarian style in architecture. He drew his 
inspiration on the vernacular architecture and folk art of multicultural Transylvania, while also trying to 
identify those elements of architectural heritage that could coherently form a more refined Hungarian 
National Style. His book of architectural drawings and essays, Erdély népi építészete (1908), inspired many 
of the Hungarian Secessionist artists. (Mattia Moretti, “Karoly Kós and the quest for the Hungarian forms 
and types,” published on June 30, 2009, http://www.szecesszio.com/?p=572, accessed January 25, 2010.) 
Secession was an adaptation of the principles of Art Nouveau to the political and aesthetic searches of a 
turn-of-the-century Hungary, then part of the dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The movement drew upon 
the motifs of Hungarian vernacular architecture in order to create a more coherent National style, 
emblematic of a national identity. As I have already pointed out in the third chapter, where I discuss the 
emergence of the National Style in interwar Romania and its relative appropriation by the socialist 
architects in post-1960 Romania, the quest for a National Style in architecture characterized many countries 
in search of a new political identity in a radically redefined post-1918 Europe. 
As Nastasă and Salat mention, Kós was also among the founders of the Transylvanian Guild for 
Fine Workmanship (Erdélyi Szépmíves Céh), an independent publishing company which would play a 
major role in the promotion of Transylvanian Hungarian writers. He became the leader of the Guild 
publishing house until its dismantling in 1944. After the end of the Second World War, Kós became a 
professor of architecture at the Agricultural College (Mezőgazdasági Főiskola) of Cluj Napoca, while he 
continued his work as an architect, designing churches, houses, and holiday homes, and restoring medieval 
buildings. In Fall 1944, he fled his home in the village of Stâna, home which was looted and where his 
manuscripts were destroyed, and sought refuge in Cluj-Napoca. Once in Cluj, he immediately joined the 
People’s Hungarian Union in 1944 to rapidly become the president of the Union’s branch in Cluj (one of 
the most important offices of the Union). Between 1946 and 1948 he was a deputy in the Grand National 
Assembly. He retired in 1953. Sources of information: http://hungarystartshere.com/Karoly-Kos-Kosch, 
accessed January 25, 2010, and an unauthored note in Károly Kós, “Glasul care strigă, [The Crying Voice]” 
in Maghiarii din România (1920-1940), ed. Lucian Nastasă and Levente Sálát (Cluj: Centrul de Resurse 
pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală, 2003), 50. 
584  Almost a year after the Commission had met in spring 1947 to discuss the situation of the Hungarian 
historical sites and to request further material from the Union, Kós Károly submitted a detailed report on 
fourteen sites, which included a description of each building’s history as well as its current state, together 
with an image (drawing or photography) of the site. He requested that the “historical monuments [in the 
report] be included among the national historical monuments.” By having them immediately set under 
“official protection,” these sites would thereby be saved from complete destruction. The letter’s writers also 
requested funding for the sites’ restoration. The historical buildings included in the list were the following: 
1) the castles in Ardid, Bahnea, Brâncovenești, Bonţida, Mănăstirea, Ozd, Samsond, Vinţul de Jos, and 2) 
the churches in Benic, Cricău, Petriu, Sf. Maria Orlea, Uioara, Cetatea de Baltă.  ACMI, 3842/28, Letter 
signed by Károly Kós and Géza Entz, dated March 24, 1948, Cluj.  
 These descriptions offered a gloomy picture of what had happened within less than five years with 
these historical buildings, some of them built several centuries ago. The story of their destruction was more 
or less similar: some of them were greatly damaged during the war, such as the castle in Bonţida, which 
German troups set on fire, and others were looted in the aftermaths of the war, such as the castle in 
Mănăstirești, Someș county, where the sculpted-in-wood vestibule, doors, and window frames, 
representing “the most refined wood sculpture of the 16th-17th century Transylvanian Hungarian 
Renaissance,” had been “sacked by the greed of the villagers.” ACMI, 3842/22 (on Bánffy castle) and 25 
(on Mănăstirești).  
 Relying on the first study submitted by Kós, the Commission agreed that most of the sites in the 
report (eleven out of fourteen) represented important architectural accomplishments and consequently 
deserved to be granted the status of national historical monuments. ACMI, 3842/24-25. The Commission 





of these sites: 1) the villagers could use them for cultural or economic purposes, to 
establish there cultural centers, hospitals, hospices, or workers’ universities, and 2) many 
of the buildings were monuments of Hungarian art in Transylvania, representative of the 
heritage of the Hungarian population living in Romania. The Union knew that, in order 
for the demolition or any other form of destruction be stopped, these sites had to be 
included in the official list of historical monuments. If the Ministry of Arts had started 
regarding these castles as unique pieces of architecture and built heritage, the local 
authorities could no longer consider them simple buildings and destroy them without any 
consequences.585  
Since many of these sites had been privately owned before the Second World 
War, either as part of the patrimony of the Lutheran or Catholic churches or as private 
estates of the formerly aristocratic Transylvanian families, the interwar Commission for 
Historical Monuments had less interest in studying them.586 Therefore, the urgent petition 
sent by the Union after the war seemed to have caught the Commission off guard, as the 
Commission’s specialists had little to no information about many of the sites.587 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Internal Affairs or the Ministry of Agriculture, in order to oblige them to set the sites under an immediate 
protection. Memo sent to the Minister of Arts, not dated, signed by Horia Teodoru, ACMI, 3842/18. 
585 A month and a half after the drafting of the petition, the national Commission for Historical Monuments 
proposed an action plan for the “protection and conservation of Transylvania’s castles.”  They asked for 
further petitioning of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture, which were using 
some of “the historical castles on the expropriated estates in Transylvania,” to actively pursue their 
conservation. The Commission also requested the Union to provide a complete portfolio of the sites, 
including recent photos, building plans, detailed descriptions, and short historical accounts, all of them to 
be used as evidence for granting the sites the status of historical monuments. ACMI, File 3842, Page 6, 
Petition sent to the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, signed by the President of 
the Commission, Alexandru Lepădatu, and the Secretary, Victor Brătulescu. 
586 Another factor may have been that art history research and historical literature about the Hungarian sites 
were at that moment mostly in Hungarian, which most of the Commission’s members did not read. 
587 See, for instance, the answer offered by architect Horia Teodoru, member of the Commission, following 
the petition sent by the Union of Hungarians in Romania. He gave some references on the Hungarian 
monuments in Transylvania, all of them in Hungarian, which he did not understand, and mentioned that he 
had been entrusted by the Commission to study only three sites: the castle in Vinţul de Jos, the St. Michael 





Suddenly, the Commission learned about a significant cluster of historical buildings, 
some of them of high artistic value, which, unfortunately, were be already partially or 
radically destroyed due to their abandonment, improper care, or even willful 
destruction.588 
However, by the middle of 1948, the internal pressure against the Commission 
increased, as they were asked to reduce their budget and move to a much smaller 
location, where the extensive archive of the Commission, with architectural plans, 
photography collections, and other documentation on art and architectural sites, could not 
be hosted.589 As I have already discussed at length in Chapter 2, it was the beginning of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
standards to be included in the national list of monuments.” Internal memo, “The Hungarian historical 
monuments in Romania,” by architect Horia Teodoru, July 24, 1947. ACMI 3842/8,9. 
588 The Commission pursued a thorough investigation of the sites that could potentially be classified as 
historical monuments by requiring all of the regional Cultural Councils, established within the new Mayor 
Halls, to submit a detailed report on the situation of the buildings in their county that were older than 100 
years (built before or during 1848). The reports sent by the Cultural Councils in Transylvania offer a dire 
image of the post-war condition of most of the historical buildings in the region. “Partially destroyed,” 
“ruined due to abandonment,” “abandoned ruins,” “destroyed in the aftermaths of the war,” were some of 
the descriptions used for the castles listed by the Council in Blaj county. ACMI, 3842/11-12. In Mureș 
county, a region in the northern part of Transylvania with a large Hungarian population, the report 
described a similar situation: in the case of the castle in Brâncovenești, initially built in 1228 and redone in 
a baroque style in 1775, the war led to the destruction of art collection, while the building underwent 
significant damage; the 18th century Teleki castle in Gornești no longer had window frames, while the 
library and the art collection had been fully destroyed; the Teleki castle in Glodeni, also built in the 18th 
century, had most of the art collection destroyed because of the war; other 18th century castles, belonging 
to Zichy family in Voivodeni and Toldalaghi family in Bolintineni, underwent similar damage. The report 
proposed that those castles be restored and preserved as architectural monuments. ACMI, File 3842/4-5. 
The report sent by Cultural Council of the Mayor Hall of Satu Mare county, located in the upper northern 
region of Transylvania, with a large number of Hungarians, presented a similar despoliation of the castles 
in the region, where parts of the buildings were completely destroyed, while the building elements in 
interior and exterior (roof tiles, window frames, but also doors, door handles, brick stoves, etc) completely 
missing. ACMI, 3842/9. 
589 In parallel with the investigation done by Kós, the central Commission entrusted Virgil Vătăşianu, who 
taught art history at the University of Cluj, with in-depth research of the Hungarian sites in Transylvania, 
which the Union had initially proposed to be considered national monuments. There was a genuine interest 
of the commission to learn more about the Hungarian sites, shown by the letter the Commission sent to 
professor Vătăşianu. In it, the president of the commission inquired into the possibility of having some of 
the Hungarian language studies about the Hungarian monuments in Transylvania translated into Romanian, 
so the Commission could publish them in their journal. ACMI, 3842/20. Letter sent to Professor Virgil 
Vătăşianu, the University of Cluj, signed by Constantin Daicoviciu and Victor Brătulescu sent on February 
13, 1948. Vătăşianu was the most trustworthy specialist to pursue such an investigation, not only due to his 
thorough training in art history through a doctorate at the University of Vienna, completed by long 





the end, even though the members of the Commission did not want to acknowledge it at 
that time. Confronted with the sudden shrinking of funding, the Commission could no 
longer pursue ample projects, but instead tried as much as possible to prevent the 
demolition of the castles, as well as other vandalized mansions after the war, demolition 
often required by the local authorities.590 This enterprise was, however, never fully 
accomplished, as the Commission increasingly lost its authority within the newly 
reorganized Ministry of Arts, to be soon thereafter dismantled.  
Why is this context so important for a better understanding of the shifts in the 
forms and meanings of heritage in the case of Bánffy castle in Bonţida? First, it reveals 
the institutional gaps of that time (approximately 1945-1950) at the national level, such as 
                                                                                                                                                                     
abilities (he fluently spoke five languages, including Hungarian and German), but also that he happened to 
be the brother-in-law of the president of the Commission, archeologist and historian Constantin Daicoviciu. 
 After more than half of a year, in November 1948, professor Vătăşianu succeeded in completing a 
detailed report on a significant number of Hungarian sites in Transylvania. Vătăşianu’s report included 63 
sites, which he proposed to be included in the national monuments’ list, while the other 73 required, he 
suggested, more documentation. While he suggested that many of these sites must be included in the 
national list of historical monuments, he noticed, however, that there seemed to be a lot of confusion 
regarding the situation of the Hungarian sites existent at that moment in Romania. Even though he stressed 
that he had repeatedly requested the Commission to inform him about those Hungarian buildings that had 
already been included in the monuments’ list, he received no answer. He proposed therefore that he travel 
to examine the current situation of those sites about which there had not been recent information available 
and therefore solicited the Commission to sponsor his research trips. This sponsorship, however, never 
happened. Letter sent by Professor Vătăşianu to the president of the Commission, ACMI, 3842/33-34. 
590 See, for instance, the answers received from the local authorities, when the Commission contacted them 
to ask about the legal ownership status of three castles on Károly Kós’s initial list, where the owners were 
not mentioned: the Samsod castle in Mureș county, the Bonţida castle in Cluj county and the Ardud castle 
in Satu Mare county. All of the three responses, sent by the municipalities of each county, described the 
disastrous current state of the buildings and proposed their immediate demolition, so that the municipality 
could use the construction material for the new houses in the village, or for erecting a cultural house for the 
locals or other buildings for the public use. Letter sent by Satu Mare City Hall on October 30, 1948, ACMI 
3843/11. See also letter sent by Mureș municipality asking for demolition of Samsod castle (ACMI, 
3843/13,) as well as the earlier petition regarding the Bethlen castle in Somes (ACMI 3843/3, 4). Following 
the petition sent from Someș county, asking for the demolition of the Bethlen castle, the new president of 
the Commission, archeologist Constantin Daicoviciu, suggested that the Ministry of Agriculture be 
contacted in order to send the Commission the list of the old castles which [were] occupied by various 
offices and institutions of the minister (as agricultural machinery parks, offices for the agricultural 
chambers or state farms. He stressed that “the Commission must inform all of the public institutions to 
carry official protection measures of all of the civil architectural monuments, which must be restored 
according to norms of historical conservation and which, under any circumstances, may not be demolished 
without the written approval of the Commision.” ACMI, File 3843/6, letter sent to Someș City Hall on 





the uncertainty or even total lack of information about the buildings of high architectural 
value across the country, gaps that were then greatly manipulated by the local authorities 
for their own benefit. Despite the attempts of the central institutions in Bucharest to mend 
these gaps and pursue projects of restoration of the abandoned Hungarian castles of 
Transylvania, these endeavors had been impeded from the bottom up, by the local 
institutions. An analysis of these failed projects points out that the central institutions of 
the socialist state were in fact very weak in the absence of support from the regional or 
local state agents.  
More importantly, however, my discussion of the collaboration between the 
Commission for Historical Monuments and the Hungarian People’s Union points to the 
concept of heritage as a palimpsest, constituted by multiple but independent layers, some 
of which are not always recognized as such by groups carrying distinct, even diverging 
political agendas. All of the castles and mansions that had been owned by the well-to-do 
Transylvanian Hungarians before the Second World War, capturing a life style and 
culture of a well situated social group in Transylvania, represented a silent but rich 
heritage that remained mostly unknown to Romanian art historians and most of the 
Commission’s members. This ignorance may have also derived from the fact that the 
articles and research reports published about Transylvanian castles had been mostly 
published in Hungarian and were therefore accessible only to a Hungarian-speaking 
audience. It thus became very difficult for these estates to become “heritage sites” after 
1945, since the interwar Commission for Historical Monuments had not included them in 
the list of national monuments, while the locals had looked upon them as simply 





Rapid industrialization, especially in Transylvania, combined with increasing 
social mobility of villagers going to search for jobs in the big cities or even abroad, 
severed earlier economic ties between a wealthy estate in Transylvania and its village 
community. (All of the Transylvanian Hungarian aristocratic families lost their noble 
titles after the reunification of Transylvania with Romania in 1918, becoming simple 
citizens of the new Romanian state.) Functioning more as two separate worlds, no longer 
connected by economic interdependency, the village communities living near those 
estates with their castles, mansions, parks, and orchards could not regard them as socially 
and historically important sites after 1945. On the contrary, the locals looked upon these 
sites as sources of wealth that unexpectedly could be plundered under the forgiving eye 
of the new local authorities, themselves very much interested in acquiring valuables 
without owners. Their uncertain ownership status uncertain, with their former owners 
being kicked out and a blurry entity such as the socialist state taking their place, these 
estates were suddenly up for grabs. 
Despite the memos and orders sent by the central institutions, including the 
Commission for Historical Monuments, the process of destruction of those sites, once 
started, was difficult to stop. No immediate measures of protection of these sites were 
implemented at the end of the war. In fact, especially in the case of the Hungarian sites, 
this attempt was even more difficult since the two institutions—the Commission for 
Historical Monuments and the Hungarian People’s Union—were themselves rapidly 
losing political power, until they disappeared from the central institutional network.591  
                                                        
591 As I have discussed at length in the second chapter, the Commission for Historical Monuments was 
officially dismantled in 1950. Historian Lucian Nastasă considers that “already by the end of 1950 the 
Hungarian People’s Union had accomplished its political purpose.” The Communist Party wanted a 





A Story of Deconstruction: The Bánffy Castle in the Socialist Period 
 
The story of the Hungarian castles in Transylvania also offers a new perspective 
on the social and cultural homogenization pursued by the socialist state after 1947. In 
Transylvania, the majority of these estates had been historically owned by Hungarian and 
Saxon lines while a much smaller number belonged to Romanians. The rapid degradation 
of these sites meant also the disappearance of an ethnic and social marker of the 
Hungarians and Saxons of Transylvania. In other words, the project to protect and 
conserve some of these buildings, which the Hungarian People’s Union pursued with so 
much energy immediately after the war, represented an attempt to protect their people 
and their forms of ethnic expression. However, while the religious sites carried an 
important role in the constitution of ethnic identity, the castles and mansions belonging to 
formerly aristocratic Hungarian lines represented merely private estates of a well-to-do 
group. These buildings could not stand for an imaginary of the Hungarian heritage in 
Transylvania as a whole. The attempt of the Union to transform these sites a posteriori 
into historical monuments, part of the multiethnic heritage of socialist Romania, must 
have been determined by something more than a genuine concern for a cluster of 
exquisitely beautiful buildings and courtyards. It was also a form of strengthening a 
political legitimacy for the Hungarian minority within the politically blurry context that 
followed the 1946 elections. A close examination of the unsuccessful attempts of the two 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the dismantling of all of the organizations focused on the ethnic minorities, such as the People’s Hungarian 
Union, the Antifascist Committee of the Germans in Romania, and the Democratic Jewish Committee. 
According to Nastasă, however, “the Politburo still feared that the dismantling of the Union would trigger 
negative reactions among the Hungarian population, who would have felt affronted and threatened by 
losing their representative political body.” The Hungarian Union continued to exist institutionally until 
March 1953; however, it remained a marginal political body, having lost the political leverage that it had 
had between 1946 and 1950. Lucian Nastasă, "Maghiarii din România şi etica minoritară. Repere istorice, 
1920-1940 [the Magyars of Romania and the Minority Ethics. Historical Milestones, 1920-1940]," in 
Maghiarii din România (1920-1940), ed. Lucian Nastasă and Levente Salat (Cluj: Centrul de Resurse 





institutions, the central Commission for Historical Monuments and the Hungarian 
People’s Union, to save most of the Hungarian sites in Transylvania from destruction, 
reveals how the process of social homogenization, initially meant to create a post-class, 
post-ethnic socialist society, endorsed in fact an ethnically homogeneous peoplehood that 
was becoming ever more Romanian.  
As I have already discussed in the first section, this ethnic homogenization 
occurred through two complementary strategies adopted by the central institutions of the 
new state. The first one entailed a systematic displacement and reordering of people and 
communities, by resettling them in new living habitats, such as the socialist cities and 
towns to be developed in the 1960s and 1970s. The second method was the 
nationalization of immovable cultural goods, such as valuable buildings and estates, 
whose rich cultural histories were to be “cleansed” of any traces of a past that did not fit 
the ideological requests of the present. As much as the specialists working for central 
institutions, such as the Commission for Historical Monuments, attempted to preserve 
their economic value, they simply did not have the means to enforce a policy of 
protection and conservation of those sites. The local agents of the communist state did 
not always submissively implemented the dispositions of the central committees in their 
territory.  Some of them played in fact a major role in accelerating the degradation of 
sumptuous sites and mansions by allowing the locals to continue plundering these 
suddenly available places. Their gradual destruction and silent incorporation of their 
materials into the village fabric was accompanied—in fact, accelerated—by the local 
campaigns of erasing or distorting the singular histories of each of those sites and their 






Figure 24 The northern wing iof the castle, 1968. Constantin Rusu, the album “Castelul Banffi,” 
1969.Courtesy of József Bálint. 
 
The Bánffy castle in Bonţida was one of those places. Following nationalization, a 
large machinery park (SMT in Romanian) was established in Bonţida in the west wing, 
the castle’s largest building. Until 1964, the machinery park stood as a major regional 
center for agriculture, serving many communes and even the city of Cluj and the town of 
Gherla. If we recall, already in 1947, as part of the larger project initiated by the 
Hungarian People’s Union in Romania, the Commission for Historical Monuments 
contacted the town hall of Cluj county as well as the offices of the machinery park in 
Bonţida to ask them to actively pursue the conservation of the castle. The local 
authorities informed the Commission that it was not their responsibility to take care of the 
site, since it was administered by the Ministry of Agriculture, whereas the SMT replied 
that their funding could not cover the large expenses required by the buildings’ 
preservation, as their budget should be exclusively channeled towards agricultural 
projects.592 By the beginning of the 1960s, people started moving into some rooms in the 
                                                        





other parts of the castle, which had been previously abandoned.593 In 1964, the recently 
established Department for Historical Monuments, then part of the Central Committee for 
Architecture and Construction, began a national campaign of restoration, preservation 
and conservation of major architectural sites across Romania, which had been abandoned 
after the end of the war. An initial restoring attempt was initiated by the regional 
Direction of Architecture and Construction, attached to the People’s Council of Cluj 
County, in 1968. Due to this planned renovation of the castle, the SMT offices moved to 
another location. According to a former engineer from Bonţida, who had worked at the 
SMT, at the time of the move the rooms in the western wing of the castle had been well 
preserved, with doubled doors, wood floors, and tiled stoves.  
The initial budget clearly included materials and labor force of high quality, 
designated to preserve the details of craftsmanship and architectural skill reflected in the 
baroque and renaissance elements of the building. The central Direction for Historical 
Monuments unambiguously stated that the reconstruction should be carried out in 
conformity with the principles of historical building renovation. For example, the 
specialists required that the roof be redone in “its original form and with no 
modifications”, for it “must be preserved” as “an example of the art of the 18th century 
building craftsmen.”594  Notwithstanding all the good intentions underlying the 
                                                        
593 A Roma family lived in the tower of the Miklós building between 1962 and 1972, while other six or 
seven families lived there until 1967-1969, until the renovation started. The “Miklós building” is the 
building where Bánffy Miklós lived when he returned to Bonţida. As he did not get along too well with his 
father, the old Bánffy, he moved into the eastern wing of the castle, which was used as the offices for the 
machinery park after 1948. The larger building, L-shaped, marking the western and northwestern wings of 
the castle, had been more affected by the fire and consequently abandoned after 1948. See photos 1 and 2. 
594 Authorization nr. 1329 of February 8, 1971. The initial strategy of rehabilitation also suggested a set of 
social measures (such as, “the evacuation of families living on the castle’s premises, who contribute to the 
destruction of the monument; the hiring of a watchman, who could stop the destruction of walls perpetrated 
by locals; the building of a fence around the castle in order to stop the demolition and theft of materials”). 





enterprise, the initial project of the castle’s complete renovation was eventually canceled, 
since “the funds had not been properly spent,” while the funding was channeled to other 
projects underway in the county.595 These suggestions did not even make it to the final 
draft of the document, but the project was handed over to the People’s Council of Cluj 
county, which supervised the renovation project carried out at the castle between 1969 
and 1970. Some parts of the architectural complex were, indeed, reconstructed, though 
only partly, others were covered with a tiled roof, which locals gradually made to 
disappear by stealing the tiles.596 On the other side, the “industrial bricks” used in the 
reconstruction succeeded in altering the quality of the building as a historical 
monument.597  
Since the renovation project did not last beyond summer of 1969, with the 
machinery station already relocated to a different site, the castle was eventually left in the 
hands of those who used to live on its premises and who moved back afterwards (some of 
them were new-comers to the village, who had not enough money to construct a house). 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1968. All those suggestions were though taken out from the final text of the document, Fișa proiectului 
privind lucrările de conservare și consolidări la castelul Bánffy din Bonţida. Beneficiar: Consiliul Popular 
Judeţean Cluj, Dir. Tehnică. Proiectant: DSAPC-Cluj. Mai 1969, Cluj. I am grateful to Architect Dávid 
Gyula for offering me a copy of those materials from his personal archive, as I was not able to retrieve 
those copies in the archives in Cluj. 
595 The Archives of  the City Hall, Cluj-Napoca. People’s Council of Cluj county, the Executive 
Committee, Decision nr. 745, December, 28, 1970. 
596 Dávid Gyula A Bonchidai Bánffy-Kastély, 61. 
597 All of these made the specialists involved in the castle’s rehabilitation after 1998 view the 1968 
renovation work as fake. More specifically, even if they admit that “it was only this project of 
reconstruction that eventually saved the castle from utter destruction,” contemporary experts call the 1969 
project an “intervention” in the original architectonical structure of the castle, while stressing the damages 
and the poor work done on the buildings. Sectia 5. Date istorice, concluzii. In Studiu de parament și studiu 







Figure 25 The western builing, 1968. Constantin Rusu, the album “Castelul Banffi,” 1969. 
Courtesy of József Bálint. 
 
Even the tiled roof, redone during the 1970s renovations, slowly disappeared in five 
years. The statues on the roof were thrown down to the ground, because, as one of the 
people who lived there put it, they “could have fallen on the children playing in the 
courtyard.”598  
Meanwhile, the castle and the park continued to function as one social site up 
until the mid-1970s, especially during the warm season. People would often come there 
on weekends. Young mothers would go there with their children, the youth would gather 
at the kiosk, wander around the park and “sometimes even get lost in the alleys.” There 
was an organic connection between the castle and the park—one could not live without 
the other. People would come to the park and, to a certain extent, enliven the castle as 
well. Very importantly, it was not only through the locals that the park had been 
temporarily integrated within the local social space. 
                                                        
598 Interview with a Roma old man in Bonţida, August 27, 2007. He had moved to Bonţida in early 1960s. 
As the local council could not offer any better accomodation, he moved directly into the Miklós tower (the 
east wing tower). He admitted to me that, as the rooms were so high and large, he had to cut many trees 






Figure 26 Some of the statues on the roof of the stable.  The statues surrounded the entire 
courtyard. Source: Biró József, A kolozsvári Bánffy-palota és tervező mestere, Johann Eberhard 
Blaumann, Cluj-Kolozsvár: Minerva rt, 1933. Photo included in the album “Castelul Banffi,” 
Constantin Rusu, 1969. Courtesy of József Bálint. 
 
 
 The events organized in the park during the communist holidays formed an 
important part of this temporary “re-awakening” of the site, which also simultaneously 
entailed a project of resignifying its history. The locals no longer talked about the Bánffy 
castle and its presocialist history since it became a site to celebrate the international 
workers’ day and other national events. The castle became a meeting place within the 
new symbolic geography of the village. However, by the mid 1970s, with the help of the 
locals and the local authorities, the park slowly disappeared, as its large trees were 
systematically cut. The castle was abandoned as well. Official celebrations were no 
longer held there, as the regional authorities chose a different location, closer to Cluj, the 
largest city in the region. While before it was “everyone’s,” a key social site at least for 
weekends and holidays, the castle became no one’s property, and the locals felt entitled to 








Figure 27 With the tacit consent of the local authorites, the park was eventually depleted 
of its large trees. Photo included in the album “Castelul Banffi[sic],” Constantin Rusu, 
1969. Courtesy of József Bálint. 
 
They reasoned that “so what, am I stupider than others? If they take, I should take as 
well,” as a highly respected Bonţidan put it.599 Moreover, after the machinery park had 
installed its office in one of the castle’s wings, the site became regarded as state property. 
To steal from the state, far from being regarded as ‘theft’, was in fact socially valued.600 
Thus, once the site was relatively abandoned, this “transfer” of construction materials 
from the “state” (the castle’s premises) into private courtyards only become easier.  
The slow literal disappearance of the castle into the village’s built environment 
stands as a striking image of the radical transformation of the local social and political 
                                                        
599 Informal conversation, August 30, 2007. 
600 There are other analyses of property transformation in post-socialist Romania, studies that point out the 
key difference, even linguistically signified, between “to take” and “to steal”. While “taking” from the state 
was a way to re-establish a relative balance within a world that was unbalanced from the start (the state had 
everything and the people had nothing), “stealing” did not involve state property in any form, but regarded 
only a relation between two individuals. See, for instance, Oana Mateescu, "Furt, vînzare sau dar: bucuriile 
privatizării într-un sat din Oltenia [Theft, Sale or Gift: The Joys of Privatization in a Village of Oltenia," in 





landscape after 1945. The furniture, the statuettes in the lobbies, the bottles and barrels of 
exquisite wine in the castle’s cellar appropriated during the first looting of the castle in 
the autumn of 1944 were soon followed by the roof tiles, bricks, wood, and other parts of 
the buildings that continuously moved to the village. All of these components were 
slowly incorporated into the new houses erected on the land in the immediate vicinity of 
the castle, land once owned by the Bánffys and now divided and distributed to the 
villagers as house plots. By the mid 1970s, with the Department for Historical 
Monuments fully dismantled and with the local institutions denying its architectural value 
and functionality and eventually abandoning it, the Bánffy castle openly became a 
“source” of construction materials for the villagers of Bonţida.  
 
Heritage as Recognition, History as Ruptures: The Trust and the Decentralization 
of Heritage Making in Postsocialist Transylvania 
 
The full abandonment of a castle, which once had been an emblematic piece of 
architecture, also signaled the central government’s willful ignorance of the terrible state 
of destruction of key Hungarian cultural sites in Transylvania. This silence reflected a 
broader radicalization of the Romanian socialist state’s repressive attitude towards the 
German and especially the Hungarian minorities during the 1980s. It is due to this tense 
political context that immediately after 1989, when the political regimes in the Eastern 
bloc changed, the Hungarian government offered, via its Ministry of National Heritage, 
generous support for the reconstruction or rehabilitation of the churches, castles, and 





organizations that received financial support and expertise in order to develop such 
projects, the most important one has been the NGO Ardeal Trust (the Trust, henceforth).  
 The NGO was established in 1996 at the initiative of Transylvanian specialists, 
mediated also by the heritage experts of Hungary, and sponsored by private foundations 
from abroad. The Trust has grown into the main organization that works in the field of 
conservation of built heritage in Transylvania.601 While collaborating with Hungarian and 
British experts, the NGO’s own specialists are mostly Hungarian Transylvanians. They 
started their projects by focusing on Hungarian built heritage, as they felt that the 
regional Commission for Historical Monuments, working under the supervision of the 
Romanian government’s central Commission (part of the Ministry of Culture), had not 
shown enough interest in funding and protecting the non-Romanian historical sites of 
Transylvania.  
Generally, the Trust’s specialists clearly stress that their enterprise does not entail 
interethnic political agendas nor interfere with political debates.602 Their aim is 
purportedly to save the abandoned sites, while giving them a novel role in the 
development of local communities. As the one of the Trust’s directors put it, all they care 
about is “what heritage can do for the community.”603  Another expert, this time a 
Hungarian Transylvanian working for the Trust, pointed out that such a project of 
heritage rehabilitation outside the framework of state institutions could have been 
pursued only in Transylvania. His explanation was that in this region such grassroots 
                                                        
601 Source: online reports. 
602 As one of those experts put it, “We do not care about this ‘minorities’ rubbish!” 
603 During this informal conversation, one of the managers proudly mentioned that Princess Margareta of 
Romania accepted to be the Patron of the Bánffy castle’s rehabilitation project. At this point, I pointed out 
that is it interesting that a member of the old aristocracy of Romania (the former royal family) is now the 
patron of a castle symbolizing the Hungarian aristocracy of imperial Transylvania. Here, he replied that he 






initiatives — i.e., belonging to “the civil society” — are much stronger than in other 
regions of Romania, where the state had (and still has) full control over the know-how, 
strategy and resources of heritage conservation. Moreover, the same expert stressed that 
the Trust’s projects of rescuing built heritage sites are informed by an all encompassing 
approach to Transylvania as a whole. In other words, the overall project focuses on 
rescuing Transylvania as a site of multiculturalism and ethnic diversity. He believed that 
everyone living in Transylvania would care about all of Transylvania’s sites (no matter if 
they stand for Romanian, Hungarian, or Saxon heritage) and would engage in protecting 
them. In support, he offered the example of an art historian—“a pure Romanian” as he 
phrased it—who, after the Bánffy castle had been abandoned and turned into playground, 
saved some of the baroque statues thrown down on the ground. This historian simply 
went to the castle, filled a truck with the remaining statues he found in the courtyard, all 
the while being confronted with serious threats from the villagers (such as beating). The 
statues were brought to the Art Museum in Cluj-Napoca.604 “This is,” the man said in 
conclusion, “what it means to be a true Transylvanian!”605 
Since its inception the rehabilitation of the Bánffy castle represented a pivotal 
goal for the Trust.606 In fact, immediately following the reestablishment of the National 
Comission for Monuments in 1994 (even before the Trust was founded), a Cluj-based 
private “Center for Built Heritage Research and Planning,” whose specialists eventually 
became the Trust’s employees, had already started an initial feasibility study on the 
abandoned castle. Following this study, in 1999 at the request of the National Office for 
                                                        
604 This was confirmed by the art historian himself, Professor Nicolae Sabău, interview September 27, 
2007, Cluj. 
605 Informal conversation with one of the managers, fieldwork notes, August 15, 2007. Bonţida.  





Patrimony Protection, the Center carried out a small project of urgent intervention, during 
which the main buildings were tile-roofed. In 1996, benefiting from the funds of the 
Hungarian Minister for Cultural Heritage, the Trust was established as an institutional 
body independent from the Center.607 It started the reconstructive work with an 
archeological dig and an art history study, both pre-requisites for the rehabilitation of the 
building itself.608 From the very beginning, the Trust’s specialists acknowledged that if 
they wish to save the Bánffy castle from full destruction, they must bring it to the 
awareness of the international community. They knew with absolute certainty that a 
project on such a scale could not ever rely only on governmental funding. Consequently, 
the Trust submitted an official request for including the castle on the World Monuments 
Watch List. They also published booklets with photographs prior to the Second World 
War, showing the castle in its full splendor. Money started coming in from governmental 
sources (Ministries of Culture in Hungary and Romania), private foundations (Getty 
Foundation in USA, Hedley Trust in UK) and transnational organizations (such as the 
EU).  
The Trust’s team felt therefore very fortunate upon meeting Prince Charles during 
his first visit to Transylvania in the summer of 1998. Prince Charles admitted to have 
been “deeply impressed by the beauty of both its landscape and its built heritage.”609 He 
was enchanted by “the churches and the villages which are spread across [Transylvania]” 
                                                        
607 Information offered by one of the Trust’s managers. 
608 Reports: Săpături arheologice 2000, investitor Ministerul Patrimoniului Cultural, Budapesta, 
[Archeological research 2000, sponsor: the Ministry of Cultural Heritage, Budapest through the Foundation 
“Ardeal Trust”] and Cercetări de parament și studiu de istoria artei, investitor Ministerul Patrimoniului 
Cultural, Budapesta. Source: the archives of Bonţida commune. 
609 Appraisal letter of HRH Prince Charles in Built Conservation Training: The Aiud Conservation and 
Trans-national Trade Project (ACTT) [henceforth, ACTT book], 2000, sponsored by Headley Trust and the 





and their “extraordinary, timeless integrity.”610 On this very occasion, he decided to 
sponsor and coordinate the Mihai Eminescu Trust, a foundation that has been focusing on 
the renovation, protection, and revival of the Saxon heritage in Transylvania.611 He also 
offered the Trust’s specialists his assistance.612 The conclusion was that the highest need 
at the moment consisted of a conservation officer, who would discuss the heritage 
situation with Romanian authorities.613  
 
Constructing Civil Society: Learning Democracy by Performing Craftsmanship  
 
Another outcome of Prince Charles’s visit to the castle was the direct involvement 
of the British Council in the rehabilitation project. The Council helped the Transylvanian 
specialists develop and maintain a close partnership with established British professionals 
in the field (such as, the National Trust, the English Heritage, the Institute for Historical 
Building Conservation). During their first visit to the UK in the spring of 1999, together 
with some of the Trust’s specialists, a group of 21 Romanian craftsmen acquired methods 
and techniques of building conservation from their British colleagues. Under the 
                                                        
610 Ibid. 
611 As one could read on their web page, Mihai Eminescu Trust (MET) is currently “dedicated to the 
conservation and regeneration of villages and communes in Transylvania and the Maramureș, two of the 
most unspoilt regions of Europe.” The NGO was founded, in fact, before 1989, as a reaction of the 
Romanian diaspora and some other intellectuals to the village systematization policy (read, erasing entire 
villages) initiated by Nicolae Ceauşescu in the mid 1980s. Starting in the mid 1990s, the MET resumed its 
involvement in Romania by restoring houses in the abandoned Saxon villages while trying to make the 
Roma who move in appreciate and contribute to such restorations. However, MET no longer has a good 
reputation among the Romanian specialists and other international foundations working in the heritage 
field. The latter accuse MET of mercantilism. As a Norwegian architect put it, after having failed to work 
with MET: “After their initial work, MET became investors. They bought houses, when land was very 
cheap, now they are restored, and now this is English controlled property. They look at Mălâncrav as a new 
Tuscany, they want the place to look nicer, the visitors see only the façades.” A Scottish conservation 
specialist ironically described the managers of MET as fake aristocrats who want to have their lands in 
Transylvania, because they could not have such property in Great Britain.  
612 According to one of the Trust’s directors, he asked them: “how can I help you?” 
613 Field notes, discussion with one of the Trust’s directors. See also discussion with Maria Berza, about the 
minister of finance who said that “when it comes to the national budget, the monuments would [should] 





institutional umbrella of the British Council in Romania, the project of establishing a 
Built Heritage Conservation Training Centre at the Bánffy castle in Bonţida began to 
develop. Since 1999, British specialists have come to Romania with the goal of 
“train[ing] and retrain[ing] craftsmen who are trained in historic building conservation 
based on traditional skills and materials.”614  
Inasmuch as the preliminary studies were still under way at the Bánffy castle, the 
first training project opened at Aiud in 1999. It envisioned the restoration of the building 
of the Bethlen Gábor College, which was another Hungarian site that had been 
abandoned after the Second World War, located approximately 80 km from Bonţida. The 
workshop was to be transferred to the Bánffy castle starting in 2000 and has been 
organized there every summer ever since. The textbook used during the practical 
workshops and lectures reveals the Trust’s and IHBC’s approach to the built heritage.615 
Its overall strategy was “to redress the balance following the years of destruction and 
devastation in Romania, by helping to establish a system for the re-introduction of 
traditional building craft skills and techniques.”616 The main goal was to develop the 
Training Centre as “a basis for the dissemination of information and craft skills 
throughout Romania,” which will further “non-governmental initiatives…in order to 
enhance public awareness.”617 In other words, the Trust has aimed at breaking the state’s 
monopoly over built heritage (at the institutional and expertise level) by developing an 
active network of heritage professionals. This network would operate in a decentralized 
manner and become as independent as possible from the governmental actors. Moreover, 
                                                        
614 Introduction to the ACTT textbook, 4. 
615 The format was trilingual, with the original English text accompanied by both Romanian and Hungarian 
translations. 






having admitted that “Romania is a fledgling democracy which…is looking to western 
Europe for guidance to ensure its democratic stability,” the project managers intended to 
transform the mindsets of Romanian craftsmen. The managers claimed that these 
craftsmen “[were] not only unfamiliar with traditional techniques, but also [did] not 
understand the concept and compatibility between modern and traditional building 
materials.”618 
As a result, the project aimed at changing the craftsmen’s values formerly based 
on the equation “modern = good” versus “traditional = old, and therefore bad.” The 
British specialists intended to reverse this equation by proposing an approach that would 
revalue, restore and integrate older buildings into the current built environment, rather 
than one framed within a “cycle of decay and rebuilding.”619 Their goal was to make the 
local craftsmen reevaluate the historic buildings by regarding them as valuable economic 
assets, instead of ruined and/or abandoned sites. At the same time, this project may be 
understood as a strategy of reversal. During the learning process, Romanian craftsmen 
were un-taught the skills they had previously acquired during “proper” craftsmanship 
(i.e., the construction of modern buildings). The British specialists encouraged the 
Romanians to search for a germane combination of traditional and modern methods. In a 
sense, the craftsmen were to be persuaded that their past skillfulness, acquired during the 
communist period, was more or less out of date. The attempt to persuade the craftsmen to 
change their own perspective on their own skills and the environment in which they were 
working also represented an ironic paradox. The British specialists, though they 
attempted to salvage a past embedded in buildings from pre-communist times, had 
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simultaneously performed a different erasure of the past: the immediate past of craftsmen 
trained during the socialist regime of Romania.  
In 2001, the training center moved to the Bánffy castle with the precise purpose of 
starting the site’s renovation. Ever since, teams of craftsmen and architecture students 
from various countries came to work and learn stonemasonry, carpeting, and stone 
carving during the two week intensive workshops (“modules”) organized twice per year. 
Besides this significant, albeit temporary, labor force, a permanent team of 12 craftsmen 
began working on the site in the summer time. During one of my first visits to the castle 
in summer 2007, the team leader explained to the visitors the specifics of their work (the 
materials and techniques they use). Once, he showed us two vaults in the building where 
the team had been working that summer.620 Though they looked similar, a closer look 
revealed that the bricks used in one of the vaults were smaller and more tightly arranged 
to form the vault shape, whereas the other one was made of bigger bricks, not so closely 
connected. Whereas the first vault was done two hundred years ago, the other was created 
during the attempted renovation of the building at the end of the 1960s. His explicit 
intention was not to cover the bricks with layers of paint so that everyone would notice 
the difference between two kinds of craftsmanship: the “proper,” good work that lasted 
two hundred years, and the shoddy job, with larger bricks, done much later. As the 
craftsman put it, “here you can see how building was done a hundred years ago, [in 
comparison] to how the communists worked!”  
I wondered at the time why he did not assume a different approach to his whole 
presentation. Why did he not say, for instance, that during the communist period there 
existed an attempt to renovate the castle, which eventually failed? Why did he say 
                                                        





instead, with the backup of the Trust’s expert voices, that the renovation done back then, 
between 1969 and 1970, has actually accelerated the building’s collapse? I suggest that 
we find here a particular illustration of the dichotomous social and moral landscape that 
the Trust has tried to project upon the castle. In this case, the two kinds of bricks stood 
for much more than simple construction materials. They were taken to signify two 
different work ethics, accompanied by different moral evaluations of persons and social 
relations, thereby reinforcing for both the craftsmen and other visitors an image of the 
castle as the signifier of a moral past—as the quintessence of heritage.  
The British specialists (the main collaborators of the project) approached the 
buildings’ traditional restoration as a means to reinstate “civil society” as imagery and 
practice among the local craftsmen, who should then promote it to their own apprentices 
in various regions of Romania. As such, by becoming involved in recreating a specific 
built environment (that of the past), people were taught to embody the values associated 
with this past—that is, a personal responsibility towards buildings as forms of ownership, 
combined with a particular work ethic and aesthetic dispositions. We witness therefore a 
peculiar instance in which representations of “tradition” under the form of crafts and skill 
are being called upon to endorse a project of modernization, in which the locals “learn” 
democracy through re-learning how to “see” and work on the old buildings. In this case, 
the castle becomes a vector for mediating novel social relations among people, as the 
Trust’s specialists attempt to impose a semiotics of the moral society onto the buildings 
themselves. However, through this very process of resignifying the castle to imbue a 





by automatically rejecting any renovation done during the communist period and 
consequently any form of personhood and value created at that time. 
 Therefore, the Trust adopted an attitude of doing away with the communist times, 
by asking the construction workers to forget how they used to construct under socialism. 
Interestingly, they wanted to teach Romanian workers traditional construction techniques, 
but these skills would be applicable only to renovating older buildings. The knowledge 
that the craftsmen acquired during the workshop could not be directly applicable in the 
new construction sites for modern buildings, which bloomed all over Romania in the 
1990s and required a significant labor force. The Trust thus not only projected a 
dichotomous perspective on buildings and the two opposite ways of construction 
techniques, but they extrapolated it to social relations, as well. They did so by 
nostalgically idealizing the social worlds represented by the castle before 1945. On one 
hand, they promoted an image of the castle as the social and cultural center of the village, 
a perspective that starkly contradicts the more complex economic changes occurring in 
the intewar times. On the other, they grossly simplified the world in which most of these 
construction workers lived before 1989. 
While the Trust’s project stands as a noteworthy ambitious project of restoring a 
beautiful architectural assemblage back to life, the justificatory framework of the project 
appears to be far too simplistic. First, it rejects the earlier projects of restoration and 
conservation that the specialists of the Department for Historical Monuments had 
promoted and supervised, sometimes after long negotiations with both central and local 
authorities. Some of these projects may have been more successful than others, but more 





conservation could not just be dismissed as if it never existed. It is not so much that no 
heritage concept or policy of heritage preservation was being promoted during the 
socialist period but that it was significantly thwarted by the gaps of centralization. The 
Trust makes a broad-brush erasure in suggesting no heritage preservation was in place 
prior to 1989, which comes in part from their ignorance of the political mechanisms of 
the socialist state that underlay the heritage-making processes within a centralized 
system.621 
Second, by constructing a dichotomous temporal framework with an idealized 
pre-1945 period, which they want to revive, set in contrast to a purely bleak communist 
period, the justifications the Trust employed deny a more acute form of continuity. This 
continuity refers to the intricate links between the former structures of power, such as the 
local apparatchicks who controlled the regional economic transactions in the communist 
regime and other forms of networking, and the ones emerging after 1990 by relying on a 
system of connections and political and economic resources that they had acquired during 
the communist times.  
It is this denial that greatly complicates the Trust’s project to transform the castle 
into a heritage site, accepted as such both by external actors (specialists, politicians, 
foreign tourists, etc.) and Bonţida’s villagers. Whereas the first category has no doubts 
about the invaluable cultural richness of the castle, the villagers who have lived for 
decades with the castle continuously degrading under their eyes cannot easily accept this 
perspective. Some of them could not understand why a ruined castle, which only a decade 
ago, as late as the mid1990s, was considered a ruin, some non-place that respectable 
people would not dare enter, should suddenly be seen as a unique cultural treasure, a 
                                                        





heritage site, of which they should be proud.622 Moreover, by employing tropes of 
“tradition,” “revival of traditional crafts,” “cultural revival” of the castle, imagined as a 
representation of a turn-of-the-century idyllic and multicultural Transylvania, the Trust 
only accentuates the contrast between their project and the plans and hopes of the locals. 
In an economically unstable region, many of the villagers in Bonţida have been going 
through prolonged hard times, as most of them have been living off subsistence 
agriculture or leaving temporarily to search for work in other locations or even abroad. 
At the same time, the community’s revival via built heritage is an important trope 
in the discourse adopted by the Trust when they present their project to EU-funding 
agencies and other international audiences. The Trust won two Culture 2000 grants (in 
2004 and 2006), which was a rare achievement among the non-governmental 
organizations involved in the heritage field in Romania. The first grant proved to be 
instrumental for the establishment of a “built heritage conservation training centre,” 
which I mentioned earlier. Whereas the first grant had exclusively focused on the 
renovation works, the 2006 project presented the castle as an integrated element within 
the larger community of the village.  This time, the Trust’s intentions were to 
“[d]isseminat[e] know-how at a European level and promot[e] good practice examples in 
using a built heritage site of European significance for the furtherance of social 
integration and citizenship.”623 As the proposal further argued, the NGO’s projects would 
start from the castle as a nucleus of inspiration for the local community The castle’s 
“revival” would extend then into the village by attempting to engage the local inhabitants 
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in a new appreciation of the site’s uniqueness. The application explicitly pointed out the 
novelty of such a project in a country like Romania, where, despite a “wealth of heritage 
sites of European significance,” no one had so far approached those sites as a potential 
source of community development. The main goal was to use the expertise gained in 
projects of community integration developed in the UK and transplant that into the “new” 
sites. As they put it,  
the purpose of this project is to provide a mechanism for the transfer of know-how 
based on the UK experience; for the mechanism to be tested and the results 
evaluated through the implementation of a Pilot Project at Bánffy Castle, Bonţida, 
Romania, and to be easily transferable to other countries as a potential model for 
promoting social integration through the historic environment.624 
 
The Trust envisioned developing a cultural event that would “help the social cohesion of 
the region” while enticing the local inhabitants as well as visitors to rediscover the place 
via cultural performances and socialization in situ, on the castle’s premises.625 Launched 
in 2002, three years after the initial reconstruction work on the castle, the Bonţida 
Cultural Fair became an important focus point for the Trust personnel, as it followed the 
two summer modules of teaching and preservation work scheduled for May and July 
every year. In my first conversation with the Trust’s manager, he clearly stated that “our 
agenda is to demonstrate the value of the heritage in order to regenerate the community 
and not the other way around!” He further elaborated: 
The basis of the renovation project is to bring the community [back] into the 
castle. As the castle used to be economically and socially responsible for 
communal wellbeing, we wish in turn to reintegrate it into the community, for the 
community to use the castle’s facilities. We want to return [the castle] to the 




626 He offered me a detailed account of how this “return of the castle to the community” would take place: 
upon their renovation, some of the buildings would be opened as sites for community use. More 






When I had arrived in Bonţida at the beginning of summer 2007, I had expected 
even more that people would talk to me a great deal about the Trust’s endeavors of 
involving the village community in the activities at the castle. Instead, some of my 
informants displayed a circumspect attitude toward the Cultural Fair. Others were more 
bluntly critical of the event itself, perceiving it more as an extravagance, something 
prepared for and enjoyed by visitors and urbanites from nearby Cluj, who would come to 
listen to chamber music concerts and watch the equestrian competitions. When I asked 
my host, an old woman born and raised in Bonţida, who lived within a 3 minute walk to 
the castle’s gates, whether she would go to the event in August, she answered me that she 
had not been to the castle for years and years. “What is there for me to see?,” she replied. 
“Just people selling old things…” Only when I went myself to the castle for the Cultural 
Fair in August 2007 did I begin to comprehend what Aunt Ana wanted to express.  
The entire castle yard was covered by blankets, cars with their trunks wide 
opened, large tables, all displaying various objects, ranging from Rosenthal china and 
Nazi Gothic inscribed beer mugs to Baroque golden-framed armchairs that traveled as far 
as Budapest, together with their owner. Instead of a folk fair, I found a thrift market.  
 
Indeed, to my surprise, during the three days of the Cultural Fair the immense 
courtyard of the castle was covered by a wide range of mostly old things, which are 
brought by traders from all across Romania and advertised as “antiques.” The traders 
came because they were fully aware of the classic marketing technique through which the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
be used by the community for private celebrations or events; the two rooms at the entrance: for the 
reception area, then for a small library and computers to be used by the community; the former stables 





old objects could become “antique” by capturing an additional market value if displayed 
in the right site: a ruined aristocratic castle.  
 
Figure 28 Sellers at the Bonţida Cultural Fair, August 2007. 
 
But why did the Trust invite them to the site, when they could potentially mark 
the Cultural Fair as a flea market? I suggest that this invitation was not grounded in an 
exclusively economic rationale, with the Trust being only interested in making money 
from the “display fees” they make the traders pay. This action of bringing these old, 
seemingly-antique objects into the castle signals also a form of revival of the castle as a 
form of assembly of things, as an action aimed to reverse the dismantling of the castle 
that had occurred through its looting immediately after the war and then gradually 
afterwards.  
As I have already shown, the reconstruction of the castle that started in 1999 
appeared as a worrisome situation for most of these apparatchiks, who had based their 





heritage site of the Transylvanian Hungarian former aristocracy wreaked havoc on the 
plans of the latter group to build an unusual form of “heritage” for themselves. 
 
Figure 29 Objects, the Bonţida Cultural Fair, august 2007. 
 
As much as the Trust wanted to bring the castle into the open, by developing publicity 
campaigns and bringing international cultural and political figures to the site in the hope 
that these celebrities would further publicize the castle abroad, the local politicians 
wanted to keep it out of sight as much as possible, hidden in various forms in the walls, 
roofs, and closets of some of the village houses. “It” represented two diverging things, set 
within two different temporal frameworks: 1) the castle as imagined and promoted 
through the Trust’s publicity campaigns, and 2) the material remains of a dispersed 
castle, perhaps purposefully detached from their origin and bearing little connection to 






Figure 30 The Bonţinda Cultural Fair, August 2007.  The castle appears both as an object 
on display and a display background.  
 
Symbolically, I suggest that the temporal reassembling of the castle with objects 
brought from far away was meant to counteract the current status of the castle. Besides 
the site itself, as many Bonţindeans know, the “castle” is literally distributed across the 
village, in the form of dislocated pieces caught within its built fabric as bricks, roof tiles, 
or even statues or pieces of furniture hidden in some bedroom closets. Moreover, this 
temporal rearrangement of disparate material things, endorsed by the Trust during the 
Bonţida Cultural Fair, together with their being glued onto the castle, both an object of 
and a background for display, stands also as a powerful metaphor. It illustrates, in fact, 
how representations of “European heritage” as well as the very concept itself are being 
made through disparate cultural and material forms, strangely glued together. On the 
other hand, it could also be a way of resignifying the place as an economic marketplace, 
as the Trust employs a powerful historical narrative in order to transform the castle into a 





ideologically as a metonym for the process hoped-for by the Trust, that of bringing 
together these often opposed entities of castle and village.627 
The Bonţida Cultural Fair represents an attempt of the Trust to rearrange the 
castle into a culturally coherent site out of an assembly of no longer connected things. 
Exchange could be the most immediate and persuasive strategy to ground it as an 
economic and cultural site; however, it is this combination of flea market and cultural site 
that the Trust proposes that the villagers as well as local officials, each for their own 
reasons, find most unsettling. I will examine some of these tensions in the last part of the 
chapter.  
 
Heritage as Proximity, History as Continuity: Conflicting Historical Frameworks in 
Bonţida 
 
  As I will show further, the negotiations over what “heritage” represents in 
Bonţida and to whom it belongs should be situated within a broader context of tense 
conflicts emerging not only between various local and external actors, but also distinct 
and even diverging historiographies, historical frameworks and regimes of property. I 
will first discuss the stakes that the local authorities currently hold in relation to the castle 
and the land surrounding it and the duplicitous relationship developed between some of 
the local leaders and the Trust. I then move to analyze the conflicts over “heritage” as a 
means employed by different groups in the village to gain access to various political and 
economic resources.  
                                                        






Figure 31 The center of commune Bonţida in summer 2007. The site is marked by the 
Orthodox Church, the monument of the Romanian soldiers who died during the Second 
World War, and the Romanian flag. The Bánffy castle lies behind the blue building in the 
back, but no sign indicates its existence.  
 
The locals’ distrustful attitude towards the Trust’s project has also been 
encouraged by some of the local leaders in the village, each of whom would like to retain 
a significant share of the 400 ha land surrounding the castle, land that used to be in the 
administration of the village authorities during the communist times. The restoration of 
the castle has wreaked havoc on more specific plans of the local authorities to maintain 
full control over the castle and the land. In fact, it was the restoration project that played a 
significant role in prompting Bánffy’s only heir, his adopted daughter who lives now in 
Morocco, to reclaim the castle and the land back from the Romanian state. This action 
made the Romanian Ministry of Culture stop any further investment in the project.628 The 
                                                        
628 In his introduction to the English edition of Bánffy Miklós’s memoirs, Patrick Thursfield mentions an 
agreement between the restaurateurs of the site and Bánffy family, which states that, should the castle be 
regained by Katalin Bánffy, the castle will be used for multiple activities, functioning also a hotel and 
conference center for visitors, whereas a part of the western building will form private apartments, to be 
used by Katalin Bánffy and her family during their visits. Patrick Thursfield, "Introduction to the Phoenix 
Land: The Memoirs of Count Bánffy Miklós," in The Phoenix Land: The Memoirs of Count Bánffy Miklós, 
transl Patrick Thursfield and Katalin Bánffy-Jelen (London: Arcadia, 2003). At the time of my fieldwork in 





local council, and especially the mayor, who held the position between 2000 and 2008 
and is himself a very controversial figure, has constantly rejected those claims. He has 
constantly questioned the right of inheritance of Bánffy’s daughter by pointing out that 
she was not his natural child. Moreover, in one of his first responses—a note sent directly 
to the prefect of the Cluj county—he inverted the story of the castle’s destruction by 
claiming that: 
the notification of the restitution of the Bánffy castle contains a series of 
inaccuracies. Following some investigations among the older citizens of Bonţida, 
we found out that at the withdrawal of the last German troups, the castle had been 
set on fire by the last owner, Bánffy Miklós, himself. At the moment when it had 
been taken over by the Romanian state, it was practically an incipient piece of 
ruin. The state had invested in its conservation starting in 1970.[…] Since 2000, 
the Ministry of Culture invested [funds] in this castle, investment that is currently 
[the note was written in 2001] going on/active. Consequently, we propose that, 
given its importance, this monumental assemblage be not included under the Law 
10/2001 mandating restitution in kind.629 
 
As of this writing (September 2009), the castle’s ownership status is still uncertain. The 
court has not yet reached a final decision. Meanwhile, the mayor collected various kinds 
of evidence that would make his position stronger. He shared with me the file containing 
the correspondence between the lawyers of Bánffy’s daughter and Bonţida’s town hall, 
the justifications he sent to the court and the county prefect, copies of older documents, 
petitions signed by the villagers in 1945 as well as excerpts from the regional press 
published between 1945 and 1947 with information about Bonţida. Interestingly, he 
seemed not to have any problems with taking the socialist propaganda against the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the area, which would have included some other sites nearby, such as the Hungarian village of Szek (Sic, in 
Romanian), famous for its grand, two-floor houses, the local women’ folk costumes, and the four churches 
included in the national list of historical monuments. The village annually holds Szek’s Days at the end of 
August, a cultural fair attended by many tourists from Hungary. It is very likely that the Trust drew 
inspiration from this cultural fair in Szek when they came up with the idea to organize a similar cultural fair 
at the castle, also at the end of August. 






“bourgeois exploiters” at face value. He in fact intended to use the articles on Bánffy, all 
of them written in 1945-1946, as real proofs of his “exploitative” demeanor towards the 
villagers. At the same time, the file that the mayor has used as the main proof to deny 
Katalin Bánffy’s request for the castle’s restitution also contains a declaration signed by a 
group of local Hungarians in 1945 attesting to Bánffy’s involvement in the community 
and his generosity toward Bonţida. This very document complicates the account that the 
file is meant to deliver, as it could act as a counterproof undermining the entire 
architecture of evidence concocted by the mayor. However, if the same document is read 
against the contemporary distribution of power among the ethnic groups in Bonţida, it 
could very well stand as proof of the ethnic bias embedded in the project of the 
reconstruction itself. It would thus confirm the rumor that the castle is being restored by 
the Hungarians (the Trust) for themselves (also, for the Hungarians), a line that I kept 
hearing from different Romanians who were visiting or living in Bonţida.  
The mayor’s attempt to vilify Bánffy could be read not only as a form of 
validating the new elites (or local leaders) by trampling on the old ones, but also as an 
effort to keep the castle within its post-1945 uncertain functionality, as a space in 
between, whose own liminality could still offer the leeway needed to use it for various 
purposes. The village leaders opposed the reconstruction of the castle not only before, but 
also after 1989 by downplaying its historical importance. They did so while continuing to 
exploit its uncertain ownership status and use it as a private resource. At the same time, 
those leaders, most of them working directly with the former local apparatchiks, managed 





directly participating in the circulation of an all-inclusive narrative of destruction in 
which the village participated as one.  
 
Figure 32 The Main Street in Bonţida, summer 2007. 
 
 
Most of the stories I heard in Bonţida included the elements of violence and 
destruction as a significant part of the narrative. But those elements were tamed, as they 
were deemed things from the past (“this was all in the past”). The collectivity appeared as 
a whole as a single social actor—“the whole village stole”—while the justification was 
offered immediately afterwards: “anyhow, the Germans had set it on fire, so there was 
not much left.” This relegation to a past that no one ever wants to see again, not even 
merely with words, signifies the reluctance of a will to memory, which is also very much 
orchestrated by some of the local elites. I suggest that it is they who have contributed to 
endorsing a sense of collective responsibility for the castle’s destruction. More 
specifically, they made this destruction much easier for the villagers to bear and thus 
eventually to be forgotten.  They not only portrayed the looting of the castle as having 
been a collective act, one shared across the whole village, but also described it as an 
insignificant consequence of an event (the fire set by the German troups) occurring in 





When I complained that people in Bonţida kept saying that they did not remember 
much about the castle, a Hungarian stonemason who kept coming to the castle every 
summer for the the Trust workshops said that actually “they [the people of Bonţida] do 
not want to remember because they feel guilty” for having destroyed and looted the castle 
in 1945 and afterwards. This explanation was then strengthened by a remark of a person 
with high status among Bonţida’s Hungarians, who came to live in Bonţida in the late 
1980s. Due to his particular position in the local reformed community, people entrusted 
him with detailed accounts about the Hungarian community, and implicitly of what had 
happened during earlier times. Also, as his house was located right across from the castle 
gates, he had direct knowledge of what had been happening in his “neighbor’s backyard.” 
According to him:  
[t]he people in the village had not had many links to the castle and the Bánffy 
family. The castle was a special site of Bonţida. People had not had much contact 
either with the Bánffy people, or the castle. They were not allowed to enter the 
castle’s courtyard. This distance was later reflected in the way [the Bonţideni] 
destroyed the castle, by constantly stealing and looting. If they had cared about 
the castle, it would not have been destroyed. At least this was one thing they 
could have done: not steal. We cannot say they had the castle in their heart, that 
they felt anything [good] for the castle. […] 
It was not the Gypsies who destroyed the castle, even if people say this 
now in order to find a scapegoat. It was the people with power and connections 
[my underlining]. It wasn’t the Gypsies who needed so much wood and 
construction material. The Gypsies don’t need much. I saw with my own eyes 
how as late as 1996 those guys [the people with connections] were taking away 
tractor-loads of bricks from the castle. All they could get…it is easy to blame the 
Gypsies or someone else. The big trees (from the park)—it was not the Gypsies 
who took them. The Gypsies took just the bark on the trees; this way the trees 
dried out and it was easier to cut them down.[…] In fact, people sometimes used 
to call them names when talking about the Bánffy family. This hate came over the 
castle during the communist times, and then afterwards. […] No one from the 
village ever wanted to save the castle. They were just fine with the castle as it 
became [abandoned and ruined].630  
 
                                                        





This story was confirmed by another person in Bonţida, a well-situated Romanian, highly 
respected in the local community, who told me that the Gypsies were putting nails into 
the taller trees to go up to cut the branches. Once the branches were cut off, then the staff 
at the local Ocolul Silvic could obtain approval to cut down the tree.  
 
Figure 33 The Roma quarter, the poorest neighborhood in Bonţida. 
 
The conversation with the local Hungarian adds to the political economical 
framework that I presented in the first part of the chapter a sociological explanation of the 
formation of a new elite in the village post-1945. More importantly, it points out the 
interests of this group to legitimize their newly acquired privileges. These local actors 
succeed in strengthening their position in the village’s hierarchy by literally grounding 
themselves in a new environment built out of the remains of the castle and by buying 
various favors with the large amounts of wood generated by the old trees cut from the 
park. My interlocutor’s particular situation enabled him to provide a fuller picture of the 
tense social landscape of the village. (As a newcomer, he was relatively neutral to the 





resources, while his high rank within the local Hungarian group enabled his access to a 
wealth of information). First, he stressed that the people “with power and connections” 
actively and continuously pursued the destruction of the castle before and after 1989, 
being those who carried away bricks with tractors. He then pointed out that the Roma, 
who usually took what the others left, such as dried tree branches, had been merely used 
as scapegoats by the first group of well placed villagers, especially when they felt put on 
the spot and questioned about the sudden and massive disappearance of a key local 
resource (the castle, the park, and the land). 
This narrative sheds more light on the intricate relationship between the local 
authorities and distinct groups in the village. To better understand the ways in which the 
local authorities, and especially the mayor, have developed different relations with 
specific groups in Bonţida is a prerequisite for an in-depth analysis of the negotiations 
over what “heritage” represents and to whom it should belong. During the informal 
conversations I had with the mayor, he openly accused the Roma of being lazy and for 
having devastated the castle’s site. Later on, I learned, however, from other conversations 
with villagers, including some Roma, that the latter had been systematically hired by the 
mayor to work on his domains or to perform various tasks, such as taking down an 
abandoned building on land to be then sold by the city hall.  
This relationship between the mayor and the Roma was harshly criticized by other 
people in Bonţida. For instance, my Romanian host and her Romanian and Hungarian 
neighbors accused the mayor of having encouraged the Roma, some of whom moved into 
the village after 1995, to display a cheeky attitude towards other residents, born and bred 





more relaxed settings of small social gatherings. Most of the villagers, however, did not 
dare to challenge the mayor straightforwardly, since he supervised the land restitution in 
Bonţida in the late 1990s and they therefore felt somewhat obliged to him for having their 
land plots back. The locals found themselves ensnared in a network of obligations 
towards the mayor for the land they had managed to obtain back from the state. At the 
same time, they have had to confront difficulties in making their land profitable, with 
some of them ending up selling it to people from the city (Cluj) or to others in the village 
who have the technology and economic means to work it.  
As in other locations, the local authorities in Bonţida who held the allocation 
rights in the postsocialist land reform managed to acquire an immense and immediate 
political capital, as well as important resources from maneuvering the redistribution of 
land plots.631 Many of those characters, well versed in the complicated workings of the 
socialist economy, managed to create a new niche within the local social hierarchies. 
From this position, they have aimed to build upon the already accumulated capital in 
order to fashion themselves into the new local economic and political elites.  
In Bonţida, the mayor, who in 2007 was already almost at the end of his second 4-
year term, perfectly fits the description. During my first meeting with him, I mentioned to 
him that I had heard that among other projects, the Trust planned to open a stud farm 
within the territory of the castle, one that would conjure up the memories of the famous 
stud farm of count Bánffy. The mayor’s immediate reaction upon hearing my comment 
was “we have our own horses, as well!” somewhat hinting that his horses would be no 
worse than any others to be brought to the castle for potential tourists. At the same time, 
                                                        
631 For a detailed discussion of this complex process, see Katherine Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare: 





as critical as he was about the Trust’s support for Bánffy’s heir to reclaim the castle back 
from the Romanian state, the mayor kept cultivating a duplicitous alliance with the Trust. 
For instance, on the occasion of the Bonţida Cultural Fair in summer 2007, which had 
been annually organized by the Trust on the premises of the castle, the mayor held his 
inauguration speech and then offered the title of honorable citizen of Bonţida to one of 
the Trust’s managers, who gladly accepted it. In exchange, the Trust offered the city hall 
a significant number of tickets to the three-day event, the Bonţida Cultural Fair, which 
should have been distributed to the more important people in the village (the teachers, the 
priests at the Orthodox and Reformed churches, as well as to other local persons of 
means). However, the mayor did follow strictly the local hierarchy, as he used the tickets 
to solidify his own alliances in the village while ignoring others who should have been 
theoretically invited, but with whom he was no longer on speaking terms.  
This complex triangle of reciprocal mistrust and duplicitous alliances among three 
distinct groups—the Trust, the villagers, and the local authorities—sets the discussions 
about the castle and its preservation as a unique heritage site in a different light.  These 
fierce debates raises the question: what does stand as heritage, for whom and in which 
historical time? The Trust struggles to receive recognition from the locals for the efforts 
to reconstruct and preserve the Bánffy castle as a heritage site of fin-de-siecle 
Transylvania. They hope to transform it into a luxurious residence for well to do tourists 
who would pay a wealth of money if they could turn, even for a few weeks, into some of 
the characters of Bánffy Miklós’s novels. The other group, such as the mayor and his 
local acolytes, want to preserve a different type of “heritage.” The latter represents the 





blurry postsocialist economy via the collective farm land restitution and other forms of 
speedy privatization, in which valuable assets of the former economy were being sold for 
nothing.  
These two groups want to keep the castle within a distinct historical time, either 
as a private estate, restored to a symbol of pre-war Hungarian heritage, or as a non-place, 
a dispersed collective possession that stood as the “property of our village,” as the mayor 
put it. In contrast with these two agendas, the most important and acute form of heritage 
for the villagers is the land. It is this land that they strove to receive back from the state, 
but that many of them, due to lack of financial resources and management knowhow, 
cannot fully transform into a profitable enterprise. 
The project of restoring the castle and according it a heritage value therefore 
stands as a window onto larger social and economic processes occurring in contemporary 
Romania. An analysis of this process offers new insights into the ways in which claims 
for cultural heritage have been increasingly employed by various groups as strategies to 
gain political visibility. However, notions of heritage-making in Bonţida are just one 
among several competing claims to the castle, which still fails to be fully intelligible or at 
least sensible to villagers.632  
As I have shown in this chapter, the local authorities have their own interest in 
keeping the castle within the collective ownership of the village. They have appropriated 
the discourse of heritage in order to use it to counter the claims for the castle’s restitution 
that had been put forth by the heirs of the former owner of the castle, Bánffy Miklós. The 
mayor and his acolytes shifted from treating the castle as a resource of construction 
materials to suddenly deeming the castle the village’s heritage, which should belong to 
                                                        





the villagers and not to the inheritors who never visited the site after 1945, as they claim. 
I suggest that this group of apparatchiks-turned-into-entrepreneurs set their arguments 
within a framework of heritage as practice or heritage as proximity. That is, they draw 
upon a historical span of the last fifty years when the castle and the estate, as a state-
owned good, had been under their own administration. This actually meant that the local 
officials regarded the entire estate as disparate parts of property or valuables that they 
could appropriate in order to further individual economic goals or political alliances.  
By contrast, the Trust and its funding agencies, including Hungary’s Ministry of 
National Heritage, are working within a framework of heritage as recognition. In it, they 
approach the castle as one of the most important Hungarian sites in Transylvania, which 
must be restored and preserved as a private estate, rightfully returned to its original 
owners, the Bánffy family. They present the restoration of the castle as an active 
preservation of an important ethnic group of interwar Romania: the Hungarians of 
Transylvania and especially its political and cultural elites, among whom Bánffy Miklós 
was an important figure. This framework of heritage as recognition also helps the Trust to 
be eligible for European funding. They promote their project not only as a restoration of a 
site significant for the cultural history of Europe, but also as yet another indicator of 
cultural diversity and political stability in the EU-zone, to which Romania gained access 
in 2007. The success of the Trust’s enterprise lies in their conflating two distinct 
historical frameworks. Specifically, they call upon a turn-of-the-century multicultural 
Central Europe to use it as a political metonym for an EU-zone that seeks to justify itself 







The ongoing reconstruction of the Bánffy castle in Bonţida, supervised by the 
Trust, represents one of the most important projects of built heritage revival in 
Transylvania. As a project aiming for ethnic minorities to have their heritage recognized, 
the restoration of the Bánffy castle and its transformation into an international heritage 
site stand as a promise to heal historical wounds and restore social fabrics torn apart 
during and after the socialist regime. Even though many of the villagers, both Romanians 
and Hungarians, took part in the looting of the castle immediately after the war, very few 
locals would be willing to talk about their relatives’ participation in this long operation of 
disassembling the castle and spreading it into various pieces across the village. Most of 
the villagers accuse the local Roma of having stolen these things, but the Roma are in fact 
the scapegoats. This complex, immense rearrangement of material forms, a 
decentralization and recentralization of capital, was orchestrated in fact by the new 
village leaders after the Second World War. They were the local authorities of the 
socialist state, some of whom continued to have significant political leverage even after 
the regime change in 1989. 
 In this chapter, my aim was to examine the multiple meanings of “heritage” in 
Bonţida and how distinct groups employed them. I pointed out that the Trust could not so 
far gain significant local support because it simultaneously advances two contradictory 
agendas. On one hand, in their official description of the project, the Trust argues that 
they aim for a revival of the local community via the transformation of the castle into a 
heritage site, a vision very much informed by projects already successfully implemented 





what they had next to them—the castle—something that once had been destroyed, but 
that could be rekindled back to life with the villagers’ support. On the other hand, the 
Trust’s rehabilitation project has been instrumental in having the Bánffy heirs initiate the 
request for the castle’s restitution and its transformation into a private estate.  However, 
the local authorities of the village adamantly oppose the castle’s restitution. 
In order to counteract the authorities’ maneuvers to retain the castle within the 
collective ownership of the village, the Trust presented the castle’s partial reconstruction 
as a form of moral obligation. They assert that the castle’s destruction during socialist 
times could be undone not only by restoring its original form, but also by being returned 
to its original owners. Moreover, they claim that people could better comprehend the 
model and practices of civil society by learning traditional building techniques at the 
castle. However, in contrast to the case of Sibiu, where GTZ initiated workshops for the 
residents of the city’s center to learn how to restore and preserve their houses, the 
villagers in Bonţida were never invited to the Trust’s workshops held at the castle every 
summer. 
 Like other projects of built heritage rehabilitation under development in 
Transylvania, the strong desire of Transylvanian heritage specialists to reconstruct the 
Bánffy castle met not only the interest of foreign architects and other specialists in 
building conservation. It also fulfills the increasing demand of EU institutional bodies for 
cultural agents to produce material representations of “European heritage.” In order to 
present the castle as a site of European significance in the present, the Trust called upon 
an idyllic image of a multicultural central Europe of the turn of the 19th century, which 





21st century Europe. Unfortunately, the “local community” that the Trust’s managers 
invoke in their funding application does not exist in reality. The villagers find themselves 
caught between two historical frameworks and two opposite ways of defining the 
relationship between people and things, with neither of which they could identify. One 
represents the turn of the century Mitteleuropa that the Trust invokes as the period 
characteristic for the heritage of the castle. The other is an idealized socialist economic 
order, which the local officials call upon in order to render an illusionary sense of 
collective ownership of the community over the castle.  
 Both strategies have entailed distinct forms of maneuvering history for individual 
benefit. The Trust has been trying to excavate data and stories that would consolidate 
their discourse about the castle’s historical importance in the economy of the community 
at large, while ignoring earlier projects of restoration implemented at the castle. A 
distinct erasure of history underlies the idyllic, politically saleable narrative about 
multiethnic society that the Trust has tried to attach to the castle project in order to make 
it appealing to funding bodies. The local officials, on the other hand, would like to 
dismiss exactly what the Trust had been trying to unearth: the history of the former 
Transylvanian Hungarian aristocracy, who played an important role in shaping the 
political and cultural context of contemporary Transylvania. 
In conclusion, the conflicts over heritage in Bonţida stem not only from the 
distinct relations between different groups and the things they regard as heritage, but also 
from the different historical frameworks that are called upon by those groups in order to 
justify the “heritage” value of specific things. Diverging understandings of history 





history as a set of ruptures (from the interwar period to communist times, and then from 
the latter to a democratic postsocialist setting, currently within the EU zone) underlies the 
Trust’s project of restoration and preservation of the castle as a heritage site. From the 
perspective of the Trust’s specialists, the site’s restitution to Bánffy’s heirs and its 
potential transformation into a privately owned estate, opened to luxurious international 
tourism, would also signify a restored social order, in which the locals would have 
(re)learned the political tools of democracy, lost during the communist regime.  
In contrast, the refusal of the local authorities to accept the restitution of the castle 
signal an understanding of history as multiple continuity. By presenting the castle as the 
most important collective possession of the village, this group keeps relying on the social 
practices and economic mechanisms developed during the communist times in order to 
legitimize their current position in a postsocialist order. Ironically, they make these 
claims at a time when an intense transnational migration and a new regime of property 
have led to a broader individualization of rights in communities all across the former 
socialist bloc. 
Therefore, the Trust’s management should start paying more attention to the post-
socialist class structure under formation in the mirror of earlier social hierarchies. Such 
attention would also help them acquired a more nuanced understanding of the complex 
and dynamic relations among the local groups in Bonţida, which are far from forming a 











The main question that this dissertation has attempted to answer relates to the 
broader imaginaries of political and social order underlying projects of heritage-making 
in a location that underwent radical political upheavals during the 20th century: socialist 
and postsocialist Romania. What do the three case studies of built heritage rehabilitation 
or revival tell us about how various groups (socialist technocrats, British experts in 
historical preservation, German coordinators of development projects, Romanian 
politicians, and people living on or within the vicinity of “heritage sites”) imagine and 
pursue diverging, often conflictual, representations of history, politics, citizenry, and 
social relations? First, these case studies (the Old Court in socialist Bucharest, the 
beautification of Sibiu’s historical downtown, and the rehabilitation of the Bánffy castle 
in Bonţida) show that debates around what heritage is and what it is good for are deeply 
embedded in economic, social, and political processes of global significance. As I 
pointed out in the Introduction, what “heritage” means in the year 2010 is vastly different 
from what the same word connoted as recently as 1978, the year when the UNESCO 
World Heritage List was established. In the last 20 years, the discourse of heritage has 
been embraced as a powerful way of marking and requesting political visibility. Many 
groups invoke heritage as a way to ground current claims of political recognition by 





groups. The paradox, therefore, is that in an increasingly interconnected world, cultural 
boundaries between groups and people are being redrawn again as strategies to preserve 
cultural difference as economic value. A close reading of the ways in which “heritage” is 
invoked, represented, and practiced could therefore reveal how discourses about “history” 
are employed in order to justify or reject situated interconnections among cultural, 
political, and economic concerns. 
 
Heritage as Assembly of Things 
 
By searching for the meanings taken by “heritage” during two politically distinct 
periods in 20th century Romania—socialist times and the post-socialist, contemporary 
period—I aimed to understand the specific political and semiotic processes through 
which historical meanings have been assigned to material forms, be they historical 
buildings, archeological artifacts, or cultural goods. At the same time, I sought to inquire 
into the opposite process, by asking under what conditions particular material forms, such 
as castles in Transylvania, had been divested of political meaning and what other 
signification they acquired instead. This field could be further explored, I suggest, if we 
begin to analyze the processes of signification that are engendered by the particular ways 
in which things are ordered in relation to one another. One possible line of research that 
would add a new perspective to the processes of heritage-making in socialist Eastern 
Europe is an approach that brings recent insights from science and technology studies to 
bear on the political pursuit of new urban imaginaries in the socialist bloc. More 
specifically, I have drawn upon Bruno Latour’s argument that things, far from being mere 





things should always be understood as contingent assemblies. If we apply Latour’s 
statement to the urban landscapes of the socialist bloc, we could better understand how 
urban forms acquired signification and a history via a constant negotiation among the 
strategies whereby politicians assigned ideological meanings to urban landscapes, as well 
as the very material contingencies—the stubbornness of things, as Latour would call it—
that challenge those associations. Such an approach could lead to comparative research 
that considers the formation of a specific regime of socialist heritage as a specific type of 
assembly, entailing a particular distribution of value to things, which took shape across 
the Eastern bloc during the Cold War period. Moreover, as I also suggested at the 
beginning of this dissertation, this socialist heritage may have emerged as a way to 
represent and justify a particular relationship between history and modernity, one 
grounded in Marxist ideology and its emphasis on materialism. Moreover, an increasing 
monitoring of the cultural field, pursued by transnational institutions such as UNESCO, 
appealed to both political blocs (the socialist countries and the capitalist ones). They 
began to treat the cultural domain as an alternative field to wage more subtle political 
conflicts during the Cold War period.  
In socialist Romania, I argued, heritage represented a form to legitimize and even 
literally ground the new state. A heritage regime offered legitimacy to a communist 
government that had been forged and imposed by external political actors within the 
radical redefinition of global geopolitics in the aftermaths of the Second World War and 
the beginning of the Cold War period. The first part of the dissertation showed how this 





(movable and immovable goods), but also on the resignification of the ways in which 
these things were reordered in relation one to another.  
From the old walls found in the center of Bucharest, planned as an urban pinnacle 
of socialist architecture, to the houses in Sibiu or the castle in Bonţida, this dissertation 
has moved from one kind of assembly to another. It did so by examining different 
contexts in which things become meaningful and enter the heritage domain. The thesis 
also followed the trajectory of distinct political projects, by analyzing the consolidation 
of a field of heritage at two different political moments in 20th century Romania. To 
understand how materiality was imbued with highly conflictual meanings in two 
multiethnic locations in Transylvania right before and immediately after Romania’s 
inclusion in the European Union in January 2007, I argued that it is crucial to first 
analyze how the relationships between people and things had been defined during 
socialist times. Therefore, the project of heritage-making currently being pursued at the 
Bánffy castle offers some interesting parallels to the rehabilitation of Sibiu’s historical 
center between 2000 and 2006, as well as to the rebuilding of a part of the Old Court 
Palace in socialist Bucharest between 1968 and 1971. In the first part of the dissertation, I 
explored how in the early socialist period some walls, those of the Old Palace in the 
center of Bucharest, were being assigned political meaning by being set within a 
historical framework linking feudalism to socialism. A similar process, but informed by a 
different political agenda, has occurred in Sibiu in the late 1990s, where Sibiu’s houses 
that had been owned by the Saxons have been portrayed as extensions and signs of their 
former owners through the rehabilitation project sponsored by the German state. The 





groups vying for political recognition, whose claims take distinct material forms in the 
ways in which they relate to the castle as an assembly of things. More specifically, the 
heritage specialists have attempted to reassign the site a coherent meaning, by linking a 
ruined castle to many of its original pieces lying hidden, spread around the village, and 
bringing other objects to the premises of the castle, via the Bonţida Cultural Fair. In order 
to reverse this process and maintain their administrative rights over the estate, the local 
officials deemed the castle an irreversible ruin, unworthy of preservation. In sum, this 
dissertation explored how the physical actualities of the sites themselves, the building 
materials, their appearance in the middle of a socialist Bucharest, their migration into 
surrounding structures in Bonţida or their redesign, as was the case with the house 
facades in Sibiu, conveyed the non-verbal dimensions of competing temporal 
frameworks, historical narratives, aesthetic preferences and visions of social order. An 
analysis of these competing narratives could tell us more about the distinct groups that 
assigned meanings and values to such forms, about why they chose one framework over 
another, about the ways they imagined themselves as historical actors and the deeper 
reasons underlying their aesthetic choices.   
 
Imaginaries of Social Order: Configuring Peoplehoods through the Built 
Environment 
 
The first part of this dissertation also inquired into the specific institutional 
mechanisms, ideological arguments, and material forms employed by the post-1947 
socialist government to create a post-ethnic, post-class workers’ state of “socialist 





specifically, I argued that architecture and urbanism, as technologies of redefining spatial 
and social relations, played a pivotal role in this political project of homogenization 
emerging in the early 1950s across the socialist bloc, under the direct influence of a 
Stalinist USSR. Furthermore, I contended that this technocratic project of defining 
Romania’s identity as a socialist country must be set in conjunction with the 
complementary enterprise of creating a past that would ground the imagery of the 
socialist future. The latter concerns the creation of a “peoples’ heritage” formed of 
selected movable and immovable forms: those buildings and objects that had been 
collected from the ethnically and regionally diverse groups that formed the middle and 
upper class of interwar Romania. I showed how the state officials of early socialism 
aimed to de-ethnicize those forms, by stripping them of their localized historical and 
cultural value in order to assign them an exclusively political dimension. These things 
became symbols of a post-class socialist society, in which they represented the inviolable 
possession of the socialist people, and thereby materially constituted and legitimized the 
body politic of the new state.  
Moreover, this reordering of things accompanied a reordering of people. The 
latter were moved from one social status to another, or from one part of the country to 
another where labor power was needed for the developing industrial field, or even from 
their residences to forced residence in the countryside or even to political prison. The 
making of a socialist heritage was a project of endorsing a new vision of social and 
political order, that of an increasingly homogenized post-class and post-ethnic socialist 
peoplehood. As the transformation of the ruined walls of the Old Court in the center of 





material embodiments of the political regime’s conceptions of peoplehood.  The intense 
negotiations among technocrats, architects, and archeologists regarding the making of the 
Old Court into a museum reveal broader political shifts occurring in Romania after 
Stalin’s death in 1953. That is, the creation of the Museum of the Old Court illustrates 
how Romanian communists tried to create national heritage within a political 
environment dominated by their struggles to diminish Soviet domination. 
Beginning in the late 1950s the regime changed its tactics. In an attempt to limit 
Soviet influence over every domain of Romania’s social and cultural life, Party officials 
began to develop a project of national heritage-making that would have no longer needed 
Soviet “expertise.” As such, institutional efforts were directed to produce a framework of 
historical continuity for the Romanian nation on the territory of 20th century Romania. 
Consequently, the processes whereby material forms were assigned meaning shifted as 
well. Movable or immovable things acquired a political meaning only if there were good 
reasons for them to carry the label of “(Romanian) national history.”  
The national heritage-making pursued by the socialist state reflected the workings 
of a heavily centralized system. It represented a project of cultural homogenization by 
producing a dichotomous map of things and people. Heritage-making in socialist 
Romania aimed to create simultaneously a homogeneous form of peoplehood inhabiting a 
politically homogeneous territory, set within a framework of historical continuity. (For 
instance, the attempts to reconstruct the Bánffy castle in Bonţida were justified only 






Despite this intended social homogenization that was to be pursued not only 
discursively, but also through a radical reordering of place, built environment, cultural 
objects and even people (moved from one part of the country to another), new strategies 
of social and ethnic differentiation emerged as subtle responses during the 1960s and 
developed during the 1970s. A comparison between the forms of social homogenization 
deployed in Bucharest of the 1960s and those pursued in Sibiu and Bonţida during the 
1970s and 1980s, as they came across in my interlocutors’ accounts, offers an interesting 
perspective on how the concept of “heritage” was understood and manipulated by 
different groups in Romania. The second part of the dissertation examined what 
particular shape the centrist project of social homogenization took in two sites in 
Transylvania (Sibiu and Bonţida), as well as the extent to which this former socialist 
project still informs the recent social and economic transformations in these sites. I 
showed how the dichotomous forms of spatialized knowledge that the postsocialist state 
wanted to impose by designating concentrated urban areas as “heritage sites” and 
contrasting them with socialist urban landscapes of modernist architecture were subtly 
countered by local histories of multiethnic inhabitation. Those histories informed the 
ways in which groups were actively creating a situated heritage-as-practice, which 
countered forms of heritage imposed by the state. At the same time, some interesting 
oxymorons appeared at the conjunction of local social patterns, multiethnic histories, and 
the centralizing project of the socialist state. 
The cases of Sibiu and Bonţida illustrate how centrist models of “socialist 
peoplehood” had been adjusted to locally and historically thicker social differences 





the dissertation is also a scale-shift between the center and the margins of the state project 
of creating a post-class, post-ethnic socialist peoplehood that, in fact, becomes ever more 
Romanian. Far from being too homogeneous, this peoplehood was divided along the 
Party-line, in which the officials within the Party, starting from local affiliation to the 
central ones, were a distinct group, almost a different kind of people.  One of the 
contributions of this dissertation is to show not only how imageries of social order were 
being concocted and negotiated among technocrats at the center of the socialist system, 
but also how they took shape on the ground and became enmeshed within more 
heterogeneous cultural patterns, especially in multiethnic regions such as Transylvania.  
These complex situated social patterns continue to undergird the local responses 
to the heritage-making projects that have been pursued in both sites during the 1990s and 
2000s. At the same time, they have intersected with new cultural models, which are being 
brought along by external actors, ranging from international heritage specialists, 
technocrats pursuing projects of local development in the region, as well as agendas of 
cultural diversity and ethnic recognition set forth by EU actors especially in the new 
member states, such as Romania. In the last two chapters of this dissertation, I analyzed 
how these new external interests meet long-durée histories of interethnic cohabitation and 
social patterns endorsed by the socialist regime. I used the two projects of heritage 
revival in Sibiu and Bonţida to also explore how they endorse new clusters of political 
capital by adding to them an ethnic significance. As such, the rebuilding of a castle or the 
rehabilitation of medieval houses become political projects through which novel forms of 
“European” peoplehoods, such as Saxon or Hungarian, are being imagined and debated. 





remaking taking place in Sibiu and Bonţida represent two instances of response to the 
still cumbersomely centrist social and cultural policies of the postsocialist state. Both 
signal claims for ethnic recognition understood as cultural and economic decentralization. 
More specifically, the rehabilitation of Sibiu’s medieval houses as well as the 
reconstruction of the Bánffy castle in Bonţida are forms of revaluing these material forms 
as instances of European heritage in order for local and transnational groups to reclaim 
their restitution by the postsocialist Romanian state. As such, these rehabilitation projects 
claim forms of political currency in a broader European cultural landscape set both 
outside of and within an increasingly decentralized state, now part of the EU zone. 
 
Centripetal Socialism, Centrifugal Europeanization: Regimes of Expertise and 
Projects of Heritage-Making in Fluctuating Political Geographies  
 
This dissertation also analyzed the formation of distinct regimes of cultural 
expertise within contrasting political geographies. More specifically, Part I emphasized 
the consolidation of a localized framework of expertise through the attempt of the 
Politburo, led by Gheorghiu-Dej, to reject any counseling from the Soviet specialists by 
increasingly relying on Romanian professionals. In the first chapters, I showed how the 
socialist state was engaged in producing “experts of the past” across several key 
institutional sites, set within different disciplinary frameworks. A new regime of 
expertise emerged, in which the central political actors entrusted specialists from adjacent 
professional domains (archeology, architecture, museum curatorship) with the creation of 
a heritage for the new state. In an attempt to limit Soviet influence over every domain of 





heritage-making that would no longer need Soviet “expertise.” The creation of the 
Museum of the Old Court in Bucharest illustrates how Romanian communists tried to 
create national heritage within a political environment governed by their struggles to 
diminish Soviet domination. Gheorghiu-Dej’s strong determination to lessen Moscow’s 
direct intervention in Romania’s internal affairs after 1953 is proven by the compromise 
that he made of inviting formerly ostracized local professionals, “the old elements” who 
had built a career during the interwar “bourgeois” period, to help younger professionals 
build a socialist Romania. However, as I showed in Part I, the encounter between these 
“older elements” and the younger professionals coming of age in the socialist period 
turned out to be rather tense, due to their diverging professional visions, emerging out of 
different training, education, and experience. Instead of a smoothly running system of 
obedient technocrats that the central political actors had initially envisioned, the regime 
of indigenous experts set in charge of the project of socialist modernization turned out to 
be ridden with internal conflicts.  
Ironically, this turmoil was amplified by further struggles for resources within a 
centralized state-owned economy. The formation and arrangement of networks of cultural 
expertise in socialist Romania, set in a dynamic tension with one another but always 
oriented towards a single center of power, mirrored broader mechanics of the socialist 
system as a whole, a system that drew its political legitimacy by incessantly guzzling 
resources and hoarding them at the center. The project of transforming the Museum of 
the Old Court into a national heritage site, which I discussed in Part I, reveals the merry-
go-round model of the socialist system, in which cultural capital was constantly 





political apparatus for resources. The unilaterality of these accumulations of capital (be 
they political, cultural, or economic) at the center had a direct impact on the development 
of the cultural expertise networks, which became increasingly obtuse and sluggish, more 
and more prone to serve no other cultural values but the ideological tenets of a socialism 
with a strong nationalist penchant. 
Thus, if we set our analysis within a political economic perspective, the two parts 
of the dissertation illustrate different relationships between cultural and political capital 
in two distinct historical times.  In Part I, I show how specialists possessing unique 
technical expertise, such as architects and archeologists who had made a career in pre-
communist times, were employed by key political actors to create further concentrations 
of political capital at the “center.” (In this case, the “center” was symbolically as well as 
institutionally represented by the capital of the country, Bucharest.) But the competition 
was high, as many professionals from various disciplinary domains vied for the attention 
of a relatively small group of politicians. The fights among these specialists therefore 
occurred not only within their professional domain, but also across distinct disciplinary 
areas, as different groups attempted to validate and impose their own hierarchies of 
cultural capital. Thus, the debates over what kinds of things—be they buildings, walls, or 
areas in the center of the city—represented “cultural heritage” expose the efforts of 
different groups of specialists owning different kinds of cultural capital, who were 
striving to outdo each other in defining what disciplinary grounds would "count" 
(archeology, architecture).   
In contrast to the centripetal configuration of socialist networks of expertise, the 





II, illustrate the constitution of a more fluid form of transnational European expertise. 
This regime of expertise emerged from a more dispersed, indeed centrifugal, institutional 
landscape. Here, cultural producers compete for funding and resources coming from 
different sources, ranging from EU funding to private monies of aristocratic families of 
Europe, such as Prince Charles of Wales, or even public monies from western states, such 
as the UK, Germany, or the Netherlands. At first glance, this network of expertise 
appears to have a more rhizome-like configuration, in which cultural actors (in our case, 
specialists in cultural communication, built heritage, architecture, or art) continuously 
draw up new paths, as they participate in multiple heritage projects simultaneously and 
migrate from one to another with ease and efficiency.  
During the first decade after the dismantling of the communist regime, the central 
government showed little interest in transnational NGOs pursuing heritage revival 
projects in Romania. However, starting in the late 1990s, many of the NGOs turned to be 
increasingly important for central political institutions. Romanian politicians became 
more open to systematic collaboration, inviting these transnational experts to work as 
external consultants for the Ministry of Culture, to join national commissions for the 
protection of built heritage (as Romania’s president, Traian Băsescu, did in 2008), or to 
apply for substantial funding from the national budget for heritage projects. Especially 
after the establishment of liberal governments in 1997 and again in 2004, the central 
political actors realized that they could no longer rely exclusively on local experts and 
specialists to create and control the cultural domain, a role that the latter had fulfilled 
within the centripetal model of cultural production under socialism. This radical turn 





transnational networks of expertise, including the NGOS pursuing projects of heritage 
revival for transnational institutions like the EU. In other words, we encounter here yet 
another case in which cultural capital is being called upon to legitimize political agendas, 
except this happens within a more flexible environment, set under the competitive 
dynamics of the global markets. 
Especially after the inclusion of Romania in the EU in 2007, these transnational 
networks of expertise exerted increasing leverage on the reconfiguration of meanings and 
representations of “culture” in Romania. For instance, in contrast to the localized and 
self-sufficient model of cultural production under socialism, which promoted exclusively 
autochthonous assessments of “national culture,” the cases of heritage-making in Bonţida 
and Sibiu show how foreign experts assume the leading role in creating a heritage for 
another group. The field of cultural production, as it is being reconfigured in the cases of 
Sibiu and Bonţida, appears therefore as much more dynamic and porous than the one 
produced in socialism. In it, different groups or individuals pursue the making or 
reproduction of cultural forms, including representations of heritage, according to 
multiple possible dispensers of resources and their specific agendas. Currently situated in 
a centrifugal landscape, where Europeanization is supposed to sweep away national 
representations of culture, these groups must adjust quickly to the new demands. Some of 
them embrace this process, as they see in it a promise of obtaining a stronger cultural 
identity and thereby political recognition that national authorities had previously denied 
them. The projects of heritage-(re)making in Sibiu and Bonţida show how the EU-
instituted cultural policies prompt groups such as Transylvania’s Saxons or Hungarians to 





sponsored by transnational experts, in order to formulate stronger claims for political 
recognition within the national borders. Sometimes, however, the multiple participation 
of these actors in heritage-making projects, be they foreign experts, national politicians, 
local politicians, or representatives of ethnic groups, reveal that “heritage” itself means 
different things for different factions.  
In the case of the two projects, specialists from abroad managed to promote them 
to an international audience by emphasizing the value of these sites for European culture 
as a whole. Moreover, they pointed out these sites’ relative marginality within a 
framework of national heritage that continued to be tightly controlled by the central 
political actors in Romania (especially until the late 1990s). Notwithstanding their good 
intentions, these experts (such as GTZ in Sibiu or Ardeal Trust in Bonţida) could not help 
evaluating these projects of local heritage-making through a clearly defined grid of 
representations of European culture and political values, which are currently promoted by 
the EU. Therefore, as the projects in Sibiu and Bonţida illustrate, the transnational regime 
of cultural expertise proves to be less rhizome-like and heterogeneous than it initially 
appeared. Despite enthusiastic appeals for a more heterogeneous cultural landscape for 
Europe, transnational institutions exert an increasing pressure on local actors to prove 
their Europeanness by setting themselves within a rigorously defined cultural scale. In 
short, these actors, be they minority groups or other kinds of community, are encouraged 
to present themselves as both different enough to obtain a political recognition as a 
separate group and similar enough to maintain claims of belonging to an overarching 





In conclusion, this dissertation analyzed the shift from a perspective on heritage 
rooted in a material culture framework, in which heritage is mainly represented by 
(specific) objects, to one set within a much more dynamic environment, prone to rapid 
changes and ever increasing challenges. Part I analyzed the political endorsement of a 
perspective on heritage-as-object, which not only reinforced a Marxist understanding of 
culture, rooted in dialectical materialism, but also drastically encroached upon the options 
of cultural producers. That is, within a centripetal political system that thrived on 
accumulation of resources at its center, a perspective on heritage as objects allowed the 
center to limit the range of forms of legitimate cultural expression. The socialist state was 
not interested in developing too fluid a cultural field, but rather one that could be easily 
manipulated. A vision of heritage set within a material culture framework permitted 
greater control over cultural production, as controlling objects was somewhat easier than 
supervising culture as a process.  
This previous model of making heritage through accumulation of objects clashed 
with the later perspective on heritage as a strategy of “taming down” cultural forms-in-
the-making by setting a broader, complex and highly dynamic field of cultural production 
within a more rigid semiotic grid. Within a global knowledge-based economy, the 
privilege of claiming a “heritage” has been won by those groups who possess the 
knowledge and resources to endow objects, gestures, or words with the most persuasive 
meanings. From a strictly economic point of view, “persuasive” would translate as 
something that carries financial value. Heritage then becomes a means of clarifying and 
cutting down a more fluid cultural domain into separate pieces, to be then evaluated and 





transnational institution such as the EU). In order to be effective, cultural forms must be 
semiotically and economically congealed—hence, the paradigm of intellectual property 
(IP), in which one cultural act or form must carry only one meaning (become a brand), 
and nothing else, with this singularity being legally guaranteed by the IP model. This 
shift from heritage-as-objects to heritage-as-signification must be therefore understood 
also as an effect of the shift from a Fordist system focused on mass production and a 
regulated conformity, to a knowledge-oriented economy, which has promoted 
“uniqueness” and innovation as the main economic and social currencies of the 21th 
century. The latter has been accompanied by a broader individualization of rights, which 
further spurred various actors (individuals or communities) to set forth claims for cultural 
or political recognition.  
At the same time, within an increasingly centrifugal landscape such as 
postsocialist Romania, in which a broader individualization of rights, rapid social 
polarization, and massive international migration concurred with other forms of 
economic and social dislocation, different groups have struggled to maintain a sense of 
cultural identity or/and of ethnic belonging. When “everything that is solid melts in the 
air,” in a fluid cultural and institutional setting where groups and individuals must 
continuously adjust to the diverging demands of dispensers of resources, how would 
individuals or groups search for meaningful forms of cultural identity, based on which 
they could make further claims for political recognition? I suggest that “heritage” has had 
the role of partially decanting this fluid environment, by offering a historical narrative as 
a kind of a sifter for a sense of identity that sometimes becomes, under various kinds of 





stabilizes and coalesces the cultural domain and enables its use to ground political claims. 
This dissertation has argued that, by watching closely how specific regimes of heritage 
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